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This dissertation examines the relation between censorship and print culture in 
colonial Indonesia.  In the Dutch East Indies, censorship was primarily a political 
measure to deal with print culture, print power, and political activism.  While it 
reflected the potency of the colonial state, it was not practiced exclusively in 
repressive ways, but manifested in many constructive programs and regulations to 
achieve comparable objectives.  It oscillated between the liberal impulses of the 
colonial regime and its intrinsic insecurity.  My research reveals that censorship in fact 
facilitated the development of print culture and print power in the Indies, rather than 
inhibited it.  Conversely, in the course of its development, the Indies print culture 
came to shape state censorship.  This dissertation investigates how and under what 
mechanism this symbiotic relationship took shape. 
More specifically, this dissertation draws attention to the fact that under the 
colonial censorship, newspapers, periodicals, and popular literature in the Malay 
language flourished in the first few decades of the twentieth century.  Such vernacular 
media in turn helped stimulate and facilitate the Indies’ conception of self, from which 
the so-called national awakening arose, all the while accomplishing its fundamental 
purpose to entertain an audience in an ever-changing colonial society.  It was also 
thanks to censorship that popular literature became a political theater as a uniquely 
indigenous-based literary genre called roman pitjisan emerged, peddling Islamism and 
nationalism as entertainment. 
This inquiry also reveals that Indies censorship operated depending on internal 
and external political conditions.  Domestic security threat and international structural 
change affected the types and rationales of censorship in the Indies.  Changes in 
censorship essentially moved to one direction, that is a tighter one; yet, they 
simultaneously opened up new possibilities for print power to gain more popular 
supports.  On their part, journalists and political activists were able to adapt, even took 
advantage of censoring mechanism.  Ultimately, censorship affected the way print 
culture was formulated and gained “sovereign” power in colonial Indonesia. 
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NOTE ON SPELLING 
 
Since this dissertation deals with colonial Indonesia, in order to preserve the historical 
flavor, as much as possible I use the original spelling of proper names or words as they 
appear in newspapers, journals, and other primary sources.  The city of Surabaya, for 
instance, is variably spelled as “Soerabaia,” ‘Soerabaija,” “Soerabaja,” “Sourabaya,” 
and, according to the most recent Indonesian spelling system, “Surabaya.”  These 
seemingly inconsistencies are not however typographical error. 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On July 1, 1940, Sin Tit Po, a local but rather influential newspaper in the 
Dutch Indies carried a brief report on an ongoing trial process of a press offence case.1  
From the report we learn that, just the day before, an associate editor of a minor 
Soerabaja-based journal Angkatan Baroe, Moehamad Choesnan Effendi, had been 
sentenced to three months in jail by the local lower criminal court.  Effendi’s 
“offence” was the publication in his journal’s February 1939 issue of two poems 
commemorating Prince Diponegoro, the Javanese aristocrat who had led a rebellion 
against the Dutch colonial authorities in the early nineteenth century. 
Setting aside the negligible standing of Angkatan Baroe, or the fact that the 
“offensive” item consisted of two poems rather than a blistering editorial attack on the 
government, the trial of Effendi and the subsequent verdict was remarkable.  It tells us 
not only about the inherent paranoia of a colonial government, but also about the 
mechanicality of the state censoring apparatus.  The timing of the trial says it all.  The 
incriminating poems had been published 16 months prior to the verdict.  They were 
not under criminal investigation in 1939, and yet the prosecutor only brought their 
author to trial in 1940.  In the meantime, there was no report about any disturbance 
caused by their publication, nor was there any notable sign that their contents had 
affected the people of Soerabaja.  During those months, the Indies had spent relatively 
calm days, while the outside world had changed drastically.  By the time of the 
verdict, the imperial motherland Holland had gone to war and been paralyzed for more 
than a month.  On May 10, the Nazi Germany had launched an attack on the 
                                                
1 “Persdelict ‘Angkatan Baroe’: Terdakwa di Hoekoem 3 Boelan Pendjara,” Sin Tit Po, July 1, 1940.   
 2 
Netherlands and Belgium and quickly overran them.  On May 14, the Luftwaffe 
bombed Rotterdam, the Netherlands’ second largest city, and the very next day, that is, 
within a week from the initial attack, the country had fallen into Germany’s hands, 
except for the province of Zeeland.  When the imperial metropole was about to 
collapse, one wonders what the Indies government was doing penalizing a journalist 
for two poems. 
Meanwhile, all literate people in the vast Dutch colony were well aware of 
what was happening in the Netherlands.  On the day of the Rotterdam bombing, the 
same daily Sin Tit Po blared a headline about “Germany going on a rampage in the 
Netherlands” (memboeasnja Djerman di Nederland).2  The defeat of the Netherlands 
by Nazi Germany obviously shocked the administrators of the Indies, as well as its 
residents regardless of race.3  Yet the censorship apparatus still managed to get a hold 
of and process Effendi’s 16 months-old, seemingly harmless, poems.  This 
demonstrates the tedious and mechanical aspects of state censorship that continued 
business as usual, and at the same time showed it to be an expedient device a time of 
crisis. 
Such persistence of censorial practices in the Indies raises a number of key 
questions that animate this dissertation:  How do we understand censorship in the 
colonial context?  Why was it such an enduring feature of the Indies colonial state?  
What types of censorship were devised in the Indies and what were the rationales 
behind each one?  How did censorship affect the Indies society, in particular the 
indigenous press that was the main target of colonial censorship?  Finally, did it 
                                                
2 “Pers Belanda di Indonesia dan memboeasnja Djerman di Nederland,” Sin Tit Po, May 14, 1940.  The 
article added that in order to support the military in the motherland, some Dutch newspapers in the 
Indies had organized fund raisings. 
3 Interestingly, after May 1940 the colonial authorities basically did not tolerate anti-government 
pestering by Indonesians, which might further intensify their anxiety.
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successfully contain anti-colonial discourse and effectively impede emancipatory 
progress? 
The basic answer to the first two questions may be obvious; colonial 
governments utilized censorship because they generally did not have any traditional 
legitimacy, thus needed perpetually to ward off attempts to undermine their authority.  
It is usually understood that censorship is as a natural function of power; those who 
are in power exercise their political, legal, economic, and physical strength to define 
the limits of what could be publicly expressed and distributed.  The Indies government 
made no secret of its censorship, even if its implementation was arbitrary and 
unpredictable as much as it was mechanical.  But the variation in censorial institutions 
and performances was immense, and hence the political consequences of censorship 
varied.  Colonial states did not practice censorship exclusively in repressive ways, but 
took many “constructive measures” to shape public opinion.   
In the twentieth century colonial Indonesia, or the Netherlands Indies, 
censorship was primarily a political machine to shape print culture, print power, and 
political activism.  By print culture, I mean all forms of printed material circulating in 
a certain (national/colonial) territory, which helps create a sense of community; 
whereas with print power I refer to the hegemonic power that print culture enjoys with 
the support of popular audience.  Print power is relatively independent from the state 
power, thus the necessity to regulate it.  In this regard, print culture can serve as an 
arena where state/official and private sectors compete, by communicating their 
respective agenda.  My dissertation defines censorship as a political institution that 
brings about specific cultural expressions; as such it primarily involves regulating 
what is allowed and/or desired to be expressed and what is not.  In the context of 
sovereign states, censorship may be utilized as part of a “nation” building effort.  As 
Richard Burt puts it, censorship is “productive as well as prohibitive; it involve(s) 
 4 
cultural legitimation as well as delegitimation.”4  In its narrow and legal sense, 
censorship means the prevention by official action of the circulation of discourse 
deemed unfavorable by the government, usually in the form of text, image, and 
speech.  In a broader sense censorship refers to the use of state resources to create 
social expressions that are favorable to the government, either by repressive or 
constructive means, in order to influence public perception.  It encompasses instances 
where the media willfully select certain narratives over others, in order to conform not 
only to existing press codes, but also, as this dissertation will demonstrate, “market 
demands” that arise out of censorship itself. 
 
Literature Review 
Existing literature concerning Indies censorship, which is scare, tends to 
characterize it as repressive.  In general, there are three different approaches to it.  The 
first school has accentuated the repressive aspect of censorship in the 1930s.  It argues 
that the Indies government employed administrative measures to contain unfavorable 
vernacular press.  As the American sociologist and anthropologist Raymond Kennedy 
observed, “The censorship laws of the Indies have been almost unbelievable in their 
repressiveness.”5  A Dutch historian J. M. Pluvier affirmed this view by stressing the 
fact that the Indonesian nationalist movement was essentially contained and major 
political leaders were exiled to prison camps.6  He used the 1931 press-curbing 
ordinance as an indicator of the repressive policy towards Indonesian political 
                                                
4 Richard Burt, “(Un)Censoring in Detail: The Fetish of Censorship in the Early Modern Past and the 
Postmodern Present,” in Robert Post (ed.), Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation 
(Los Angeles: The Getty Research Institute for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1998), p. 17. 
5 Raymond Kennedy, “Dutch Plan for the Indies,” Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 15, No. 7 (April 10, 1946), 
p. 101. 
6 J. M. Pluvier, Overzichten van de Ontwikkeling der Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesië in de 
Jaren 1930 tot 1942 (’s-Gravenhage and Bandung: N. V. Uitgevrij W. van Hoeve, 1953).  See also 
Hong Lee Oey, Indonesian Government and Press during Guided Democracy (Zug. Switzerland: Inter 
Documentation, 1971), which touches upon the press curbing ordinance as the line of repressive 
censorship in Indonesian history. 
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activism.  With this ordinance, major radical Indonesian papers were temporarily 
suspended and their associated political parties suffered setbacks in their activities.  
This view however overemphasizes the repressive censorship in the first half of the 
1930s, and hence neglects the overall picture of Indies censorship, which went through 
changes several times over nearly a century since the middle of the nineteenth century.  
The second school looks at Indies censorship in terms of cultural hegemony.  It 
draws attention to the intention and activity of the Bureau for Popular Literature,7 a 
cultural project initiated by the colonial government from 1917.  This view is 
generally shared by literary scholars on colonial Indonesia.  Based on reports by the 
Bureau and accounts by its directors,8 they have maintained that the Bureau 
successfully established hegemony in the Malay language publications.9  In this regard 
the Bureau certainly embodied constructive censorship.10  But the problem with this 
view lies in its overemphasis on policy designs.  For instance, literary scholar Hendrik 
Maier contends that the Bureau denigrated Chinese-Malay publications as trashy 
literature, and by so doing marginalized this literature.11  Such a view evidently 
overlooks the fact that the Chinese-Malay “trashy” literature dominated the publishing 
                                                
7 A. Teeuw, Modern Indonesian Literature (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967) is the classic study on 
the contribution of the Bureau in establishing Indonesian national literature. 
8 D. A. Rinkes, Nota over de Volkslectuur (Batavia: Volkslectuur, 1911); D. A. Rinkes, “Volkslectuur,” 
in Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië (Tweede druk) (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1921), pp. 
610-612; G. W. J. Drewes, The Bureau of Popular Literature of Netherlands India: What It Is and What 
It Does (Weltevreden: Kantoor voor de Volkslectuur, 1930); G. W. J. Drewes, “Balali Pustaka and Its 
Antecedents,” in Nigel Phillips and Khaidir Anwar (eds.), Papers on Indonesian Language and 
Literature (London: The Indonesian Etymological Project, 1981); K. A. H. Hidding, “The Bureau for 
Popular Literature,” Bulletin of the Colonial Institute of Amsterdam, 1-3 (1938), pp. 185-194. 
9 Pramoedya Ananta Toer, “Balai Pustaka harum namanja didunia internasional-dahulu,” Star Weekly, 
No. 580 (February 9, 1957), pp. 10-11; Hilmar Farid Setiadi, “Kolonialisme dan Budaya, Balai Pustaka 
di Hindia Belanda,” Prisma (October 1991), pp. 23-41; Doris Jedamski, “Balai Pustaka: A Colonial 
Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing,” Archipel, No. 44 (1992), pp. 23-46.  
10 Intriguingly, literary scholars in the 1990s used the term hegemony instead of censorship.  This 
reflects the strength of Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, but because of it I would argue, those 
scholars overlook the reality concerning Malay print culture. 
11 Hendrik Maier, “Forms of Censorship in the Dutch Indies: The Marginalization of Chinese-Malay 
Literature,” Indonesia, special issue (1990), pp. 67-81. 
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market in the 1910s and 30s, precisely when the Bureau self-proclaimed a cultural 
hegemony over the literary market.12  
The third school focuses on the discussion of press freedom in the Indies.  
Historically, around the time when the Indies state implemented the first censorship 
law in 1854, Dutch politicians were debating whether or not they should introduce 
press freedom in the colony.  At the same time, they also considered potentially 
growing insecurity in the colonial society to be a likely by-product of press freedom.  
Such anxieties and expectations among policy-makers are nicely captured by historian 
Mirjam Maters’ pioneering work on censorship.13  By tracing closely the policy 
debates over nearly a century, she rightly points out the fact that while Dutch 
politicians introduced the Ethical Policy to improve indigenous welfare, leading to the 
promotion of the indigenous vernacular press in the early twentieth century, they 
continued discussing how to monitor those press and contain them in case they posed 
a threat to social order.  Maters however does not thoroughly examine the reality of 
policy implementation.  This leaves many questions unanswered, in particular how 
Indies censorship and press monitoring dealt with growing number of the Malay 
publications and press.   
The existing literature, albeit very valuable, has shortcomings that have to do 
with the analysis of the policy process.  They convincingly analyze the political 
intentions of the policy elite, but this disproportionate focus on policy creates a 
problem with existing studies on Indies censorship.  Generally, policy is developed in 
response to the (potential) existence of a perceived problem.  Who identifies the 
problem, why and how something is conceived as problem, all determine the 
                                                
12 Armijn Pané, “Het Chineesch-Maleisch en het Indonesisch,” Sin Po (weekblad), November 30, 1935; 
Balai Pustaka, Balai Pustaka Sewadjarnja 1908-1942 (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1948), p. 29. 
13 Mirjam Maters, Van zachte wenk tot harde hand: persvrijheid en persbreidel in Nederlands-Indië, 
1906-1942 (Hilversum: Verloren, 1998). 
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characteristics of a certain policy.  Unexpected policy outcomes that shape new 
perceived problems then require another round of policy debate.  Thus policy makers 
select particular issues and make policy the priority.  This policy priority creates an 
imagined reality among the policy elite, which sometimes paves the way for political 
opportunities for their opponents.  By focusing on the policy process, the existing 
literature on censorship has overlooked an undeniable fact that the Malay print culture 
actually flourished in the 1920s and 1930s. 
The existing literature also rests on the assumption that censorship was 
designed and operated “nation-wide,” consistently, and in a uniform way.  Hence it 
overlooks unforeseen consequences brought by different political conditions.  This 
centralistic image of state and censorship echoes Napoleon Bonaparte’s vision in the 
early nineteenth century, which aimed at the establishment of a centralized state with a 
nation-wide censorship.  Napoleon took the matter of censorship seriously because he 
saw “publishing as a political weapon which was dangerous if it fell into the wrong 
hands.”14  The kind of control Napoleon envisioned was one marked by homogeneity 
of criteria and application, which had previous been proven challenging and never 
fully realized.  The image of a strong colonial state in the existing literature of Indies 
censorship is also due to the fact that studies have been done largely by literary 
scholars, who mainly deal with the cultural and literary state project, assuming that it 
successfully created a kind of sociocultural hegemony in the Indies.  Disproportionate 
focus on Dutch policymakers, which looked at the Indies as a horizontal whole, also 
leads to neglect of local dynamics, inconsistencies in implementation, and 
unpredictable effects of censorship.  Unlike these existing studies, my dissertation 
demonstrates that, although enjoying political dominance, the Indies state failed to 
                                                
14 Nicholas Harrison, Circles of Censorship: Censorship and its Metaphors in French History, 
Literature, and Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 26. 
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establish a hegemonic power over the Malay print culture; the Bureau for Popular 
Literature, which was the symbol of the colonial press monitoring and cultural project, 
by the middle of the 1930s had been proven ineffective.   
Recent development in censorship studies provides a theoretical base for this 
dissertation inquiry.15  Such studies demonstrate that censorship is rarely static, 
systematic, unilateral, stable, or always fruitful, but is often dynamic, circumstantial, 
and conducive to clashes of interest.  It is marked by, in Richard Burt’s terminology, 
“dispersal” and “displacement.”16  The implementation of censorship is usually 
“dispersed among a variety of regulatory agents and practices,” while censorship itself 
manifests itself in “more than one thing, occur[ring] at more than one place and at 
more than one time.”  One object of censorship can take a variety of forms; in Burt’s 
study of the early modern English theater, “texts were displaced from one channel or 
medium to another (for example, from print to manuscript or performance to print).”  
Given this condition, censorship and its implementation needed to be dynamic, 
capable of adaptation in order to be circumstantially more effective.  As Sue Curry 
Jansen puts it, “The question is not, ‘is there censorship’, but rather ‘what kind?’.”17  
Burt’s new conceptualization of censorship in particular, as dispersal and 
displacement as opposed to removal and replacement (which emphasizes the 
conventional view of repressive and unilateral censorship), fits well with my 
                                                
15 Richard Burt, “Introduction: The “New” Censorship,” in Richard Burt (ed.), The Administration of 
Aesthetics: Censorship, Political Criticism, and the Public Sphere (Minneapolis, London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1994), pp. xi-xxix; Burt, “(Un)Censoring in Detail”; Robert Darnton, “Censorship, a 
Comparative View: France, 1789-East Germany, 1989,” Representations, No. 49 (Winter 1995), pp. 40-
60; Annabel M. Patterson, Censorship and Interpretation: The Conditions of Writing and Reading in 
Early Modern England (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991); Nigel Wheale, Writing and 
Society: Literacy, Print, and Politics in Britain, 1590-1660 (London: Routledge, 1999). 
16 By defining censorship as “dispersal and displacement,” Burt provides a new understanding of 
censorship.  Burt, “(Un)Censoring in Detail,” p. 17. 
17 Sue Curry Jansen, Censorship: The Knot That Binds Power and Knowledge (New York, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 25. 
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discussion of the implementation of censorship in colonial Indonesia and its 
unforeseen consequences. 
With regard to printed materials, there are generally two types of censorship – 
before and after publication.  Pre-publication censorship involves a work being 
submitted for official scrutiny prior to publication, which can result in its suffering 
deletions, additions, or other alterations.  Post-publication censorship comprises all 
other measures aimed at preventing already published materials from being 
distributed.  This form of censorship did not try to alter the content, but focused on 
potential audiences and future deterrence.  Censorship procedures include sanctions 
against the producers – that is authors, editors, publishers, and printers – of the 
problematic materials.  Possible measures range from the exertion of psychological 
pressure, through professional restriction, fines and prison terms, to forced exile and 
even execution. 
It is undeniable that censorship played a major role in the process of state 
formation and nation-building.  In this respect, Michael Mann’s concept of power is 
suggestive, which makes a distinction between despotic and infrastructural power.18  
Despotic power refers to the repressive capacities of a state, while infrastructural 
power refers to its ability to penetrate the society and actually implement its decisions.  
Despotic power implies the autonomy of the state from social pressures, and it can be 
thought of as negative power.  By contrast, infrastructural power is the ability of a 
state to get things done, to effectively exercise its authority and achieve its goals 
within the society, and hence can be described as a positive power.  While despotic 
power is power over society, infrastructural power is power through society.19  
                                                
18 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), pp. 54-75; Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms 
and Results,” in John A. Hall (ed.), States in History (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 109-136. 
19 For a recent discussion on and/or revival of infrastructural power, see Hillel Soifer, “State 
Infrastructural Power: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement,” Comparative International 
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Borrowing Mann’s concept of power, the goal for most colonial states can be said to 
combine despotic and infrastructural power.  The state needed to be insulated from 
challenges originating from the (colonized) people, while exercising widespread 
control over its residents’ activities.  It is in these aspects that censorship played a 
crucial role to preserve the strength of the colonial state.20   
Censorship was a newly installed institution in the nineteenth century colonial 
Southeast Asia and hardly unique to the Indies.  It was introduced when Western 
powers started to build modern states in Southeast Asia since the beginning of that 
century.  In twentieth century colonial Southeast Asia, censorship functioned as a 
common tool to control media and political discourse.  Censor administered 
surveillance over print matter concerning nationalist politics and radical movements, 
and suppressed them whenever necessary.  In a colonial setting, censorship oscillated 
between a liberal ideology and conservative/repressive one, usually depending on the 
political mood in the metropoles and political developments in the colony.21  As in 
Mann’s concept of power, censorship consists of both action and reaction of the state.  
                                                                                                                                       
Development, No. 43 (2008), pp. 231-251; Dan Slater, “Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian 
Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 1 
(October 2003), pp. 81-101; Dan Slater, “Altering Authoritarianism: Institutional Complexity and 
Autocratic Agency in Indonesia,” in James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (eds.), Explaining 
Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
pp. 132-167. 
20 J. M. Coetzee, Giving Offence: Essays on Censorship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); 
Charles A. Ruud, Fighting Words: Imperial Censorship and the Russian Press, 1804-1906 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1982); Frederik Ohles, Germany’s Rude Awakening: Censorship in the 
Land of the Brothers Grimm (Kent, London: The Kent State University Press, 1992); Dominic Boyer, 
“Censorship as a Vocation: The Institutions, Practices, and Cultural Logic of Media Control in the 
German Democratic Republic,” Comparative Studies of Society and History, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2003), pp. 
511-545; Katy Heady, Literature and Censorship in Restoration Germany: Repression and Rhetoric 
(Rochester: Camden House, 2009). 
21 The nineteenth century Europe experienced various kinds of censorship.  Liberalism that dominated 
in the century appeared not to conflict the exercise of censorship at the individual state level.  For 
censorship in the nineteenth century Europe, see Robert Justin Goldstein, Political Censorship of the 
Arts and the Press in Nineteenth-Century Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989); Robert Justin 
Goldstein (ed.), The War for the Public Mind: Political Censorship in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
(Westport and London: Praeger, 2000); Alan S. Kahan, Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The 
Political Culture of Limited Suffrage (Houndmills, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
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Action phase is the promotion of freedom of expression and constructive (creative) 
censorship; while the reaction phase tends to be repressive.  By constructive 
censorship, I am referring to censorship that is designed to educate the society to 
understand the intention of the state.  This includes control over the content and 
quality of literature.  This type of censorship was often used in white settler’s colonies 
such as Australia.22  On the one hand, the dominant liberal ideology in Europe in the 
late nineteenth century leaned toward introducing freedom of press and expression in 
the colony.23  This idea came to colonies from the metropoles where citizens enjoyed 
more and more freedom of expression, and therefore were committed to granting the 
same privilege to the colonies.  As my dissertation will show, by granting the 
colonized people freedom of expression, the colonizers supposed that they could 
“listen” to the indigenous people’s voice and better understand their way of thinking.  
On the other hand, repressive censorship often reflected political developments in the 
colony.  It was generally a reaction against radical political activism in urban areas, or 
unexpected rebellion in rural areas.  There was however no universally standard 
measure of how to impose censorship in colonies.  Local political conditions and 
security threats in the end determined the format of censorship.  Local political and 
economic structures also induced different types of censorship.  It is therefore 
understandable that each colony had its own style of censorship.24  
                                                
22 A typical example can be seen literary control in colonial Australia.  British even published colonial 
edition of literature that originally published in Britain.  Graeme Johanson, A Study of Colonial Editions 
in Australia: 1843-1972 (Wellington: Elibank Press, 2000); Martyn Lyons and John Arnold (eds.), A 
History of the Book in Australia, 1891-1945: A National Culture in a Colonial Market (St Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press, 2001); Deana Lee Heath, “Creating the Moral Colonial Subject: 
Censorship in India and Australia, 1880 to 1939,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, 
Berkeley, 2003); Juan R. I. Cole, “Colonialism and Censorship,” in Roger D. Long (ed.), The Man of 
the Spot: Essays on British Empire History (Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 1995), pp. 45-62. 
23 Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006); Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-
Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).  Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation shall describe this point in the context of the Indies. 
24 Internal and external political conditions contributed to the creation of complex and diverse colonial 
realities and censorship.  As studies on censorship in colonial Southeast Asia demonstrate, each colonial 
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In the early twentieth century Indies, where post-publication censorship was 
newly installed, on the surface it appeared to work properly.  But in reality, it often 
malfunctioned and even paved the way for new markets for popular literature.  The 
infrastructural administration of censorship was not well coordinated.  In ordinary 
times bureaucrats often competed with one another for authority and influence, while 
in times of crisis they functioned rather blindly in repressive ways.  Generally 
speaking, due to the nature of post-publication censorship, the authorities could not 
prevent journalists from writing articles or publishers from publishing materials that 
were considered transgressive.  Under the mechanism of post-publication censorship, 
the politically committed writers and journalists were able to enjoy, in a limited way, a 
certain degree of freedom of expression.  Hence print culture could serve as medium 
for popular discourse and attract the political-minded audience.   
                                                                                                                                       
state had different censorship policy that reflected characteristics of individual colonial situation, and 
hardly established a central and uniform censorship.  Comparatively, Dutch censorship was much more 
lenient compared to other colonies in Southeast Asia. 
For instance, British Malaya exercised two types of censorship.  Its governing policy – divide 
and rule – applied to two major ethnic groups, that is, Malays and Chinese.  They exercised two 
different censorship policies to these two groups.  For the Malay, constructive censorship was 
employed, while the Chinese faced repressive policy.  This is because the Malay was politically 
moderate and became almost apolitical because local Malay authorities were guaranteed, whereas the 
Chinese were involved in political activism connecting with the Kuomintang movement. Anthony 
Milner, The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya: Contesting Nationalism and the Expansion of the 
Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 247.  On the exercise of power by 
Sultans in censorship and other areas, see also Tan Sri Datuk Dr Mohamad Said, Memories of a Mentri 
Besar: Early Days (Singapore: Heinemann, 1982), pp. 86, 161-162, 186; William Roff, The Origins of 
Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1967), p. 230.  For the information on 
British Malaya’s censorship on the Chinese, C. F. Yong & R. B. McKenna, The Kuomintang Movement 
in British Malaya 1912-1949 (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 1990), pp. 44-82.   
In the case of Vietnam – the heart of French Indochina –, print was faced with less state 
control than that in British Malaya, and religious sphere enjoyed popularity through print.  Shawn 
Frederick McHale, Print and Power: Confucianism, Communism, and Buddhism in the Making of 
Modern Vietnam (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004).   
In the late nineteenth century, the Spanish-Philippines saw the rise of nationalism, which was 
the first tide of such movement in colonial Southeast Asia.  For the analysis of two great Filipino 
writers and their works – José Rizal and Isabelo de los Reyes who lived in the world of censorship, see 
Benedict Anderson, Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination (London: Verso, 
2005). 
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In the Indies, censorship was executed irregularly and unpredictably, even as it 
functioned perfunctorily.  Most frequently, it was employed to harass journalists; thus 
bureaucratic harassment and prosecution of journalists were normal practices of 
censorship in the Indies.  On the other hand, expressing grievances (of the colonized 
people) and challenging abuses of official power were normal practices of journalism.  
Censorship was supposed to teach journalists the boundaries of freedom of expression 
by penalizing those who trespassed the laws that were designed essentially to maintain 
the colonial order.  Prosecutors held the power to gather and use any evidence to 
harass and punish journalists, whenever the timing was appropriate.  As my case 
studies show, charges were sometimes filed months after the targeted articles were 
published.  The aforementioned Effendi case also reveals that insecurity constituted a 
major motivation for the officials to conduct censorship.   
 
Central Questions 
This dissertation attempts to shed light on how colonial anxiety paved the way 
for the introduction of specific types of censorship; how two major types of press 
censorship – persdelict and perbreidel – operated; and ultimately how print culture in 
the Indies was shaped by them.  My research reveals that Indies censorship functioned 
depending on internal and external political conditions.  It demonstrates in particular 
how domestic security threats and international structural change affected censorship, 
and how writers and journalists adapted to, even took advantage of, it.  Changes in 
censorship essentially moved in one direction, which was a tighter one, and yet they 
simultaneously opened up new possibilities for print power to gain more popular 
support.   
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In general, censorship concentrated on the mass media to maintain its social 
influence.25  It could work properly if the infrastructural power of the state functioned 
as designed.  But the infrastructural power relies on the stability of the institutional 
complexity.  The institutional complexity determines the degree of effectiveness and 
defectiveness of censorship.  The problem is that institutional complexity does not 
guarantee the strength of the state, rather sometimes causes the weakness of the state.  
Hence the effectiveness of censorship requires constant reexamination even under a 
strong state.  My research reveals that the complexity of the structure of censorial 
institutions conflicted with the simplistic image of the Indies state.  The image of the 
colonial state was generally repressive, and it has contributed to the myth of strong 
and authoritarian state.  Indeed, the Indies state had a notorious reputation for strict 
control and censorship over the society.  In the 1930s the Dutch were firmly in control 
of the Indies and determined to maintain it.  But the censorial institutions were not 
well coordinated, as they had three levels of management.  The first level decided 
major colonial policies, and comprised the Minister of Colonies, the Minister of 
Justice, the Governor-General, and the (Indies) Prosecutor General.  Their 
communications and understanding of the circumstances of print culture in the Indies 
determined the ideology and the extent of censorship.  The second level was 
institutions of censorship execution; it consisted of the state publishing house or 
Bureau for Popular Literature, the Office for Native and Arab Affairs, the Bureau for 
Chinese Affairs, and the Political Information Service, which collected and analyzed 
printed materials.  The third level comprised of a wide spectrum of local territorial 
institutions like Residents, Assistant Residents, police, and courts; this is the sphere 
where the censor and the censored interacted in actual contexts.  Such institutional 
                                                
25 Thomas J. Cragin, “The Failings of Popular News Censorship in Nineteenth-Century France,” Book 
History, No. 4 (2001), pp. 49-80. 
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complexity reveals the relatively autonomous position that the lowest level of 
authorities enjoyed.  They deserve examination because not only they were the 
manifestation of censorship and state power, but also they “[could] empower 
challengers as well as incumbents”26 depending on political circumstances.  
Additionally, however well designed and institutionalized, censorship does not always 
work as it is planned.  In the case of the Indies, rules were often ambiguous in their 
meaning and effect, and hence the censoring authority and journalists frequently 
clashed, which created a sense of insecurity for the authorities in general.  Looking at 
how rules were applied and how journalists and writers reacted sheds a new light on 
the old rigid image of censorship. 
Censorship can be a double-edged sword.  It constituted a part of the colonial 
policies once colonialism entered the period of state building and its management 
(which essentially was to define its territory and guarantee Westerners’ economic 
activities).  It regulated, constructed, and promoted print culture among the educated 
locals.  The regulating and constructing of print culture in return provided the 
journalists and writers with a space where they could express themselves.  This shows 
the ambivalent nature of censorship.  Centralized education and bureaucracy as well as 
“nationally” circulated newspapers not only provided new forms of integration where 
the metropole and the colony functioned together in a circulating space, but they 
sometimes veered from the “right route” and instead induced the rise and spread of 
indigenous nationalism,27 which could turn radical and hence posing a threat to the 
colonial authority.  Censorship could produce both positive and negative consequences 
to the colonial authorities.  My research is motivated by the assumption that 
                                                
26 Slater, “Altering Authoritarianism,” p. 140. 
27 Anderson, Imagined Communities; Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1983). 
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examination of the interactions between censorship and popular print can shed light on 
how popular discourse developed and spread. 
The Indies state administered pre-publication censorship for nearly half a 
century before switching to a post-publication type in the twentieth century.  In this 
sense, Indies censorship closely followed and was intertwined with the development 
of nationalistic politics, in which the Malay language press played a driving force.  
Newspapers, periodicals, and popular literature in the Malay language flourished in 
the first few decades of the twentieth century.  They set the arena for contested ideas 
and formed the necessary public sphere for an emerging nation.  They were not, 
however, necessarily nationalistic projects; the colonial authorities and private 
agencies were heavily involved in the Malay print culture.  In fact, the colonial state 
founded the Bureau for Popular Literature or Balai Poestaka (Volkslectuur in Dutch) 
initially to be an institution that set the standards of language and literature as part of 
its colonizing project.  But Dutch-educated intellectuals competed with Islam-
educated intellectuals to develop the “national” language and literature according to 
their respective visions, while Chinese-Malay publications simply overwhelmed the 
Indies print market.  In the meantime, commercial-oriented entertainment media with 
distinct tastes and programs continued to circulate, irrespective of political programs.  
Thus, under the colonial censorship, the vernacular media helped stimulate and 
facilitate the Indies’ search for identities, without neglecting its fundamental purpose 
to entertain an audience in an ever-changing colonial society.  In fact, as this 
dissertation shall demonstrate, thanks to censorship, the vernacular publishing market 
in the Indies flourished as popular literature conflated with political theater. 
In the twentieth century Indies, censorship facilitated print culture, especially 
the Malay language print.  Against the prevailing view that censorship restricts print 
growth, the rise of Malay print culture was actually shaped by censorship.  This print 
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culture was primarily the exchange of commodities through publishing businesses, for 
which the logic of capitalism ineluctably operated.28  Publishers tried to make money, 
and popular writers abided by market demands.  On the other hand, when writing 
about politics was proscribed, popular literature began to peddle political fiction and 
turned a dissident fugitive into a fictional cult hero.  Facts turned into fiction, fiction 
became politics; thus the Malay print power proved resilient.  The Indies state could 
not simply control and affect the popular print market.  Yet, print power was not free 
from economic circumstances that affected the publishing business.  In the early 1930s 
when the Great Depression hit the colony, the Indies state started to pay close attention 
to the economic aspects of publishing business, such as advertisements and the 
financial situation of printing houses.  Many private printers went bankrupt and some 
newspapers were forced to stop circulations.  I argue therefore that exploring print 
culture as commodity helps underscore a different side of print power that is as 
sensitive to economic as to legal-political circumstances. 
In reality, under the so-called repressive censorship, Malay language 
publications overwhelmed the print market.  Remarkably, the number of Malay 
periodicals doubled from 60 in 1918 to nearly 120 in 1929.29  Almost simultaneously, 
the Malay book market also expanded rapidly.  In both newspaper and book markets, 
private publishers played a significant role; among them, Indies Chinese businessmen 
were dominant.  The political atmosphere of the time – among others the spread of 
communist ideas, Chinese nationalism, women’s emancipation, and discourse of 
political self-determination – also contributed to the growth of the Malay print market.  
In the 1910s and 1920s, Indonesian political activism developed and the political press 
                                                
28 Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 9-36. 
29 The data is calculated from Overzicht van de Inlandsche Pers (Survey of Native Press), various issues 
from 1918 to 1929.  For the history of vernacular press from the middle of the nineteenth century until 
1913 in the Indies, Ahmad B. Adam, The Vernacular Press and the Emergence of Modern Indonesian 
Consciousness (1855-1913) (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1995). 
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followed.  These two decades have been described as “an age in motion,”30 when 
mobilized and organizational politics flourished, especially in Java.  Organs of various 
Indonesian organizations provided forum for expressing and exchanging ideas and 
opinions.  Three dominant ideologies – nationalism, Islamism, and Marxism – set the 
platform for the new society.  In 1926 an article entitled “Nationalism, Islamism and 
Marxism” was published, crystallizing the political and ideological zeitgeist of the 
time.  The article was written by then Indonesia’s most popular nationalist, Soekarno, 
and he had no problem explicating his position in relation to the three ideologies.31  
Unlike contemporary understanding, Indonesian intellectuals often blended and cited 
those ideologies interchangeably, not always as conflicting ideas.  From the point of 
view of the colonial state however, each ideology contained different orientations and 
induced different political activism and discourses, which needed to be monitored in 
distinct ways.  By the late 1910s censorship had penetrated every single corner of 
intellectual activities, albeit in different degrees and with different effects.  Hence it 
was the colonial censorship project as well as process that shaped the print culture in 
the Indies. 
Analyzing the colonial state’s views and policies has often led to 
disproportionate reliance on Dutch reports and sources.  Those sources are indeed 
valuable for historical reconstruction, but Dutch perspective and interests had various 
kinds of limitations, which inevitably pass on distorted views.  The Indies state 
successfully contained radical communist activism, but in fact this was limited mainly 
to Java.  It rather overlooked the development of political activism and anti-
colonialism in which Islam played a significant role in Sumatra in the 1930s.  
                                                
30 Takashi Shiraishi, An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926 (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1990). 
31 Sukarno, Nationalism, Islamism and Marxism (translated by Ruth T. McVey) (Ithaca: Modern 
Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1970). 
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Historian Audrey Kahin contends that because the Dutch were concerned mainly 
about Java, colonial reports inevitably stress “the limited and elite nature of the 
nationalist movement, and naturally downplay both its indigenous features and broad 
appeal.”32  They not only neglect the outer islands, but also lack a comparative 
perspective and analytical framework.  How should one overcome this partiality?  One 
approach is to examine local, private, and popular elements in print culture.  Even with 
a small capital, publishing business was possible, as market demands supported it.  
Various local print cultures developed with local, ethnic, and class bases, and to 
analyze them requires a comparative perspective.  Shifting from elite-centric texts to 
popular writings, from Java-centric focus to other regions, as well as from 
“indigenous”-centric analysis to inter-ethnic rivalry will be a promising style of 
comparative analysis.  For my analysis of print power, I choose two types of popular 
literature: one produced by Indies Chinese in Java and the other by Medan-based 
intellectual circles in northeast Sumatra.  The former literature, including its 
periodicals, was popular not only among the Chinese population but also among 
readers of other racial groups due to its colloquial Malay language style and popular 
topics.  The latter type is the so-called “Medan literature,” which grew out of the 
Minangkabau ethnic group and (modernist) Islam networks in the late 1930s.  A 
comparative perspective in return enriches our view of print culture and power in 
colonial Indonesia. 
 
 
 
                                                
32 Audrey Kahin, Rebellion to Integration: West Sumatra and the Indonesian Polity 1926-1998 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999), p. 92.  Shiraishi’s An Age in Motion, although it 
concentrates on political activism in Java, also makes a similar critique on historiography in Indonesian 
studies. 
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Plan of the Dissertation 
This dissertation attempts to highlight the instances where censorship was 
conceived, implemented, challenged, and forced to adapt.  It is structured according to 
the chronological order of censorial regulations, while attempting to address a set of 
intertwined questions.  My research reveals that censorship in fact facilitated the 
development of print, as much as print culture and power shaped censorship.  The 
question is how and through what mechanisms this symbiotic relationship took shape.  
How were censorial regulations conceived and executed as a part of the maintenance 
of law and order in the Indies?  What were the political conditions that defined Indies 
censorship?  How did print culture shape censorship formation?  How did censorship 
operate in the Indies?  How did it interact with and affect the print culture?  What kind 
of print culture was created?  What kind of newspapers and popular literature emerged 
as a result?  How did journalists and writers deal with or challenge censorship in order 
to perform their task as journalists?  My research reveals that some political activist-
journalists in fact took advantage of the media spotlight that came with charges of 
press offences.  But what kind of writings or publications provoked the colonial 
authorities?  How does one understand the interactions between writers and the 
authorities in the last decades of Dutch colonialism?   
Chapter 2 describes the sociopolitical background of Indies censorship from 
the nineteenth century.  It introduces the communications revolution that took place in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century Indies.  It also illustrates how at the beginning 
of the Ethical Period in the 1900s the colonial government began to promote a “free 
press” and helped cultivate “indigenous” press by patronizing Javanese (and to a lesser 
extent Atjehnese) journalists.  The first Indies censorship law was repressive in pre-
publication fashion when only Dutch language newspapers were available in the 
colony.  After the middle of the nineteenth century, a vernacular press emerged and 
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gained popularity among inter-racial audiences.  The local born indigenized Europeans 
and Chinese – the so-called indo and peranakan – built this popular vernacular press.  
Liberal tendencies in the Netherlands introduced the Ethical Policy in 1901 to improve 
“native” welfare, led to the post-publication censorship law in 1906.  The same liberal 
principles motivated Governor-General Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz to provide 
political and economic patronage to indigenous journalists, paving the way for 
indigenous-owned vernacular newspapers.  But the patronage system came to an end 
when Van Heutsz was replaced in 1908.  Meanwhile, overseas Chinese nationalism 
arrived in the Indies at the beginning of the twentieth century, setting in motion the 
national “awakening” of Indies people.  The 1910s saw the formation of various 
indigenous and interracial political organizations.  Those political associations had 
their own organs that caused anxiety among the colonial authorities, resulting in the 
introduction of the so-called “hatred-sowing” articles of the Penal Code in 1914.  This 
new weapon of censorship was to be applied with particular zest to journalists. 
Facing rapid sociopolitical changes, the Indies government considered and 
installed a new measure to monitor the burgeoning vernacular press.  Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation examines the policy process and debate concerning press monitoring.  
Post-publication censorship of 1906 and the rise of nationalistic movement pushed the 
government to consider a surveillance system over the vernacular press.  Thus the 
1910s and 1920s became the age of press monitoring.  Various kinds of press surveys 
were published; some were publicly consumed, while others circulated confidentially.  
The purpose of those press surveys was relatively the same, that is, to monitor 
vernacular press so that the government could obtain a clear picture of what was 
happening in the colony and what indigenous intellectuals were thinking.  Press survey 
was also useful to identify potentially dangerous persons, movements, and places.  
However, no uniform and “nation-wide” press monitoring system was established.  
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Rather, it followed the colonial administrative arrangement, which distinguished 
indigenous from Chinese affairs.  Since the main purpose of colonial administration 
laid in the maintenance of law and order in the society, major efforts were made to 
devise surveillance over indigenous groups and their publications.  In this regard, the 
colonial Bureau for Popular Literature or Balai Poestaka was actively engaged in press 
monitoring as well as a cultural offensive. 
Chapter 4 demonstrates how the “hatred-sowing” articles were applied to 
journalists and political activists, and how they reacted to such legal charges.  The 
articles symbolized the repressive colonial attitude towards indigenous movements.  
Prosecutors collaborated with Balai Poestaka, which regularly conducted and 
published press surveys.  But in the 1910s and the first half of the 1920s, indigenous 
journalists and activists took advantage of their “punishment” – specifically the trial 
process – and turned it into a political theater from where they could further expound 
their views.  As a result of this repressive censorship, in the middle of the 1920s, 
entertainment and other types of apolitical publications flourished.  Some indigenous 
journalists collaborated with the colonial government and tried to make profit using 
the latter’s patronage in publishing business.  It was the time when the population of 
urban middle-class grew, and looked for entertainment. 
Chapter 5 traces the policy shift concerning censorship.  The colonial state 
experienced two major political blows.  Since the late 1910s, it had launched a cultural 
project initiated by Balai Poestaka, which aim was to provide “proper” (apolitical) 
reading materials for the indigenous population and dominate the literature publishing 
market.  In reality, however, it faced severe competition from the well-established 
Indies Chinese publishers and other types of “wild” (independent) publications.  Its 
press monitoring was also severely challenged; because the number of vernacular 
press increased and Balai Poestaka failed to provide sufficiently comprehensive 
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information for the colonial bureaucrats.  On the top of it, the press monitoring system 
failed to predict the communist uprisings in 1926 and 1927.  Calls for the introduction 
of administrative measure to curb press excesses gained the majority voice, resulting 
in the Press Curbing Ordinance in 1931. 
In the meantime, the unexpected communist uprisings of 1926-1927 forced the 
Indies state to build a political internment camp in Boven Digoel.  Chapter 6 explores 
another form of censorship that works not so much by restricting than by managing, in 
this case by framing the way the press reported on Boven Digoel.  The government 
controlled information on what was going on in the camp; all letters from Digoel were 
tightly censored, and only a handful of Western journalists were allowed to visit and 
write reports on Digoel.  Yet news about the life of Digoel internees – with emphasis 
on its “normality” – were widely accessible to ordinary readers of Malay language 
newspapers.  This peculiarity reveals how the government engaged in creative form of 
censorship by letting the public know about the prison camp as a form of deterrence, 
while upholding its image as the benefactor of the colonized people’s wellbeing.  In 
other words, the censorship was as much about government propaganda about Digoel 
as it was about the restrictions to information, speech, and political activism that 
Digoel symbolized.  For this chapter, I examine two vernacular newspapers – Sin Jit 
Po of Soerabaja and Pewarta Deli of Medan – to show how these newspapers carried 
accounts on Digoel.  Intriguingly, most reports mentioned actual names, both 
detainees and their families, to make the stories sound “real.”  A striking and 
understandable fact was that, although some internees collaborated with the Dutch 
authorities, no politics were detected in newspaper accounts.  Such hidden political 
messages projected a new reality in the period of post-communist uprising, and 
political activists were supposed to be able to recognize them. 
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Chapter 7 scrutinizes the content and implementations of the 1931 Press 
Curbing Ordinance, which was the first administrative measure to suppress 
“dangerous” publications.  Up until then, violations of press regulations were a matter 
for the courts; but the new ordinance empowered government officials to discipline 
publishers, printers, and distributors without trial.  Originally, this ordinance targeted 
radical nationalist and Islamist party organs.  In combination with the press offence 
articles of the Penal Code, it was successful in containing politically “dangerous” 
newspapers and journalists.  It symbolized the repressive policy that the Indies 
government took against the nationalist movement in the 1930s.  Yet external political 
conditions altered the original target and purpose of the ordinance.  After 1936, no 
Indonesian nationalist newspapers or journals were shut down; instead, many Chinese-
Malay and Chinese language press became the victims of the ordinance, along with a 
number of Japanese-owned vernacular publication and Dutch newspapers.  By this 
time, the government’s security concern had shifted from the Indonesian nationalist 
movement to Japan’s southward expansion, which triggered hostile reactions from 
ethnic Chinese in the Indies.  This development indicated that the Indies had entered a 
new age of security in which international matters presented a new challenge for the 
colonial government and were intertwined with domestic ones. 
Yet a security concern somehow remained from the original “communist” 
threat as Chapter 8 examines.  It analyzes a type of popular literature known as roman 
pitjisan (dime novels), which originated in Medan on the northeast Coast of Sumatra.  
The rise of this literature outside Java – the center of Dutch colonialism – escaped the 
attention of censorship.  It was partly because the city was not geopolitically important 
from the point of view of colonial management, and partly because it was a form of 
literature that had less to do with organized politics.  Taking advantage of not being 
affiliated with any political party, Adi Negoro, a German educated indigenous 
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journalist, started a new literary project in 1931.  His newspaper, Pewarta Deli, often 
featured stories on underground communist activities.  But these articles could avoid 
becoming the target of the Press Curbing Ordinance, mainly because they used semi-
governmental Dutch newspapers as their sources.  Medan also witnessed the 
emergence of a variety of nationalistic-oriented popular literary and Islamic journals 
that similarly escaped censorship attention by concentrating on “permissible” topics 
such as culture, literature, religion, and education.  These “local” publications were 
supported financially by ethnic Minangkabau and modernist Islamic networks, which 
enjoyed “nation-wide” agents.  
Finally, Chapter 9 is in some way an extension of Chapter 7 in that it discusses 
how the Chinese press in the Indies came to present a new challenge for the colonial 
authorities in the wake of the onset of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937.  The Press 
Curbing Ordinance, which was initially designed to maintain internal public order, 
was forced to change its nature (and target) in order to ward off external security 
threat, in this case potential aggression by Japan.  The Indies government had a 
difficult time dealing with the external threat, because like other colonial authorities it 
was designed to govern the colonial territory.  The Chinese population in the Indies 
began to become politically active ever since Japan started to invade China’s 
Manchuria in 1931.  After the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 1937, aggressive anti-
Japan(ese) propaganda proliferated in Chinese-Malay and Chinese newspapers despite 
frequent warnings and penalties.  Because of this, both the Chinese-Malay and 
Chinese language press became the main target of suspension in the latter half of the 
1930s.  The colonial government was concerned that provocations by its Chinese 
residents would be used by Japan as an excuse to interfere in Indies domestic affairs.  
For this chapter, my dissertation spotlights a prominent Indies Chinese journalist, 
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Liem Koen Hian, who was among the most outspoken on the Japanese issue and as 
such became the most frequent target of censorship.  
Ultimately, this dissertation demonstrates how censorship facilitated print 
culture and print power that might undermine the state power.  Analyzing social and 
political functions of censorship in the Indies reveals both the strength and 
vulnerability of the Indies state, because censorship was essentially a matter of 
security and order.  Although the colonial state retained the power to alter and 
eliminate political activities, it could not always regulate and control public discourse 
that appeared in the vernacular press and popular publications, thus became public 
consumption.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
“FREE PRESS” AND THE COLONIAL CONTEXT  
 
The newspaper, a Western product, brings like a magic wand that lifts dead 
prose to a new life.  The effervescence of everyday life: news demands 
expression, first in the longwinded style of narrative of the old prose of the 
hikayat, later short and powerful, sharp and clear, “to the point”: the new style, 
the new prose is born.  Swept along by real life it sets off on the alleys of 
trashy literature.  
 – Armijn Pané33  
 
 
The Indies colonial state, as historian Onghokham put it, was “the first state in 
Asia with a modern bureaucracy and administrative structure, modeled after the new 
state after the French Revolution.”34  In that regard, the role of the newspaper can 
hardly be overstated.  The modern style newspaper was first introduced in the Dutch 
colony in the form of an official newspaper.35  The Governor-General, Herman 
Willem Daendels (1808-1811), explained its purpose thus:   
                                                
33 Armijn Pané, Kort overzicht van de moderne Indonesische literatuur (Djakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1949), 
p. 13. 
De krant, een Westersch product, brengt, gelijk een tooverstaf, het doode proza tot nieuw 
leven.  Het vluchtige leven van alledag: het bericht vraagt om uitdrukking, eerst in de 
langdradige verhaaltrant van het oude proza van de hikajat, later kort en krachtig, scherp en 
helder, “to the point”: de nieuwe stijl, het nieuwe proza is geboren.  Meegesleurd door het 
werkelijke leven begeeft het zich op zijpaden van schund-literatuur. 
34 Onghokham, The Thugs, the Curtain Thief, and the Sugar Land: Power, Politics, and Culture in 
Colonial Java (Jakarta: Metafor Publishing, 2003), p. 161.   
35 The missionary press existed since the middle of the eighteenth century, but its circulation was quite 
limited.  Ahmat B. Adam, The Vernacular Press and the Emergence of Modern Indonesian 
Consciousness (1855-1913) (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1995), pp. 5-7.  
Newspapers in the Netherlands began to circulate widely in the middle of the seventeenth century.  
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Besides affording the residents the pleasure of being able to read all the news, 
the object of the paper […] was to publish all the acts of the General 
Government so far as they were of general interest, as also the condition of the 
finances and the employment of the revenue, in order that each and everyone 
might be given the opportunity to study the affairs of the colony and acquaint 
himself with the great changes that had been made in the administration and be 
assured of the salutary intentions and results of the same.36   
 
This statement needs to be placed in a historical context.  As the Napoleon-appointed 
administrator in Java, Daendels’ mission was literally to establish “a modern 
bureaucracy and administrative structure.”  Thus on November 22, 1809, regulations 
of the government printery works were drawn up, which set the stage for the official 
newspaper.  In the same year, Daendels established the Government Printing Press 
(Landsdrukkerij).  On January 5, 1810, the first official weekly newspaper, 
Bataviasche Koloniale Courant, appeared in Batavia, the capital of the colony.  But 
the paper circulated for only one and a half years because the English took over Java 
in August 1811.   
A British liberal, Thomas Stamford Raffles headed the British interregnum.37  
He started its own official paper, The Java Government Gazette, with its first issue on 
February 29, 1812.  In addition to government notifications, decrees, and regulations, 
the Gazette contained lengthy accounts of the war in Europe.  Through it, Dutch 
                                                                                                                                       
Maarten Schneider, De Nederlandse Krant van “Nieuwstydinghe” tot Dagblad (Amsterdam: P. N. Van 
Kampen & Zoon N. V., 1943). 
36 G. H. Von Faber, A Short History of Journalism in the Dutch East Indies (Sourabaya: G. Kolff & Co., 
1930), p. 21. 
37 Raffles was knighted in 1817.  Coincidently, the same year he published his well-received A History 
of Java (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965). 
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readers in Java could follow the fall of Napoleon in April 1814, which brought hope 
that they would soon be released from British rule.  When Britain handed Java back to 
the Netherlands in 1816, Gazette naturally ceased to exist.  The new Dutch 
administration started Bataviasche Courant in August 1816 as its official paper.38  The 
paper was renamed to Javasche Courant in 1828, and lasted until the end of the Dutch 
rule in 1942. 
These official papers circulated in a small circle because limited resources for 
print prevented privately owned newspapers from being published.  Printing presses 
were almost exclusively owned by the government, aside from the contribution of the 
missionaries.  Skilled print-setters were scarce.  The number of readers was also very 
low at first.  In 1814, the number of non-military “Europeans” (mainly Eurasians in 
fact) on the islands of Java and Madoera was estimated to be about 2,000.  By 1860, 
46 years later, the number was only 43,000 men and 1,000 women, scattered over both 
Java and the number of the Outer Islands.39 
But in the middle of the 1820s these conditions started to change.  Merchants 
demanded information about economic resources and merchandise in Java.  Thus 
privately owned commercially oriented newspapers began to be printed and circulated.  
As the center of the Dutch rule, Batavia (West Java) saw the initial emergence of such 
newspapers in Indies history.  The first among them was Bataviaasche 
Advertentieblad (Batavian Advertiser) that marked its first issue in 1825.  Four years 
later in 1829, another commercial paper Nederlandsch Indisch Handelsblad 
(Netherlands Indies Commercial Paper) began circulation.  The long-lived De Java 
                                                
38 Adam, The Vernacular Press and the Emergence of Modern Indonesian Consciousness, pp. 4-5. 
39 Evert van Imhoff and Gijs Beets, “Education at home: the age-specific pattern of migration between 
the Netherlands and the former Dutch East Indies around 1930,” Demographic Research, Volume 11, 
Article 12 (2004), p. 338.  On the Dutch in the Indies from the sixteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
see Ulbe Bosma and Remco Raben, Being “Dutch” in the Indies: A History of Creolisation and 
Empire, 1500-1920 (translated by Wendie Shaffer) (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), pp. 1-103.  In the 
early nineteenth century, 43,000 was about the same size as a small provincial town in the Netherlands. 
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Bode (The Java Herald) started its publication in 1852.40  Other major port cities 
followed.  In Soerabaja (East Java), the weekly Soerabaijasch Courant (Soerabaja 
Paper) began in 1837.  In 1853 Oostpost was also launched in Soerabaja, changing its 
name to Het Soerabajaasch Handelsblad in 1859.  In Semarang (Central Java) the 
Semarangsche Advertentieblad (Semarang Advertiser) started publication in 1845, and 
in 1863 renamed itself De Locomotief.41   
 
The Printing Press Regulation of 1856 
While private commercially oriented newspapers emerged in the first half of 
the nineteenth century, no legal regulations with regard to the supervision of the press 
existed.  Even without specific press-related laws, strict state control was easily 
exercised because the size of the press was relatively small.  The publisher of the 
apolitical Semarangsch Advertentieblad, for instance, had to obtain the permission of 
the local law officer for each day’s issue.42   
But one influential editor enjoyed some degree of social standing and was 
treated in a quite opposite way from the publisher of the Semarangsch 
Advertentieblad.  W. R. Baron van Hoëvell, the liberal editor of Tijdschrift voor 
Nederlandsch-Indië (Review for Netherlands Indies) of Batavia, revealed that “he was 
not required to submit to the censor the copy for his monthly magazine, which 
frequently contained articles on the political administration of the Dutch East 
Indies.”43  With his words, van Hoëvell of course indicated that the practice of 
censorship was in fact operating during this period in the Indies.  His comment was 
                                                
40 It stopped its circulation in 1957. 
41 For a general history of major Dutch newspapers in the Indies, C. W. Wormser, Journalistiek op Java 
(Deventer: Uitgeverij W. Van Hoeve, 1941). 
42 Von Faber, A Short History of Journalism in the Dutch East Indies, p. 40.  The following example, 
debate, and citation are drawn from this page.  
43 Von Faber, A Short History of Journalism in the Dutch East Indies, p. 40. 
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intentionally political because he was an advocate for the interests of the people of the 
Indies.  Through his writings in the journal, he contended that the Dutch had to fulfill 
their moral obligations towards the Javanese.  After working as editor for the journal 
for eight years, in 1848 he was elected to the parliament in the Netherlands.  As a 
member of the Second Chamber, he promoted an “ethical” colonial policy.  Education, 
Christianity, and progress, he maintained, needed to be brought to Java.44  Van 
Hoëvell considered the press to be as a powerful weapon to fight abuses and 
wrongdoings.45  In fact, in the 1840s his journal apparently had been continuously 
harassed “by the Secretariat General, which had the final power to determine what was 
printable and what was not.”46  The rationale of this authoritarian exercise derived 
from a government resolution of 1844 that prohibited the publication of “internal” 
materials obtained from government sources. 
Thus although in the legal sense censorship did not exist, in practice most 
private Dutch newspapers were subjected to the state, and particular contents were not 
allowed to be published.  This unwritten practice of censorship eventually stirred a 
debate in the Netherlands on whether or not freedom of the press should be granted in 
the Indies.  The well-known liberal statesman John Rudolf Thorbecke took the 
initiative and singlehandedly drafted the revision of the Constitution of the 
Netherlands in 1848.  His main intention was to create public checks on the 
government’s performance, which had not been exercised before.  For him, a royal 
monopoly was not acceptable, thus he demanded the introduction of freedom of the 
press in the Indies, which up until that point remained still largely a royal domain.47   
                                                
44 C. Fasseur, The Politics of Colonial Exploitation: Java, the Dutch, and the Cultivation System, (R. E. 
Elson translated), (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1992), pp. 107-108. 
45 Fasseur, The Politics of Colonial Exploitation, p. 109. 
46 Adam, The Vernacular Press and the Emergence of Modern Indonesian Consciousness, p. 13. 
47 In 1849 Thorbecke became the Minister of Internal Affairs, which made him the de facto first Prime 
Minister of the Netherlands.  His first cabinet lasted until 1853.  His second cabinet was formed in 1862 
and lasted until 1866.  The end of the Cultivation System is his achievement at the end of the 1860s.  In 
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Conservatives were opposed to this idea.  Under the leadership of ex-
Governor-General Jean Chrétien Baud (1833-1836), they attempted to limit such 
freedom, arguing that the indigenous people of the Indies were being “somewhat 
exploited” and their bleak living conditions could easily be exposed by irresponsible 
newspapers.  In other words, freedom of the press should not be granted because it 
could be “employed as a weapon against the Government.”  
After a series of parliamentary debates, the conservatives’ argument prevailed, 
producing the “Press Article in the Government Regulation of 1854.”  The Article 
concerning the press reads: 
 
The supervision of the press by the Government must be regulated by 
ordinance in agreement with the principle that the publication of ideas and 
sentiments by the press and the admission of printed matter from outside the 
Netherlands must not be submitted to any restriction except such as is needed 
to ensure public order.48 
 
The article later produced a form of preventive supervision, which was put into the 
“Regulation on Printed Matter in the Netherlands Indies” (Reglement op de 
Drukwerken in Nederlandsch-Indië), which was abbreviated as the Printing Press 
Regulation or Drukpersreglement.  Thorbecke retaliated by calling the Printing Press 
Regulation of 1856 “a deed of darkness.”49  Considering the fact that no indigenous 
press existed at the time, the newly installed regulation was clearly aimed at those 
European papers in the colony that had a mainly liberal character, such as the 
                                                                                                                                       
1871 he led his third and last cabinet until he fell ill in December that year.  E. H. Kossmann, The Low 
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48 Adam, The Vernacular Press and the Emergence of Modern Indonesian Consciousness, p. 14. 
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Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indië, which was led by van Hoëvell and often harassed 
by the authorities for its boldness and venom.50 
The Printing Press Regulation required newspaper publishers to register at the 
local office, pay a security deposit, and maintain friendly relationships with the local 
government.51  Publishers were held responsible for all items in their newspapers other 
than straight news reports.  If the reported items were considered to insult, scorn, or 
print libels directed against the King, the royal family, the Governor-General, and any 
public official or public body, or to attack laws and legitimate regulations, or to 
undermine respect for the government, the publishers would be punished by fines of 
up to 500 guilders and imprisonment for up to three years.  Lesser punishments were 
prescribed for publishing false reports that might engender contempt or hate between 
the various segments of the population.  As a precautionary measure, publishers of 
newspapers and periodicals were required to submit a copy of each edition to the local 
government two hours before it was released to the public.  With the concurrence of 
his Advisory Council, the Governor-General could suspend or close down the 
operation of any press.52  
However, although the Printing Press Regulation was repressive in nature, in 
reality, the colonial authorities faced a challenge in trying to implement it.  The printer 
and publisher of Soerabaja Courant argued, “the obligation [to submit one copy to the 
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authorities prior to the publication] could not apply to daily newspapers.”53  He 
refused to submit the first issue of his paper for the year of 1869 to the law office, and 
hence his prosecution followed.  Surprisingly, the court decided that the article in 
question could not apply to newspapers and even periodicals, because they were 
regulated by a different article, one which required publishers to send copies of their 
publication to the chief local authority.  The judgment was confirmed by the Supreme 
Court on June 4, 1869.  All non-state printers and publishers of newspapers and 
periodicals welcomed the decision.  In wake of the court decision, local authorities 
were forced to subscribe to all papers and periodicals within their jurisdiction in order 
to exercise proper supervision.  Accordingly, from July 1869, all provincial heads who 
received free copies had immediately to pass on all newspapers and periodicals to the 
law officers. 
As the Printing Press Regulation of 1856 obliged all printers and publishers to 
send a copy of newspapers and periodicals to the chief local authority, the local 
authority was given the task of exercising pre-publication censorship.  It had the 
power to check the content, change it, and even suspend distribution of the issue.  It 
also had power to withdraw the license of printers and publishers at any time.  The 
regulation was meant to intimidate and curb the newly emerging press in the Indies.  
This repressive measure, however, did not stop newcomers from starting their own 
newspaper business. 
 
The Birth of the Malay Press 
The latter half of the 1850s saw the emergence of Malay language newspapers 
and periodicals in various major cities in Java.  Between 1855 and 1860, three weekly 
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newspapers and two periodicals were published, although most of them were short-
lived.  This trend started not in Batavia, as had been the case of the Dutch language 
press, but in Soerakarta, the capital city of a small Javanese sultanate in Central Java.  
On January 25, 1855, a Jogjakarta-born Eurasian, C. F. Winters, Sr. and his son 
Gustaaf Winters launched the first Javanese-language weekly, Bromartani (All-Round 
Proclaimer), issued by a private printery Hartevelt Brothers of Soerakarta.  It used the 
most refined form of the Javanese language, kromo inggil, because its target audience 
was the educated Javanese circle, including members of the royal family, who learned 
and taught such language at schools in town.  Winters’ weekly had educational 
purposes.  News items were drawn from “from different countries,” including “articles 
about science or physics, focusing on such subjects as the weights of air, water, and 
matter.”54  Local events, advertisements, notices of auctions, and the timetables of 
ships were also carried in the journal. 
The first Malay-language newspaper emerged in the port-city of Soerabaja, 
East Java.  In January 1856, a publisher, E. Fuhri, founded Kabar Bahasa Melaijoe 
(Malay Language News).  It was a commercially oriented newspaper and its 
readership was drawn from among Chinese merchants, and Arab and indigenous 
traders in the city. 
Within two years, a Malay language press also appeared in Batavia.  In April 
1858, the bookshop proprietors in Batavia, Lange & Company, started Soerat Chabar 
Betawi.  It was also commercially oriented, but included news of official 
appointments, promotions, and retirements of civil servants, and local events in 
Batavia and other parts of Java.   
In the main trading port-city of Central Java, Semarang, the weekly Selompret 
Melaijoe (Malay Trumpet) made its appearance in February 1860.  The publisher was 
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G. C. T. van Dorp & Co., which also published the Dutch-language Semarangsch 
Courant.  Selompret Melaijoe quickly gained support from the European and Chinese 
mercantile communities in the form of advertisements.   
From the 1860s on, various cities in the Indies saw the birth of journalistic 
publications in vernacular languages, mostly in Malay.  Bintang Timor (Eastern Star) 
appeared in Soerabaja in 1862, Pertela Soedagaran (Mercantile Report) in Soerabaja 
in 1863, Bientang Timoer in Padang (West Sumatra) in 1865, Biang-Lala (Rainbow) 
in Batavia in 1867, Tjahaja Siang (Daylight) in Tondano (North Celebes) in 1868, 
Mataharie (Sun) in Batavia in 1868, Bintang Bara (Evening Star) in Batavia in 1870, 
and so on. 
Europeans and Eurasians dominated the publishing business until the middle of 
the 1880s.  It was not until 1885 that the so-called peranakan Chinese started to 
compete in the publishing business.  Peranakan Chinese were local-born mix-blood 
Chinese, who were generally Malay or Javanese-speaking.55  When the Gebroeders 
Gimbers & Company, which published the Malay newspaper Bintang Timoer (Eastern 
Star), went bankrupt, the business was publicly auctioned,56 keeping its right to 
publish the missionary paper Indische Opmerker, and continued as Bintang Timor.  
The buyer was Tjoa Tjoan Lok, with the support of his relatives Tjoa Sien Hie and 
Tjoa Tjoan King.  Later that year, in Buitenzorg, West Java, an educated peranakan 
Chinese, Lie Kim Hok purchased a printing press from the widow of the late D. J. van 
der Linden, who was a missionary and had edited Bintang Djohar (Star of Venus).  
Lie started to print Pembrita Betawi under the aegis of the Lie Kim Hok Press in 
September 1886.  In 1886 in Semarang, a tri-weekly paper called Tamboor Melayoe 
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(Malay Drum) appeared under the editorship of Sie Hian Ling.  In 1888, Yap Goan Ho 
launched Sinar Terang (Bright Light) in Batavia, which was distributed also in 
Buitenzorg, Bandoeng, Tjiandjoer, Soekaboemi, Garoet, Tjirebon, Semarang, Demak, 
Soerabaja, Tegal, and Padang.  In 1893, a publisher and owner of a printing press, Oeij 
Tjai Hin, began editing the daily Bintang Barat (Western Star) after the departure of 
Eurasian journalists J. Kieffer and E. F. Wiggers went on to found Bintang Betawi 
(Star of Batavia).  
Around the same time, peranakan Chinese in the Outer Islands also started to 
engage in newspaper publishing.  In 1894, Lie Bian Goan of Padang,57 who was the 
agent of the Batavia-based Sinar Terang (Clear Light), launched his own paper Pertja 
Barat (Western Sumatra) together with Dja Endar Moeda, who later became the most 
influential journalist in Sumatra at the turn of the century.  In Ambon, Ong Kie Hong 
began to edit a missionary periodical Penghentar (Introduction) in 1897, and the 
following year purchased the printing press that had printed Selompret Melajoe.  In 
1899 in Menado, North Celebes, a Chinese by the name of K. D. Que, who had 
acquired the legal status of a European, set up the printing press enterprise 
Menadosche Drukkerij (Menado Priting-House).58 
Between 1855 and 1875, eighteen new vernacular newspapers and periodicals 
were launched; between 1875 and 1900 the number jumped to forty; and between 
1900 and 1913 it reached one hundred twenty-three for the whole the Indies.59  Many 
of these publications were short-lived, but some managed to last long and circulate 
widely.  Notably, at the beginning, almost all publishing companies were run by either 
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Dutch or Dutch Eurasians, but Chinese with roots in the Indies soon followed.  The 
growing number of vernacular newspapers and periodicals reflected the rapid social 
change in urban areas and growing market demands.  Needless to say, the colonial 
authorities had to consider how to deal with this changing situation.  
 
The Press Act in Practice 
 Despite the initial problems in the way the regulations could be interpreted and 
applied, the newly installed Printing Press Regulations of 1856 did manage to control 
vernacular newspapers tightly in the Indies.  From the 1860s onward, local colonial 
authorities began to exercise control in the form of the Press Act, which was applied 
first to Dutch newspapers and then Malay language newspapers.  In particular, since 
“the Dutch-language press predominantly took on an oppositional flavour, promoting 
liberal ideas in a crusading style,”60 they became the major target of the Press Act. 
According to Ian Proudfoot, the earliest cases of violation of the Press Act took 
place in Batavia and Soerabaja in the first half of the 1860s.  In 1860 the editor of 
Bataviaasch Handelsblad was prosecuted under this Act.  The offending article 
entitled “Officials on unemployment relief” allegedly disgraced public officials and 
the Governor-General, and for this reason, he was imprisoned for eighteen months.  A 
second case occurred in 1865 when an anonymous article in De Nieuwsbode 
(Messenger) of Soerabaja projected a miserable future for the colony.  It was accused 
of stirring up “hatred and contempt for the colonial government” and of attempting to 
split the Indies from the Netherlands.  The Governor-General invoked his “exorbitant 
rights,” which allowed him to forbid residency at the particular places in the Indies 
when he believed that public order and peace was threatened,61 to exile “both the 
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(translated by Peter Hawkes) (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 23. 
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editor, Nosse, and the author, (later on exposed as) Roorda van Eysinga, from the 
Indies.”62   
The 1870s saw many editors of Dutch language newspapers being prosecuted 
for violation of the Press Act.  Most of these cases took place in major cities in Java.  
Ahmad Adam explained that “[the] common accusation was [journalists] defaming 
someone through their newspapers.”63  For instance, in 1871, Mr. Winckel, an editor 
of the Semarangsche Courant was charged with libel and had to face the Raad van 
Justitie (Court of Appeal).  He “was accused of libeling the Resident of Japara” and 
was found guilty.  In 1873 the Netherlands declared war on the Sultanate of Atjeh and 
intermittent fighting lasted until 1904 when most of the region came under firm 
colonial control.  In 1873 Winckel was charged again for his writing in the same 
newspaper.  This time he criticized the government’s policy towards Atjeh, saying that 
the Governor-General James Loudon “was not prepared for his great task in handling 
the Atjeh question.”  Due to this article, Winckel was deported to the Netherlands.64   
In 1879 the editor of Semarang’s De Locomotief, J. W. Cohen Stuart, was 
arrested and imprisoned for a period of six months.  The charge was that he wrote a 
seditious article that was critical of the Governor-General.  In 1881 another editor of 
De Locomotief, J. W. H. Halkema of Jogjakarta was reportedly banished from the 
Indies due to an article that libeled the local Sultan.  In 1882, the editor of Bataviaasch 
Handelsblad, J. A. Haakman, received a warning, saying that “the government would 
not hesitate to deport him from the Indies.”65   
Lesser charges under the Press Act were found in the cases of H. B. van 
Daalen and L. N. H. A. Chatelin.  As the editor of Java Bode of Batavia, van Daalen 
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was imprisoned for a year in 1874 due to “his criticism of the government’s conduct of 
the Atjeh issue.”  In 1876 Chatelin, who was the editor of the Sumatra Courant of 
Padang, “was sentenced to four month’s jail for” violation of the Press Act.  Both 
men, it appears, were often charged with violations of the Press Act: in 1879 van 
Daalen was fined ƒ 20 and imprisoned for two months, while Chatelin was fined ƒ 
1,000 in 1873 “for reprinting a circular of the General-Secretary dated November 4, 
1866 in his paper.”66   
Starting in the 1870s, Dutch, Indo (Eurasian), and indigenous editors of Malay 
language newspapers also became the targets of the Press Act, although the rulings 
against them were minor compared to those of the Dutch language newspapers.67  
Nonetheless, editors were being fined or imprisoned for a short period: the editor of 
Wazir Hndia (Indies Commissioner) of Batavia, Abdul Chatab, in 1878; the editor of 
Bentara Melajoe (Malay Herald) of Padang, Arnold Snackey, in 1882; the editor of 
Bintang Timoer (Eastern Star) of Soerabaja, A. Bois d’Enghien, in 1883; the editor of 
Selompret Melajoe (Malay Trumpet) of Semarang and former Assistant Resident, G. 
R. Lucardie, in 1883; the editor of Batara-Indra of Soerabaja, A. M. Voorneman, in 
1885; the editor of Bintang Timoer, F. C. E. Bousquet, in 1887; the editor of 
Pembrita-Bahroe (New Herald) of Soerabaja, P. C. Halkema, in 1890; and the editor 
of Palita Ketjil (Small Lantern) of Padang, Datoe Soetan Maharadja, in 1893.68 
Some victims of the Press Act were forced to close their printing houses, 
permanently or temporarily.  The first case of closure of a printing press came on July 
3, 1879.  On that day, the Governor-General issued a decree shutting down the press 
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of Jonas Portier & Co in Soerakarta, and its paper De Vorstenlanden (The 
Principalities) was banned.  The government reportedly had been irritated by the 
criticisms that De Vorstenlanden made, and its editors had not stopped writing critical 
comments.  The 1880s saw several similar cases.  In 1882 H. M. van Dorp & Co. of 
Batavia was ordered to suspend the printing of Java Bode, which also affected the 
publication of Hindia-Nederland.  In 1885 G. C. T. van Dorp of Semarang faced the 
same fate, which affected the circulations of Indische Vaderland (Indies Fatherland) 
and Selompret Melajoe. 
 The local authorities in Batavia, Semarang, Soerabaja, Soerakarta, and Padang 
often exercised the Press Act against mainly Dutch journalists.  Those cities were 
major commercial centers in the Indies and attracted many merchants and newcomers 
from outside.  The question is then why the 1870s and 1880s experienced many cases 
of Press Act prosecutions, especially with regard to the Dutch language newspapers.  
In order to answer this question, social and demographic changes need to be 
examined. 
 
Social Changes  
The severity of punishments meted out to Dutch-language newspapers 
reflected major social changes in Java that were taking place in the late nineteenth 
century.  Among others, demographic change established a new social reality in the 
Indies.  In the late nineteenth century, the majority of Europeans resided in major 
towns and cities in the Indies, especially on Java.  In 1850 more than half of the 
Europeans were Eurasians or the so-called Indos, whose fathers were Europeans and 
mothers natives.69  But after the opening of the Suez Canal in November 1869, a 
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growing proportion of Europeans came from outside the Indies.  In 1870, free entry 
into the Indies was allowed to Dutch people of all kinds, and the first ships that sailed 
through the Suez Canal reached the colony.  First, wealthy and aristocratic Europeans 
arrived, followed by growing numbers of middle class Europeans from the middle of 
the 1880s onwards.70  
In 1870 reportedly half of the Europeans in Java lived in the three largest cities 
of Batavia, Semarang and Soerabaja.  In 1855 there were 4,145 Europeans in Batavia 
of which 2,009 were Indos and other mixed-race, 1,026 Indies-born Europeans, and 
840 newcomers (European-born Caucasian).  Thus 80 percent of the Europeans in 
Batavia were born in the Indies.  Fifteen years later, however, the demographic 
composition of Batavia had changed.  In 1870 the percentage of Indies-born 
“Europeans” had declined to 63 percent.  Other urban centers of the Dutch colony, 
however, did not follow this pattern; the Indies-born European population in 
Semarang and Soerabaja still had Indies-born European populations totaled 87 percent 
and 84 percent respectively.71   
The newly arrived migrants brought European life styles into the Indies.  They 
insisted on leading a secure and convenient urban life in the colony.  Having been able 
to bring their families from Europe in the 1870s, they then demanded schools of 
acceptable European standards for their children.  These demands necessitated the 
construction of social infrastructures fit for modern European-style urban life, 
changing the urban landscape, and in turn creating a compartmentalization of 
population groups.  For instance, in 1862 Batavia had its first gas lamps for European 
residential areas, while in the Chinese quarters they only came in 1895.  The same 
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went for the installations of piped water and paved roads.72  City gardens, public 
parks, theatrical performances and concerts became public spaces exclusively 
available for “Europeans.” 
While many “Europeans” enjoyed an increasingly modern lifestyle, the 
number of paupers became more and more visible in urban areas since the 1850s.73  A 
division between the well-to-do Europeans and poorer ones, usually Eurasian, 
gradually developed.  The former established residencies in the newer districts of the 
cities, while the latter lived close to the Chinese and indigenous people in the 
unhealthy inner city.  After the agricultural crisis of 1884, even plantation owners 
could not avoid an erosion in their socio-economic foundation.74  Unemployment grew 
among Europeans, while increasingly Indos began to be treated as social pariah, which 
helped shape an Indo consciousness.75   
The cheap Dutch-language newspapers bore testimony to struggles against 
discrimination and resistance to an oppressive colonial bureaucracy.  They articulated 
the grievances of the lower “European” (mainly Indo) classes, which often provoked 
the colonial authorities to contain their voices on charges of inciting hatred.  The case 
of the West Sumatran newspaper Padangsch Handelsblad (Commercial Newspaper of 
Padang) in 1882 deserves attention.  It was accused of violating the printing press 
regulations and eventually was forced to close down.  The excuse the judge presented 
was the fact that the newspaper, edited by sinjos (derogatory word for mixed blood 
Eurasians), had expressed, now for fifteen years, open hostility towards the 
“newcomers” who were marginalizing them.76   
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Dutch-language newspapers also drew attention to white pauperism in urban 
areas,77 which became a major topic among Dutch journalists.  They criticized the 
government and accused it of doing nothing during the crisis of 1884.  In 1885 J. F. 
Scheltema, the editor-in-chief of De Locomotief and his colleague Paul A. Daum of 
the Indisch Vaderland were forced to resign under the Press Act (persdelict) due to 
their critical comments on the alleged government unresponsiveness.78 
Another kind of social uneasiness arose from within the “European” 
community itself.  The social behavior of Dutch women drew more media attention.  
Until the end of the nineteenth century it was considered normal for white women, 
especially in areas outside of the colony’s big cities, to wear indigenous dress in their 
daily life.  Some white women became sexually involved with indigenous men, just as 
Dutch men lived with indigenous concubines or njais and sired mixed-blood 
children.79  But newly arrived Europeans could not tolerate this kind of acculturation, 
and instead they tried to protect their private sphere and social status as “whites.”80  
Most of the newcomers lived in the colony’s cities, and were fearful of the crime and 
epidemics that they imagined as being rampant among the native population.  Those 
who had to live in rural areas or small towns simply felt insecure living in a situation 
where they were surrounded by the indigenous people.81  
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This insecure feeling among Europeans created a new attraction in the 
newspapers.  Stories about njais and crimes, particularly in Malay language 
newspapers, became popular topic in the 1880s on.  These new genres demanded new 
kinds of journalists who could penetrate into the grey zones of society, although up 
until the middle of the 1880s career journalists were almost exclusively Europeans not 
born in the Indies.82  Thus the Indos and the Indies Chinese found new career 
opportunities in journalism.  In fact, their writings elicited positive reaction from a 
growing audience.  Popular topics often became the focus of fictionalized accounts 
that were serialized in the newspapers and later compiled and published in book form.  
Indo writers such as F. Wiggers, G. Francis and H. Kommer and Chinese authors like 
Lie Kim Hok and Tan Ging Tiong were major and popular contributors of such tales.83 
   Gradually, “daily papers had grown cheaper and people on low incomes would 
often share a subscription.”84  Literacy rates also increased.  This whole process can be 
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seen as the democratization of the press in the Indies.85  Simultaneously journalism 
“joined in as watchdog over white morality.”86  This newly constructed tradition of 
journalism as a moral as well as social force was passed onto the indigenous 
journalists in the early twentieth centuries.   
 
Liberal Winds 
In the Netherlands after the 1848 revolution liberalism became more and more 
popular.  Dutch citizens in the metropole started to pay attention to the indigenous 
people in the Indies.  In 1860, a few years after the authoritarian Printing Press 
Regulation was introduced, the publication of one novel changed the Dutch people’s 
perception of the colony and came to influence colonial policies in the long run.  The 
novel was Max Havelaar, of de koffij-veilingen der Nederlandsche Handel-
Maatschappij (Max Havelaar, or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading 
Company),87 written by Eduard Douwes Dekker, who was born in Amsterdam in 
1820, but at the age of 18 had gone to Java, where he obtained a post as civil servant.  
In 1851 he was promoted to Assistant Resident in Ambon, and then was transferred to 
Lebak in Bantam, Java, in 1857.  Because of his position as a medium-ranking 
colonial official, Dekker came to see firsthand the abuses of the Dutch Cultivation 
System, and began to criticize it openly.  Consequently he was threatened with 
dismissal, and because of this he resigned from his position and returned to the 
Netherlands.  Upon his return he was determined to expose in detail the scandals and 
abuses that he had witnessed, and began to write about them in newspapers.  In 1860 
he published the novel Max Havelaar under the pseudonym Multatuli.   
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Max Havelaar became a sensation, domestically as well as internationally, and 
was translated into the top European languages.88  It was sensational because it 
informed the Dutch people in the metropole of the harsh socio-economic conditions in 
Java and at the same time laid the blame on the Dutch colonial system as its cause.  
Arguably it pushed the Netherlands government to legislate colonial slave 
emancipation in 1863, thirty years after the British counterparts.89 
The main target of the novel was the Cultivation System, which was 
introduced in the Indies in 1830.  In the novel, the protagonist Max Havelaar is a 
colonial official who is caught up in this corrupt government system despite his good 
intentions.  Max Havelaar was a protest novel against the overall colonial system and 
was later credited as “the book that killed colonialism.”90  It brought awareness among 
Europeans in Europe that the wealth they had enjoyed actually derived from 
immeasurable suffering in the colonies.   
The liberals’ rationale was that removing barriers to economic progress would 
promote the general welfare in the Indies.91  The implicit goal was individual gain, and 
so they clamored for the state to develop a modern economic and communications 
infrastructure.  After the 1850s, the telegram, railways, and modern mailing system 
were introduced, bringing about a revolution in social communication in the Indies.   
In October 1856 the first electro-magnetic telegraph link was installed between 
Batavia and Buitenzorg.  In the following year when the Batavia-Soerabaja link was 
opened and its Semarang and Ambarawa branches was established, telegraph services 
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were opened to the public.92  As the following table shows, the telegraph wire was 
installed beginning in 1856, two years before it became active.  The wire is the long 
continuous cable connecting points in the telegraph system, while the telegraph line is 
the wire that carries telegraph signals.  In 1859 when the telegraph line was activated, 
its network extended for 2,750 kilometers.93   
 
 
Table 2-1: Development of Telegraph Network, 1856-1906 
Year Wires (km) Lines (km) 
1856 0 0 
1858 2,650 0 
1859 2,750 2,750 
1871 4,750 4,750 
1886 7,600 5,750 
1888 9,750 7,500 
1889 10,023 7,751 
1890 10,045 7,773 
1891 10,043 7,761 
1906 18,928.32 13,912.23 
[Source: Taken from Verslag omtrent den Post- en Telegraafdienst in 
Nederlandsch-Indië (Batavia: Ogilvie & Co, 1891, 1892, 1893); Verslag 
omstrent den Post- en Telegraafdienst in Nederlandsch-Indië 
(Weltevreden: Javasche Boekhandel & Drukkerij, 1907); Verslag 
omstrent den Post- en Telegraafdienst in Nederlandsch-Indië (Batavia-
Weltevreden: G. Kolff & Co., 1916). Data between 1856 and 1886 are 
my estimation.] 
 
In 1870 submarine cables began to be established within the archipelago.  The 
colonial regime took advantage of the vast under-sea cable system built by the British 
and Americans, by hooking into the nearby hub of Singapore.  The following table 
shows the speed and character of the process.94  Because of the aggressive expansion 
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of telegraph networks, telegraph lines reached 7,761 kilometers in 1891, and 
13,912.23 kilometers in 1906.  By 1914 telegraphic submarine cables had expanded 
throughout the Indies connecting to the hinterland. 
 
Table 2-2: Expansion of Telegraphic Submarine Cable 
1870 Batavia (Java) – Singapore, Banjoewangi (Java) – Port Darwin (Australia) 
1888  Gresik (Java) – Bangkalan (Madoera) 
1892 Medan – Olelheu (Sumatra) 
1897 Olelheu (Sumatra) –Sabang (Weh Island) 
1897 Singaradja (Bali) – Ampenan (Lombok) 
1901 Situbondo (Java) – Bandjarmasin (Borneo) 
1903 Balikpapan (Borneo) – Kwandang and Manado (Celebes) 
1904 Muntok (Billiton) – Pangkalpinang (Bangka) – Palembang (Sumatra) 
1905 Makassar (Celebes) – Balikpapan (Borneo) 
1907 Muara Pegatan (Borneo) – Kumang-Kumang) (Laoet Island) 
1909 Medan (Sumatra) – Sabang (Weh Island) 
1910 Situbondo (Java) – Makassar (Celebes) 
1912 Padang – Sibolga (Sumatra) 
1913 Padang (Sumatra) – Batavia – Semarang and Soerabaja (Java) 
1913 Soerabaja (Java) – Balikpapan (Borneo) 
1913 Balikpapan (Borneo) – Manado (Celebes) 
1914 Kema/Gorontalo (Celebes) – Ternate  
[Source: Taken and modified from Direktorat Jenderal Pos dan Telekomunikasi, Sejarah pos dan 
telekomunikasi di Indonesia: Jilid I Masa pra Republik (Jakarta: Departemen Perhubungan, Direktorat 
Jenderal Pos dan Telekomunikasi, 1980), p. 98. 
 
The first steam train was introduced in 1868 in Semarang, Central Java.  The 
train ran from Semarang Goedang (station) to Tanggoeng, and soon reached to 
Kedoengdjati, a total of 9 kilometers.  As a port city connecting the hinterland as well 
as the spread of plantations in the northern coastal region of Central Java, Semarang 
became the center of the train system in Java.  By 1885 railway network had expanded 
                                                                                                                                       
Telekomunikasi, Sejarah pos dan telekomunikasi di Indonesia: Jilid I Masa pra Republik (Jakarta: 
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to 553 kilometers in Java, while by 1900 it had reached 2607 kilometers in Java and 
Sumatra.95 
In turn, railways led to the expansion of postal system in the Indies.  By the 
1890s long distance mail delivery in Java mainly relied on trains.  Major routes 
consisted of Batavia-Tandjong Priok-Weltevreden-Meester-Cornelis-Buitenzorg-
Tjitjalengka-Garoet; Tegal-Balapoelang; Semarang-Kedoengdjati-Ambarawa-
Soerakarta-Djokjakarta-Koetoardjo-Poerworedjo-Tjilatjap; Soerakarta-Modjokerto-
Sidoardjo-Soerabaja; Kertosono-Kediri-Toeloengagoeng-Blitar; Sidoardjo-
Pasoeroean-Probolinggo; and Bangil-Malang.96 
In 1876 when newspaper delivery started, it ultimately became the main item 
being distributed through the colony’s the postal system.  From the outset, the 
newspaper delivery already constituted 30 percent of all mail delivered, while by 1891 
it reached more than half of all items (53.7 percent) in the mail category.  In the cities 
Batavia, Semarang, Soerabaja and Jogjakarta, which were the centers of the publishing 
industry, newspapers circulated mainly through the mail system.  In 1891 newspapers 
accounted for 82.1 percent of all mails delivered in Batavia, while in Semarang and 
Soerabaja this share reached 59.5 percent and 64 percent respectively in the same year.  
The expansion of the postal network and service certainly helped develop the 
newspaper business. 
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Table 2-3: Newspapers in Mail Delivery, 1876-1915 
year total mails newspapers percentage 
1876 2,250,000 675,000 30 
1885 3,300,000 1,275,000 38 
1886 3,300,000 1,500,000 45 
1889 3,873,149 1,635,384 42.2 
1890 3,905,811 1,827,034 46.7 
1891 3,941,935 2,119,816 53.7 
1906         ----- 8,468,928             ----- 
1915         ----- 12,215,814             ----- 
[Source: Taken from Verslag omtrent den Post- en Telegraafdienst 
in Nederlandsch-Indië (Batavia: Ogilvie & Co, 1891, 1892, 1893); 
Verslag omstrent den Post- en Telegraafdienst in Nederlandsch-
Indië (Weltereden: Javasche Boekhandel & Drukkerij, 1907); 
Verslag omstrent den Post- en Telegraafdienst in Nederlandsch-
Indië (Batavia-Weltevreden: G. Kolff & Co., 1916). Data between 
1987 and 1886 are my estimation.] 
 
Table 2-4: Newspapers in Mail in Major Cities in 1891 
City Newspapers Total Mails Percentage 
Batavia 1,386,136 1,686,957 82.1 
Semarang 950,362 1,596,946 59.5 
Soerabaja 768,890 1,200,459 64 
Djokjakarta 56,206 171,692 32.7 
Weltevreden 60,087 539,835 11.1 
Soerakarta 45,327 232,851 19.4 
Padang 32,937 170,301 19.3 
Medan 25,806 117,097 22 
Makasser 10,543 94,017 11.2 
[Source: Taken from Verslag omtrent den Post- en Telegraafdienst in 
Nederlandsch-Indië (Batavia: Ogilvie & Co., 1893)] 
 
The communications revolution paved the way for the Dutch liberals to pursue 
their moral mission in the Indies.  In 1899, a liberal Dutch lawyer and statesman, 
Conrad Theodor van Deventer, published an article entitled “Een eereschuld” (A Debt 
of Honor) in the Dutch journal De Gids, in which he argued that the colonial 
government had a moral responsibility to repay the wealth that the Netherlands had 
extorted from the Indies.97  Such sentiment eventually formed the motivation for the 
                                                
97 Conrad Theodor van Deventer, “Een eereschuld,” De Gids, No. 3 (1899), pp. 205-257. 
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Ethical Policy, which was announced by the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina in 1901.  The 
Ethical Policy was endorsed by a broad coalition of Christian parties, liberals, and 
business interests in the Netherlands.  It was in sharp contrast with the previous 
official doctrine that perceived the Indies as a “region for profit making” 
(wingewest).98  It also marked the start of modern development policy, which 
emphasized improvement in the material living conditions of the indigenous people.  
An important component of the Ethical Policy was the development of Indies people 
after Western models under Dutch supervision. 
Principal to this development was the propagation of Western-style education.  
Children from aristocratic families had privileged access to this modern education.  
The formation of a reservoir of Western-trained indigenous people would also meet 
the needs of government and business interests for cheap indigenous middle-level 
personnel.  The colonial administration required more personnel for positions in newly 
annexed territories and for the newly set up and expanded social welfare services and 
educational institutions.  Consequently, the period of the Ethical Policy from 1901 to 
1930 saw the colonial government expanding secondary educational opportunities to 
the indigenous people of the Indies.99  As the chart above shows, the number of 
Indonesians who obtained Western primary education jumped from 2,987 in 1900 to 
74,697 in 1928, which was a twenty-five fold increase in twenty eight years, while 
those who graduated from Western secondary schools increased 258 times from 25 in 
                                                
98 On van Deventer and the Ethical Policy, see C. Snouck Hurgronje, “Van Deventer’s werk voor 
Indië,” De Gids, No. 79 (1915), pp. 422-446. 
99 In 1925, the government’s focus shifted to the provision of a widespread three-year elementary 
vocational education.  The 1930 census recorded the indigenous literacy percent at 6.3 percent.  In 
1940, over two million indigenous students attended such schools.  Dutch-medium education opened 
new horizons and opportunities, and was in strong demand among the indigenous population.  In 1940, 
65,000 to 80,000 Indonesian students were in Dutch-medium primary schools, equivalent to one per 
cent of the relevant age group.  Around the same time, there were 7,000 Indonesian students in Dutch-
medium secondary schools.  A good number of students attended the Advanced Primary Education 
(Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs, or MULO). Although the number of enrolled students was small 
compared to the relevant age group, Dutch-medium education was generally of high quality and from 
the 1920s began to produce a generation of educated Indonesians.  
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1900 to 6,468 in 1928.  Thus a new indigenous social class emerged; in the Java 
region they were considered the new prijaji, mostly members of the lower aristocracy 
who settled in urban areas.   !
Table 2-5: Numbers of Indonesians Obtaining Western Education, 1900-1928 
Years 
Average number of Indonesians in 
schools giving Western primary 
education 
Average number of Indonesians in 
schools giving Western secondary 
education (incl. Mulo [grades 7-9]) 
1900-1904   2,987     25 
1905-1909   5,175     45 
1910-1914 23,910   135 
1915-1919 33,516   675 
1920-1924 51,308 2,602 
1925 61,425 4,431 
1926 64,721 4,799 
1927 66,824 5,692 
1928 74,697 6,468 
[Source: George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1952), p. 31.] 
 
The local indigenous administrators (Binnenlandsch Bestuur, BB) were the 
distinct specialist branches of the Indies regime, which was divided into the European 
administration (Europeesch Bestuur) and indigenous administration (Inlandsch 
Bestuur).  The European administrators extended through the colonial government’s 
hierarchy running (from below) aspirant controller (aspirant controleur) and controller 
(controleur) to assistant resident (assistent resident), resident, and governor 
(gouverneur).  The rank of controller was paired with that of regent (boepati) in the 
indigenous administration as a putative advisor to the Indonesian ruler.  Since the 
nineteenth century, most members of the traditional class of the nobles of the robe 
(prijaji) had generally obtained a position in the indigenous administration.  As the 
numbers of Western-educated indigenous residents grew with the implementation of 
the Ethical Policy, not all graduates were able to get government jobs.  As more and 
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more members of educated indigenous population sought a place in higher society and 
greater, they often became trailblazers in positions as newspaper reporters, teachers, 
and other professions that were relatively independent of the colonial government and 
businesses.100 
 
Abdul Rivai and Economic Patronage 
In 1906 during the governorship of General Joannes Benedictus Van Heutsz 
(1904-1908), an important development in press legislation took place.  By Royal 
Decree of March 19, 1906, a system of post-publication censorship came to replace 
that of preventive, pre-publication censorship.  Article 13 of the 1856 Printing Press 
Regulation was revised so that all printers or publishers were no longer obliged to 
submit a copy of their publication to the head of local government within twenty-four 
hours prior to circulation.   
The main reason behind this change was the hope harbored by the colonial 
authorities that by letting the vernacular press speak they could grasp what was going 
on in the indigenous communities and what the natives were thinking.  Unlike the 
dominant view that regards the 1906 Royal Decree as signaling a new trend in the 
direction of press freedom,101 I look at the change that took place from preventive to 
restrictive censorship as a shift towards introducing tougher measure of control over 
the press.  If the decree really guaranteed press freedom, Van Heutsz might not have to 
provide any patronage for indigenous journalists.102  Another factor behind the 
                                                
100 For analyses of transformation of traditional aristocrats and growing number of educated Indonesian 
bureaucrats, see Robert Van Neil, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite; Heather Sutherland, 
The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite: The Colonial Transformation f the Javanese Priyayi (Singapore: 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1979).  In the 1930s, 90 percent of Indies civil servants were “natives.” 
101 For this view, see the pioneering study of Indies censorship by Maters, Van zachte wenk tot harde 
hand. 
102 It can also be argued that patronage was necessary to some extent because indigenous journalists 
might not be able to compete with Indo or Chinese own newspapers at the turn of the twentieth century.  
There are two reasons for this.  One is the limited number of readers, while the other is a sharp 
competition to get advertisements, which were the main financial source for newspaper businesses. 
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government’s adoption of post-publication censorship was that the government 
considered the alternative – the suppression of all potentially inflammatory print 
matter – as the more dangerous course.  The new policy was to try to contain 
discontent by allowing it in certain channels where it could be kept within the bounds 
without endangering the public order.   
The 1906 press regulation ushered in a new regime of press “limitations.”  
Other than the Printing Press Regulation, Articles 156 and 157 of the Penal Code 
concerning persdelict (press offence) and spreekdelict (speech offence) were major 
legal hurdles for local journalists.  These two codes were installed in 1906 when the 
new censorship format was put into place.  Even after the Indies state installed the new 
censorship, Dutch officials both at home and the colony mooted various proposals to 
curb the press, but eventually it was decided that the existing laws were adequate as I 
will discuss in Chapter 3.   
Governor-General Van Heutsz paved the way for the indigenous press to 
flourish in the Indies.  As he took office in October 1904, Van Heutsz changed the 
political circumstances surrounding the vernacular press.  Van Heutsz provided secret 
financial support to Bintang Hindia in order to help an indigenous leader, Abdul Rivai 
and maintained a close personal relationship with Tirto Adhi Soerjo, a highly educated 
Javanese aristocrat who later on would be remembered as Father of the National Press. 
Dr. Abdul Rivai was born in Benkoelen in 1871 as son of a teacher, and 
studied at the school for Javanese doctors – which later became the Training College 
for Native Doctors (School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen, STOVIA) – in 
Batavia from 1887 to 1895.  After graduation, he worked as a government doctor in 
Deli, where he was also active as a journalist.  In 1899 Rivai moved to Utrecht and 
then Amsterdam to continue his practice as doctor, while keeping up with his interest 
in journalism.  In March 1902 Rivai and his partner, a Dutch journalist named 
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Clockner Brousson, launched a new journal called Bintang Hindia in Amsterdam and 
in 1903 started to publish it in Batavia.103  Bintang Hindia was a good model for the 
Ethical Policy, because it symbolized education, progress, and native uplift that were 
ostensibly the new guiding principles of the colonial rule.  The articles in Bintang 
Hindia confirmed the Dutch expectation that a new era had arrived in the Indies, 
which would modernize the colonial society.  The journal itself was a sign of 
modernity and a vehicle for renewal of the Indies.   
In 1905 Rivai published a remarkable article entitled “Kaoem Moeda” (Young 
Generation), which was a term referring to the group of people who, due to their 
Western education, had broken from the old ideas and tradition and were open to new 
cultural influences.  Bintang Hindia thus developed into a hub of the “kaoem moeda” 
movement, to which numerous young indigenous elites turned their questions and 
comments.  The journal was a great success in general with a circulation reaching 
14,000 in 1903, and agents extending from Java to Sumatra and Celebes.  Three-
fourths of its subscribers were government employees.  Although its Chinese 
readership also grew rapidly and reached six thousand in 1906,104 Bintang Hindia 
could not stand on its own without governmental subsidies, which made the journal a 
semi-official government publication.105 
In 1910, a year after Van Heutsz was replaced by Governor-General A. W. F. 
Idenburg, the subsidy for Bintang Hindia was terminated and it ceased publishing.  In 
this regard, Van Heutsz had played a major role in the emergence of indigenous press 
in Java by providing political and financial patronage to Abdul Rivai and his Bintang 
Hindia.   
                                                
103 Parada Harahap, Riwajat Dr. A. Rivai, (Medan: Indische Drukkerij, 1939). 
104 Harry A. Poeze, “Early Indonesian emancipation: Abdul Rivai, Van Heutsz and the Bintang Hindia,” 
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, No. 145 (1989), pp. 87-107. 
105 Poeze, “Early Indonesian Emancipation.” 
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Tirto Adhi Soerjo and Political Patronage 
Tirto Adhi Soerjo’s journalistic activities drew attention from Governor-
General Van Heutsz.  Van Heutsz had encouraged Malay-language journalism; along 
with other Dutch ethici, he was deeply interested in the “native awakening.”  As the 
Director of Education, Religion, and Industry M. J. A. Abendanon (1900-1905) 
supported R. A. Kartini, an aristocratic Javanese girl, and helped make her a symbol of 
the indigenous women’s emancipation; the Dutch Parliamentarian H. H. Van Kol, the 
director of Koningin Wilhelmina School J. Stigter, and other ethici also befriended 
Tirto.  But most importantly, Tirto enjoyed direct personal access to Governor-General 
Van Heutsz, which accorded him immunity from bureaucratic harassment and respect 
from his educated countrymen, Chinese, Arabs, Eurasians, and ethical-minded Dutch. 
As Indonesia’s most recognized author Pramoedya Ananta Toer puts it, Tirto 
was not only “Father of the National Press” (Bapak Pers Nasional) but also the first 
real (self-subsidized) indigenous editor/publisher and one of the first indigenous 
writers.  He was also the founder of modern voluntary associations in Indonesia – the 
Aristocrats Association (Sarikat Prijaji) and the Islamic Commerce Association 
(Sarikat Dagang Islamiah); the first indigenous to establish a limited liability 
company; arguably the first indigenous aristocrat-turned-entrepreneur; and among the 
earliest indigenous supporters of women’s emancipation.  Because of his 
groundbreaking activities, he was memorialized in Pramoedya’s novel as the 
“pioneer” (sang pemula) of the Indonesian national awakening.106 
Tirto Adhi Soerjo was born in 1880 in Blora, East Java, as a grandson of the 
Regent of Bojonegoro, R. M. T. Tirtonoto.  He was educated in European Elementary 
Schools in Bojonegoro, Madioen, and Rembang, and in 1893/94 at the age of 13 or 14 
                                                
106 Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Sang Pemula, (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1985).  For a fine review of this book, 
from which I owe to draw Tirto’s career, see Takashi Shiraishi, “Reading Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s 
“Sang Pemula” [The Pioneer],” Indonesia, No. 44 (1987), pp. 129-139. 
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entered STOVIA in Batavia, as Rivai had done about a decade earlier.  Already as a 
student of STOVIA, in 1894-1895, Tirto had begun submitting his writings to Malay-
language Batavia newspapers, and then became an assistant of Chabar Hindia Olanda 
(News of Netherlands Indies), Pembrita Betawi (Batavian Messenger), and Pewarta 
Priangan (Priangan Courier).  At the age of 20, he dropped out of STOVIA and joined 
Pembrita Betawi as an editor, and the following year in 1900, became its editor-in-
chief.  In 1902 Tirto reported on the trip of R. M. Ng. Prodjo Sapoetro of the 
Kasoenanan to Banten and exposed a scandalous plot by Resident of Madioen J. J. 
Donner to depose the Regent of Madioen, Brotoningrat.  This kind of report made him 
a star journalist.  In 1903 he started his own newspaper, Soenda Brita (Soenda News), 
with financial support from the Regent of Tjiandjoer R. A. A. Prawiradiredja; it was 
the first newspaper financed, managed, edited, and published by an indigene.   
In 1904, Tirto became the editor of Staatsblad Melajoe (the Malay-language 
edition of the Dutch Staatsblad) and of Oranje Nassau, while continuing his 
editor/administrator-ship in Soenda Brita.  Three years later, he started the weeklies 
Medan Prijaji (Aristocrats’ Arena) and Soeloeh Keadilan (Beacon of Justice) with the 
financial support from Regent Prawiradiredja and Sultan Bacan Pangeran Oesman 
Sjah.  A year later, together with Hadji Mohammad Arsad and Pangeran Oesman, 
Tirto established Java Bookstore and Printing and Stationery Dealership Ltd. (NV 
Javansche Boekhandel en Drukkerij en Handel in Schrijfbehoeften) “Medan Prijaji.”  
It was the first limited company ever established by an indigenous Indonesian, which 
then owned one of the first indigenous printing houses.  Subscribers to Medan Prijaji 
were encouraged to buy the company’s shares, and reduced subscription rates were 
offered to those who became its shareholders.   
Medan Prijaji was the most important newspaper that Tirto edited and 
published, and was originally conceived as the organ of the Sarekat Prijaji.  As the 
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journal’s subtitle declared, Medan Prijaji was intended to reflect “the voice of all 
Rulers, actual and intellectual Aristocrats, Native Aristocrats and merchants, officials 
and merchants of other colonized nations (bangsa) that is equivalent to Natives, all 
over the Netherlands Indies.”107  Using this medium, Tirto confronted injustices, 
tyranny, abuses, exploitation, and fraudulent scheming committed by Dutch and native 
officials, from the Resident level down to village chiefs.  In so doing he created his 
own brand of journalism, which was to be inherited by the indigenous movement 
(pergerakan) leaders of the 1910s.  
Aside from his journalistic activities, Tirto maintained his interest in 
establishing and managing voluntary associations.  One organization with the potential 
for significant social influence among Indonesian natives was Boedi Oetomo (Noble 
Endeavor), an organization that was established in 1908 for native aristocratic 
intellectuals and is celebrated in Indonesian history as the first articulation of the 
“native awakening.”108  Boedi Oetomo owed its prominent position to Governor-
General Idenburg who blessed its activity and to Douwes Dekker, an Indo journalist, 
who enthusiastically reported its activity in the Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad.  Yet despite 
Boedi Oetomo’s prominence and Tirto’s Javanese background, Tirto received greater 
guidance from the Chinese model for organizational management and strategy.  The 
movement for social and educational organizations such as the Tiong Hwa Hwee Koan 
(THHK, Chinese Association) established by Batavian Chinese in 1900 caught his 
attention.  The Chinese succeeded in boycotting the Amsterdam Trade Association 
(Handelsvereeniging) and in protecting the commercial interests of the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce (Siang-hwee).109  From reading about their activities in 
                                                
107 Pramoedya, Sang Pemula, p. 47.  
108 Akira Nagazumi, The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism: The Early Years of the Budi Utomo, 1908-
1918 (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1972). 
109 Tirto Adhi Soerjo, “Gerakan Bangsa Cina di Surabaya Melawan Handelsvereniging Amsterdam,” in 
Pramoedya, Sang Pemula, pp. 189-192. 
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newspapers, Tirto in 1906 founded the union of Javanese aristocrats, Sarikat Prijaji, 
whose purpose was to promote education among the sons of indigenous aristocrats.  
Tirto’s strength might have also caused his undoing.  Those whom he had 
“shot at with bow and arrow” and who felt their persons and careers had been 
tarnished by his investigative reporting did not forget what he had done to them.  They 
waited for the right time to strike back.  Over the course of his numerous exposés of 
scandals, Tirto’s name and activities were recorded in the files, dossiers and other 
documents developed by the Indies State and could be used against him in the future. 
The time came when Van Heutsz left office in 1909 and A. W. F. Idenburg 
took over.  Idenburg was another proponent of the Ethical Policy, but the new 
Governor-General’s “pet” was not Tirto, but the organization Boedi Oetomo.  After 
the Islamic Association (Sarekat Islam, SI) was born in 1911, its founder R. M. Oemar 
Said Tjokroaminoto who was popular all over Java, also became Idenburg’s favorite.  
Tirto, in other words, had lost his powerful patron and protector within the Indies 
state.  Within a few months he found himself serving a two-month exile in Lampoeng 
from March to May 1910 due to a charge of persdelict.110   
This persdelict case exemplified the consequences of losing political 
patronage.  In the middle of 1909, Tirto finally had to stand in a court for natives and 
present his own defense statements against the prosecutor’s accusations.  He was 
accused by an Aspirant Controleur,111 A. Simon, due to his article “Betapa Satu 
Pertolongan Diartikan” (“How An Assistance Has Been Perceived”) published in 
Medan Prijaji, no. 24, in July 30, 1908.  The article covered and offered commentary 
                                                
110 Tirto Adhi Soerjo, “Oleh-oleh dari Tempat Pembuangan,” in Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Sang Pemula, 
pp. 243-288. 
111 Aspirant Controleur was the lowest level of Dutch civil service. 
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on a legal case marked by a typical abuse of power by the local authority, in this case 
during a village election.112    
It begins with a description of the day the Wedono (middle-ranking official of 
the native territorial bureaucracy) of Cankrep, Mas Tjokrosantono, sent a letter to 
Tirto requesting to stop his subscription to Medan Prijaji.  But his request was not 
followed because he had sent his letter to the chief editor (Tirto) instead of to the 
administrator who was in charge of subscriptions.  A few months prior to this incident, 
a villager from Bapangan, Tjankrep, named Soerodimedjo, had come to see Tirto in 
Bogor113 to report on his cause.  This villager recounted that he had won in an election 
for village head, but the person with the second most votes had later been appointed as 
the village head instead of him.  This person was supported by a European, the 
Aspirant Controleur A. Simon.  The election itself was coordinated by the Wedono, 
who also supported the second person.  Because of the election problem, quarrel and 
chaos had ensued in the village.  Soerodimedjo was held responsible for the chaos, and 
was subsequently caught and sentenced to 14 days in prison.  In view of these 
injustices done to him, Soerodimedjo had come to Tirto for protection.  With Tirto’s 
assistance and an introductory letter, Soerodimedjo was able to see the Governor-
General in the afternoon and asked to be released from legal punishment.  On sight, 
the Governor-General granted his wish. 
We are told that several days later, on his way to Jogjakarta, we are told that 
Tirto went to see Soerodimedjo.  He learnt that the case had indeed been reexamined 
by Aspirant Controleur A. Simon, but apparently the latter had also questioned the 
villager as to why he had asked for the case to be reviewed.  At this point in the article 
Tirto criticized the Aspirant Controleur by saying that everyone who has been unjustly 
                                                
112 The persdelict case below is taken from “Persdelict: Umpatan: A. Simon Kontra R. M. Tirto Adhi 
Soerjo” in Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Sang Pemula, pp. 208-216. 
113 “Bogor” used to be called “Buitenzorg” in colonial days. 
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punished naturally wants to clear his name.  Furthermore, the Aspirant Controleur 
apparently had also asked the villager how much money the latter had spent for Tirto’s 
assistance.  To this, Tirto remarked in the article that if the Aspirant Controleur had 
really asked such a question, he also wanted to ask the Aspirant Controleur the same 
question, that is, how much money the person who had won the second most votes had 
to spend in order to become the village head.  Further we are told that because of such 
intimidation, Tirto sent a telegram to the Regent of Poerworedjo, asking him to protect 
the villager.   
Tirto’s article, published in Medan Prijaji, demonstrated how he dealt with 
local authorities who were corrupt or abused their power.  For this particular article, 
Aspirant Controleur Simon had sued Tirto.  The charges against Tirto were twofold.  
One was that he had falsely accused the Aspirant Controleur and the Wedono of 
malpractice in conducting the election; the second was that he had humiliated the 
Aspirant Controleur by calling him a “whipper-snapper.”  
In court, the reported exchanges between the public prosecutor and Tirto went 
like this (in dialogue format):114 
                                                
114 Extracted from the original text in Pramoedya, Sang Pemula, pp. 212-214. 
ditanyakan siapakah yang menulis karangan itu. […] 
kita jawab yang itu adalah tulisan kita sendiri. […] tidak ada satu karangan atau kabar boleh 
dimuat dalam Medan Prijaji jika tidak dengan ittah kita. […] 
apakah tulisan kita itu ditujukan pada Mas Tjokrosentono, Wedono Cangkrep, dan A. Simon, 
Aspirant Controleur Purworejo, dan kita jawab “ya.” […] 
kita tulis itu karena kita murka, murka tiada hingga, ya marah besar, karena bangsa kita, si 
seperempat manusia, sudah dibikin sesuka-sukanya oleh pegawai, yang semestinya menjaga 
keselamatan si seperempat manusia yang lemah dan tidak berdaya itu.  
Tahukah, tuan, bahwa perkataan “snot-aap” […] adalah suatu penistaan dan hinaan […]? 
[Kita jawab: “di antara snot-aap snot-aap boleh jadi kalimat itu sutu penistaan atau 
penghinaan, tetapi di antara orang yang sempurna budi-pekertinya kalimat itu bukan kalimat 
penistaan.  Bukankah sepanjang pendapat Prof. Najon […] bahwa sebuat kalimat adalah 
kalimat penistaan jika kalimat itu mengenai harga diri dan harga kesopanan orang yang 
terkena.  Dalam hal ini maka kalimat itu tak lain artinya bahwa yang menggugat adalah dari 
jenis rendah, jenis bodoh di antara aspirant-aspirant controleur dan karena ini pun saya 
berpendapat di antara assistant-assistant residen, ya malah lebih tinggi lagi, ada terdapat jenis 
snot-aap. […] jadi tetap saya menyangkal pendapat si penggugat, bahwa kalimat itu tidak saya 
gunakan untuk menistanya. 
 63 
Prosecutor:  Who wrote this article? 
Tirto:  That is my own writing.  Not one article or report can be published in 
Medan Prijaji without my permission. 
P:  Was the article aimed at Mas Tjokrosentono, the Wedono of Cangkrep, A. 
Simon, the Aspirant Controleur of Purworejo? 
T:  Yes.  I wrote it because I was infuriated, infuriated beyond words, because 
our people (bangsa), the one-quarter of mankind (si seperempat manusia), 
have been treated unjustly by officials, who were supposed to look after these 
weak and powerless one-quarter humans.  
P:  Are you aware that the word “snot-aap” is a disgrace and an insult? 
T:  Among the snot-aaps, the sentence may be a disgrace and an insult.  But 
among those who have untainted wisdom, the sentence is not an insult.   
According to Professor Najon [...] a sentence is an insult if it concerns the other 
person’s integrity and civility.  In this case the sentence only means that the 
accuser is of the low level, ignorant type of assistant controllers, and I would 
even venture to say that among assistant residents, yes, even higher, you can 
                                                                                                                                       
Tuan sudah katakan, bahwa Aspirant Controleur A. Simon dan Wedono Mas Tjokrosentono 
menerima sogokan (semir) dari lurah yang diangkat itu? 
Tidak, itu tidak benar.  Karena Aspirant Controleur Simon menggunakan kemerdekaan 
bertanya pada Soerodimedjo, yang telah saya tolong itu, berapa saya dapat upah dari dia, maka 
saya pun menggunakan kemerdekaan bertanya, berapakah lurah yang diangkat itu membayar, 
maski tidak mendapat suara pemilih lebih dari Soerodimedjo, apa lagi sehingga Soerodimedjo 
yang dapat suara pemilih terbanyak […] 
Aspirant Controleur sudah selayaknya mengetahui bahwa seorang redaktur, seorang jurnalis, 
membela orang, menolong orang karena kewajibannya, jadi bukan karena diupah sebagai juga 
dia, Aspirant Controleur, menolong orang kecil menurut kewajibannya, jadi bukan karena 
omkooping (suap).  Karena itu dengan hak mutlak saya boleh mengatakan dia adalah snot-aap 
Aspirant Controleur dan dia seorang pegawai pembikin kekusutan alias pegawai broddelaar 
atau pegawai stumperaar, karena pegawai yang patut dicintai mesti dan wajib mengetahui, 
bahwa seorang jurnalis adalah pengawal pikiran umum, atau wakil rakyat, wakil penduduk, 
laksana Permaisuri Dunia sebagaimana Kaisar Wilhelm telah menggelari pers, jadi bekerja 
menurut kewajibannya, bukan karena suap].  Karena Simon, Aspirant Controleur, dengan 
pertanyaannya sudah menyerang kewajiban saya sebagai jurnalis, yang saya pegang tinggi, 
sudah layak kalau bukan saja menjadi murka, marah besar […] 
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find this snot-aap type.  [...]  so I deny the accuser’s opinion, that my sentence 
is to insult him. 
P:  Did you also say, that Aspirant Controleur A. Simons and Wedono Mas 
Tjokrosentono accepted bribery from the person elected as village head? 
T:  No, that’s not true.  Because Aspirant Controleur Simon had taken the 
liberty to ask Soerodimedjo, the person I had helped, how much fee I had 
received from him, I also took the liberty to ask, how much the appointed 
village head had paid, even though Soerodimedjo had received more votes [...]. 
As Aspirant Controleur he should have known that as an editor, a journalist, 
protecting the people is my his job, not because I am being paid, just as he, an 
Aspirant Controleur, helps the little people as his duty, not because of bribes.  
Because of this, I categorically called him a snot-aap Aspirant Controleur and 
that he was an incompetent official [...], because a respectable official should 
have known, that a journalist is a guardian of public opinion, a representative 
of the people, representative of the population [...], so he works according to 
duty, not for bribes.  Because Simon, the Aspirant Controleur, with his 
questions had attacked my [performing of my] duty as journalist, which I hold 
in high regard, naturally I have become not only very angry, but infuriated [...]. 
 
Tirto’s fierce and satirical writing style must have been enjoyable to read, especially 
for an audience that included the powerless people and exploited persons of Indies 
society as well as liberal minded intellectuals.  However, his political clout and 
immunity only worked so long as he remained under the patronage of the Governor-
General.  At the end of the trial, Tirto explicitly claimed his special rights as a member 
of the aristocratic class, so that the judge would not mistakenly treat him like the 
villager Soerodimedjo.  It appears that Tirto himself realized that he had lost his 
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political and legal immunity and now had to stand on his own feet, relying on his 
aristocratic credentials.  
When Tirto returned from his imprisonment, the number of subscribers of 
Medan Prijaji was over 2000.  By this time, however, Medan Prijaji had been 
confronted with a steady lack of advertisements, because most European companies 
had stopped advertising with the newspaper, putting it into a difficult situation 
financially.  On August 23, 1912 Medan Prijaji published its last issue and ceased 
publication.  
Rivai and Tirto’s cases exemplify how the ethical ideology, manifested most 
directly in the Governor-General’s patronage, provided opportunities to “indigenous” 
journalists and press; and how, in turn, the Indies government “tamed” indigenous 
intellectuals and influenced the way they asserted themselves (and their voices) in the 
increasingly vital vernacular print culture.  That one or two prominent indigenous 
journalists received “protection” (therefore immunity and credibility) from the highest 
authority in the land shows the specific way the Ethical Policy brought into existence 
not only “press freedom,” but also an “indigenous press” in the first decade of the 
twentieth century.  The number of indigenous vernacular press was still small, and yet 
the Ethical Policy provided a space where voices of the colonized people could be 
expressed relatively freely under the guardianship of the authorities.  It is worth noting 
that this “protection” did not correspond with nor was written into the Press 
Regulation of 1906, and yet has given rise to an important feature, which later on 
would be called “the national press.”115 
                                                
115 Governor-General Van Heutsz’s patronage targeted a handful of indigenous intellectuals and 
fostered indigenous journalists in Java, but Sumatra experienced a different dynamism in developing 
journalism since the dawn of the twentieth century.  Being on the periphery of the Indies, no equivalent 
patronage worked in Sumatra where pure business competition emerged in the field of newspapers.  As 
the center of commerce and trade in West Sumatra, Padang functioned as the center of vernacular 
publications and press.  Private journalists and businessmen competed for a limited number of readers 
and advertisements.   
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 “If I were, for a moment, a Dutchman…” 
On July 19, 1913, one of the most controversial political essays ever written by 
an Indonesian was published in the Dutch-language newspaper De Expres in 
Bandoeng.  It was authored by a Javanese aristocrat, Soewardi Soerjaningrat (1889-
1959), and was also published as a pamphlet on the same day.116  The essay was titled 
“Als ik eens Nederlander was…” (“If I were, for a moment, a Dutchman…”) with an 
appendix of its Malay translation by Abdoel Moeis.  It ironically questions the moral 
justification of the Dutch government asking the colonized people of the Indies to 
contribute to and participate in the celebration of the Dutch Independence Day.  The 
pamphlet stirred up consternation among the Dutch authorities, resulting in severe 
                                                                                                                                       
As was the case in Java, since the 1880s vernacular newspapers in Sumatra had been published 
either under Dutch, Indo, or Chinese ownership.  In 1905 however Padang saw the first indigenous-
owned newspaper, Insulinde (Archipelago).  Dja Endar Moeda co-purchased the newspaper with a 
Dutch journalist, J. C. Holtzappel (In 1928 when the first the radio conversation between the Indies and 
the Netherlands was held, Holtzappel was invited to give a short talk.  “Het eerste Radio-kruisgesprek 
Indië-Holland,” Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlansch-Indië, April 2, 1928.).  But Dja Endar 
Moeda does not seem to have been a good businessman.  Born in Padang Sidempoean in 1861, Dja 
Endar Moeda as a Southern Batak attended Dutch schools and the Teachers’ Training School in his 
hometown.  After having returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1893, he began his own private school 
in Padang, as well as became an editor of Pertja Barat (Western Sumatra).  In 1901 he sat on the 
editorial board of Insulinde, and bought it in 1905.  In 1906 he moved to Koeta Radja, Atjeh, and 
started Pemberita Atjeh (Atjeh News), which existed only for three years.  He was not successful in the 
newspaper business there.  Then he moved to Medan where he set up the Sjarikat Tapanoeli printing 
house with some Batak businessmen.  In January 1910 in his capacity as editor-in-chief he started to 
publish Pewarta Deli (Messenger of Deli).  But after a short stay in Medan, he returned to Koeta Radja 
and began Bintang Atjeh (Star of Atjeh) in June 1911, which ceased to exist in 1913.   
It appears that Dja Endar Moeda was a controversial figure in the newspaper business in 
Sumatra.  Although absent from Padang, he continued to serve as the chief editor of Pertja Barat.  
According to Ahmad Adam, the newspaper was “the most influential and lasted the longest” in Padang 
at the turn of the century.  Dja Endar Moeda regularly contributed propagandistic articles on modern 
education and social progress.  But in 1911 Pertja Barat often expressed racial hostility towards the 
Chinese.  Probably due to a series of charges of libel and seditious tendencies, Dja Endar Moeda fell 
victim to the press law (persdelict), and because of it his press business went down and the newspaper 
ceased to exist in 1912.  On the development of the Malay language press in Padang, see Adam, The 
Vernacular Press and the Emergence of Modern Indonesian Consciousness, pp. 146-147. 
116 R. M. Soewardi Soerjaningrat, “Als ik eens Nederlander was…,” in E. F. E. Douwes Dekker, Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo and R. M. Soewardi Soerjaningrat, Onze Verbanning: Publicatie der Officieel 
Bescheiden, Toegelicht met Verslagen en Commentaren, betrekking hebbende op de Gouvernements-
Besluiten van den 18en Augustus 1913, nos. 1a en 2a, Regelende de Toepassing van Artikelen 47 R.R., 
(Schiedam: Drukkerij DeToekomst, 1913). 
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penalties not only for its author, but also his associates.  Who was Soewardi and why 
did his writing so upset the Indies authorities?   
Born on May 2, 1889 as the second son of Pangeran (Prince) Soerjaningrat, 
like Rivai and Tirto, Soewardi Soerjaningrat117 also graduated from STOVIA.  In 1908 
he was involved in the founding of Boedi Oetomo, serving as its first secretary.  In 
1909 he was forced to abandon his studies due to financial hardship, and thus resigned 
from his activity in Boedi Oetomo.  In 1911 he moved to Jogjakarta, where he worked 
at a pharmaceutical factory, and began contributing articles to newspapers and 
magazines, thereby later attracting Douwes Dekker’s attention.  In 1912, at Dekker’s 
request, Soewardi moved to Bandoeng to take up full-time editorship of De Expres.  In 
Bandoeng Soewardi joined the Indies Party (Indische Partij) founded by Dekker and 
also became head of the Bandoeng branch of the Islamic Association (SI).  In July 
1913, Soewardi along with Tjipto Mangoenkoesomo (1886-1943) and Douwes Dekker 
(1879-1952), the grandnephew of famous author Eduard Douwes Dekker (Multatuli) 
who wrote Max Havelaar, established the Native Committee for the Commemoration 
of One Hundred Years of Dutch Liberty (Inlandsch Comité tot Herdenking van 
Nederlands Honderdjarige Vryheid), shortened as Native Committee (Comité Boemi 
Poetra) in Bandoeng.   
Ernest François Eugene Douwes Dekker was born in Pasoeroean, East Java, in 
1879 to a Dutch father and German-Javanese mother.118  After having studied at a top 
Dutch high school in Batavia, E. F. E. Douwes Dekker worked briefly at a coffee 
estate and subsequently at a sugar factory.  At the outbreak of the Boer War in South 
                                                
117 Soewardi, later known as Ki Hadjar Dewantara, founded the nationalistic Taman Siswa School 
system in July 1922.  A fine study of Dewantara and the Taman Siswa School is Tsuchiya, Democracy 
and Leadership. 
118 Paul Van Der Veur, “Introduction to a Socio-Political Study of the Eurasian of Indonesia,” (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Cornell University, 1955), pp. 156-176; Paul Van Der Veur, “E. F. E. Douwes Dekker: 
Evangelist for Indonesian Political Nationalism,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Aug. 
1958), pp. 551-566. 
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Africa, he volunteered his services to fight the British.  Captured and held a prisoner 
of war in Ceylon for two years, in 1903 he returned to Java.  Dekker started to work as 
an editorial staff at leading Dutch-language newspapers such as Soerabaiaasch 
Handelsblad (Soerabaja), Locomotief (Semarang), and Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad 
(Batavia).  His experience shaped his critical view of Western colonialism.  Dekker 
even criticized the newly formulated Ethical Policy, which focused on education, 
irrigation, transmigration, and decentralization of the Indies, and maintained instead 
that self-government should be granted.  In Batavia his house was located near 
STOVIA and became a “clubhouse as well as reading room and library” for STOVIA 
students.119  On May 20, 1908, a provisional student committee was formed and 
named Boedi Oetomo.120 
Coincidently, 1913 was the year when the Netherlands celebrated the 
centenary of its liberation from Napoleon’s rule.  In the abovementioned pamphlet 
Soewardi relished the irony: “What a joy, what a pleasure it would be to be able to 
commemorate such a very great day.”  He reflects on the good fortune of the patriotic 
Dutch “to whom it is given to celebrate such a jubilee.  For I am a patriot, too, and just 
like a Dutchman with pure nationalist intent loves his Fatherland, so do I love my own 
Fatherland, more than I can say.”  But then Soewardi goes on to say how unwise it 
was for the Dutch people to hold their celebrations of freedom in the Indies;  
                                                
119 Dr. Soetomo and Goenawan Mangoenkoesoemo were two frequent visitors there.  Robert Van Niel, 
The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1960). 
120 In 1910 Dekker moved to Bandoeng after staying for several years in Europe, and joined the 
Bandoeng branch of the Indische Bond, a friendship association for Eurasians.  He advocated the 
formation of the Indies Party (Indische Partij) from the Indische Bond, so that all residents of the Indies 
would be free to join.  In December 1912 the Indies Party was officially inaugurated.  Meanwhile, 
Dekker began to publish De Expres, through which he pushed for the reorganization of the Indische 
Bond as a political force.  From 1911 to 1912 Dekker also organized rallies to gather support across 
Java.  His political activity and the formation of the Indies Party drew government’s attention.  The 
Indies government regarded the party as a threat to the peace and order of the Indies and refused to 
recognize it as a legitimate association; hence as of April 1913 the Indies Party was obliged to suspend 
its activities.  S. L. Van Der Wal, (ed.), De opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlands-
Indië. Een bronnenpublikatie (Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1967), pp. 234-241.  On the activity of Boedi 
Oetomo, Nagazumi, The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism. 
 69 
 
If I were, for a moment, a Dutchman, I would not organize an independence 
celebration in a country where the independence of the people has been stolen. 
Thinking along this line, it is not only unfair but also improper to order the 
natives to give donations to the celebration fund.  The mere thought of 
preparing the independence ceremony is enough to humiliate them and now we 
even rob their pockets.  It is indeed a moral and material humiliation. […] 
If I were, for a moment a Dutchman, I would protest against the wish to have a 
celebration.  I would write in every newspaper declaring that such an intention 
is wrong.  I would warn all my fellow colonists about the danger in holding an 
independence celebration at this moment.  I would advise all Dutchmen not to 
hurt the feelings of the people in the Indies who have begun to have the 
courage to disobey us and who may in fact do so.  Indeed I would protest as 
hard as my powers let me.   
But […] I am not a Dutchman, I am only a brown-colored person from the 
tropics, a native of the Dutch colony, and because of that I will not protest. […] 
At the most it reminds us that we are not a free people and that the “Dutch do 
not give independence to us” so long as Mr. Idenburg still rules the country.  
Thus we, however absurd it may seem, will get a lesson from the ceremony: 
that it is a duty for everyone to commemorate the independence of their 
people.121 
 
                                                
121 Soewardi Soerjaningrat, “Als ik eens Nederlander was, …,” pp. 68, 69, 73.  Translations were taken 
from Savitri Prastiti Scherer, “Harmony and Dissonance: Early Nationalist Thought in Java,” (MA 
Thesis, Cornell University, 1975), pp. 300, 301, and 302, although I made minor changes.  One major 
change, however, is a Dutch word “eens,” which should be translated into “for the moment.”  I owe this 
point to Benedict Anderson. 
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When the Resident of Bandoeng, T. J. Janssen, read Soewardi’s pamphlet, he 
immediately reported it to the authorities in Batavia.  On July 25, a justice official, H. 
V. Monsanto, arrived in Bandoeng from Batavia.  Judging the pamphlet to be 
dangerous and in contravention of Article 26 of the Press Regulations, Monsanto 
interrogated the author and members of the Native Committee.  The following day he 
ordered that the pamphlets be confiscated.122  Correspondingly, the public prosecutor 
of Bandoeng confiscated Soewardi’s pamphlet on the grounds that it contravened 
Article 26 of the Press Regulations, which forbids “the belittling of Dutch authority 
and the instigation of hostility among the peoples of the Indies.”123  In the afternoon of 
July 30, Soewardi, Abdoel Moeis, Tjipto, and Wignjadisastra were arrested and held 
in custody; all of them were members of the Native Committee, whose “dangerous 
writing activities” Janssen considered to be seditious and disruptive of public order 
and peace.  Meanwhile, Douwes Dekker, who had been taking a short trip to Europe, 
returned to Java on August 1.  Immediately he wrote an article in De Expres of August 
5 entitled “Onze Helden: Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo en Soewardi Soerjaningrat” (Our 
Heroes: Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo en Soewardi Soerjaningrat), “in which he praised 
them as heroes, martyrs, and pathfinders, who had set an example for those who would 
come after.”124  He was detained the same day.125   
For the charge of violating Article 26 of the Press Regulations alone, offenders 
were liable to imprisonment for one to three months and a fine of 10 to 500 guilders.  
Governor-General Idenburg, however, applied Article 47 of the Constitutional 
Ordinance, which vested him “exorbitant rights.”  After the three leaders – Dekker, 
Tjipto and Soewardi – had been permitted to write a defense against the charges 
                                                
122 Mr. 1596/1913 in Verbaal 25 September 1913, No. 56. 
123 Mr. 1695/1913 in Verbaal 25 September 1913, no. 56. 
124 Tsuchiya, Democracy and Leadership, p. 22. 
125 Van Der Veur, “Introduction to a Socio-Political Study of the Eurasian of Indonesia,” pp. 173-174. 
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against them, mainly “to satisfy the requirements of the law,”126 on August 18, 
Idenburg announced the banishment from Java of all whose names appeared on the 
pamphlet in question.  Originally Dekker was to be exiled to Koepang in Timoer, 
Tjipto on Banda Island in Ambon, and Soewardi on Bangka Island.127  On August 27, 
however, Idenburg changed his original intention and instead gave permission for all 
three to go to the Netherlands, where Dekker stayed for the next five years, while 
Tjipto for about one year, and Soewardi for about six.  
Soewardi also penned a satirical pamphlet, among his first articles ever, in 
which a Javanese aristocrat used the Dutch language to assert his view on colonial 
rule.  The administration found it disturbing not for the fact that it was written in 
Dutch, but because it was translated into Malay and appended to the Native 
Committee’s propaganda literature.  Being translated into Malay meant that their 
opinions could now reach a much larger audience, in particular the colonized people 
who now could visualize a Javanese making remarks on the colonial rule.  
Furthermore, the variant of Malay language being used in the pamphlets was not the 
rigid “high” Malay of the manuscript tradition, but the “low” and casual variant, 
generally used in urban areas and heavily mixed with Dutch, Javanese, Minangkabau, 
Hokkien, and other languages. 
At a meeting of the Council of the Indies on July 31, Governor-General 
Idenburg stressed his point: 
 
The major difference between the situation today and that of six months ago 
[when the Indische Partij was formed] is that then activities were confined to 
                                                
126 Van Der Veur, “Introduction to a Socio-Political Study of the Eurasian of Indonesia,” p. 174. 
127 Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlands-Indië, pp. 326-329. 
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the newspapers in Dutch, whereas now everything is also published in 
Malay.128 
 
Although Soewardi, Tjipto and Dekker had often expressed strong critical attitudes 
towards the Dutch colonial rule in many Dutch newspapers and periodicals, it was not 
until the article “If I were, for a moment, a Dutchman…,” and especially its translation 
in Malay, that the Indies government took them seriously and regarded them as a 
potential threat to the stability of the colonial society.  The authorities were also 
concerned with the influence of the Native Committee’s publications over the 
followers of the Islamic Association (which, however, turned out to be 
insignificant).129 
 
Persdelict  
In 1914 a revision of the Penal Code was introduced.  It took the British Indian 
Press Act of 1910 as a model.  It adopted the provisions of Articles 124a and 153a in 
the British Penal Code in India and introduced provisions for a Penal Code for 
Europeans and a Penal Code for Natives.  The revision made possible the tightening of 
existing provisions in the Press Act.   
The Indies authorities had referred to the 1910 British Indian Press Act, which 
allowed the government to take action when the needs of protecting public order and 
tranquility required it.  It gave sweeping powers to the provincial governments130 in 
                                                
128 Mr. 1695/1913 in Verbaal 25 September 1913, no. 56. 
129 Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlands-Indië, p. 326. 
130 At the turn of the twentieth century, British India consisted of eight provinces that were administered 
either by a Governor or a Lieutenant-Governor.  Eight major provinces were Burma, Bengal, Madras, 
Bombay, United Provinces, Central Provinces and Berar, Punjab, and Assam.  See Barbara Daly 
Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
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suppressing the propaganda for the civil disobedience movement.  Section 4 (1) reads 
as follows: 
 
Whenever it appears to the Local Government that any printing-press in respect 
of which any security has been deposited as required by section 3 is used for 
the purpose of printing or publishing any newspaper, book or other document 
containing any words, signs or visible representations which are likely or may 
have a tendency, directly or indirectly, whether by inference, suggestion, 
allusion, metaphor, implication or otherwise: 
(a) to incite to murder or to any offence under the Explosive Substances Act, 
1908, or to any act of violence, or 
(b) to seduce any officer, solder or sailor in the Army or Navy of His Majesty 
from his allegiance or his duty, or 
(c) to bring into hatred or contempt His Majesty or the Government established 
by law in British India or the administration of justice in British India or 
any Native Prince or Chief under the suzerainty of His Majesty, or any 
class or section of His Majesty’s subjects in British India, or to excite 
disaffection towards His Majesty or the said Government or any such 
Prince or Chief, or 
(d) to put any person in fear or to cause annoyance to him and thereby induce 
him to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, or to do any 
act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which he is 
legally entitled to do, or 
(e) to encourage or incite any person to interfere with the administration of the 
law or with the maintenance of law and order, or 
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(f) to convey any threat of injury to a public servant, or to any person in whom 
that public servant is believed to be interested, with a view to inducing that 
public servant to do any exercise of his public functions, 
the Local Government may, by notice in writing to the keeper of such printing-
press, stating or describing the words, signs or visible representations which in 
its opinion are of the nature described above, declare the security deposited in 
respect of such press and all copies of such newspaper, book or other document 
whenever found to be forfeited to His Majesty.”131   
 
These recognizable offences included violence or directly or indirectly expressing 
approval or admiration of any such.  According to the Act, any person publishing 
under real or fictitious name who had committed or was alleged or represented to have 
committed the offence, would be punished.  The 1910 Press Act required owners of 
printing presses and newspapers to deposit a security of up to 5,000 rupees, which 
could be forfeited for publishing any objectionable material including criticism of the 
government.  If the security bond was forfeited, the next one would be heavier, and a 
third offence meant that the printing press could be stopped.  The Act also 
incorporated a provision that the governments of both Punjab and the United 
Provinces had recommended, which was the need to expand the provisions of the bill 
in order to encompass writings that excited antipathy between racial and religious 
groups.  The Act included a clause providing for forfeiture of a security bond in any 
case in which a press had been used “to bring into hatred or contempt any class or 
                                                
131 S. Natarajan. A History of the Press in India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), pp. 358-359.  
This book contains all major press legislation in British India in pages 325-377.  On the Indian Press 
Act 1910, see also Great Britain Parliament, Copy of the Indian Press Act, 1910, and proceedings of the 
legislative council of the Governor-General of India relating thereto (London: Darling & Son, 1910); 
Milton Israel, Communications and Power: Propaganda and the Press in the Indian Nationalist 
Struggle, 1920-1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 3-10, 50, 55. 
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section of His Majesty’s subjects in British India.”  There was also a provision for 
search and seizure of all copies of an offensive publication.132  Over the next decade 
the 1910 Press Act penalized more than 350 presses and 300 newspapers, and 
proscribed more than 500 publications.133   
Unlike the British Indian regime, the Indies government did not seem to 
engage in debates on the dangers of obscene publications in the Indies.  In the course 
of debates on press control, the question was whether the Indies government needed to 
change its policy from pre-publication censorship to post-publication one.134  All 
political expression and freedom of speech were directly translated into matters of 
public order in a way that made any other consideration trivial or irrelevant.  The 
Indies state viewed some publications as a dangerous source of nuisance or public 
disorder in the society, despite the fact that it had encouraged the development of 
indigenous press. 
The 1914 revision of the Dutch Penal Code for the Indies colony resulted in 
the introduction of Article 63a and b and 66a and b, the former being for Europeans 
and the latter for the Natives.  Article 66a of the Penal Code for Natives stipulated that 
whoever by words or signs or displays or in other ways aroused or fostered animosity, 
hate or contempt against the government of the Netherlands or the Netherlands Indies, 
would be punished with hard labor, in chains, from five to ten years.  Article 66b 
provided that whoever “by words or signs or displays or in other ways arouses or 
fosters animosity, hate or contempt between the different groups of the Netherlands’ 
subjects or the inhabitants of the Netherlands Indies will be punished with 
                                                
132 G. R. Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India: A Study of Controversy, Conflict and 
Communal Movements in Northern India, 1923-1928 (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 1975), p. 22. 
133 Sanderson Beck, South Asia, 1800-1950 (Goleta: World Peace Communications, 2008), p. 128. 
134 In the British India, the state perceived obscenity largely in terms of a threat to its authority, and 
hence sought to regulate it through deployment of the law.  Regulating the obscene was considered a 
means of controlling the contents of publications.  See Heath, “Creating the Moral Colonial Subject.”  
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imprisonment of six days to five years.  An attempt to commit this offence is 
punishable with hard labor, without chain, for a period not exceeding five years.”135 
Apart from the above articles, the Indies government also introduced Articles 
154-157 in the Penal Code,136 known popularly as the “hatred-sowing” articles 
(haatzaai-artikelen).  They were meant further to equip the provisions of the Printing 
Press Regulations.  With these new provisions the government felt more confident that 
it could prevent or deter anyone or any party from arousing hatred and contempt (haat 
en minachting) towards the government, or from arousing hatred and contempt (haat 
en verachting) between different groups of the population. 
Equipped with the 1906 press regulations and persdelict articles of 1914, the 
Indies state was about to face indigenous political development that thrived through 
mobilization as well as discussion and propaganda in political newspapers.  The 
question of how to develop press monitoring, however, was yet not settled and a new 
institutional arrangement was still to come. 
 
                                                
135Ahmat Adam, “Radical Journalism and Press Persecution in Java: 1914-1918,” JEBAT, No. 20 
(1992), pp. 94-95. 
136 Oemar Seno Adji, Pers: Aspek-Apek Hukum (Jakarta: Erlangga, 1974), pp. 101-107; Saëroen, 
Dibelakang Lajar Journalistiek Indonesia, pp. 80-81. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE AGE OF PRESS MONITORING  
 
“The meaning of free press is not simply freedom, that is, we are free to 
express our thoughts or opinion without any restriction and limits, but as is 
everything else there are limits to the press.  If we stay within the limit, we will 
not get into trouble.  But if we cross the limit, of course we will get prohibition 
or punishment.” (Parada Harahap)137 
 
The birth of political organs and the rising tide of indigenous political and 
socio-economic movements that had found a voice in the indigenous press were new 
to the Indies state, and some Dutch officials thought it was a threat to the “tranquility 
and order” (rust en orde) of the Indies.  The action taken by Dekker, Soewardi and 
Tjipto had opened the eyes of the Indies government to the danger of press freedom 
provided by the amendment 1906 of the Press Act of 1856.  In the light of the events 
that took place in 1912 and 1913, the colonial government saw the urgency of 
overcoming the inadequacy of existing press laws in deterring the newly emerging 
indigenous journalists and activists.  The contents of the vernacular press needed a 
much closer scrutiny by the General Secretariat, as well as the Department of Native 
and Arab Affairs. 
 
                                                
137 Parada Harahap, Pers dan Journalistiek, (Medan: Handel Mij. Indische Drukkerij, 1941), pp. 111-
112. 
Adapoen maksoednja vrijheid (kebebasan) terseboet boekanlah kebebasan semata-mata, jaitoe 
jang kita bebas memaparkan boeah pikiran atau pendapatan kita dengan tidak ada pelarangan 
dan batasnja, akan tetapi seperti segala perboeatan ada berbatas, begitoe djoegalah tentang 
pers, djika kita masih tinggal dalam lingkoengan batas itoe tidak akan mendapt apa-apa.  Kalau 
kita meliwati garis, soedah barang tentoe dapat larangan atau hoekoeman. 
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First Press Survey 
In 1912 the colonial government went through major reorganization of its 
structure due to new social developments in the form of political activism by the 
indigenous people of the Indies.  The reorganization required the government to 
employ more Dutch bureaucrats than before.  These new developments also prompted 
the colonial government to install a new system of surveillance in order to supply 
information on indigenous affairs to colonial bureaucrats.138  The question was how to 
provide accurate and concise information for these bureaucrats.  Since the 
administrative apparatus was not yet well-systematized and effective at the lower level 
of the bureaucracy due to the vast territory of the Indies, gathering information 
became a significant challenge. 
Several areas of political activism that emerged in the early 1910s had set off 
the alarm for the colonial government.  The birth of the Republic of China on January 
1, 1912, brought about new hopes for Chinese communities in the Indies, because they 
believed that a strong modern China would help promote their social and legal status 
in the Dutch colony.  In the same year, using Islam as a symbol, SI emerged as the 
first mass movement of the indigenous population in Java, and was involved in anti-
Chinese violence in several cities.  In 1913, the Indies Party founded by E. F. E. 
Douwes Dekker posed a potential threat to the Indies state, because it sought to create 
Indies nationalism based on a multi-racial society.   
Since it appeared that the press played a significant role in all these 
movements, how to deal with the vernacular press became the focal point of debate 
among Dutch bureaucrats.  In general there were two main arguments in this issue.  
One focused on the rise of the vernacular press and its connections with political 
                                                
138 This was suggested in the correspondence of the Adjunct-Adviser for Native Affairs, D. A. Rinkes, 
as this chapter will explore. 
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organizations, and on the need to restrict the emergent press by introducing 
administrative measures.  The other believed that the growing indigenous press did not 
contribute to social anxiety; rather, it actually reflected a positive outcome of the 
Ethical Policy.  It was clear that the liberal tendency in the Netherlands made Dutch 
politicians hesitant to pursue administrative measures against the vernacular press, so 
the debate shifted to the possibility of conducting a regular survey of the press and 
how to best execute it. 
Monitoring the vernacular press and producing a regular summary of the news 
reported there thus became a major issue in the Department of Internal Affairs and the 
Bureau for Native and Arab Affairs. Debates and a kind of inter-department power 
struggle between these institutions began in 1912.  My research reveals that from the 
beginning, the Adviser of the Bureau for Native and Arab Affairs disagreed with the 
Department of Internal Affairs’ plan to carry out the survey of vernacular press in the 
department’s official journal. 
Regardless, in December 1912 Koloniaal Tijdschrift (Colonial Journal) 
launched the official and public version of the press summary.  As its subtitle reads, 
the journal was “presented by the Association of Staff of the [Department of] Internal 
Affairs in the Netherlands Indies” (buitgegeven door de Vereeniging van Ambtenaren 
bij het Binnenlandsch Bestuur in Nederlandsch-Indië).  This journal was published in 
The Hague, the metropole of the Dutch empire.  It was designed for Dutch bureaucrats 
who worked on and in the Indies but had no or little knowledge of local languages, 
and it covered local politics, social affairs, and cultural analysis.  It was considered 
essential reading for Dutch bureaucrats who worked in the Indies until 1942 when 
Japan came to take over the Indies. 
The Department of Internal Affairs employed, among others, a linguist to 
produce a monthly survey of vernacular newspapers.  An expert of Javanese language, 
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A. H. G. J. Walbeehm became the first official to monitor vernacular press.  
Walbeehm was not only familiar with Javanese, but also with Malay.  He had 
published three books on local languages before he was appointed to the job.139  Along 
with other Dutch experts such as Pillard and Ch. P. J. Blok, Walbeehm came to 
monitor newspapers in the indigenous (both Malay and Javanese) and Chinese-Malay 
languages for a period of five years until 1916. 
In his first analysis of the press summary, Walbeehm made a suggestion for 
modifications, the most important of which was to undertake separate surveillance for 
the indigenous and Indies Chinese newspapers.  He maintained that these two groups 
of newspapers should be monitored separately, while acknowledging the challenges 
involved in accurately distinguishing between them.  He also was aware of the fact 
that indigenous journalists contributed articles to Chinese newspapers and vice versa, 
and that sometimes it was difficult to identify clearly whose opinions were published 
in the newspapers (as many articles were written under pseudonyms).  But 
intriguingly, Walbeehm surveyed both the indigenous and Chinese-Malay press 
almost equally.  In Koloniaal Tijdschrift of January 1-24, 1912, he reviewed eleven 
indigenous press and eight Chinese-Malay newspapers.  The survey of the indigenous 
press included Pembrita Betawi (Batavia Herald), Medan Prijaji (Aristocrat Arena), 
Boedi Oetomo (Noble Endeavor), Taman Pewarta (Reporters’ Arena), Bintang 
Soerabaja (Soerabaja Star), Tjahaja Sumatra (Light of Sumatra), Oetoesan Melajoe 
(Malay Envoy), Pertja Timoer (Eastern Sumatra), Pembrita Makassar (Makassar 
Herald), and Matahari Terbit (Rising Sun), whereas those of Chinese-Malay included 
Perniagaän (Commerce), Pantjaran Warta (News Flash), Tiong Hoa Wi Sien Po 
                                                
139 The most important publication of these was a book on Javanese grammar, Javaansche spraakkunst.  
The two other books examined the local dialects of Djepara and Tegal, respectively.  A. H. J. G. 
Walbeehm, Javaansche spraakkunst (Leiden: Brill, 1905); Het dialekt van Djapårå (Batavia: Albrecht, 
’s-Hage, 1897); Het dialekt van T!gal (Batavia: Albrecht, 1903). 
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(Chinese Reformist Newspaper), Ho Po, Djawa Tengah (Central Java), Pewarta 
Soerabaja (Soerabaja Messenger), and Sinar Sumatra (Gleam of Sumatra). 
Walbeehm’s expertise was limited to linguistics and he was not involved in the 
policy debate on the press survey.  His writing style was scholarly and his purpose was 
not political.  He was of the opinion that an ideal press summary would provide the 
readers with what (and how) local people were thinking, which was presumed to be 
different from the way Dutch people thought and understood things.  This non-
political intention made his selection of vernacular press rather comprehensive.  His 
choice represented a wide geographic region, including many cities.  It appears that 
Walbeehm’s survey provided an overall picture of social, political, and cultural 
conditions in the colony.  For instance, his very first newspaper summary covered a 
controversy regarding land lease for sugar and coffee cultivation.  In it, Walbeehm 
remarked on how ignorant and underdeveloped the Javanese were when it came to 
running a commercial enterprise.  “They are not ready for business yet” (toch komt de 
Javaan niet op het denkbeeld), he writes, even though their land is very rich.  This 
supposedly was the reason why many Europeans came to Java – to open plantations, 
become entrepreneurs, and be successful in their business ventures – while the 
Javanese remained workers for the Europeans.140 
The mission and goal of the press survey and summary in Koloniaal Tijdschrift 
was clear; it attempted to understand the local (non-European) residents in the Indies, 
and supplied this information to the colonial bureaucrats.  Like Walbeehm, the 
Department of Internal Affairs was of the opinion that local newspapers reflected the 
thoughts and deeds of local people that were rooted in their unique worldviews.  It 
differentiated indigenous and Chinese residents in part because the colonial 
government regarded them as two different people with different cultural 
                                                
140 A. H. J. G. Walbeehm, “Persoverzicht,” Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 1912, pp. 90-94. 
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backgrounds, and as such the existing colonial bureaucratic structure treated them 
separately.  For a while it insisted on having both press surveys conducted by one 
team led by Walbeehm.  But in the middle of the 1910s, the division of surveillance 
activities between different colonial government agencies became consistent with the 
emerging distinction being made between the indigenous and Chinese residents: the 
Bureau for Native and Arab Affairs concentrated on the indigenous affairs, whereas 
the Office for Chinese Affairs kept an eye on the Chinese in the Indies.   
However, political circumstances however forced the termination of the press 
survey after several years.  Koloniaal Tijdschrift ceased carrying out the summary of 
Javanese press in 1916 and of the Malay press in 1920.  It turned out that ongoing 
objections from (and power struggle with) then (Adjunct-) Adviser for Native and 
Arab Affairs had led to the discontinuation.  From the beginning the Adjunct Adviser, 
Dr. D. A. Rinkes, had his own idea of how vernacular press should be surveyed and he 
had tried to realize it all the while. 
 
Rinkes and the Press Survey 
In his capacity as Adjunct-Adviser for Native Affairs, Rinkes had expressed 
his idea on press survey in a confidential letter to Governor-General Idenburg as early 
as February 1912.141  Rinkes did not believe in the effectiveness of administrative 
measures against the press, and instead was of the opinion that the native press was 
not something the government should worry about.  He argued that it was not 
necessary to toughen regulations against the press.  Needed instead was effective press 
monitoring in the form of a regular survey, which would provide practical and 
valuable information to Dutch bureaucrats.  In the letter, Rinkes gave a sample of a 
                                                
141 Ajunct-adviseur voor inlandse zaken (D. A. Rinkes) aan Gouverneur-Generaal  (Idenburg), Feb. 19, 
1912 in S. L. Van Der Wal, (ed.), De opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlands- 
Indië. Een bronnenpublikatie (Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1967), pp. 70-84. 
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press survey that he found useful.  He carefully chose twenty-two vernacular (Malay 
and Javanese) newspapers – Bramartani (The Messenger, Soerakarta), Djawi Kanda 
(Javanese Narrative), Taman Pewarta, Darma Kanda (Soerakarta), Retna Doemila 
(Jogjakarta), Pantjaran Warta (News Flux), Pembrita Betawi (Messenger of Betawi), 
Perniagaän (Commerce, Batavia), Slompret Melajoe (Malay Trumpet, Semarang), 
Bintang Soerabaja (Star of Soerabaja, Soerabaja), Tjahja Timoer (Eastern Light, 
Malang), Pertja Barat (Western Sumatra), Oetoesan Melajoe (Malay Envoy), Tjahaja 
Sumatra (Light of Sumatra, Padang), Al Moenir (Enlightenment), Goeroe Desa 
(Village Educator), Tjaja Hindia (Indies Light), Pewarta S.S. (Messengar for Railway 
Workers), Pewarta Pengadilan (Messenger of Justice), Soeara Pagadean (Voice of 
Pagadean), Sinar Pasoendan (Pasoendan Gleam).   
Rinkes’ careful selection reflected the orientation of these newspapers as well 
as their geographical locations.  His focus lay in Java where political activism was 
growing and of the Dutch empire in Asia had its focal point.  On the top of the list he 
put Javanese newspapers from Soerakarta and Jogjakarta in Central Java where SI had 
started to gain mass supports.  Batavia, Semarang, and Soerabaja were the three major 
cities in West, Central, and East Java.  From those cities, well-established Malay 
newspapers were chosen.  Two widely read Chinese-Malay newspapers were 
included, Perniagaän and Tjahja Timoer, which were commerce-oriented and well-
established in the Chinese community.  Outside Java, Rinkes summarized three 
vernacular newspapers from Padang, West Sumatra, where the Islamic modernist 
movement, which was influenced by the non-conservative Sunni Islamic sect, 
Wahhabism, from the Middle East, was penetrating into the local Muslim community.  
These twenty-two newspapers represented a fraction of vernacular press circulating in 
the Indies at that time.  But Rinkes’ selection had a clear aim, which was to gather 
information and measure the socio-political temperature of different parts of the 
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colony.  Selected newspapers were politically influential in certain communities, 
particularly those reflecting Islamic views and Islamic affairs.142  As the Adjunct-
Adviser for Native and Arab Affairs whose main target was domestic political 
development and Islamic affairs, Rinkes’ main concern was how to understand Islamic 
movements (such as SI and Wahhabism) that were growing in Java, particularly in 
Central Java, and in West Sumatra.  It is worth noting that this concern did not imply 
an intention to suppress those movements.  In his eyes, those movements were locally 
focused and had no sign of becoming a “national” threat. 
This concentration on Islamic movements affected Rinkes’ selection of 
Chinese newspapers.  For Rinkes, the priority of a press survey was rightfully the 
indigenous press and given this focus only major Indies Chinese press was covered 
mainly as a matter of formality, to ensure that the survey appeared comprehensive.  
Rinkes’ lack of concern for Chinese affairs was most obvious in his omission of Sin 
Po of Batavia, which was to become the biggest and most influential Chinese-Malay 
newspaper from the 1910s.  Sin Po was not an ordinary commercial/politically neutral 
newspaper; it promoted Chinese nationalism among Chinese residents in the Indies.  
But in the eyes of Rinkes, the China-oriented nationalist movement among overseas 
Chinese did not constitute a threat to the Indies state.  What he found more relevant 
was a kind of ethnic antagonism between the “natives” and the Chinese, which was 
largely motivated by commercial rivalry.  This constituted a major factor in the 
formation and growth of SI since 1911.  Anti-Chinese sentiment among the Muslim 
population could instigate social instability, and in this sense the Indies state had to 
take the Chinese affairs seriously.  Rinkes however seems to believe that there was a 
                                                
142 Ajunct-adviseur voor inlandse zaken (D. A. Rinkes) aan Gouverneur-Generaal (Idenburg), Feb. 19, 
1912 in Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlands-Indië, pp. 70-84. 
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distinct line between the Indies Chinese and the Chinese nationalist movement.143  
Therefore, he chose two Chinese-Malay newspapers that represented a moderate 
Chinese view.  
Nevertheless, the Department of Internal Affairs did not heed his opinion and 
its organ, Koloniaal Tijdschrift, started its press survey in December 1912.  Needless 
to say, Rinkes was frustrated with the kind of survey that Koloniaal Tijdschrift was 
conducting.  In May 1913, half a year after the publication of press survey started, 
Rinkes wrote another confidential and detailed report to Governor-General Idenburg 
concerning SI.  This time he argued that the abstracts prepared by the Internal Affairs 
did not provide a representative picture of the Indies society.  In his opinion, the 
survey tended to select only sensational and radical items from the vernacular press.  
He contended that it was much more advisable to create a regular representative press 
abstract to keep government officials informed with what was going on, which would 
thus bring them closer to the indigenous society.  Such close knowledge of the society 
would in his view be beneficial to the development of the colony as a whole.144  This 
view indeed was very ambitious, and it should be understood in the context of Rinkes’ 
own personal ambition to become a successful high colonial bureaucrat.  Luckily for 
him, his detailed analysis of SI – its organization, leaders, and activities – succeeded in 
impressing Idenburg.  In order to advance his bureaucratic career, Rinkes was eager to 
tame SI, which around this time both growing locally – in particular, Soerabaja, Solo, 
Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Bandoeng – and also gaining a “national character.”145  His 
                                                
143 Even though Rinkes himself could not read Chinese, he must have gotten the idea from available 
colonial documents on Chinese affairs in the Indies. 
144 Ajunct-adviseur voor inlandse zaken (D. A. Rinkes) aan Gouverneur-generaal (Idenburg), May 13, 
1913, in S. L. Van der Wal (ed.), De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlands-Indië, 
(Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1967), pp. 171-210, especially p. 175 footnote. 
145 Ajunct-adviseur voor inlandse zaken (D.A. Rinkes) aan Gouverneur-generaal (Idenburg), May 13, 
1913, in Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlands-Indië, pp. 208-
210.  See also Shiraishi, An Age in Motion, pp. 69-72. 
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special attention to Tjokroaminoto, the leader of Soerabaja-branch of SI and chief 
editor of its newspaper organ Oetoesan Hindia, proved that Rinkes understood the 
inner working of SI and had picked the right person “to tame.”  In other words, 
contradicting his assertions of the Ethical Policy’s success in promoting progress 
among the natives, Rinkes was not, as ethicists believed, a liberal idealist favoring the 
“native awakening.”  He believed that intimate contact with indigenous society was 
necessary and for this purpose the press survey was to be devised.  In practice, this 
intimate contact was not with the society in general, but was directed to the Islamic 
community, particularly to SI.  Roughly one month after this secret correspondence, in 
June 1913, Dr. Rinkes was promoted to be the Adviser for Native and Arab Affairs, 
replacing Dr. Hazeu.  He was put in charge of guiding the SI’s central leadership to a 
path more favorable to the Indies government.  Now he held considerable power over 
the indigenous affairs, and his position enabled him to report directly to Governor-
General Idenburg.146 
However, despite Rinkes’ determined advocacy bureaucratic procedure did not 
change immediately.  Walbeehm continued business as usual and made the summary 
of vernacular press for Koloniaal Tijdschrift.  In 1915, two years after his promotion, 
Rinkes expressed once again his strong displeasure with the current press survey.  
While previously he had complained about the content of press abstracts, this time he 
expressed disapproval about the form.  He pointed out that most Dutch officials were 
(still) indifferent to the indigenous press and their neglect of the press surveys and 
abstracts rendered these publications useless.  In his report Rinkes raised awareness 
about public opinion (publieke opinie) in the indigenous society.  He pointed out that 
the indigenous press covered such public opinion, which Dutch officials needed to 
                                                
146 Before the full-fledged secret police was formed in 1919, the Adviser for Native and Arab Affairs 
played a significant role in gathering information on the indigenous movement and guiding it to the 
path favorable for the Indies government. 
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both pay attention to as well as comprehend.  Press abstracts were essential to 
achieving this level of understanding of current popular opinion in indigenous society, 
yet in their current format, they were not suited for the purpose.  In his confidential 
letter to the Governor-General, Rinkes explained how the vernacular press expressed 
their views on the government and its activities, saying that:  
 
During the discussion concerning the press I [Rinkes] have come to realize that 
a certain part of the public seems to demand a somewhat sensational tone, and 
that self-respecting periodicals are usually less successful than those that let 
their tongues run away with them, and in weekly talks and other occasions they 
discuss the Government, civil servants, an exhibition, a lottery in a spicy 
manner indeed, that is to say: they run them down.147 
 
In Rinkes’ view, the vernacular press created and responded to the public opinion and 
public aspirations.  He insisted that it was worth grasping people’s view on the 
government, too.  In order to grasp what the people thought and desired, the Indies 
state allowed them to speak and write.  The vernacular press was the most important 
media to transmit public opinion.  Making accurate summaries of this media therefore 
was an essential step towards understanding the popular mind.  So Rinkes went on to 
propose an alternative, namely that a press summary should be published every month 
under the guidance of the Adviser for Native Affairs, which had an intimate 
relationship with local leaders.  By making use of the indigenous press, he maintained, 
Dutch officials could understand indigenous public opinion and gain knowledge of 
dangerous people and even their strategies in advance.148   
                                                
147 Adviseur voor inlandse zaken (D. A. Rinkes) aan Gouverneur-generaal (Idenburg), June 7, 1915, in 
Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlands-Indië, p. 389. 
148 Mr. 2280/15 in Vb. June 14, 1919 no. 26. 
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The Indies government feared the spread of revolutionary ideas by radical 
nationalists using the medium of printed materials, and therefore conceived the press 
survey as a way to impose further surveillance over the press.  By offering such 
service the administration could provide up-to-date information to all civil servants, by 
detecting and giving details of (potential) trouble spots and troublemakers.  Yet Rinkes 
did not propose administrative measures at all.  Rather, his vision was to try to guide 
the “native awakening” onto a developmental path that would not be at odds with 
government programs.149    
By September 1915, the Minister for the Colonies, Mr. Th. B. Pleijte, was 
finally convinced with what Rinkes’ argument, and wrote a letter to Governor-General 
Idenburg as follows: 
 
Curbing the press, it has been assumed, serves to stop the worst disasters from 
happening.  I am, however, fully convinced that the gross extravagance of a 
free press is less dangerous for a community than the dangers, which a deeply 
embittered group of people could create for a society, if their mouths are 
stopped and they are forbidden to speak out.  Every opinion expressed in the 
press that is worth a fight will give rise to objections, which in their turn could 
influence the supporters of that very opinion.150 
 
Thus with Pleijte’s support, Rinkes finally won the years-long debate concerning press 
monitoring and was given the green light to initiate the “proper” press survey and 
abstracts.  The administrative measures against the press that had been discussed 
                                                
149 This is how Rinkes helped and guided the leadership of Tjokroaminoto and the SI at the time.  See 
Shiraishi, An Age in Motion, pp. 69-72.  
150 Minister van Koloniën (Pleijte) aan Gouverneur-generaal (Idenburg), Sept. 17, 1915, in Van der 
Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlands-Indië, pp. 396-397. 
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earlier were to be cancelled.  The Department of Internal Affairs could not disregard 
Rinkes’ powerful voice any longer.  The decision by Pleijte forced this Department to 
reconsider its position regarding the press survey and to put an end to the role of 
Koloniaal Tijdschrift in press monitoring by 1920. 
In 1916 under the guidance of Rinkes, the monthly summary of indigenous 
press called “Summary of the Native Press” (Overzicht der Inlandsche Press) began to 
be compiled by the Office for Native Affairs and filed in a Secret Mail Report 
(Geheim Mailrapport).  The press surveys on vernacular periodicals began circulating 
regularly among the Dutch bureaucrats and became compulsory reading material for 
them.  The ideal press survey and its abstracts, as imagined by Rinkes, were finally 
realized when the state-subsidized publishing house, Balai Poestaka (Volkslectuur), 
was reorganized in 1917 under his leadership. 
 
Balai Poestaka As A Cultural Project 
Under the Ethical Policy the Indies state claimed to promote the social 
wellbeing of the indigenous population.  The propagation of Western-style school 
education was perceived as being key to achieving this goal.  Although the number of 
enrolled students was small compared to the relevant age, the Dutch medium 
education was of high quality and from the 1920s began producing a new educated 
Indonesian elite.151 
In order to provide reading materials for schools and graduates, the 
Commission for Native Schools and Popular Literature was established in 1908 with 
G. A. J. Hazeu, the Adviser for Native and Arab Affairs, as its head.  It was considered 
a precautionary measure to prevent potential dangers (in the realm of culture) to the 
                                                
151 Van Neil, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite; Sutherland, The Making of a 
Bureaucratic Elite. 
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Indies state.  The Commission consisted of six members nominated by the Director of 
Education and Religion and was modeled after the Wereldbibliotheek in the 
Netherlands.152  Its mission was to select (and later on produce) proper reading 
materials for students of the indigenous schools and for the public libraries of the 
indigenous population.  The Commission was to promote the “composition” of a 
reading environment that encouraged youth to read the right kinds of material, from 
the government point of view, especially for junior high school graduates by setting up 
libraries and popular lending stores, which provided books free of charge.153   
After being appointed as the secretary of the commission in place of Hazeu in 
1910, Rinkes wrote his account of it: 
 
[T]he government has taken the initiative to elevate the population in a 
systematic manner, and it is to become clear from the application and 
appreciation of the principles that will be developed by the native population 
itself whether it wants to continue along this road or not.  It is in the interests of 
its existence as a nation (natie) that its development is led along the same path 
that almost all other nations follow towards progress.  A first effort has been 
made, but it is obviously the task of the more developed persons among the 
                                                
152 Wereldbibliotheek was established under the name Society for Good and Cheap Reading 
(Maatschappij voor Goede en Goedkoope Lectuur).  It was the private literary publisher founded in 
1905 by Leo Simons. Although in the Netherlands publishing literature was not considered as a 
profitable publishing business, Wereldbibliotheek published literary classics and translations.  Many 
famous authors from the Dutch and the world literature were introduced such as Couperus, Dante, 
Freud, Goethe, Multatuli, Schopenhauer, Spinoza, Dickens and Darwin.  It published about 3,500 titles.  
Similar private literary publishers were Reclams Universal-Bibliothek in Leipzig (founded in 1867) and 
Everyman’s Library in London (founded in 1906).  The publisher’s name “Wereld”bibliotheek suggests 
that the Dutch had the idea of “world literature,” which has been the world of translation.  On the 
discussion of world literature, Pascale Casanova, The World Republic of Letters (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2004). 
153 “Volkslectuur,” Regeerings-Almanak, 1914, p. 273. 
 91 
native population itself to show their fellow countrymen the way and to offer 
them the proper tools to find the proper paths towards progress.154 
 
In 1917 the Commission for Popular Literature was reorganized under the Department 
of Education and Religious Affairs (Departement van Onderwijs en Eeredienst) with 
Rinkes as its chairman, from 1917 to 1927, and was given its Malay name, Balai 
Poestaka.  Here, too, Rinkes used the position and the institution to put his ideas into 
practice.   
Balai Poestaka consisted of eight sections: Editorial, Translation, Press Bureau, 
Printing Shop, Book Trade, Book Shop, Accounts, and People’s Reading Room 
(Volksbiblitheeken or Taman Poestaka).  The editorial section (Afdeeling Redactie) 
dealt with manuscripts of all types including European texts as well as those sent to 
Balai Poestaka for publication by private persons.  The staff would make suggestions 
on the manuscripts and then send them over to a European chief, who would make the 
final decision on whether or not to publish the compositions.  The editorial staff also 
was responsible for the two (later three) Balai Poestaka periodicals.   
Balai Poestaka’s main function was to provide “useful” reading materials for 
the public, and to promote “respectable” literature.155  The Dutch had thought that they 
could in this way counter the influence of “wild” (independent) publications by 
flooding schools and public libraries with literature that would not inflame public 
political opinion.  As Rinkes frankly wrote, Balai Poestaka was designed to cater to 
those who were products of Western-style schooling, because it would be detrimental 
to the government “if the man who knows how to read obtains dangerous reading 
                                                
154 D. A. Rinkes. Nota over de Volkslectuur (Batavia: Volkslectuur, 1911), pp. 3-4.  The similar 
comment can be seen in Hidding, “The Bureau for Popular Literature,” p. 187.  
155 Nidhi Aeusrivongse’s pioneering work on Indonesian novels analyzes Balai Poestaka’s novels and 
authors most systematically.  Nidhi Aeusriongse, “Fiction as History: A Study of Pre-war Indonesian 
Novels and Novelists (1920-1942),” (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1976). 
 92 
materials from book traders who are not honest and from people who intend to cause 
chaos.”156 
All manuscripts were thus subject to heavy editing, naturally not excluding 
censorship of politically sensitive content, in order to be more “suitable” for the 
indigenous society.157  The category of “useful” books included handbooks for 
practical knowledge; manuals for farming, gardening, book-keeping, guidebooks for 
electricians, painters, and nurses among others; books on hygiene and popular 
medicine, history and geography, popular almanacs, educational periodicals, and so 
on.158  Balai Poestaka also encouraged the production of original literature in the 
vernacular languages.  A good number of original novels were written by indigenous 
authors, but were published only after undergoing strict editing, Balai Poestaka editors 
found them “generally with a strong bias and not free from sensationalism.”159 
Three examples show what Balai Poestaka considered to be improper content.  
One ended with a major modification of the final published work, and the other two 
involved Balai Poestaka’s rejection for publication.  The first case is Salah Asoehan, a 
novel by indigenous writer Abdoel Moeis.  It was written in the middle of the 1920s 
and was one of the earliest Balai Poestaka’s original Malay novels.  The plot features a 
Eurasian woman who marries an educated indigenous man and finds both of them 
caught in a social limbo, unable to fit in either group.  In the original manuscript, 
Corrie, the Eurasian, is described as a promiscuous woman is ultimately slain by one 
of her lovers.  Balai Poestaka required Moeis to modify these elements to make her die 
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Febr. 1926).  See also D. A. Rinkes, “Volkslectuur,” in Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië. Tweede 
druk, (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1921), pp. 610-612. 
157 Setiadi, “Kolonialisme dan Budaya, Balai Pustaka di Hindia Belanda,” pp. 23-41. 
158 W. H. van Helsdingen and H. Hoogenberk (eds.), Mission Interrupted: The Dutch in the East Indies 
and Their Work in the XXth Century (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1945), p. 86. 
159 Van Helsdingen and Hoogenberk, Mission Interrupted, p. 86. 
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of cholera instead.   The modified novel was published in 1928, and became one of the 
“classics” in Indonesian literature.   
The two cases of manuscript rejection by Balai Poestaka took place in the late 
1930s.  One case involved Soewarsih Djojopoespito’s autobiographical novel Buiten 
het Gareel (Outside the Harness), rejected in 1939 officially on account of the 
manuscript’s sub-standard Sundanese language, more likely due to its overt political 
content.  Literary scholar C. W. Watson notes that the novel “offers personal 
testimony of the atmosphere and events of the times,” including an account of 
Soekarno, leader of the Indonesian nationalist movement, who is described as being 
“under constant scrutiny by the Dutch PID [Politiek Inlichtingendienst, Political 
Information Service], the intelligence bureau, and, during the period covered by the 
book . . . [is ultimately] arrested and exiled.”160  Following Balai Poestaka’s refusal to 
publish Djojopoesito’s manuscript, a Dutch publisher W. de Haan in Utrecht decided 
to publish the novel in Dutch in 1940, with a new subtitle “Indonesische roman.”  The 
other case of Balai Poestaka’s denial to publish involved the novel Belenggu by 
Armijn Pané, also an indigenous writer, which was refused on “moral” grounds 
because the content was considered too sexually explicit.  Subsequently published by 
Poestaka Rakjat in Batavia in 1940,161 Belunggu became one of the canonical texts in 
Indonesian literature. 
                                                
160 C. W. Watson, “Feminism and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement: A Reading of Soewarsih 
Djojopoespito’s Novel Buiten het Gareel,” Sari 27 (2009), pp. 125-142.  On the origin, development 
and activity of PID, see Takashi Shiraishi, “A New Regime of Order: The Origin of Modern 
Surveillance Politics in Indonesia,” in James T. Siegel and Audrey Kahin (eds.), Southeast Asia over 
Three Generations: Essays Presented to Benedict R.O’G. Anderson (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Southeast Asia Program, 2003), pp. 47-74; Harry A. Poeze, “Political Intelligence in the Netherlands 
Indies,” in Robert Cribb (ed.), The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic 
Foundation of the Netherlands Indies 1880-1942 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994), pp. 229-245.  For a 
comprehensive history of police in the Indies, see Marieke Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van de 
Politie in Nederlands-Indië: Uit zorg en angst (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009). 
161 Teeuw, “Impact of Balai Pustaka on Modern Indonesian Literature.” 
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Translation was also encouraged by Balai Poestaka, especially that of 
European literary classics from Dutch or other Western languages.  The rationale was 
that European literature represented the pinnacle of human civilization and could 
guide educated indigenous people to proceed onto the path of “progress” and become 
more like Europeans.162  A great number of Dutch and other Western classics were 
translated or adapted, for example the works of Jonathan Swift, Leo Tolstoy, Charles 
Dickens, Alexandre Dumas (father), William Shakespeare, and the likes.  These 
translations were said to be more popular than original works by indigenous authors, 
even though the Malay language used by Balai Poestaka was quite removed from the 
ordinary speech (which was used in independent publications). 
Balai Poestaka, however, was aware that it could not “eliminate all reading that 
might endanger the authority of the government and the security of the state” by 
censoring measures alone.  So it sold its books below the market price and established 
the People’s Libraries (Volksbibliotheken) to ensure a kind of oligopolistic control 
over the book market.  In other words, it tried to stamp out undesirable private 
publishers in the market with its pricing policy and by making its books available 
though thousands of lending libraries.  The People’s Libraries or reading rooms were 
established in many Second Class Schools all over the country, mainly for 
administrative convenience; and their number increased from 768 in 1917 to 2,171 in 
1925 to over 3,000 at the end of the Dutch era.  The self-claimed success of Balai 
Poestaka in inundating the book market can also be seen in the figures on books 
checked out from such reading rooms under its administration.  In 1925 the total 
circulation frequency of books in the reading rooms was 1,924,447, and by the end of 
the Dutch era the figure was approximately 2,100,000.  The number of readers who 
                                                
162 Rinkes, “Volkslectuur,” in Gedenkboek voor Nederlandsch-Indië ter gelegenheid van het 
Regeeringsjubileum van H.M. de Koningin 1898-1923 (Batavia, Weltevreden, Leiden: G. Kolff & Co., 
1923), p. 184. 
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used the reading rooms also increased from 241,864 persons in 1925 to 327,150 in 
1940.163  As one can see from the number of people’s reading rooms run by Balai 
Poestaka from the Table below (Table 3-1: The Development of Balai Poestaka), its 
activities were mainly confined to Java, leaving the so-called Outer Islands were 
relatively overlooked in this strategy.  Its distributing agents however were 
impressively wide, encompassing cities and small towns all over the Netherlands 
Indies.  
 
Table 3-1: The Development of Balai Poestaka, 1917-1940 
 1917 1919 1921 1923 1925 1927 1929 1931 1934 1936 1938 1940 
Lending 
Books* 
406,700 751,429 1,116,365 1,282,397 1,924,477 2,281,852 2,591,211 2,907,291 2,216,809 2,014,292 2,003,078 2,133,290 
Readers* --- --- --- 195,850 241,864 279,569 325,646 381,795 338,232 318,533 323,880 327,150 
Reading 
Rooms 
768 1,388 1,618 1,842 2,171 2,340 2,479 2,623 2,402 2,336 2,335 2,341 
Java 563 712 761 572 1,031 1,140 1,219 1,326 1,255 1,216 1,212 1,214 
Sunda 205 229 239 259 348 407 490 447 424 405 406 410 
Madura --- 76 76 86 93 105 114 115 96 91 92 91 
Melayu** --- 371 542 625 699 688 706 745 627 624 625 626 
Library*** 327 390 442 449 383 395 448 478 471 471 475 476 
 
This table is made from Balai Pustaka, Balai Pustaka Sewadjarnja 1908-1942 (Jakarta: Baiai Pustaka, 1948). 
* These are the total number of lending books and readers, respectively. 
** Melayu means Sumatra area. 
*** These were popular libraries, whose books had been provided by Balai Poestaka. 
 
 
On the surface, Balai Poestaka’s constructive censorship appears to have 
worked well.  Many studies of Indonesian literary history have praised Balai Poestaka 
for its achievement in promoting works by indigenous writers, and the institution was 
credited as the cradle of modern Indonesian literature.164  Some have noted that Balai 
                                                
163 See Table “The Development of Balai Poestaka.”  For an excellent argument on Balai Poestaka’s 
hegemony and discourse formation, see Setiadi, “Kolonialisme dan Budaya.” 
164 See Pramoedya, “Balai Pustaka harum namanja didunia internasional-dahulu”; Teeuw, “The Impact 
of Balai Pustaka on Modern Indonesian Literature.”  Chapter 3 of this dissertation will describe the 
political mission and development of Balai Poestaka. 
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Poestaka could enjoy a hegemonic status over print culture because as a government 
institution it could dominate the production and distribution of literary works.165  More 
importantly, according to A. Teeuw, who was long considered the established 
authority on modern Indonesian literature, as a channel for the first generation of 
“modern” indigenous writers, Balai Poestaka could be described as “the vehicle of 
innovation and modernization,” a medium for the indigenous reader to “take himself 
outside his village” in both conceptual and spiritual sense.166  Thus, as Teeuw puts it, 
Balai Poestaka successfully asserted domination over the publishing market, 
especially the market for popular genre “romantic adventure stories.”167  In reality, 
however, and quite contrary to this claim, Chinese-Malay books dominated the 
popular literature market, far outnumbering Balai Poestaka’s publications and 
overwhelming the latter in terms of their overall impact.168   
 
Balai Poestaka’s Press Monitoring 
Since Balai Poestaka was to deal with all kind of printed matters, it was no 
surprise that in the original plan submitted by the First Government Secretary on 
September 14, 1917, the name “Office for Press Affairs and People’s Reading” was 
suggested for the bureau that was to be established.  After two weeks of discussion, 
however, the phrase “Press Affairs” was eliminated and the name was changed to 
                                                
165 See Maier, “Forms of Censorship in the Dutch Indies”; Setiadi, “Kolonialisme dan Budaya, Balai 
Pustaka di Hindia Belanda”; Jedamski, “Balai Pustaka.” 
166 Teeuw, “The Impact of Balai Pustaka on Modern Indonesian Literature,” p. 115. 
167 Teeuw, “The Impact of Balai Pustaka on Modern Indonesian Literature,” p. 116.  For the hegemonic 
influence of Balai Poestaka, see Teeuw, Modern Indonesian Literature; Aeusrivongse, “Fiction as 
History”; Setiadi, “Kolonialisme dan Budaya, Balai Pustaka di Hindia Belanda”; Jedamski, “Balai 
Pustaka.” 
168 The marginalization of Chinese-Malay literature only happened after Indonesia gained its 
independence.  On the discussion of marginalization of Chinese-Malay literature, see Nio Joe Lan, 
Sastera Indonesia-Tionghoa (Djakarta: Gunung Agung, 1962); John B. Kwee, “Chinese Malay 
Literature of the Peranakan Chinese in Indonesia 1880-1942,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of 
Auckland, 1978); Salmon, Literature in Malay by the Chinese in Indonesia; Maier, “Forms of 
Censorship in the Dutch Indies”; Elizabeth Chandra, “National Fictions: Chinese-Malay Literature and 
the Politics of Forgetting” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2006). 
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“Bureau for Popular Literature” (Bureau voor Volkslectuur).  This change happened 
because Dutch officials were worried that the name Press Affairs would provoke a 
backlash from the indigenous society.169  Despite the change, however, it is clear that 
from the beginning Balai Poestaka was designed to deal with press affairs as its most 
important function.  Balai Poestaka took over from the Office for Native Affairs the 
charge of summarizing the vernacular press and the Press Bureau section was created 
within Balai Poestaka. With these developments, a new periodical called Overzicht 
van de Inlandsche Pers (IPO) came into being in 1917 to replace the press survey of 
the Koloniaal Tijdschrift.170 
Balai Poestaka also produced other periodicals, mainly for popular 
consumption. The weekly Malay journal Sri Poestaka features popular science from 
1918; others were the literary weekly Pandji Poestaka (1923) in Malay, the Javanese 
weekly Kedjawen (1926), and the Sundanese weekly Parahiangan (1928).  Among 
these periodicals, Pandji Poestaka became widely popular, according to Rinkes, with 
an initial circulation of about 3,000 copies per issue, which later climbed to 7,000.  
Rinkes was proud of its “enormous success,” pointing out that Pandji Poestaka had 
demonstrated a promising means of counter-propaganda and a potential counterweight 
to such “tendentious” newspapers as Api and Sin Po.171 
Unlike these periodicals however, IPO carried a press summary in Dutch for 
Dutch officials.  There were two kinds of press survey in the Dutch era; one was the 
IPO that became public from 1921 onwards, and the other was the secret press survey, 
                                                
169 Vb. 22 Dec. 1917, no. 45. 
170 In regard IPO as a kind of periodical as well as a colonial document, for it was published regularly 
and had quite steady reading audience among mainly Dutch colonial officers. 
171 Hoofdambtenaar voor de Volkslectuur en aanverwante aangelegenheden (D. A. Rinkes) aan 
Gouverneur-generaal (Fock), 26 Juni 1925, in Mr. 1647/25.  It is questionable if 3,000 copies of Pandji 
Poestaka in a 60,000,000 population show an “enormous success” as Rinkes claimed.  The point here is 
not how many copies of Pandji Poestaka were sold, but rather the journal had certain influences on the 
small reading public in the 1920s.  Api was succeeded Sinar Hindia, a PKI (Indonesian Communist 
Party) organ, and Sin Po was a leading and pro-China Chinese-Malay newspaper in colonial days. 
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which circulated within a very small circle of high ranking officials.  IPO was 
published weekly from 1918 until 1940.  Between 1918 and 1920 its official name 
was Overzicht van de Inlandsche Pers (Survey of Indigenous Press), and it kept the 
same format as the one made by the Office for Native Affairs.  From 1921 the title 
change to Overzicht van de Inlandsche en Maleisch-Chineesche Pers (Survey of 
Indigenous and Chinese-Malay Press), and the form changed from a mail report to a 
book form.  From this point on IPO stopped being “secret” any longer and became 
available to the general public, which was able to “subscribe to it.”172  Each issue of 
IPO contained usually 40 to 60 pages in the 1920s. 
Because IPO became a compulsory reading for Dutch officials, it had a wider 
audience than normal colonial documents, which circulated in a rather limited orbit.  
But this did not mean that Dutch officials were incapable of reading the vernacular 
press, because most of them had been trained in Indology and passed examinations on 
the Malay language.  IPO was for busy administrators who could read Malay, but did 
not have the time or habit to read dozens of Malay publications every day.  They relied 
on IPO in order to quickly and consistently grasp of what was going on in the Indies. 
Generally speaking, periodicals carried important and interesting articles that 
attracted the general reader, as did IPO.  The way in which IPO carried articles, 
however, was somewhat different due to its nature as a colonial document.  It was 
supposed to detect potential troublemakers and trouble spots that might endanger the 
public order and stability of the Indies.  Native periodicals of this kind in the 1920s 
were associated with SI and Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis 
Indonesia, PKI), which constituted a major threat to the Indies government.  
Periodicals such as Neratja (Weltreveden, radical SI), Sinar-Hindia (Semarang, 
Communist), Oetoesan-Hindia (Soerabaja, radical SI) were to be closely monitored.  
                                                
172 Brondgeest, Bureau voor de Volkslectuur, p. 18. 
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Because of the translations provided by IPO, it was easy to follow and comprehend 
the characteristics of each of these leading periodicals.  By contrast while included in 
IPO’s listing of the vernacular press, Chinese-Malay newspapers were rarely reviewed 
in the 1920s, and no Chinese language periodicals were even mentioned in IPO 
outside of the in the occasionally prepared vernacular press listing. 
 
Table 3-2: The Numbers of Malay Periodicals listed in IPO from 1918 to 1929 
        Newspapers Magazines             Chinese 
       Java O.I. Java O.I. Java O.I. 
1918 33 18 -- -- 6 2 
1919 34 19 -- -- -- -- 
Jan. 1920 31 24 -- -- 6 2 
Nov. 1920 34 22 -- -- 6 2 
Mar. 1922 28 9 11 11 10 4 
Aug. 1922 25 11 16 16 13 4 
Jan. 1923 28 16 28 20 12 4 
Jul. 1923 27 19 31 24 11 4 
Oct. 1923 26 20 26 24 12 4 
Mar. 1924 25 18 30 33 14 5 
Jul. 1924 27 20 22 28 13 4 
Oct. 1924 26 21 24 29 14 5 
Jan. 1925 28 21 32 31 16 6 
Apr. 1925 33 20 40 36 17 7 
Aug. 1925 36 21 31 37 18 9 
Des. 1925 38 23 28 38 20 9 
Jun. 1926 36 25 24 37 21 10 
Sept. 1926 30 23 25 30 20 7 
Mar. 1927 26 20 27 27 20 12 
Apr. 1928 33 27 28 20 26 14 
Sept. 1929 46 33 45 22 27 11 
[Source: IPO, 1918-1929, my computation] 
The distinction between newspapers and periodicals are based on the original 
category in IPO called “nieuwsbladen” (newspapers) and “inlandsche 
periodieken” (indigenous periodicals).  I have also included in the category 
“Malay” all periodicals published in the Malay language or in combination with 
other languages. 
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The press review in IPO was organized not by general topic, but by summaries 
of major stories from representative native newspapers and periodicals.  The 
categories were originally based on geographical areas such as Java and the Outer 
Islands, with sub-categories based on either language (Malay and Javanese) or 
religious association (Islam and Christianity).  If one wanted to know what was 
happening in Sumatra, for example, all one had to do was to turn to the section on 
periodicals from the Outer Islands, which included Sumatra.  Following the news of 
specific issues or organizations, however, was a more painstaking process.  Most 
articles in IPO were translated directly from the indigenous press into Dutch, and 
articles on similar topics from different sources in the vernacular press often appeared 
in the same issue of IPO.  If one needed to monitor what, for instance, SI was doing in 
July 1920one needed to search each IPO issue carefully to find summaries from those 
newspapers that were the organs of the organization in question; by following these 
papers, one could accumulate desired information on the organization.  Needless to 
say, government officials needed to read IPO on a regular basis.173 
IPO and persdelict reinforced each other to monitor violation of press law, as 
well as to broadcast persdelict charges and proceedings.  After 1914, persdelict was 
frequently enforced against radical nationalists and journalists, and sometimes even 
against Dutch journalists when the colonial government thought it was necessary to 
take action against them.174  IPO carried many articles on these cases.  By reading IPO 
Dutch administrative officials, judges, and police officers came to know who had 
                                                
173 Because of this nature of IPO, it has become an indispensable source for post-colonial scholars to 
trace thoughts and deeds of political activism in colonial Indonesia.  It also partially explains the reason 
why there are few fine studies on political history in the 1930s when IPO was virtually not available 
any longer due to colonial policy change that took place in the late 1920s as Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation argues.  
174 Chapter 4 of this dissertation analyzes persdelict cases in which IPO played a role.  For the case 
persdelict issued against Dutch journalist in the 1910s, see Jaap de Moor, “De affaire-Asymptoot en de 
haatzaai-artikelen,” in Herman Diederiks and Chris Quispel (eds.), Onderscheid en minderheid: 
Sociaal-historische opstellen over discriminatie en vooroordeel (Hilversum: Verloren, 1987), pp. 285-
302. 
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violated persdelict and why.  But since they also knew who was writing in the native 
press and what they were writing about even if they could not read the vernacular 
press, it is likely that reading IPO helped them decide when to invoke persdelict. 
A secret press summary was also prepared to compensate for IPO’s 
shortcomings.  Balai Poestaka first starting publishing a monthly secret press 
summary, called “General Summary of the Indigenous Press” (Algemeen Overzicht 
van de Inlandsche pers, hereafter Algemeen) in March 1918, only for circulation 
among the Governor-General and higher government officials.  Algemeen carried a 
more concise summary than IPO.  Before Algemeen began publication, Rinkes 
himself, acting in his capacity as chairman of Balai Poestaka, compiled the survey of 
indigenous press, which provided information on who was engaged in which 
newspapers.175  Basically, Algemeen summarized only two topics, a general summary 
of periodicals and one of general affairs, in this order.  Information on indigenous (not 
Chinese) periodicals, editors, and publishers was carried by Algemeen.  Articles were 
written based on the information gathered in IPO, and the two journals complemented 
each other.  Thus, if one wanted to know about a newly published periodical in detail 
for instance, Algemeen would direct the reader to related issues of and pages in IPO. 
Discussion of press surveys conducted by the colonial government would not 
be complete without mentioning those for the Chinese press.  Two types of such 
surveys existed in the Indies – secret and standard (public) press surveys on the 
Chinese press.  The former was “General Review of Chinese and Chinese-Malay 
Press” (Beschouwingen over de Chineesche en de Maleisch-Chineesche Pers, 
hereafter Beschouwingen), and the latter was “Survey of Chinese-Malay and Chinese 
                                                
175 “Beschouwingen over de inlandse pers gedurende de laatste maanden van 1917 van het bureau van 
de hoofd-ambtenaar voor de volkslectuur en aanverwante aangelegenheden,” 1 Jan. 1918 in Vb. 17 Mei 
1918 no. 73, or in R. C. Kwantes (ed.), De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging in 
Nederlandsch-Indië  (Bronnenpublicatie). Eerste stuk 1917 - medio 1923, (Groningen: H. D. Tjeenk 
Willink, 1975), pp. 11-18. 
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Press” (Overzichten van de Maleisch-Chineesche en Chineesche Pers, hereafter 
MCC). 
The secret press surveys, Algemeen and Beschouwingen were only published in 
limited numbers.  From December 1923 until September 1925, only twenty-two copies 
of Algemeen were sent to the General Secretaries of the Department of the Colonies 
and Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, then Professor and Adviser for Native and Arab 
Affairs.176  Later, in the beginning of 1926, the circulation of secret press surveys 
became even more restricted.  Three of each copy of IPO and MCC were sent to the 
Library of the Department of the Colonies, two copies of Beschouwingen to the 
Minister for the Colonies, and one of each copy of Algemeen to the Minister and 
Professor Hurgronje.177  
Thus four kinds of press survey actually existed.  These press surveys helped 
Dutch colonial officials – particularly ones who were new to the Indies colony – in 
different ways to understand the indigenous society, listen to their voices, detect the 
economic pulse of the Indies, measure its political temperature, and make decisions 
accordingly.  “Unruly” voices needed to be detected early and stamped out for the 
sake of law and order.  In this sense, the surveys also helped the colonial officials to 
discipline disobedient subjects.  
 
The “Chinese Question” 
As I have mentioned above, besides IPO another kind of press survey existed 
in the Indies to target periodicals by the Chinese.  The Chinese played a major role in 
developing the vernacular press and influential media in the twentieth century, even 
                                                
176 De Hoofdambtenaar voor de Volkslectuur en aanverwante aangelegenheden (Rinkes) aan 
Gouverneur-generaal (Fock), Oct. 26, 1925, in Mr. 1019x/25. 
177 wd. 1e Gouvernements-Secretaris (W. G. Stroband) aan den Hoofdambtenaar voor de Volkslectuur 
en aanverwante aangelegenheden (Afs. verleend a/d Adv. Chin. Zaken en Bureau G. te Batavia), Feb. 
25, 1926, in Mr. 229x/26. 
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though they made up only a small percentage of the overall Indies population.  The 
remark Rinkes made in 1925 about “tendentious” vernacular newspapers was in part 
directed at Sin Po and other Indies Chinese publications,178 demonstrating the social 
influence of Chinese-Malay press.  Historically Indies Chinese had been publishing 
newspapers in Malay since the 1880s.179  Thanks to the number of private Chinese 
publishers and more relaxed government scrutiny, throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century, the Chinese had dominated the publishing market in the Malay 
language.  Much like other pioneering media, early Chinese-Malay newspapers also 
started out as a medium for commercial news, before expanding to coverage of social 
and legal matters, as well as political affairs. 
A major social function of Chinese-Malay press was to communicate Chinese 
concerns and interests to the authorities.  It carried complaints regarding the travel 
restrictions (passtelsel) and zoning system (wijkenstelsel) designed specifically for the 
Chinese,180 the separate taxation rate, the lack of government services such as schools 
for the Chinese, mistreatment by government officials, and the fact that in civil and 
criminal cases they were subjected to the same legal system as the indigenous 
population.  The press had played a significant role in getting the government’s 
attention since the end of the nineteenth century when the so-called “Chinese 
question” was formulated.181  To understand the social significance of the Chinese-
Malay press, it is necessary to examine the “Chinese question,” which also explains 
how the colonial state monitored the Chinese press.    
                                                
178 Hoofdambtenaar voor de Volkslectuur en aanverwante aangelegenheden (D. A. Rinkes) aan 
Gouverneur-generaal (Fock), Jun 26, 1925, in Mr. 1647/25. 
179 Adam, The Vernacular Press and the Emergence of Modern Indonesian Consciousness, passim. 
180 Soon after the 1740 massacre of Chinese in Batavia, the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde 
Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC) regime installed these travel restrictions and zoning systems for the 
Chinese on grounds of “security.” 
181 See P. H. Fromberg, Mr. P. H. Fromberg’s Verspreide geschriften (Leiden: Leidsche 
Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1926). 
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The “Chinese question” pertains to the way the Indies government perceived 
the Chinese.  It refers to a set of issues related to the position of the Chinese in the 
Indies, similar to those faced by minority groups in other countries.  It consists of 
discussions and debates on the relationship between the Chinese and non-Chinese in 
the Indies, the legal restrictions placed upon the Chinese, and their emancipation and 
assimilation.  The Dutch experts on the Chinese in the Indies played an important role 
in these discussions, because they understood the Chinese situation well.  They were 
aware of the Chinese grievances stemming from their relative disadvantaged position 
compared with the Dutch and, in some regards, the natives.  In books or journal 
articles, these experts described in detail the socio-cultural life in the Indies Chinese, 
suggesting that the majority of the Chinese were already to a great extent acculturated 
in the local culture.  But despite their writings, the stereotypes of Indies Chinese 
remained in the society – they had pigtails, wore Chinese outfit, resided in designated 
zones in the city, and were predominantly merchants.182  These stereotypes derived 
from the Dutch policy towards the Chinese population since the seventeenth century, 
which consisted of the travel restrictions and zoning system.  Furthermore, a new 
social reality reinforced the image of the Chinese as a separate population in the 
Indies.  Since the 1880s the Dutch saw a flood of new Chinese immigrants speaking 
various dialects of Chinese, with which most Dutch officials were not familiar.  This 
influx of “Chinese” speaking people overshadowed the fact that Indies Chinese spoke 
local languages and Malay.  So the colonial experts in effect found themselves dealing 
with two different kinds of Chinese, each requiring different approaches. 
For the government the nineteenth century colonial government, the” Chinese 
question” had been a minor problem, but by the turn of the century it became a more 
                                                
182 Ironically, against their will, their writings contributed to the preservation of Chinese idiosyncrasies.  
It happened because in order to distinguish the Indies Chinese from those of China, the writings tended 
to dwell on the latter, which stuck in the reader’s mind. 
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significant issue affecting the indigenous population.  At that point, two distinct 
aspects of the “Chinese question” emerged:  How to “protect” the indigenous people 
from exploitations by the Chinese, on the one hand, and, on the other, on how to deal 
with demands from and concessions to the Chinese residents of the Indies.   
It is no secret that the Indies government saw the Chinese as the main cause of 
the diminishing welfare among the natives.  Many officials saw confronting the 
Chinese as part of the duty they had to protect the natives.  The Chinese were often 
blamed for fraudulent trades with both Europeans and natives.  They were seen as 
taking advantage of the native residents, especially in terms of the revenue farming 
system.  The latter was a system whereby the government granted a private contractor 
(revenue farmer) the exclusive right to collect a certain tax in a specified area for a set 
number of years in return for a fixed rent, and the farmer kept for himself any amount 
which he collected over and above what he owed the government in rent.183  The most 
notorious “Chinese exploitation” was the sale of opium.  This was why in 1900 the 
opium farming was abolished and a government monopoly was instituted in its place. 
This was followed by the decision to extend the government monopoly of pawnshops 
throughout the Indies.  The government also began its system of agricultural credit 
banks with the objective of furnishing cheaper credit to the indigenous farmers and 
rescuing them from the clutches of loan sharks, which often were Chinese.  All these 
measures affected the livelihoods of the Chinese in the Indies. 
On their part, the Chinese had their own grievances, the most important of 
which involved their legal status and the restrictions placed on travel and residents.  
The Ethical Policy gradually removed those grievances.  On March 17, 1900, the 
Chinese Association (THHK) was established in Batavia.  It marked the beginning of 
overseas Chinese nationalism as an organized movement in the Indies.  It exemplified 
                                                
183 See Rush, Opium to Java. 
 106 
the resinicization of the indigenized Chinese (peranakan) because THHK promoted 
Chinese-medium education as well as Confucianism.184  In reaction to the 
development of THHK, as well as in compliance with peranakan Chinese demand, the 
government established the Dutch-Chinese Schools in 1908.  The unpopular pass 
system was relaxed in 1904 by the granting of passes valid for a year instead of for a 
single journey, and in 1910 the right of free passage along the main highways without 
a permit was conceded.  In 1911, the Indies government recognized Chinese consuls; 
and in a succession of orders between 1914 and 1916, it allowed the Chinese greater 
freedom of residence and movement.  In 1919, the government abolished all 
restrictions regarding place of residences for the Chinese people in Java, and in 1926 
extended the ruling to those in the Outer Islands.  The Chinese were also admitted to 
advisory councils at the central and local levels.  In sum, these concessions provided 
the Chinese with greater social freedom and a legal status closer to that of Europeans. 
The Chinese population may not have posed any political threat to the Indies 
state, but the flood of new Chinese immigrants from the 1880s onward eventually 
created social problems in many places.  It forced the Indies state to appoint Officials 
for Chinese Affairs (Ambtenaren voor Chineesche Zaken) under the Department of 
Justice in 1896.  Its establishment on 1 October 1896 came two years earlier than the 
establishment of Bureau for Native Affairs, which was under the Department of 
Internal Affairs.  This fact indicates how the Indies state was in fact also concerned 
about the Chinese population in its territory. 
 
                                                
184 The THHK schools opened throughout the Indies; 54 by 1908 and reaching 450 by 1934, some of 
which were only in name.  Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat 40 taon dari Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan Batavia, 1900-
1939 (Batavia: Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan, 1940).  As early as in the late 1910s, however, some THHK 
schools got only 50 % enrollment because the rich Chinese parents sent their children to Dutch-Chinese 
Schools (Hollandsch-Chineesche School, HCS) that was established in 1907.  Mona Lohanda, Growing 
Pains: The Chinese and the Dutch in Colonial Java, 1890-1942 (Jakarta: Yayasan Cipta Loka Caraka, 
2002), p. 59. 
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Survey of Chinese Periodicals 
Monitoring the Chinese press became an issue when Rinkes tried to implement 
the vernacular press monitoring system in the beginning of the 1910s.  In fact, as I 
have described above, the first press survey report that Rinkes made in 1912 includes 
three Chinese-Malay newspapers out of twenty-two newspapers that he cited.185  In its 
early years, IPO also carried brief summaries of Chinese-Malay press in each issue.  
Rinkes must have understood that if he wished to accomplish comprehensive press 
monitoring, he needed to include major Chinese-Malay press.  Nevertheless, IPO’s 
main focus needed to remain on the indigenous press and the task of monitoring the 
Chinese vernacular press fell to another institution. 
The task of monitoring Chinese-Malay and Chinese periodicals had been 
carried out by the Bureau for Chinese Affairs (Dienst der Chineesche Zaken), which 
was established in 1916 to replace the Officials for Chinese Affairs.  One 
contemporary scholar, J. F. H. Later, contended in 1915 that Chinese-Malay and 
indigenous press had a different orientation because the former focused on Chinese 
affairs in the Indies and political developments in China.186  This view was prevalent 
in the middle of the 1910s; hence the Indies state decided to monitor Chinese-Malay 
press independently.   
Since their appointment in 1896, the Officials for Chinese Affairs had been 
under Department of Justice (Departement van Justice), which was responsible for 
dealing with immigrants.  During a reorganization of the Indies administrations that 
occurred in 1913, Officials for Chinese Affairs were positioned under the guidance of 
                                                
185 Three Chinese-Malay newspapers were Perniagaan (Batavia), Bintang Soerabaja (Soerabaja), and 
Tjahja Timor (Malang). 
186 J. F. H. Later, “De Maleise Pers,” De Indische Gids, 37-2 (1915), pp. 1264-1272.  Later was aware 
that there were two kinds of Chinese in the Indies; one group was driven by Chinese nationalism and 
became politically active, while the other called “Peranakan” was conservative and politically remained 
calm.  He noticed the reason of successful Chinese-Malay newspapers lay in their advertisement and 
subscription programs, which were weak points that indigenous press had. 
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the Department of Internal Affairs (Departement van Binnenlandsch Bestuur) instead 
of Department of Justice.  This change suggested that the “Chinese question” had 
become a domestic issue that affected inter-racial relationships.  In the same year, B. 
A. J. van Wettum, the Advisor for Japanese and Chinese Affairs, suggested in his 
letter to Governor-General Idenburg that control of the press should be regulated in 
accordance with the Indian Press Act 1910.187  No extra powers were granted to the 
administration or the Advisor for Chinese Affairs; in spite of this, the Officials for 
Chinese Affairs decided to issue a summary of the Chinese press in Dutch language 
under the guidance of J. L. J. F. Ezerman, then the Advisor for Chinese Affairs 
(Adviseur voor Chineesche Zaken). 
The very first series of mail reports on Chinese periodicals were “Press 
Reports/Press Surveys” (Persrapporten/Persoverzichten) of February, March, and 
April 1915, which were submitted to the Director of Home Affairs (Directeur van 
Binnenlandsch Bestuur), who monitored the thirteen leading Chinese newspapers in 
both Malay and Chinese languages.  The thirteen Chinese papers were as follows: Sin 
Po, Perniagaän, Han Po (Batavia), Warna Warta, Djawa-Tengah (Semarang), Pelita 
(Jogjakarta), Ho Po (Soerabaja), Tiong Hoa Wi Wien Po (Buitenzorg), Andalas 
(Medan), Soeara Hindia (Sibolga), Sinar Sumatra, Bintang Tiong Hoa, Hoa Po 
(Padang).188  In the 1916 the name, “Press Reports/Press Surveys” was changed to the 
aforementioned Beschouwingen.  These secret reports were submitted every month to 
high government officials such as Governor-General and Prosecutor General.   
                                                
187 Adviseur voor Japanse en Chinese Zaken (B. A. J. van Wettum) aan Gouverneur-generaal 
(Idenburg), Aug. 10, 1913, in Van der Wal, De opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging in 
Nederlands-Indië, pp. 312-313. 
188 Mr. 1030/1915.  It is to be noted that in the 1910s Batavia, Semarang, and Padang were the centers 
of Chinese own periodicals, while later the centers were moved to Soerabaja and Medan, except 
Batavia. 
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The survey of the Chinese press was developed under the guidance of H. 
Mouw.  Mouw was appointed as Advisor for Chinese Affairs on 19 May 1919 and 
retired as Head of the Bureau for Chinese Affairs (Dienst der Chineesche Zaken) in 
1935.189  For lower level Dutch officials, the “Survey of Chinese-Malay and Chinese 
Press” or MCC was first prepared and published in book-form in October 1917.  This 
Dutch language report was issued monthly with an average of 40 pages until April 
1927.   From May 1927 it became a weekly of about 15 pages.  It covered major 
Chinese and Chinese-Malay newspapers in the Indies, while focusing on the latter, 
because the number of circulation and audience was much larger than the former.  The 
number of both Chinese and Chinese-Malay newspapers it covered increased from 39 
in October 1921 to 50 in October 1923, and to 60 in December 1927. 
The report itself was compiled by the Office for Chinese Affairs, but was 
published by Balai Poestaka, except in 1927 when it was published by ’t Kasteel van 
Aemstel in Weltvreden.  Unlike IPO, which had been confidential until 1921, MCC 
was made available to the public from the beginning, even if few people knew of its 
existence.  The number of periodicals monitored in the report grew from thirteen in 
1915 to more than fifty in the 1920s.190   
The number of newspapers and periodicals reviewed in MCC is different from 
that of IPO, which also claimed to be surveying Indies Chinese newspapers.  In 
January 1923, MCC listed 48 newspapers as its sources, while IPO listed 16 or one-
third of MCC’s coverage.  In September 1929, MCC covered 59 newspapers, whereas 
IPO listed 38.  It is obvious that there was a major difference in terms of the number 
                                                
189 Mouw’s first appointment as Advisor for the Chinese affairs was in 1916, but he was demoted to 
officer in 1917 for a couple of years for unclear reasons. 
190 These figures are taken from Mr. 1030/15, and the lists of periodicals from various issues of the 
report (October 1921 - December 1930). 
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of vernacular publications that MCC and IPO covered.  Although their focuses were 
different, some of the Chinese-Malay newspapers they covered actually overlapped. 
Comparing IPO and MCC in terms of their coverage of Chinese newspapers 
reveals the characteristics of their surveys.  The two government surveys differ not 
only in the number of newspapers each journal covered, but in a more complicated 
sense as well.  Here for the sake of comparison, I take two different years – 1920 and 
1927 – of press surveys of each journal.  To show the distinction, I follow the original 
lists in both IPO and MCC.191 
 
Table 3-3: The Number of Press Reviewed in MCC (1921.10-1930.12) 
 
[Source: The list is from various MCC issues] 
 
IPO in 1920 only covered eight Chinese-Malay newspapers.  Its order does not 
suggest any significance, but it covered major Chinese-Malay press.  The number of 
                                                
191 These lists tell many stories, but I will stick to the comparison between IPO and MCC in order to 
show the uniqueness of the latter. 
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covered publishers then jumped to thirty-two in 1927, this time listed in alphabetical 
order.  The list looks more organized, but the ways in which IPO summarized 
Chinese-Malay press provided almost nothing significant.  It often did not carry any 
summary of Chinese-Malay press at all.  In other words, it is safe to say that the list 
was made mainly as a matter of formality as part of the press survey.  
However, from the standpoint of scholarship, the list reveals several intriguing 
facts, because it listed the names of chief editors at a particular time.  For instance, a 
well-known journalist, Liem Koen Hian was the chief editor of Sinar Sumatra in 
Padang after 1921, and in 1923 moved to become the chief editor of Pewarta 
Seorabaia in Soerabaja.  But he quarreled with the editors, and then founded Soeara 
Publiek in 1925.192  In 1927 the city of Djombang, East Java, had four Chinese-Malay 
newspapers; the position of chief editor for three of them – namely Bintang Pagi, 
Sinar Matahari, and Yoe Sen – was held by Ong Khing In.  Another newspaper called 
Tjahaja Djombang had Tan Sionk Gwan as its chief editor.  Also in 1927 Tan Boen 
Kim, a journalist and popular novelist, held the position of chief editor of Kiao Po in 
Palembang.193  But as I mentioned above, reading IPO did not provide any detailed 
information explicitly on these journalists.  One had to follow the summaries made of 
the articles they had written in their respective newspapers in order to piece together a 
kind of profile of the journalists themselves.  
 
 
                                                
192 Benedict Anderson, “Kata Pengantar,” in Tjamboek Berdoeri, Indonesia dalem Api dan Bara 
(Jakarta: elkasa, 2004), pp. 15-16. 
193 When he was the chief editor of Kiao Po, he was charged with a complaint offence (klachtdelict).  
His defense statement is available as “Pleidooinja Hoofdredacteur Kiao Po dalem Klachtdelictnja Pada 
Burgemeester Palembang,” in Tan Boen Kim, Tanboenkim’s Pleidooi: Pleidoenja Journalist-journalist, 
advocaat-advocaat en Procureur ternama, jang belaken diri sendiri atawa clientnja lantaran 
persdelict, klachtdelict dan laen-laen perkara delict, kadjahatan atawa crimineel, depan sidang 
pengadilan di Indonesia. (Batavia: Firma Sun Boen, 193?), pp. 24-31. 
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Table 3-4: Chinese Vernacular Newspapers and Periodicals Covered by IPO,  
1920 and 1927 
1920 
 Names Language Editors Place 
1 Pewarta Soerabaja M Kommer (Indo) Soerabaja 
2 Sin Po M Tjoe Bou San Batavia 
3 Perniagaän M Tio Tjin Boen Batavia 
4 Djawa Tengah M K. T. Kwee Semarang 
5 Warta Warna M Phoa Tjoen Hoat Semarang 
6 Tjahaja Timoer M W. A. Kailola Malang 
7 Sinar Sumatra M Liem Koen Hian Padang 
8 Andalas M Toejoeng Medan 
 
1927 
1 Bintang Borneo M Tio Ie Soei Bandjarmasin 
2 Bintang Pagi M Ong Khing In Djombang 
3 Djawa Tengah M Be Sik Tjong Semarang 
4 Djawa Tengah Monthly M 
Editors of Djawa 
Tengah Semarang 
5 Doenia Baroe M Pek Pang Ing Medan 
6 Han Po M Tan Thwan Khing Palembang 
7 Hoakiao M Kwee Hing Tjiat Soerabaja 
8 Hoa Pit M Lie Sian Siang Padang 
9 Keng Hwa Po M Tjia Djoe Tjiat Menado 
10 Keng Po M Tan Tjin Thay Batavia 
11 Kiao Po M Tan Boen Kim Palembang 
12 Panorama M Kwee Tek Hoay Batavia 
13 Pelita Andalas M J. Koning (Indo) Medan 
14 Perdamean M Liem Soen Hin Padang 
15 Perniagaän M Thio Tjin Boen Batavia 
16 Pewarta Soerabaja M Liem Kwie Giok Soerabaja 
17 Radio M Tjio Peng Hong Padang 
18 Revolver M Tan Liang Hoo Palembang 
19 Sinar Matahari M Ong Khing In Djombang 
20 Sin Po M Kwee Kek Beng Batavia 
21 Sin Po (illustrated) M Editors of Sin Po Batavia 
22 Sin Jit Po M  Soerabaja 
23 Sinar Sumatra M Jap Gim Sek Padang 
24 Soeara Baroe M Liem Hian Bing Semarang 
25 Soeara Publiek M Liem Koen Hian Soerabaja 
26 Soemangat M Ong Kiong Djoen Semarang 
27 Tjahaja Djombang M Tan Siok Gwan Djombang 
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Table 3-4 (Continued) 
28 Tjahaja Timoer M Th. K. Kwee Malang 
29 Tjin Po M Tan Tek Bie Medan 
30 Warna Warta M & E Lauw Kong Hoey Semarang 
31 Warna Warta weekly M Liem Thain Joe Semarang 
32 Yoe Sen M Ong Khing In Djombang 
[M = Malay, E = English] 
 
For comparison, the examples from MCC are from October 1921 and 1927.  
The list from October 1921 has 39 newspapers.  The list of covered periodicals 
indicates what the Office for Chinese Affairs was paying attention to.  As the content 
of MCC shows below, it monitored press coverage on Chinese related domestic 
politics, education, economy, journalism, and complaints, as well as international 
affairs concerning political development in China.  In order to pursue the last 
objective, MCC needed to cover newspapers and periodicals from Peking, Nanking, 
Shanghai, Canton, Hong Kong, and Singapore.  Therefore, in 1921 sixteen out of 
thirty-nine papers and periodicals were from outside the Netherlands Indies.  The 
number of “foreign” newspapers went down slightly to fourteen in 1927, while that of 
“domestic” vernacular ones increased to thirty-nine from twenty-three in 1921.  This 
change reflects the fact that the volume and variety of vernacular press in the Indies 
increased.  In other words, in the latter half of the 1920s, MCC spent more time poring 
over the growing number of domestic vernacular newspapers than foreign ones. 
 
Table 3-5: List of the Surveyed Newspapers and Periodicals by MCC,  
1921 and 1927 
1921 
No. Name of periodicals Place 
1 Andalas Medan 
2 Bintang Soerabaja Soerabaja 
3 Canton Times Canton 
4 Chiao Yu Kung Pao (Dept. of Education) Peking 
5 China and Malaysia Nanking 
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Table 3-5 (Continued) 
6 
Chung Hua Min Kuo Chung Fu Kung Pao (South 
China Gazette) Canton 
7 Chung Fu Kung Pao (Chinese Gazette) Peking 
8 Deli Morning Post Medan 
9 Djawa Tengah Semarang 
10 Fadjar Cheribon 
11 Great Light Hongkong 
12 Indo-China Makassar 
13 Keng Hoa Po Menado 
14 Kong Po Batavia 
15 Kong Siong Djiet Poo Batavia 
16 Macassar Free Press Macassar 
17 
Monthly Magazine of Chinese Educational 
Association Medan 
18 Morning Post Peking 
19 Nam Jang Djit Pao Medan 
20 New Society Peking 
21 North China Herald Shanghai 
22 Nung Shang Kung Pao (Dept. of Agriculture) Peking 
23 Perniagaän Batavia 
24 Perobahan (vroeger Algemeen Advertentieblad) Padang 
25 Pewarta Soerabaja Soerabaja 
26 Se Fa Kung Pao (Dept. of Justice) Peking 
27 Shun Thien Shih Pao Peking 
28 Sinar Sumatra Padang 
29 Sin Kuo Min Press Singapore 
30 Sin Po Batavia 
31 Sin Po (Chinese edition) Batavia 
32 Sin Wan Pao Shanghai 
33 Soe Pien Djiet Po Soerabaja 
34 Straits Magazine Peking 
35 Sumatra Daily News Medan 
36 Thien Sung Yit Po Batavia 
37 Tjahaja Timoer Malang 
38 Tsun Wan Yat Po Hongkong 
39 Warna Warta Semarang 
 
1927 
 Name of periodicals Place 
1 Asia Semarang (M) 
2 Bintang Borneo Bandjarmasin (M) 
3 Chiao Yu Kung Pao (Dept. of Education) Peking (C) 
4 Chinese Educational Association Koetoeardjo (C) 
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Table 3-5 (Continued) 
5 Chuan Min Yit Po Batavia (C) 
6 Chun Fun Kung Pao (Chinese Gazette) Peking (C) 
7 Chua Hwa Monthly Soerabaja (C and E) 
8 Djawa Tengah  Semarang (M) 
9 Djawa Tengah (monthly) Semarang (M) 
10 Fikiran Menado (M) 
11 Great Light Hongkong (C) 
12 Han Po Palembang (M) 
13 Hoa Kiao (bi-monthly) Soerabaja (M) 
14 Hongkong Weekly Press Hongkong (E) 
15 Keng Po Batavia (M) 
16 Keng Hwa Po Menado (M) 
17 Kong Siong Djit Po Batavia (C) 
18 Kwong Wah Yit Poh Penang (C) 
19 Morning Post Peking (C) 
20 Nayang Daily News Medan (C) 
21 North China Herald Shanghai (E) 
22 Nung Shang Kung Pao (Dept. of Agriculture) Peking (C) 
23 Panorama (weekly) Batavia (M) 
24 Palita Andalas  Medan (M) 
25 Perniagaän Batavia (M) 
26 Pewarta Soerabaia Soerabaia (M) 
27 Radio Padang (M) 
28 Republican Daily News Shanghai (C) 
29 Sam Yu Weekly News Bagan Api2 (C) 
30 Sek Kang Siong Po Makassar (C) 
31 Se Fa Kung Pao (Dept. of Justice) Peking (C) 
32 Semarang Yit Po  Semarang (C) 
33 Shun Pao Shanghai (C) 
34 Shun Tien Shih Pao Peking (C) 
35 Sinar Sumatra Padang (M) 
36 Sin Kuo Min Press Singapore (C) 
37 Sin Yit Po Soerabaia (M) 
38 Sin Po (Malay edition) Batavia (M) 
39 Sin Po (Chinese edition) Batavia (C) 
40 Sin Po (Weekly edition) Batavia (M) 
41 Soe Pin Sin Po Soerabaia (C) 
42 Soeara Publiek Soerabaia (M) 
43 Shiong Tih Hui Buitenzorg (M) 
44 Sumatra Bin Poh Medan (C) 
45 Tay Kong Siang Po  Soerabaia (C) 
46 Thien Sung Yit Po Batavia (C) 
47 Tiong Hwa Siang Po Bandoeng (M) 
 116 
Table 3-5 (Continued) 
48 Tiong Nam Djit Po Semarang (C) 
49 Tjahaja Timoer Malang (M) 
50 Tjin Po Medan (M) 
51 Tsun Wan Yat Po Hongkong (C) 
52 Warna Warta  Semarang (M) 
53 Warna Warta (weekly) Semarang (M) 
[C = Chinese, E= English, M= Malay] 
  
MCC provides a better-organized survey than IPO, which was essentially a 
summary of the vernacular press.  While IPO only summarized individual newspapers, 
MCC prepared a table of contents for the newspapers covered.  Although MCC’s order 
slightly changed over the period of time, its basic format in the first half of the 1920s 
was as follows: Domestic Politics, Foreign Affairs, Labor Movement, Education, 
Economy, Unions, Journalism, Complaints, and Varia (Miscellaneous).  The format 
changed between January 1925 and December 1926, when it assumed the following 
order:: Domestic Politics, International Politics, Nationalism and Communism, 
Education, Economy, Unions, Journalism, and Varia.  Between February 1927 and 
April 1927 the order changed again to become: Domestic Politics, International 
Politics, Chinese Movement, Anti-Western Action, Education, Economy, Unions, 
Journalism, Complaints, and Varia.  After MCC turned from monthly to weekly, the 
classification became simpler: Domestic Politics, International Politics, Chinese 
Politics, Education, Unions, Journalism, and Complaints.  The contents varied 
depending on the topic that MCC picked up for the week.  Sometimes the heading 
“Complaints” was omitted, whereas in another issue it was “Anti-Western Action.”   
The major institutional change of the colonial government in 1932 affected MCC, as 
well.  Since January 4, 1932, weekly MCC became a 10-page booklet.  At the outset, 
its content followed the same format as in the 1920s, but from issue No. 3 dated on 
January 18, 1932, it only had “Domestic Politics,” “International Politics,” and 
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“Chinese Movement.”  Although the subjects that MCC covered were reduced, it kept 
the same number of pages.   
Each heading has its number and concise summary, followed by several 
sentences.  Take for example issue No. 11 from November 1921; the heading 
“Journalism” came at No. 100 and it reads: 
 
100. Pewarta Soerabaja November 2.  The replacement of chief editor Tan 
Tek Yang of Bintang Soerabaja by Thio Tjin Boen is still uncertain.  If the 
latter will not be in Soerabaja on November 10, Lauw Kong Huy will probably 
become the chief editor of Bintang Soerabaja as of January 1.194 
 
The above entry is a summary of Pewarta Soerabaja’s report on the internal affairs of 
Bintang Soerabaja.  Because the chief editor usually determined the direction of a 
newspaper, such personnel change was worth reporting in MCC.  In the same issue of 
the same section, at No. 115 is another news concerning Chinese journalism.  It goes: 
 
115. Thien Sung Yit Po November 18.  In Semarang, a new Chinese journal 
called Semarang Daily News will be published.195 
 
Here a Chinese language newspaper Thien Sung Yit Po in Batavia reports about the 
launching of a new Chinese journal in Semarang.  No other summary mentions the 
launching; and since almost no data on Semarang Daily News is available, this news 
snippet is valuable information for administrators charged with monitoring 
developments in the Indies press. 
                                                
194 MMC, No. 11 (November 1921). 
195 MMC, No. 11 (November 1921). 
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 As the above example demonstrated, MCC was intentionally made compact.   
Almost no duplicated information occurred in the publication, and hence each topic 
and summary offered valuably efficient reading for busy colonial bureaucrats.  It was 
also very useful because of its coverage of both Chinese language and Chinese-Malay 
language newspapers from domestic and international sources.  Its format and content 
made MCC handy essential reading for Dutch officials who worked on Chinese 
affairs. 
 MCC reflected the priority that the Office for Chinese Affairs had set, which 
was domestic Chinese politics.  In other words, the ways in which the Chinese 
articulated their grievance shaped the construction of MCC.  That is why not only the 
politics of the Chinese, but also social issues such as education and complaints 
occupied major parts in MCC.  The “Complaints” section was a particularly persistent 
and revealing component of the MCC publication with regard to the Chinese in the 
Indies.  Therefore, MCC did not need to look further to find out problems in the 
Chinese community, because it could identify potential problems for the Indies state 
regarding the Chinese.  In the mind of Dutch officials, the “Chinese Question” stood 
on its own and the Chinese could be isolated from the indigenous population. 
 
Thus the 1910s ushered in the age of press monitoring and a glimpse of the 
coming age of political movement.  These two were intimately intertwined, as the next 
chapter will demonstrate.  The period saw uneasy intermingling between the liberal 
ideas of press freedom and the colonial anxiety of social order.  In the Indies, this 
tension manifested itself in terms of institutional competition on how to conduct press 
monitoring, which ultimately resulted in a more explicit conceptualization of social 
division, particularly between the Chinese and indigenous residents of the colony.  
The official distinction between “natives” and “Chinese,” was arguably very much 
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determined by the state’s apparatus for surveillance.  The ideals of the Ethical Policy 
to create a modernized social system capable of producing modern colonial subjects 
turned out to be challenging, if not illusory.  At this point, the Indies faced a 
fundamental test: To what extent could it tolerate political activism among its subjects 
and consider their aspirations, demands, and criticism.  How much the Indies state was 
willing to listen would determine what kind of society it would be.  At this point, the 
colonial roadmap remained unclear.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PERSDELICT: CONFRONTATION, CONSENT, ABSURDITY  
 
The 1919 popular novel Student Hidjo196 begins with an introduction that 
reads: 
 
This story has already been published in the newspaper under my management, 
the daily Sinar Hindia, in the year 1918.   
Essentially, this writing is the product of my pen when I was serving a sentence 
due to a case of persdelict, in the civil and military jail in Weltevreden, for the 
period of one year.  Although I could not write for the newspaper while in 
prison, I could produce books like Sair Rempah-Rempah, Student Hidjo, 
Matahariah, etc. 
Hopefully this book can be of use to all its readers.  
Marco Kartodikromo 
Semarang, 26 March 1919197 
 
In those few lines, the author provides a representative picture of indigenous political 
activism in the 1910s in the Indies.  The author, Marco Kartodikromo (1890-1932) or 
                                                
196 Marco Kartodikromo, Student Hidjo (Semarang: Masman & Stroink, 1919). 
197 Marco, Student Hidjo. 
 Ini tjeritera telah dimoeat dalam soerat kabar harian pangkoean kami: Sinar Hindia didalam 
tahoen 1918. 
Sesoenggoehnja ini karangan boeah penna kami, waktoe kami mendjalani hoekoeman perkara 
persdelict, di Civiel en Militair Gevangenhuis di Weltevreden, lamanja satoe tahoen.  
Maskipoen di pendjara itoe kami tidak bisa toelis menoelis didalem soerat kabar, tetapi kami 
bisa mengarang boekoe2 seperti: Sair Rempah-Rempah; Student Hidjo, Matahariah d.l.l. 
  Moedah moedahan ini boekoe bergoena bagi sekalian pembatjanja. 
Marco Kartodikromo 
Semarang, 26 Maart 1919 
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commonly referred to as “Mas Marco,” was a star journalist and well-known political 
activist.  He was the editor-in-chief of Doenia Bergerak (World in Motion) and 
founder of the Union of Native Journalists (Inlandse Journalisten Bond) in Soerakarta.  
Here “journalists” played the role of movement (pergerakan) leaders without well-
defined organizational base.198  Mas Marco was known for his frequent organization 
of political rallies for SI, and for his stylistic speeches that excited his audience.  In the 
introduction of Student Hidjo, Marco remarks that he has been imprisoned for a year 
because of persdelict, and yet he managed to produce books that continue to articulate 
his thoughts for his audience.  In effect, the imprisonment had provided him with the 
opportunity to gather his thoughts and ideas, which he otherwise might not have been 
able to do had he continued to focus on organizing rallies all over Java.  While he was 
physically imprisoned, his thoughts could roam freely and be organized into words 
and texts, which nonetheless could be passed on to his audience.  In other words, it 
was the persdelict case that eventually enabled him to write those books after 
meditating intensely and quietly in his prison cell. 
This is the image that journalists projected and their audience received 
regarding the consequence of persdelict in the late 1910s.  Prison was granted a 
special cultural meaning in “the age in motion” (zaman pergerakan) in Java.  It was 
thought that a prison was a space in which a satria (the knight in the traditional 
Javanese shadow plays) practiced asceticism and meditation to reflect and acquire 
supernatural power.199  He lives and dies for moral purposes in order to realize the will 
of the gods, and is seen as devoting himself to his mission.  The novel Hikajat 
Kadiroen, written by Marco’s contemporary political activist, Semaoen, is prefaced 
                                                
198 Shiraishi, An Age in Motion, p. 82. 
199 On sacred power in Javanese political culture, see Benedict Anderson, “The Idea of Power in 
Javanese Culture,” in Benedict Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in 
Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 17-77. 
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with a similar context of mental distillation: “I hope this story, which I have written 
with tears and pain in prison, will please many, that is, all readers and the general 
public.” 200  Semaoen imagines that the satria image was shared not only by his 
readers, but also by the Dutch authorities in the Indies.  In the novel, a Dutch Resident 
corroborates the rising social position of Kadiroen, the novel’s central character who 
was imprisonment for his political activity, by saying, “you are a satria.  You have 
already said that you are brave […] for you would certainly like to relieve all the 
burden of the people.”201 
This theme emerged as cliché in the politics of movement in colonial Dutch 
Indies.  Ever since the Indies state added persdelict and speech offense articles into the 
Penal Code, many journalists regardless of race were sentenced to jail or forced to pay 
fines, and they were well aware of the “risks.”  The implementation of these punitive 
articles was most rigorous in the 1910s and the 1920s.  In “the age in motion,” among 
other political tools, newspapers and political gatherings played important roles for 
movement leaders to articulate and disseminate their ideas.202  For the colonial 
authorities, press offense and speech offense articles were useful for suspending the 
activities and voices of activists for a period of time.  It was the time when a reversal 
of progress towards a more liberal state was observed, as the authorities tried to 
contain those radical voices.  Press freedom was supposed to be guaranteed by the 
law, but the reality showed recurring contradictions and disputes between journalists 
and the authorities.  These “battles” entertained readers, who hailed the activist 
journalists as satria fighting for their people, and thus reflected Javanese cultural 
cliché. 
                                                
200 Semaoen, Hikajat Kadiroen (Semarang: PKI Semarang, 1921), p. 1. 
201 Semaoen, Hikajat Kadiroen, p. 149. 
202 Shiraishi, An Age in Motion. 
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Meanwhile, in the publishing world, market demands shaped the content of 
popular print material, especially after the market for literature expanded from the 
1920s onwards.  This newly emerging print market in turn shaped a new kind of 
journalism.  Looking back to the heyday of newspapers in the 1920s, contemporary 
Dutch historian G. H. Von Faber, in 1930 described the sensational nature of 
newspapers in the Indies.  He wrote that the reading public had the desire to look for 
“something spicy or sensational” and hence “pressmen turn now to the police reports 
and the law courts,” and “print the most repugnant details of murders of white men, 
suicides, rare bestialities in remote plantations, rape, gambling-house and brothel 
scandals, black magic, etc.”203  It was a time of social change in the 1920s when the 
population of urban middle class increased not only among Dutch residents but also of 
other racial groups, and it affected the ways in which journalism developed and 
survived.  Radicalism and conservatism met in the press, and public opinion split over 
many issues.  The growing number of newly arrived Dutch citizens and their demands 
for sensational journalism inevitably affected the indigenous and Chinese journalists 
in the Indies, who not only read Indies-Dutch newspapers, but also emulated their 
practices.  Citations among Dutch, Chinese, indigenous newspapers were very 
common.  It is understandable that popular literature in the Malay language, especially 
novels “about crime and lewdness,”204 often overlapped with newspaper coverage and 
took their sources from newspapers articles.205 
In the age of political movement from the middle of the 1910s to the late 
1920s, socio-economic circumstances underwent major changes.  The expanding print 
market attracted new audiences susceptible to embracing the cultural clichés that had 
                                                
203 Von Faber, A Short History of Journalism in the Dutch East Indies, pp. 126-127.   
204 Balai Pustaka, Balai Pustaka Sewadjarnja, p. 29. 
205 Tineke Hellwig, “Scandals, Homicide in Batavia and Indo Identity: Literary Representations of 
Indies Society,” Archipel, No. 63 (2002), pp. 153-172; James T. Siegel, Fetish, Recognition, 
Revolution. 
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already become familiar to those who already movement followers.  Combative 
journalism found ways to continue expressing its opinions for its audience despite 
being subject to state repression, apolitical journalism found new audiences, while the 
colonial authorities tried to keep up with these developments.  Court cases of the time 
showcased all the wits with which journalists defended themselves and sometimes 
outsmarted the authorities.  Among others, persdelict cases that were reported in 
newspapers presented the general public with a spectacle of journalists against the 
authorities.  Coverage of trial scenes not only reconstructed the supposed offense and 
trial process, but also provided a space for journalists (the defendants) to expose the 
ways by which the authorities exercised (and often overreached) their power, or, not 
infrequently, the incompetence of government officials in the Malay language, which 
had led to misunderstanding and charges of persdelict.  In the form of newspaper 
articles, these trials emerged as political theater for journalists.  
The persdelict article undoubtedly restricted journalistic activities.  All 
journalists as well as much of their audience acknowledged this legal obstacle.  
However, contrary to conclusions reached in the conventional understanding of 
persdelict cases or cases of hate-sowing articles that arises from an exclusive focus on 
cases involving political activists in the late 1910s and early 1920s,206 there is little 
indication that any effective  “state-wide” coordination existed among colonial 
authorities to conduct persdelict charges against journalists.  Individual cases of 
popular political leaders and journalists reveal the arbitrariness of persdelict articles, 
which made the Penal court and its ruling appeared especially “unjust.”  As I have 
noted in the previous chapter, IPO’s summary of persdelict cases failed to provide an 
adequate overall picture of indigenous political development in the Indies, and it was 
                                                
206 Maters, Van zachte wenk tot harde hand. 
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not even objective in its method, because it depended completely on a highly variable 
level of knowledge and competence within the IPO staff.  
In this chapter I feature three sample cases of persdelict to demonstrate how 
the authorities exercised persdelict in the late 1910s until the middle of the 1920s, and 
how journalists reacted to it.  The first case took place in 1919 when indigenous 
journalist and leader of political activism Semaoen, was put on trial regarding his 
writings.  The second case involves to the emergence of conservative journalism in the 
Indies.  The third case deals with newspaper reports on persdelict that appeared in the 
Soerabaja-base Chinese-Malay newspaper Sin Jit Po.  Sin Jit Po was a rather marginal 
newspaper in two senses: it was a Chinese-Malay newspaper that IPO did not pay 
close attention to, and it was located in Soerabaja where two other Chinese 
newspapers, Pewarta Soerabaja and Soeara Poebliek, enjoyed wider circulation.  As 
my table below (Table 4-1: Persdelict cases from IPO (1917-1929) in the next section) 
shows, IPO did not list Sin Jit Po for its persdelict cases, and yet the newspaper 
carried persdelict-related articles – both its own cases and those of other newspapers.  
The first and third cases show how interaction between the authorities and journalists 
derived from the nature of persdelict articles as well as its application to individual 
cases.  As the third case of Sin Jit Po shows, persdelict cases usually occurred in a 
local context and they did not necessarily relate to political activism.  In fact, many 
persdelict cases turned out to stem from abuse of power by local authorities against 
journalists.  What then were the real effects of persdelict (legal) articles on journalists 
in the Indies in the 1910s and the 1920s?207  This chapter examines the political and 
social function of persdelict, in particular the authorities’ non-standardized criteria on 
persdelict and three different reactions by journalists. 
                                                
207 Hate-sowing articles were infamous throughout Dutch colonial period.  As Chapters 8 and 9 of this 
dissertation occasionally show, even in the 1930s many journalists were put imprisonment due to the 
violation of these articles.
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Persdelict and the State 
 
The Penal Code of the Indies 
Chapter 5. Regulations against Public Order (Misdrijven tegen de openbare 
orde) 
Article 154. 
Any person who publicly expresses and instigates (bevordert) the feelings 
(gevoelens) of hostility (vijandschap), hatred (haat), or contempt (minachting) 
against the Netherlands government or the Indies government will be 
sentenced to a maximum of seven years imprisonment or fined 300 guilders at 
maximum.208 
 
So goes article 154 of the Penal Code.  Articles 154-161 of the Penal Code were 
known as “hate-sowing articles” (haatzaai-artikelen).  These articles were introduced 
in 1914, making up the so-called Press and Speech Offence Codes (Pers-en 
Spreekdelicten).  Articles 154-157 of the Penal Code contain repressive stipulations 
regarding the press.  Article 155 decree a lesser prison term for a maximum of four 
years or a fine for a maximum of three hundred guilders as sanctions against persons 
who express “the feeling of enmity, hatred or disdain towards the governments of the 
Netherlands or of the Netherlands Indies” in a written or printed form meant for public 
circulation.  According to Article 156, public expression of “the feeling of enmity, 
hatred, or contempt towards one or more group(s) of population in the Netherlands 
Indies” is also punishable by a maximum prison term of four years and a maximum 
                                                
208 W. A. Engelbrecht, De Nederlandsch-Indische Wetboeken (Benevens de Grondwet voor het 
Koningrijk der Nederlanden, en de belangrijkste in Nederlandsch-Indië geldende wetten, algemeene 
verordeningen en besluiten, met verwijzing naar de op elk artikel betrekking hebbende Nederlandsch-
Indiesch, Nederlandsche en Fransche Wetbepalingen) (Soerabaja: J.M. Chs. Nijland, 1917), p. 1090. 
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fine of three hundred guilders.209  These articles were popularly known as “hate-
sowing articles,” or in the words of Parada Harahap, “the most known articles among 
journalists and activists in the Indies.”210  Residents of the Indies frequently read 
persdelict cases in the press and hence were also familiar with this particular code. 
Meanwhile, Balai Poestaka’s weekly IPO had been used as a guiding 
administrative tool for identifying and disciplining trouble-make journalists, rather 
than to socialize the press codes.  Journalists knew that persdelict charges could come 
at anytime.  Generally, they were considered a practical way for the authorities to 
separate journalists from their audience or to hurt them and/or their newspapers by 
way of a monetary penalty.  Balai Poestaka’s IPO was supposed to report on or signal 
cases that might cause social insecurity or unrest.  In this practice, journalists were the 
likely main target because of their capacity to relate ideas to the public through 
newspapers, magazines, or other forms of mass-produced medium.  For instance, in 
1926, due to a series of application of Article 153 bis of the Penal Code, the voice of 
Soerakarta’s Communist Association of the Indies (Perhimpoean Komunis di India, 
PKI), Mawa, ceased publication, only one year after its inaugural issue.211   
Over the period of twelve years, between December 1917 and January 1929, 
101 cases of persdelict were reported in IPO.  74 cases occurred in the first 5 years 
after IPO was released (1918-1922), and more than ten leaders of the nationalist 
movement and journalists were incarcerated.  Persdelict cases were often cited in IPO 
in the first few years, and then the number of reported cases declined, although ideally 
persdelict and IPO should work in tandem in order to control journalistic activities and 
writings.  In other words, there were eventually many cases unreported in IPO.  The 
                                                
209 W. A. Engelbrecht, Wetboek van Strafrecht voor Nederlandsch-Indië (Soerabaia: J. M. Chs. Njland, 
1931), p. 1090. 
210 Parada Harahap, Journalistiek: Pers-en Spreekdelictenboek (Weltevreden: Uitgevers Mij. “Bintang 
Hindia,” 1924), p. 49. 
211 On information on Mawa, see Shiraishi, An Age in Motion, pp. 324, 332-333. 
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attached table, “4-1: Persdelict from IPO (1917-1929),” lists persdelict cases, which I 
compiled from all the IPOs issued from 1917 to 1929.  It does not by all means reflect 
the whole aspect of persdelict cases; in fact, the actual number is thought to be several 
times more.  But at least the chart can gives a reflection of the cases that the 
authorities were paying attention to, and the variation of newspapers covering those 
cases.  The left hand column contains the names of personnel and newspapers affected 
by persdelict; the right-hand column lists the newspapers that covered the related case, 
as reported in IPO; the middle column gives the timeline of the coverage. 
 
Table 4-1: Persdelict cases from IPO (1917-1929) 
Names of journalists/newspapers 
charged with persdelict 
Dates of coverage 
(year/month/day) 
Newspapers covering persdelict 
cases as cited in IPO 
Padmawiganda (editor Medan Rajat 
& Hindia Moeda) 
17/12/17 
17/12/20 
Neratja, Kaoem-Moeda in IPO no. 
51, 1917 
Soetan Andomo (editor Tjahaja Sari 
Tjermin) 17/12/18 
Oetoesan-Melajoe in IPO no. 52, 
1917 
18/2/11 Pewarta Deli in IPO no. 7, 1918 
18/5/15 Pewarta Deli in IPO no. 21, 1918 
18/9/20 Pewarta Deli in IPO no. 39, 1918 
Soetan Parlindoengan (chief editor 
Pewarta Deli) 
18/10/12 Pewarta Deli in IPO no. 41, 1918 
18/ 4/4 Warna Warta in IPO no. 14, 1918 
18/5/11 Sin Po in IPO no. 19, 1918 
18/5/23-25 Warna Warta in IPO no. 21, 1918 
J.C. Weijde Muller (chief editor 
Warna Warta) 
18/7/10 Warna Warta in IPO no. 28, 1918 
Semaoen (editor Si Tetap) 18/4/13 Djawa Tengah in IPO no. 15, 1918 
18/4/13 Benih Merdeka in IPO no. 16, 1918 
Benih Merdeka (chief editor) 
18/4/16 Andalas in IPO no. 17, 1918 
Phoa (chief editor Sinar Sumatra) 18/5/30 Warna Warta in IPO no. 22, 1918 
 18/6/ 6 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 23, 1918 
Soeharijo (Sinar Hindia) 
18/6/22 Soeara Rajat in IPO no. 25, 1918 
Goei Tjeng Lian (staff Sin Po) 18/6/13 Sin Po in IPO no. 24, 1918 
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 18/3/ 7 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 27, 1918 
19/1/23 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 4, 1919 
19/8/23 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 34, 1919 
Z. Mohamad (staff Sinar Hiindia) 
19/10/8 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 41, 1919 
18/7/27 Kaoem Moeda in IPO no. 30, 1918 
18/12/2 Kaoem Moeda in IPO no. 49, 1918 Schreutelkamp (editor Bandoenger) 
18/12/9 Neratja in IPO no. 50, 1918 
18/8/16 Kaoem Moeda in IPO no. 32, 1918 
18/10/28 Kaoem Moeda in IPO no. 44, 1918 S. Goenawan (Kaoem Moeda) 
18/4/15 Kaoem Moeda in IPO no. 16, 1918 
Rm. B.S. (Djawa Hisworo)  9/ 8/18 Djawa Hisworo in IPO no. 32, 1918 
18/9/14 Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 37, 1918 
 18/12/2 Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 49, 1918 
18/12/9 Neratja & Kaoem Moeda in IPO no. 50, 1918 
18/12/23 Kaoem Moeda in IPO no. 52, 1918 
19/1/20 Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 4, 1919 
19/3/12 Neratja & Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 11, 1919 
Tirtodanoedjo (editor Oetoesan 
Hindia) 
19/6/10 Neratja in IPO no. 24, 1919 
 9/ 9/18 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 37, 1918 
18/9/13 Soeara Ra’jat in IPO no. 37, 1918 Darsono (Soeara Ra’jat) 
18/9/20 Soeara Ra’jat in IPO no. 38, 1918 
Brandsteder212 (?) 18/9/28 Soeara Ra’jat in IPO no. 39, 1918 
18/12/14 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 50, 1918 
 19/1/4 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 1, 1919 Marco (Sinar Hindia) 
 19/1/8 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 2, 1919 
A. Moeis, Semaoen, Darsono 18/12/18 Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 51, 1918 
Kaoem Moeda 19/1/4 Kaoem Moeda in IPO no. 1, 1919 
                                                
212 J. A. Brandsteder was the leader of trade union of sailors serving in the Navy (BMMP), which was 
the trade union for European personnel in the Dutch Navy in the Atlantic, European, and in the Pacific.  
While living in Soerabaja, he was among the pioneer members of the ISDV (Indonesian Social 
Democratic Association) founded in May 1914 with Sneevliet as its chairperson.   
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 19/1/7 Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 2, 1919 
19/1/14 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 3, 1919 Darsono (Oetoesan Hindia) 
19/3/14 Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 11, 1919 
 19/2/3 Neratja in IPO no. 6, 1919 
Abdoel Moeis 
19/2/24 Neratja in IPO no. 7, 1919 
19/1/12 Neratja in IPO no. 7, 1919 Tjokroamidjojo (director Sinar 
Hindia) 19/3/22 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 12, 1919 
19/2/19 Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 7, 1919 
19/3/13 Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 11, 1919 
19/3/15 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 11, 1919 
19/4/20 Si Tetap in IPO no. 17, 1919 
Semaoen (director-editor Sinar 
Hindia) 
19/7/12 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 28, 1919 
Abdoellah Ahmad 19/2/15 Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 7, 1919 
 19/3/1 Perobahan in IPO no. 10, 1919 
19/3/19 Perobahan in IPO no. 12, 1919 
19/3/22 Neratja in IPO no. 12, 1919 
Mas Atje Padmawiganda (editor 
Perobahan) 
 19/8/9 Perobahan in IPO no. 33, 1919 
Darmo Kondo   19/3/3 Darmo Kondo in IPO no. 10, 1919 
19/3/10 Pewarta Deli in IPO no. 11, 1919 
19/3/11 Benih Mardika in IPO no. 12, 1919 
19/3/18 Benih Mardika in IPO no. 12, 1919 
19/3/22 Benih Mardika in IPO no. 13, 1919 
19/3/23 Benih Mardika in IPO no. 13, 1919 
 19/4/2 Benih Mardika in IPO no. 14, 1919 
 19/4/6 Bromartani in IPO no. 15, 1919 
Moehammad Joenoes (chief editor 
Benih Mardika)[& K. Mangoen 
Atmojo (chief editor Sama Rasa)] 
19/4/28 Benih Mardika in IPO no. 18, 1919 
19/3/17 Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 12, 1919 
19/3/24 Neratja in IPO no. 13, 1919 
19/3/27 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 13, 1919 
Darsono (Soeara Ra’jat) 
19/7/28 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 31, 1919 
19/3/31 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 14, 1919 
Manap (staff Sinar Hindia) 
19/7/15 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 29, 1919 
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19/3/26 Benih Mardika in IPO no. 14, 1919 
 19/4/1 Benih Mardika in IPO no. 14, 1919 Benih Mardika (editor) 
 2/ 4/19 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 14, 1919 
19/3/24 Sri Diponegoro in IPO no. 14, 1919 
H. Fachrodin (Sri Diponegoro) 
 7/ 5/19 Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 19, 1919 
 1/ 5/19 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 18, 1919 
19/5/20 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 21, 1919 
19/8/18 Neratja & Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 34, 1919 
S. Partoatmodjo (editor Sinar Hindia) 
19/12/17 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 51, 1919 
19/5/17 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 20, 1919 
Sinar Hindia (editor) 
19/5/30 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 22, 1919 
Sama Rata  19/5/7 Pewarta Deli in IPO no. 20, 1919 
19/6/28 Padjadjaran in IPO no. 26, 1919 
Padjadjaran (editor) 
19/11/1 Padjadjaran in IPO no. 45, 1919 
19/9/2 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 36, 1919 
19/9/30 Perasaan in IPO no. 41, 1919 Soemargo (assistant instructor) 
19/12/16 Perasaan in IPO no. 1, 1920 
Tirtodanoedjo (Oetoesan Hindia) 19/9/25 Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 39, 1919 
19/10/18 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 42, 1919 
Soeharijo (Sinar Hindia) 
19/10/21 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 43, 1919 
Parada Harahap (Sinar Merdeka) 19/11/17 & 24 Sri Diponegoro in IPO no. 48, 1919 
19/12/15 Oetoesan Melajoe in IPO no. 52, 1919 Sidi Maharadja (editor Oetoesan 
Melajoe) 19/12/24 Warta Hindia in IPO no. 1, 1920 
Partondo (editor Oetoesan Hindia) 19/12/30 Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 1, 1920 
 20/4/1 Kaoem Moeda in IPO no. 14, 1920 
Kaoem Moeda (editor) 
20/7/12 Kaoem Moeda in IPO no. 28, 1920 
Soerjo Mitihardjo (Medan Bergerak) 
& Moedio Wiknjosoetomo (editor 
Panggoegah) 
20/4/23 Pewarta Soerabaja in IPO no. 14, 1920 
Soebroeto (editor Boeroeh Bergerak) 20/4/26 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 14, 1920 
20/7/28 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 31, 1920 
Soekindar (editor Sinar Hindia) 
 20/6/12 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 49, 1920 
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Mohammad Kasan (secretary SI 
Semarang) 20/10/25 
Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 44, 
1920 
Agam Ma’soem (ex-editor Sora 
Merdika) 20/11/2 Sora Merdika in IPO no. 47, 1920 
Kho Tjoean Wan (co-editor Sinar 
Hindia) 20/11/24 
Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 48, 
1920 
Soewardi (editor Persatoean Hindia) 20/12/-- Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 49, 1920 
Liem Ban Goei (staff Sinar Hindia) 20/12/6 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 49, 1920 
Darsono  20/12/13 Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 51, 1920 
20/12/27 & 30 Kaoem Moeda in IPO no. 1, 1921 
20/12/29 Sora Merdika in IPO no. 2, 1921 S. Goenawan (Sora Merdika) 
21/1/3 Sora Merdika in IPO no. 7, 1921 
20/12/20 Pewarta Deli in IPO no. 2, 1921 Mangoen Atmodjo (ex-chief editor 
Sama Rata) 
   21/2/2 Benih Mardeka in IPO no. 7, 1921 
Thio Tjin Boen (chief editor 
Perniagaan)  21/1/7 Pewarta Deli in IPO no. 3, 1921 
Sri Djojobojo 21/1/27 Sri Djojobojo in IPO no. 6, 1921 
Abdoel Manap (chief editor Hindia 
Sepakat) 21/2/12 Hindia Sepakat in IPO no. 11, 1921 
Soekindar (editor Sinar Hindia) 21/3/26 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 14, 1921 
Lokot Panangaran (staff Sinar 
Mardeka) 21/5/11 Pewarta Deli in IPO no. 21, 1921 
Datoe’ Mangkoeto Alam 21/4/20 & 5/11 Warta Hindia in IPO no. 21, 1921 
Mohamad Samin & Mohamad Noer 
(editor Benih Merdika) 21/5/26 Benih Merdika in IPO no. 27, 1921 
Oetoesan Malay (editor) 21/9/19 Perniagaan (reported in Warna Warta) in IPO no. 39, 1921 
Tjio Peng Hong (editor Algemeen 
Advertentieblad) 21/10/3-8 Kaoem Moeda in IPO no. 41, 1921 
Moehamad Said (editor Neratja) 21/10/24-29 Neratja in IPO no. 44, 1921 
Abdoel Manap (Hindia Sepakat) 21/10/22, 25, 29 Benih Mardeka in IPO no. 46, 1921 
Lim Soen Hien (editor Warta Hindia) 21/Dec -22/Jan Sinar Merdeka in IPO no. 5, 1922 
Marah Sri Mahadewa (editor 
Perobahan) 22/3/18 Warta Hindia in IPO no. 14, 1922 
Gatot Sastrodihardjo (editor 
Panggoegah) 22/7/14 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 25, 1922 
A. Dasoeki & Sismadi Sastrosiswojo 
(editor Islam Bergerak) 22/6/19-24 Sinar Hindia in IPO no. 26, 1922 
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 22/7/5 Panggoegah in IPO no. 29, 1922 
K. Boedimandojono alias Patih 
Mandonosrojo (Panggoegah)  22/7/31-22/8/5 Kaoem Moeda in IPO no. 32, 1922 
Neratja (editor) 22/8/26 Neratja in IPO no. 36, 1922 
Sama Tengah (?) 22/9/6-14 Kaoem Moeda in IPO no. 39, 1922 
Java Bode (?) 22/11/21 Neratja in IPO no. 48, 1922 
Salim (Timor) 22/12/5-14 Neratja in IPO no. 50, 1922 
Tengkoe Kamaloeddin (editor 
Pewarta Deli) 22/12/16-19 
Oetoesan Malay in IPO no. 52, 
1922 
Martopengalasan (ex-editor Oetoesan 
Hindia) 23/1/2-9 Oetoesan Hindia in IPO no. 2, 1923 
23/3/30 Oetoesan Ra’jat in IPO no. 17, 1923 Pedro Almansjoer (& Abdoel 
’Xarim) 23/4/10 Oetoesan Ra’jat in IPO no. 19, 1923 
Arga 23/8/25, 27, 28 Neratja in IPO no. 34, 1923 
Neratja (chief editor) 23/9/3-11 Neratja in IPO no. 37, 1923 
Anwar 23/10/27 Halilintar in IPO no. 45, 1923 
Soetan Rai (chief editor Itqan) 23/11/25, 23/12/5, 23/12/15 
Pemandangan Islam in IPO no. 7, 
1924 
24/2/6-11 Neratja in IPO no. 7, 1924 
24/2/6-19 Pantjaran Berita in IPO no. 7, 1924 Soetan Soemoeroeng  
 24/7/9 Persamaan in IPO 
Soeroso (chief editor Zaman Kiwari) 24/6/2-7 Hindia Baroe in IPO no. 24, 1924 
Mohamad Nasid gl. St. Permata 
(Warta Hindia) 
24/5/16-26 Tjaja Soematra in IPO no. 24, 1924 
Soeara Batak (leader) 25/5/5 & 7 Persamaan in IPO no. 20, 1925 
Nawawi Arief (editor Soeara 
Tambang) 25/7/31 
Soeara Tambang in IPO no. 34, 
1925 
Maamoor Lubies (Oetoesan 
Minahasa)  26/1/1 Sajoer Maintjat in IPO no. 6, 1926 
Siswo & Soekandar (communists, 
Mowo) 26/7/22, 23, 24 Darmo Kondo in IPO no. 32, 1926 
Boemi Malay (chief editor) 27/8/18 Boemi Malay in IPO no. 35, 1927 
Asahan  27/12/28 Asahan in IPO no. 2, 1928 
22(?)/1/28 Benih Timoer in IPO no. 6, 1928 
Benih Timoer (editor)  
12(?)/2/28 Benih Timoer in IPO no. 8, 1928 
 134 
Table 4-1 (Continued) 
Tan Tek Bie (chief editro, Tjin Po) 28/3/09 Bintang Timoer in IPO no. 12, 1928 
28/3/31 Pewarta Deli in IPO no. 15, 1928 
28/4/17–28/5/2 Pewarta Deli in IPO no. 19, 1928 
28/4/28–5/12 Pertja Timoer in IPO no. 19, 1928 
Abdul Hamid Loebis (& D. J. 
Loebis) 
28/7/26& 28 Pewarta Deli in IPO no. 33, 1928 
Oetoesan Sumatra (editor) 28/4/19– 5/5 
Oetoesan Sumatra in IPO no. 19, 
1928 
R. Bh. Sabaroedin (chief editor Benih 
Timoer) 
28/5/7-15 Benih Timoer in IPO no. 20, 1928 
Manoewar (chief editor Pembrita 
Kemadjoean) 
28/6/30 Warna Warta in IPO no. 28, 1928 
Soeara Tapanoeli (chief editor) 287/4-8 
Soeara Tapanoeli in IPO no. 32, 
1928 
Lahab & Alwi (editors Persatoean) 28/8/29 Warta Hindia in IPO no. 36, 1928 
Maradja Sajoeti Loebis (editor 
Persatoean) 
28/12/5-13 Fadjar Asia in IPO no. 50, 1928 
Al Madjar (editor) 29/1/09 Al Majdjar in IPO no. 5, 1929 
Djawa Tengah 29/1/09 Djawa Tengah in IPO no. 5, 1929 
K. Wybrands (Bintang Timoer) 29/1/28-31 Bintang Timoer in IPO no. 6, 1929 
[Source: IPO, 1917-1929] 
 
In terms of numbers, this chart shows a distinct tendency.  Persdelict cases 
occurred frequently from the end of the 1910s up to 1921.  More than ten journalists 
and activists were affected with fine or imprisonment; the numbers covered in IPO are 
16 in 1918, 23 in 1919, 12 in 1920 and 1921.  In terms of IPO coverage, details of 
some persdelict cases included only their rulings, while for other cases, reporting was 
more complete from initial charges through court trials, imprisonment, and eventual 
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release of those affected.  As the IPO summary was organized by newspapers, 
government officials who were interested in a particular case, person, or organization 
were able to just focus on the newspaper of concern.213  As surveillance over the 
radicalization of political activism tightened, the number of IPO summaries on 
newspaper articles covering persdelict increased.  But contrary to the previous years, 
the year of 1922 shows noticeable decrease in this regard.  The number of “victims” 
who were affected by persdelict reached nine in 1922, and never exceeded ten 
afterwards.  The highest number after 1923 was nine in 1928, reflecting the reaction to 
communist uprisings in 1926 and 1927. 
Curiously, the number of persdelict cases cited in IPO does not really reflect 
the political development and the reaction of the Indies state in the 1920s.  It is 
commonly understood that when taking office in 1921, Governor-General Dirk M. G. 
Fock (1921-1926) tightened surveillance and took more suppressive measures than his 
predecessors.  It was the time of reaction by the Indies state against indigenous 
movements.  Fock was more conservative than his predecessor Limburg Stirum, and at 
the same time, economic depression hitting the Indies from the middle of 1921 to 1923 
required the Indies state to exercise a tight budget, which translated into less tolerant 
approaches to unfavorable labor movements and indigenous actions (demands).  
During his five years in office, Fock enacted several restrictive laws against 
indigenous movement.  A typical example was the additional articles of the Penal 
Code; 161 bis which was installed in 1923 to make indigenous labor strikes illegal, 
while 153 bis and ter restricted any movement and discourse that might cause public 
insecurity.214   
                                                
213 Although the articles dealing with persdelict cases include repetitions from reports of suspicion, trial, 
imprisonment, and release from prison, I managed to identify individual cases and count them for the 
list. 
214 Chapter 5 of this dissertation will examine these added articles of the Penal Code. 
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Around 1921 the Indies state started to tighten its control of the flourishing 
indigenous movements.  In April 1921 Fock replaced Governor-General Johan Paul 
Van Limburg Stirum, who was a liberal and took a neutral stand towards movements 
by the indigenous people of the Indies.  Under Limburg Stirum’s rule, the People’s 
Council (Volksraad) was established in December 1916, so that the indigenous leaders 
could participate in the quasi-parliament to discuss issues concerning the Indies.  Also 
during the Limburg Stirum period, Semaoen emerged as a leader and was successful 
in organizing a number of strikes.  The more ideologically conservative Governor-
General Fock was less interested in the development of indigenous associations that 
could become part of the colonial system governing politics and labor issues, and 
enacted instead a series of policies aimed at repressing emerging political voices.  
During his term, the police apparatus expanded and became more vital in surveillance 
networks monitoring native movements, whereas the role of the Advisor for Native 
Affairs, which had provided the basic information on native affairs for policy-makers, 
began to be pushed into the shadows.  The “age of reaction” had arrived.   
It is to be noted that persdelict articles was one of many regulations in the 
Penal Code.  If its effectiveness decreased, it is logical to think that other articles of 
the Penal Code would be made more effective to restrain indigenous movements.  But 
in reality, although IPO did not cover all persdelict-related cases, the number of 
persdelict cases did not decrease at all; many journalists complained about the Penal 
Code and had to live with it.   
IPO’s attention to persdelict cases concentrated on certain newspapers.  Its 
organization based on newspapers allowed its readers to keep track of the editorship of 
individual papers from 1918 to 1929.  As I will explain below, IPO intensively 
followed persdelict cases only during these twelve years.  It irregularly made lists that 
consisted of names of newspaper, their editorship and tendencies.  Curious as it may 
 137 
seem, given that persdelict articles in essence targeted individual journalists, the 
pattern of citations of persdelict cases shows that IPO focused on several “radical” or 
locally representative newspapers rather than paying consistent attention to individual 
journalists.  This pattern was reflected the ways in which IPO conducted press survey, 
translated, and summarized newspaper articles.  Considering the size of vernacular 
press in the Indies, it is likely that several staff were involved in translating and 
making summaries for IPO.  A review of the summaries of persdelict cases published 
in IPO bears out this assumption.  The way in which IPO summarized vernacular 
press was not standardized, and the Malay vernacular press in Java was given more 
attention than those outside Java.  In effect, the Indies state focused on conducting 
surveillance in Java because this was the place where indigenous movements became 
increasingly radical since the late 1910s until the middle of the 1920s.  Those citations 
that included regions outside of Java most frequently concerned the vernacular press 
in Sumatra.  
In most cases the format of the IPO summary of persdelict cases were rather 
simple, covering mainly the hard facts of the cases – who were accused of persdelict, 
when, where, and what the verdict was.  Dutch translations of excerpts from the 
original articles in IPO sometimes showed what the cited vernacular press thought 
about the case.  For instance, IPO lists the persdelict against Batavia-based Neratja 
(Summation) as its first case, and the summary is as follows: 
 
NERATJA  17 Dec. 1917, no. 116 
Native Journalists 
Another Martyr.  M. Atje Padmawiganda 
In connection with the condemnation of Mister Padmawiganda to 3 months 
imprisonment for persdelict, which sentence he is now set to undergo, 
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Neratja’s comment is that the above-named journalist is currently paying his 
debt, but a debt which the native readers will learn from. 
May his countrymen appreciate his services.215 
 
From this example, it is clear that IPO does not interpret, and rarely comments on, the 
newspaper articles it covered.  Its straightforward translation/summary shows how 
newspapers themselves reported persdelict cases.  The headline “Another Martyr,” 
suggesting that the penalized journalist was sacrificing himself for his readers, appears 
to be merely copied from Neratja, to signal the attention it attracted within the 
newspapers’ audience. 
IPO’s coverage of persdelict cases had its focus.  Outside of Java, vernacular 
newspapers that were often cited were those of Padang and the neighboring cities in 
West Sumatra.  This makes sense because since the late 1910s in West Sumatra 
Islamic religious schools absorbed ideas of anticolonialism and reformist Islam from 
abroad, which radicalized the people.  That was why journalists of the Padang-based 
Oetosan Melajoe were under the IPO surveillance.  IPO originally characterized 
Oetosan Melajoe as a “Malay traditional law (adat) party,” but in August 1922 it 
became “liberal,” and in October 1923 it was notes as “liberal, but with some radical 
elements.”  This changing character of Oetoesan Melajoe was reflected by its editors-
in-chief; from the outset Datoe Soetan Maharadja held the position, but in 1922 S. 
Maharadja Lelo and in 1923 Abd. Moeis, respectively, took over.  Oetoesan Melajoe 
                                                
215 “Inlandsche Journalisten,” Neratja, No. 116 (December 17, 1917) in IPO, No. 51, 1917. 
NERATJA 17 Dec. 1917, no. 116 
INLANDSCHE JOURNALISTEN  
Weer een martelaar.  M. Atje Padmawiganda 
In verband met de veroordeeling van den heer Padmawiganda wegens een persdelict tot 3 
maanden gevangenisstraf, welke straf hij nu bezig is te ondergaan, de opmerking der Neratja 
dat genoemde journalist thans zijn schuld gaat betalen, maar een schuld, waarvan de Inlanders 
profjit zullen trekken. 
 Moge zijn landgenooten zijn verdiensten naar waarde schatten! 
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evolved from being traditional to liberal with some radical characteristics, yet it 
appeared as a case of persdelict in IPO in 1919, during the editorship of Datoe Soetan 
Maharadja, when the newspaper was labeled a traditional law party.216   
The case was reported in the December 15, 1919 issue of Oetoesan Melajoe217 
and followed up by Warta Hindia on December 24, 1919.218  Oetoesan Melajoe’s 
article recounts how the prosecutor applied persdelict articles to its journalist.  But the 
authorities were concerned less about one particular article than the accumulated 
accusations that would lead to punishment.  In the case of Datoe Soetan Maharadja, 
the final straw was his article “Pelita Kecil” (Small Lantern) in the December 17, 
1919, issue, in which he wrote about the situation on Java in 1892, when famine 
prevailed and people sold their children for 25 cents at the market to ward off 
starvation. This history, argued the journalist, showed how Dutch officials brought 
nothing but misery and poison to the little people.  Prior to the publication of this 
article, Datoek Soetan Maharadja had already received several warnings for his other 
articles, which similarly defended the interests of common people.  Given this 
background, Raad van Justitie demanded a fine of 100 guilders, but later the higher 
court altered the penalty to one month imprisonment.  In addition to his persdelict 
case, Datoek Soetan Maharadja had been placed under surveillance for allegations of 
his connections with Wahhabism, even though he was called a Sjafeist by the 
authorities.219  Considering his social titles – Datoek and Soetan – it is no doubt that 
                                                
216 Taufik Abdullah, “Modernization in the Minangkabau World: West Sumatra in the Early Decades of 
the Twentieth Century,” in Claire Holt, Benedict Anderson, and James Siegel (eds.), Culture and 
Politics in Indonesia (Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur: Equinox Publishing, 2007), pp. 179-245. 
217 IPO, No. 52, 1919. 
218 IPO, No. 1, 1920. 
219 Authorities paid wrongly special attention to the development of Wahhabism in West Sumatra since 
the end of the nineteenth century.  Wahhabism was a reform movement to free Islamic societies of 
traditional cultural practices and interpretations and to purify Islam.  It was started by the followers of 
Ibn ‘Abd ul-Wahhab, who instituted a reform of Islam in Arabia in the eighteenth century.  Sjafei was 
one of the four orthodox jurists (Hanafi, Sjafei, Hanbali, Maliki) who were rejected by the Wahhabis.  
“Persdelicten,” Oetoesan Melajoe, No. 252 (15 December 1919) in IPO No. 52/1919, which was also 
compiled in secret mail report 74x/20. 
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he was a local aristocrat and a well-known figure in the community.  The authorities 
needed to take into consideration the social impact of his arrest and imprisonment, not 
only as a journalist, but also as a person of high social influence. 
As far as IPO was concerned, Oetoesan Melajoe was charged with persdelict 
only once, even though the colonial authority’s motive might be accumulative.  
Oetoesan Melajoe’s case was in this sense exceptional.  After being published in IPO 
No. 52/1919, the summary of the case was also compiled in the colonial secret mail 
report No. 74/1920.  Padang was the center of publishing business in Sumatra up until 
the 1920s, a point that I shall examine below.  The Sumatran presses frequently cited 
in IPO were from Medan (East Coast of Sumatra) and Tanjoeng Karang (South 
Sumatra).  It is thus safe to say that the reason why Sumatran vernacular presses were 
often cited in summaries of persdelict cases is not necessarily because the Sumatran 
cases posed (greater) danger to the colonial law and order, but because the IPO staff 
paid extra attention to them due to the local development of Islam. 
The newspapers often cited in IPO for their coverage on persdelict cases were 
Neratja, Kaoem Moeda (Young Generation), Sinar Hindia (Indies Gleam), Oetoesan 
Hindia (Indies Envoy), Soeara Ra’jat (People’s Voice), Perobahan (Transformation), 
Benih Mardika (Seeds of Freedom), and Pewarta Deli (Deli Herald), all of which were 
published either Java or Sumatra.  In the cases on Java, IPO reviews of vernacular 
press were more representative and useful by selecting major newspapers from major 
cities.  Major cities in Java included Batavia, Bandoeng, Semarang, and Soerabaja; 
while Neratja, Kaoem Moeda, Sinar Hindia, and Oetoesan Hindia represented local 
newspapers respectively, and were generally perceived as radical press.  As I have 
noted before, the editor-in-chief generally shaped the qualities and areas of interest of 
a newspaper and its audience.  Consequently, IPO’s categorization of the vernacular 
press was also determined by who was in charge of the editorial board.  A look at how 
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IPO characterized leading newspapers and identified their main editors in connection 
with persdelict cases exemplifies this point.   
IPO first categorized the Batavia-based Neratja as “Radical Sarekat Islam” 
(1918 – November 1920), and then changed its categorization of this same paper 
numerous times in subsequent years:  To “Radical” (March 1922 – January 1923), 
“No affiliated party, sometimes evolutionary and sometimes radical” (October 1923), 
and “sometimes evolutionary and sometimes radical” (March 1924).  IPO also tracked 
its changing editors over time: Abdoel Moeis (1918), H. A. Salim (1919), Moh. 
Kanoen, and Djojosoediro (1920), Soetan Pamoentjak (latter half of 1920 – January 
1923), R. St. Palindih (July 1923 – October 1923), and H. Soetadi (March 1924).   In a 
1918 issue of IPO, Neratja is listed at the top of all vernacular press based on Balai 
Poestaka’s recognition of radicality, but its ranking went down after 1922 to third and 
fourth places.  Neratja appeared for the last time in March 1924 IPO.  The Bandoeng-
based Kaoem Moeda was categorized as “Generally for [the political party] Insulinde 
and inclined towards Sarekat Islam” at the beginning, and then changed to “Radical 
Sarekat Islam” (1919 – 1920), “Moderate” (November 1920 – March 1922), “P.E.B.” 
(Politiek Economische Bond, or Political Economic Union) (August 1922– July 1923), 
“Evolutionary P.E.B.” (October 1923 – September 1926), and “Neutral” (March 
1927).  The editors were A. H. Wignjadisastra (1918 – 1920), S. Prawirasoedirdja  
(March 1922 – this was the year when Kaoem Moeda was at the top of IPO’s “watch” 
list), and M. A. Padmawiganda (August 1922 – October 1923); from March 1924 until 
March 1927, when it made the list for the last time, there was no name as editor.  Sinar 
Hindia in Semarang was categorized as “Sarekat Islam and ISDV” (Indische Sosiaal 
Democratische Vereniging, Indies Social Democratic Association) (1918) on the 
outset, and then labeled “Extremist ISDV” (1919 – November 1920), “Communist” 
(PKI) (March 1922), “Communism, Sarekat Islam” (August 1922 – July 1923), and 
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“Sarekat Islam organ, formerly communist” (October 1923 – July 1924).  The listed 
editors were Semaoen (1918), Semaoen, Marco Kartodikromo, Sanjoto, Darsono 
(1919), Semaoen, S. Partoatmodjo, Darsono (1920), Semaoen, Soekindar, Darsono 
(November 1920 – March 1922), Semaoen (August 1922 – January 1923), Samsi (July 
1923 – October 1923), and Soebakat (March 1924 – July 1924).  Soeara Ra’jat was a 
kind of byproduct of Sinar Hindia.  It was a Semarang-based bi-monthly, which in the 
beginning was categorized as “Extreme” (November 1920), then “PKI” (March 1922), 
“PKI organ” (August 1922), and “Communist, PKI organ” (January 1923 – December 
1925).  Its editors were Partondo (November 1920 – July 1923), A. Moethalib 
(October 1923 – October 1924), and A. Soekindar (January 1925 – December 1925).  
Oetoesan Hindia, a Soerabaja-based daily, was characterized as “Sarekat Islam, 
[Javanese-oriented social movement and organization] Djawa Dipo” (1918) and 
“Radical Sarekat Islam” (1919 – January 1923), whose editor-in-chief was O. S. 
Tjokroaminoto (1918 – January 1923), except in 1918 when Tirtodanoedjo was also 
on the editorial board.   
The case of Sinar Hindia and Oetoesan Hindia was obviously influenced by 
the orientation of their lead editors.  Semaoen was a well-known leftist activist, while 
Tjokroaminoto was the leader of SI.  Initially they were both activists of SI, but 
Semaoen turned more leftist and radical, causing the split from SI and the subsequent 
formation of the Communist Association of the Indies, PKI.220  Soeara Ra’jat was a 
sister periodical of Sinar Hindia, and both were considered PKI organs.  On the 
contrary, Neratja and Kaoem Moeda were slightly different from the other three 
newspapers.  Their characteristics gradually shifted from “radical” to either 
“evolutionary” or “moderate” and “neutral.”  These two newspapers often changed 
                                                
220 In June 1924, the party was renamed the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party), 
retaining the initials PKI. 
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their chief editors in charge, and their affiliation with political organizations such as SI 
became increasingly unclear.   
In the case of Sumatra, Pewarta Deli, Benih Mardeka, and Perobahan from 
Medan and Tandjoeng Karang were often cited in IPO.  Pewarta Deli and Benih 
Mardeka might be representative press in Medan, but newspapers from other major 
cities such as Padang, Bukittinggi, and Palembang in Sumatra were rarely cited.  
Pewarta Deli, a Medan-based paper, was characterized as “Generally Sarekat Islam” 
in 1918, and then changed to “Radical (Tapanoeli-oriented organ)” (1919 – 1920), 
“Moderate (Tapanoeli-oriented organ)” (November 1920), “Moderate” (March 1922), 
“Liberal, Mandailing-oriented” (August 1922 – May 1926), and “Liberal” (September 
1926 – September 1929).221  Its editors were Soetan Parlindoengan (1918 – March 
1922), and Mangaradja Ihoetan (August 1922 – September 1929).  Benih Mardeka 
was also a Medan-based paper and was categorized as “General” paper (1918), 
“Radical Sarekat Islam” (1919 – July 1923), and “Radical Sarekat Islam, Loyal” 
(October 1923).  The editors were Moh. Joenoes (1918), Abd. Moeis (1919), Moh. 
Joenoes (1920), R. K. Mangoenatmodjo (March 1922 – January 1923), and V. V. S. 
Manent (July 1923 – October 1923).  Perobahan was a short-lived paper from 
Tandjoeng Karang, South Sumatra.  It was published as a twice-weekly paper in 1919 
and then as a weekly paper in 1920.  IPO classified it as “Radical” (1919 – 1920), and 
its editors were M. Atje Padmawiganda (1919) and Radja Taka Mega (1920). 
In short, it is safe to say that individual IPO staff followed their own reasoning 
and preference in determining which newspapers to be closely monitored.  Ironically, 
persdelict articles of the Penal Code were designed to discipline individual journalists, 
                                                
221 The characterization that IPO provided regarding Pewarta Deli was tricky, because it had 
“Tapanoeli-oriented” and “Mandailing-oriented” (South Tapanoeli Batak).  These two referred to 
basically the same people; the former pointed to the region, while the latter meant the dominant ethnic 
group in Tapanoeli region. 
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not newspapers as the medium.  IPO’s coverage of persdelict cases was not systematic 
at all; rather, it depended on the staff that summarized and translated the vernacular 
press into Dutch.  IPO was to provide the Dutch summary of vernacular press 
immediately after they were published, and as such the staffs were prone to make 
errors such as misspelling and typography as they had to prepare the reports in haste.  
The information IPO provided to the authorities was far from comprehensive, and the 
same was true of the list of newspapers it made.  IPO had no clear editorial aim nor 
uniform method of making a summary.  As I will show in Chapter 5, although it had a 
political mission, Balai Poestaka as the coordinator of IPO did not carry out its survey 
of the press in an organized way and therefore IPO itself failed to foresee the political 
dynamics of the Indies. 
However, persdelict cases occurred many times between the 1910s and the 
1930s.  Journalists’ reactions differed from time to time, which uncovered the inner 
workings of the Penal Code and the authorities that implemented the law, as my three 
cases below will illustrate. 
 
The Case of Semaoen 
Semaoen is generally remembered as the first head of PKI, leader of the radical 
wing of SI, and the first full-time propagandist.  His words and deeds attracted 
members and followers of SI, as well as the attention of administrators of the Indies 
state, even though he was only in his late teens and early twenties when he became 
active in politics. 
Semaoen was born as son of a state railway (Staats Spoor Maatschapij) 
employee in 1899, in Tjeramalang, Modjokerto, East Java, and at the age of six he 
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entered the Dutch Elementary School (Hollandsch Lagere School) in Soerabaja.222  At 
the age of thirteen, he passed the entrance examination for becoming a lower 
government officer (kleinambtenaar).  While going to school, Semaoen worked at the 
state railway company and joined its trade union.  He soon distinguished himself in the 
union movement and in 1913 became member of the Soerabaja branch of SI. 
In 1915 Semaoen joined the Indies Social Democratic Association (Indische 
Sosiaal Democratische Vereniging, ISDV), which had been established by the Dutch 
socialist H. J. F. M. Sneevliet in the previous year.223  Sneevliet decided to leave the 
Netherlands due to his radical political activities, and he came to Soerabaja in 
February 1913 to work as an editor for De Soerabajaasch Handelsblad (Soerabaja’s 
Commercial Newspaper).224  Before founding ISDV, Sneevliet moved to Semarang 
(the third largest city in Java), joined the Association for Railway and Tramway 
Personnel (Vereeniging voor Spoor-en Tramweg Personeel, VSTP), and accepted the 
job as editor for the local paper De Volharding (Perseverance).225  In May 1914, 
Sneevliet established a branch of ISDV in Soerabaja.  As its initial activities were 
limited, the association was little more than a debating society for Dutch socialists.  
The principal political activity of ISDV from 1915 until 1916 was the campaign – 
carried out by its organ Het Vrjie Woord (The Free Word) – to support and organize 
rallies for Mas Marco Kartodikromo, then incarcerated due to persdelict.  Sneevliet 
believed that trade unions could improve the working conditions of laborers and 
negotiate higher salaries.  No doubt the influence and leadership of Sneevliet 
                                                
222 Semaoen’s career is based on Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1965), passim; Shiraishi, An Age in Motion, passim. 
223 Sneevliet’s career is based on McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism; Shiraishi, An Age in 
Motion; John Ingleson, In Search of Justice: Workers and Unions in Colonial Java, 1908-1926 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
224 VSTP was established in Semarang in November 1908 as the oldest trade union in the Indies.  
Ingleson, In Search of Justice, pp. 74-86. 
225 Ingleson, In Search of Justice, p. 78. 
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penetrated into both VSTP and ISDV, and resulted in an expansion of activities 
throughout Java. 
Sneevliet’s socialist ideas attracted Semaoen, and he joined both ISDV and 
VSTP.  Semaoen learned the basic ideas and strategies of Marxism together with 
Darsono, who also became one of the native leaders of the communist movement in 
the Indies.  After Semaoen became a full-time propagandist of VSTP, its membership 
grew from 2,292 in January 1915 to 4,909 in December 1916, and eventually to 7,600 
in June 1918.226  Semaoen moved to Semarang in 1916, taking a leadership role at the 
SI and VSTP there, and practiced such novel political strategies as trade unionism and 
strikes.  In May 1917, in place of Moehammad Joesoef, he took over the leadership of 
SI’s movement in Semarang.  Along with political organizing, Semaoen edited and 
contributed articles to left-wing Malay language newspapers.  Si Tetap (The Constant) 
and Sinar Djawa (Gleam of Java), which changed its name to Sinar Hindia in May 
1918, which became organs of SI Semarang and VSTP.  Sinar Hindia published 500 
copies for each issue and was circulated in Semarang as well as major cities in Java 
such as Batavia, Bandoeng, Soerakarta, Jogjakarta, and Soerabaja.  Articles by editors 
published in Sinar Hindia often drew charges of press offence.  Semaoen himself was 
jailed several times due to persdelict.   
Under Semaoen’s leadership, the Semarang branch of SI also expanded its 
membership, growing from 1,700 in 1916 to more than 20,000 in the following 
year.227  From late 1917 until early 1918, Semaoen organized a series of successful 
strikes.  Strikes emerged as one of the most effective political methods because their 
results were immediate and readily visible; if successful, the participants were able to 
obtain substantial concessions.  Therefore, strikes attracted large numbers of laborers 
                                                
226 McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, p. 23. 
227 McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, pp. 137, 407; Ingleson, In Search of Justice, p. 231. 
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and peasants, and became a major political idiom for the movement.  1918 and 1919 
were even labeled “the age of strikes” (zaman pemogokan), because organizing trade 
unions and launching strikes were relatively successful.228  The year also saw the 
banishment of several leading Dutch socialists from the Indies, and thereafter 
Semaoen took over the leadership of ISDV movement.  By introducing strikes and 
organizing trade unions in the service of the movement, Semaoen attempted to replace 
the SI’s principal ideas of “progress” (madjoe) and “Islam” with “liberation” 
(merdika) and “equality and solidarity” (sama rata sama rasa). 
Semaoen emerged as a rising star among the indigenous movement 
(pergerakan) leaders.  He was however different from other leaders of the time.  First, 
the anti-colonial/capitalist movement was already established when Semaoen joined it.   
Original SI leaders like O. S. Tjokroaminoto and Mas Marco Kartodikromo were the 
movement’s founders and needed to devote themselves to its formation.  Semaoen’s 
contribution was his success in expanding it.  Second, Semaoen started his career as a 
full-time propagandist for the trade union movement.  This also distinguished him 
from Tjokroaminoto and Mas Marco, who began their careers as journalists and then 
turned into full-time movement leaders.  Third, Semaoen learned the ideology and 
know-how of the movement from Sneevliet, who, as noted earlier, was a well-known 
Dutch socialist, a skilled trade union propagandist and party activist.  Semaoen 
mastered socialist philosophy as well as novel movement methods such as trade union, 
boycott, and strike. 
As he rose as a propagandist and movement leader, in 1919 Semaoen was 
charged with persdelict for an article published in Sinar Hindia under his editorship.  
The IPO citation of this case is as follows: 
 
                                                
228 Shiraishi, An Age in Motion, pp. 109-116. 
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SINAR-HINDIA 15 March 1919 No. 52 
PERSDELICT SEMAOEN 
Included is a report of the press offence trial of Semaoen at the Landraad on 
March 12, 1919, relating that he will be imprisonment for 2 months.  In 
connection with this, it is noted that Semaoen will be taken into custody. 
Immediately after this report, there is an announcement about the 
release on March 25 of a “red book” entitled “Semaoen’s Persdelict.” 
Contents: a. Report concerning Landraad; b. Semaoen’s defence.229 
 
The article for which Semaoen was tried was Sneevliet’s essay entitled “Kelaparan 
dan pertoendjoekan koeasa” (Hunger and the demonstration of power).  As the editor, 
Semaoen had translated and published it in the November 16, 1918 edition of Sinar 
Hindia.  His subsequent trial due to this article was also reported in Sinar Hindia and 
then published in the form of a book in 1919, as announced in the same newspaper and 
cited in IPO.230  Reports of the trial provided important lessons for the press and 
activist communities as well as political messages for Semaoen’s audience.  The court 
trial was essentially a formal occasion consisting of a series of questions and answers, 
but once the court proceedings were printed and circulated as a book, they became a 
reading material for public consumption.  By being featured in trial reports, on the one 
hand, journalists and activists could expose their “victimization” at the hands of an 
unjust ruler, the injustices that colonized people must endure, and their courage and 
steadfastness in the face of such ordeals.  By reading such reports, on the other hand, 
the audience could reconstruct the court scene and, from arguments advanced by the 
                                                
229 “Persdelict Semaoen,” Sinar Hindia, No. 52 (March 15, 1919) in IPO, No. 11 (1919) in secret mail 
report 193x/19. 
230 Semaoen, Persdelict Semaoen (Semarang: Sarikat-Islam Semarang, 1919). 
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journalist or activist, learned more about the workings of the legal, administrative, and 
economic systems in the Indies.   
The promised “red book” gives us the details.  At 8:05 o’clock in the morning 
on March 12, 1919, at the Landraad in Semarang, the trial of Semaoen’s persdelict 
case began. There was a separate court and legal codes for Europeans, but the 
Landraad was the lowest court for the indigenous population.  For Semaoen’s case, 
there were three main judges consisting of Mr. A. S. Block serving as President, and 
Prawitohadinoto and Koesnoen each as member.  Local leader Moechtar and three 
chief judges Djojomihardjo, Griffier, and Soedirman were also present at the trial.   
The normal procedure opened the trial; the accused was asked to identify his 
profession and his local address.  Semaoen was then 21 years old and working as 
propagandist and editor for the VSTP in Semarang.  But when the chief prosecutor 
[djaksa] read the grounds of accusation, the atmosphere in the room quickly changed.  
When asked if he understood the substance of the accusation, Semaoen instead poked 
fun at his mispronunciation.  He pointed out, “I have to say that the chief prosecutor 
was not very clear because for the word ‘memikirkan’ (to think) he read ‘memikinkan’ 
(to make).231  And in this case the word ‘memikirkan’ has a significant meaning.”232  
The president and the two members smiled at this, likely because they understood 
Semaoen’s swipe. 
The trial began with question and answer between the president and the 
accused.  The judges faced a tough challenge from the outset, because Semaoen 
refused to admit the charges he was accused of – the publication of Sneevliet’s article 
under Semaoen’s editorship.  Because Sneevliet now lived outside the jurisdiction of 
                                                
231 The correct spelling of Malay should be “membikinkan” instead of “mimikinkan.”  But this kind of 
misspelling often happened in colonial days. 
232 Semaoen, Persdelict Semaoen, p. 1.  The original text reads, “saja maoe kata bahwa toean Hoofd-
Djaksa membatja koerang terang sebab perkataan “memikirkan” ia batja “memikinkan” sedang ini 
perkataän memikirkan besar sekali artinja dalam ini perkara.” 
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the Netherlands Indies, he could not be held accountable; the authorities thus regarded 
the publication of the article as Semaoen’s responsibility. 
In his defence Semaoen insisted that Sneevliet asked him to translate the article 
into Malay and publish it in Sinar Hindia with an agreement that the responsibility 
was entirely Sneevliet’s.  Upon receiving the original article in Dutch, he told the 
court, he had taken it home, read it several times in order to understand it thoroughly, 
pondered how to translate it, and weighed the consequences of its publication.  He 
took his translation to the printer anyway and the piece was published on November 
16, 1918, with an accompanying editorial arguing that the article was not “dangerous” 
(bahaja).  It was signed as authored by Sneevliet, which was unproblematic under 
normal circumstances, as he was an assistant of and frequent contributor to the paper. 
Then came questions regarding the content of the article.  The first point of 
contention was whether or not the article was intended to sway soldiers not to obey 
their commanders.233 
 
President: Was the article intended so that soldiers disobey commands?   
Semaoen:  No.  It was only intended so that soldiers do not kill people so 
easily.   
P: In that case, if soldiers were being ordered to kill, so that they refuse? 
                                                
233 Semaoen, Persdelict Semaoen, p. 2.  The original text is as follows. 
P: Itoe karangan maksoednja soepaja soldadoe mogok printah? 
S: Tidak, hanja bermaksoed soepaja soldadoe djangan gampang memboenoeh orang. 
P: Djadi kalau soldadoe disoeroeh memboenoeh soepaja djangan soeka? 
S: Tidak begitoe; toean President barangkali soedah dengar bahwa baroe baroesan ini di Flores 
soldadoe di lepaskan begitoe sadja dengan di persanggoepi premie ƒ 2.50 boeat satoe satoenja 
orang jang ia boenoeh sebab ia sangka brontak.  Ketarik olih itoe premie soldadoe bisa 
memboenoeh ngawoer sadja, asal dapat itoe premie.  Saja koeatir kalau disini rajat brontak 
djoega ada atoeran begitoe dan ada pemboenoehan mengawoer, sedang soldadoe tidak oesah 
boenoeh tetapi tjoekoep mengangkap. 
P: Di soeroeh memboenoeh tetapi menangkap, itoe toch mogok perentah memboenoeh. 
S: Tidak, sebab tidak di perentah siapa orang mesti di boenoeh.  Bisa djoega orang jang tidak 
salah apa apa kliroe diboenoeh.  Dari itoe saja bilang “djangan gampang memboenoeh.” 
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S: Not so, Mr. President.  Perhaps you have heard that recently in Flores 
soldiers were given permission to kill freely for a reward of ƒ 2.50 for 
every person they killed whom they suspected to be a rebel.  Because 
of this reward, soldiers killed randomly, just to get rewards.  I am 
worried if there is a rebellion here, this kind of rule will apply and 
there will be random killing where soldiers do not need to kill but only 
to make arrest. 
P: If they were being ordered to kill, but they only arrest, it means they 
disobey the authorities. 
S: Not really, because the command did not say who needed to be killed.  
Innocent people could be mistakenly killed.  Because of that, I say, 
“Don’t kill so easily.” 
 
The second point being raised concerned the word “menipu” (to deceive).  Although 
Sneevliet wrote the original article, Semaoen appears to understand the argument well.  
His answers indicated that it was the capitalist class who deceived the people.  His 
class-based logic explained how the sugar factory and local indigenous bureaucrats 
collaborated to deceive factory workers and local peasants.234 
                                                
234 The following dialogue can be found on pages 2-4.  The original text is as follows: 
P: Dalam itoe karangan ada perkata’an “menipoe.”  Siapa menipoe? 
S: Fabriek goela, orang orang atau klas kaoem oeang. 
P: Karangan menjeboetkan pemerintah wakilnja kaoem oeang jang menipoe, djadi kamoe 
menghina pemerintah? 
S: Betoel pemerintah wakilnja kaoem oeang. 
P: Djadi kamoe mengakoe pemerintah terhina? 
S: Tidak… 
P: En kamoe mengakoe betoel…? 
S: Toean president.  Disini ada salah mengerti; saja bilang: Betoel pamerintah wakilnja kaoem 
oeang dan betoel kaoem oeang fabriek (goela oepama) menipoe.  Saja bilang jang sebetoel 
betoelnja, djadi boekan perkara penghina’an, tetapi perkara kabeneran. 
P: Boekti? 
S: Fabriek goela memberi oeang presen (premie) pada loerah boeat saban saban baoe tanahnja 
orang desa jang disewakan.  Loerah menggoenakan kekoeasaännja boeat paksa haloes soepaja 
tanah disewakan, sebab ia tjari presen. 
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P: In that article there is the word “menipu” (to deceive).  Who deceived? 
S: The sugar factory, the rich.   
P: The article says that the government represents the rich who deceive, it 
means you insult the government? 
S: It is true that government represents the rich.   
P: So you acknowledge that the government is being insulted. 
S: No… 
P: But you acknowledge, right…? 
S: Mr. President, there is a misunderstanding here.  I said: it is true that 
the government represents the rich, and it is true that the factory 
                                                                                                                                       
P: Toch loerah jang menipoe? 
S: Betoel, tetapi fabriek tahoe hal hal ini en toch beri premie terseboet dengan pengetahoean 
itoe ia berboeat tipoean, dengan tegas: Fabriek menipoe haloes haloesan.  Ada doea matjam 
tipoean, haloes dan kasar, menipoe sendiri dengan langsoeng atau dengan perantaraän, direct 
atau indirect. 
P: Ada lain boekti tipoean? 
S: Ada, seperti menjahabat ambtenaar boemipoetera, tjontonja kalau saja tidak loepa Assistent 
Wedono Petaroekan diberi pindjam ƒ 10,000 oleh fabriek dan karena persahabatan itoe 
ambtenaar B. B. bisa goenakan kekoeasaännja boeat mendapatkan tanah. 
P: Kalau tipoean orang desa toch mesti berasa roegi.  Berapa sewa tanah? 
S: ƒ 40 sampai ƒ 70 satoe baoe.  Itoe roegi. 
P: Berapa hadsilnja orang desa dari sawahnja? 
S: Loepa, tetapi saja bisa hitoengkan disini kalau toean president soeka.  Bagaimana djoega, 
orang desa dapt hadsil lebih dari tanahnja kalau dibandingkan dengan pesewaän pada Fabriek. 
P: Ja, orang desa toch haroes tida soeka roegi? 
S: Kalah sama loerah, sebab ini kepala bisa mendjadi bentji pada pemogok penjewa dan orang 
dessa laloe gampang di fitnah, oepama dimintakan rol atau lain lain sebab pagernja tidak 
dilaboer d.s.b.  Kalau toean president tahoe betoel hal ichwalnja di dessa, toean bisa tahoe ini 
semoea.  Saja ada pernah beroemah di dessa. 
P: Dalam karangan terseboet pamerintah dihina sebab dikata: diperingatkan dengan keras, 
masih sadja beloem menambah bekal makanan di Hindia!  Penghina’ankah ini? 
S: Boekan, tetapi perkara sabetoelnja. 
P: Boekti? 
S: Permoela’an tahoen 1918 soedah ada gerakan2 boeat minta pada pamerintah soepaja 
tanaman teboe dikoerangi biar bekal makanan bisa ditambah. 
P: Apa lagi. 
S: Banjak beloem ditoeroeti, seperti soepaja pamerintah memaksa peroesaha’an peroesaha’an 
kapal menoeroenkan ongkos kapal besar boeat moeatan beras dari lain negeri.  Tetapi hal hal 
ini nanti saja terangkan dalam saja poenja soerat pleidooi (soerat perlawanan).  
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people deceived.  What I said is only factual; it has nothing to do with 
insult, but only the reality. 
P: Do you have proof? 
S: The sugar factory gives reward to village heads (lurah) for every piece 
of land they rent from villagers.  So the head of the village uses his 
power to subtly force the villagers to give up their land and lease it 
out, because he wants the reward. 
P: So you are saying the head of the village deceives? 
S: Yes, but the factory also knows about this, and yet they continue to 
reward such deception, which means, the factory indirectly deceives.  
There are two kinds of deceptions: subtly and crudely, to deceive 
directly or by using a medium, that is indirectly. 
P: Do you have any other proof of deception? 
S: Yes, those who hold the position of indigenous bureaucrats for 
instance, if I remember correctly, the Assistant Wedono of 
Petaroekan235 was given a loan of ƒ10,000 by the factory, and because 
of this relationship the civil bureaucrat (BB) can use his power to 
obtain land.  
P: If you say this is a deception, the villagers must feel the loss.  How 
much is the rent for the land? 
S: ƒ 40 to ƒ 70 per baoe.  This is a loss.   
P: How much is the yield from farming? 
                                                
235 Although Semaoen said Petaroekan, the book identifies the bureaucrat as the Asisstant Wedono of 
Taman Pemalang.  Semaoen, Persdelict Semaoen, p. 3, footnote. 
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S:  I forget, but I can calculate it here if Mr. President wishes.  In any 
case, the villagers should get more from the land compared to leasing 
it out to the factory. 
P: Yes, the villagers do not want to lose, right? 
S: They lost because of the village heads, and because of this, the village 
heads dislike those who refuse to lease out their land, and the villagers 
can be accused falsely quite easily, for instance they were cited for not 
painting their fences and things like that.  If Mr. President learns 
exactly what is going on in the villages, he will know everything.  I 
have lived in the village. 
P: In that article, the government is being insulted with a description: a 
serious warning, [the government] still cannot realize food sufficiency 
in the Indies!  Isn’t this an insult? 
S: No, that is only the truth. 
P: Proof? 
S: Beginning in the year 1918 there has been a movement to request the 
government to reduce the planting of sugar cane so that the people can 
grow food.   
P: What else? 
S: There are many still not being accepted to, for instance that the 
government forces the shipping companies to reduce the tariff to ship 
rice from other countries.  But this kind of thing I can explain in my 
defence statement.   
Semaoen’s answer appears to impress the president.  He pointed out the facts of the 
case and continued to deflect the accusation of insulting the government.  Semaoen 
detailed how the rich – the sugar factory – mediated by local bureaucrats customarily 
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deceived villagers, but made a point to specify the indigenous village-heads and an 
Assistant Wedono as the immediate perpetrators.  At one point the president asked, 
“Where did you go to school?,” because he knew that Semaoen had minimum formal 
education, and yet could attract many followers and made logical arguments citing 
concrete evidence.  Semaoen answered, “Dutch Elementary School,” adding that he 
did not go to school beyond it, but studied on his own.  He also told the court that he 
used to be a train clerk and passed the test to join station committee.  After working as 
train clerk for four or five years, in 1916 he became the propaganda editor of VSTP 
Semarang.  Semaoen professed to become attracted to ISDV when in 1913 he read an 
article in Soerabajaasche Handelsblad about a gathering for the founding of ISDV.  
At the time of the trial, he was a member of the top committee of ISDV.  He had asked 
the Semarang branch of ISDV to turn Sneevliet’s article into pamphlets, and published 
3,000 to 3,500 copies of it.   
Through the dialogue, Semaoen demonstrated that he always supported those 
who were weak and exploited by the authorities.  His aversion to abuses of power 
reminds us of Tirto back in the 1900s, as I have described in Chapter 2.  The 
difference however lies in the fact that Tirto had enjoyed political patronage by the 
Governor-General, while Semaoen learned political tactics from his Dutch socialist 
guru, Sneevliet.  Unlike Tirto, Semaoen could mobilize peasants and laborers who had 
suffered economic hardship.  By introducing strikes and demonstrations that could 
bring immediate results, Semaoen showed his followers that the weak could actually 
fight against the authorities and the capitalists. 
After the obligatory question and answer session, six witnesses were called in.  
They were H. W. Dekker (the chairperson of ISDV Semarang), H. M. Waworoentoe 
(the director of printing house of Sinar Hindia), Tjokromidjojo (the director 
administrator of Sinar Hindia), Karlian (the head of typesetter of Sinar Hindia), 
 156 
Soelatin (the proofreader of Sinar Hindia), and Kasan (the distributor of Sinar 
Hindia).  The questions for these witnesses concerned printing-related matters. 
After this, it was Semaoen’s turn to give his defence statement (pledooi), 
which he read for approximately one hour.  His statement firmly made a case that the 
accused article did not break the law, and then went on to criticize the ambiguity of the 
“hate-sowing articles,” which were the basis of the accusation. 
 
Mr. President and members of the court,  
 I am truly surprised that I am accused of violating articles 154 and 155 
[of the Penal Code], because I have proven prior to this that the contents of the 
[newspaper] article in questioned are completely clear and did not cross the 
limit.  And Mr. Chairman, where exactly is the limit of such violations, 
because it is not mentioned whatsoever in the articles, and to this day the 
government has never announced where exactly is the limit by which an 
article can be said to have crossed or have not crossed the law?   
 For a journalist, he cannot write even one article without being forced 
to see the specter of persdelict and they are happy if they can write with 
evidences to support their writings.  They must not lie or cover up the truth 
that needs to be exposed for public interest, and if they cover it up, this means 
that they are doing something evil and manipulate public interest, which of 
course is not desired by the government and the law; so if a person who is in 
the right is being punished, this means that the punishment encourages lies, 
which is dangerous for public interest and is cultivating a very bad aspect of 
humanity.  My surprise has grown steadily to the point that I am completely 
confused and can only say “Oh my God” whenever I think about the content 
of articles 154 and 155 of the strafwetboek which in Malay translates into 
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“mengloearkan perasaan bermoesoehan, bentji atau penghinaan” (to express 
feelings of enmity, hatred, or contempt).  How should I know if the article by 
comrade Sneevliet has expressed such feelings?  Who knows what he felt 
when he wrote it?  Was it hatred?  Was it sadness?  Was it surprise?  In short, 
only God knows what it was, and perhaps You Gentlemen here don’t know 
either, what kind of feelings comrade Sneevliet had at the time [of composing] 
was expressing.  If I were the one writing about the reality the way comrade 
Sneevliet wrote, then I would express feelings of sadness, thinking about the 
burden and suffering of the people who have been devoured by the rich.  So it 
wasn’t hatred or contempt (penghinaan) or quarrel, but a feeling of sadness 
that I would be expressing. 
 According to this article of law, You Gentlemen of this court, need to 
know the author’s feeling when he wrote [the article], and you can ask 
comrade Sneevliet if at that time he was expressing hatred and the likes, and if 
he says no, who and how can [you] prove otherwise!  I know comrade 
Sneevliet as a leader who has pity for whoever is the victim of exploitation 
and oppression, and it saddens him to see repression; but how and where he 
expresses hatred, I still do not know.  In making criticism or analysis with 
regard to the government and the rich, he is always cool-headed, he did not 
use his feelings. 
 In short, Mr. Chairman, I wholeheartedly request that Your Honor do 
not make assumptions from this article on what the writer was feeling, and 
also because the articles of law that I mentioned above are very arbitrary, so I 
ask that this case not be decided and especially erroneously decided, because 
nobody can witness or prove what exactly the feeling that the author was 
expressing. 
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 With regard to the [newspaper] article itself, it cannot express any 
feeling because it is only a dead thing. 
 I think I have given enough proof that the article does not violate any 
part of articles 154 and 156 of the strafwetboek and now I will continue with 
proofs that the [newspaper] article was not trying to influence the soldiers of 
the army to disobey commands of their superiors.236   
                                                
236 Semaoen, Persdelict Semaoen, pp. 18-20. 
  Toen President dan toean lid-lid! 
Soenggoehpoen saja hairan bahwa saja ditoedoeh melanggar fatsal 154 dan 155 
karena sebagi saja boektikan diatas semoea isinja karangan jang mendjadi perkara ini senjata 
njatanja, dan tida melanggar batas.  Dan lagi toean Voorzitter, manakah batasnja itoe 
pelanggaran sebab tida terseboet sama sekali dalam itoe fatsal dan hingga sekarang belom di 
peroemoemkan oleh pemerintah dimana batas-batasnja karangan jang melanggar dan tida 
melanggar. 
Boeat soeatoe Journalist soenggoehpoen tida bisa toelis satoe karangan sadja, maka 
terpaksalah ia meliat gendroewonja persdelict dan marika soedah senang kalau mengarang 
dengan bisa mengadakan boekti boektinja kabenarannja toelisan.  Merika tida boleh berboeat 
djoesta atau menoetoep kaberanan jang ia sangka perloe diboeka sebab goena kaperloen 
oemoem dan kalau ia sampai menoetoep itoe tentoelah akan berboeat djahat dan seolah olah 
mempermainkan keperloean oemoem, hal jang mana tentoe tida dikehendaki oleh pemerinth 
dan fatsal-fatsal terseboet, dan kalau orang poenja kabenaran dihoekoem tentoelah 
penghoekoeman itoe menjoeroeh djoesta dan berbahaja sekali boeat kaperloean oemoem serta 
mendidik perasaan menoesia jang sangat djahat.  Heran saja bertambah bertambah besar lagi 
sehingga beberapa hari tinggal gèdèk dalam kebingoengan sambil menjeboet-menjeboet 
“Astagafir Allah,” kalau saja memfikirkan boeninja fatsal 154 dan 155 dari strafwetboek 
dimana terseboet “tot uiting komen van gevoelens van vijandschap, haat of minachting” dan 
bahasa melajoe “mengloearkan perasaan bermoesoehan, bentji atau penghinaan.”  Bagaimana 
saja bisa taoe dari toelisannja saudara Sneevliet bahwa ia soeda MENGLOEARKAN 
PERASAAN, siapa taoe dia poenja rasa koetika ia toelis itoe, rasa bentjikah, rasa soesahkah, 
rasa hairankah, wah pendek hanja Toehan Allah jang mengatahoei itoe, dan barangkali 
Padoeka toean-toean disini djoega tida bisa taoe, RASA apa.  Kalau saja jang menoelis 
kabenaran-kabenaran sebagi saudara Sneevliet, toelis diatas soenggoehpoen saja 
MENGLOEARKAN RASA SENDIH HATI, sebab memfikirkan kaberatanja dan 
kasoesahannja rajat jang djadi makanannja kaoem wang.  Djadi boekannja rasa bentji atau 
penghinaan atau persateroean, tetapi perasaan soesah jang saja keloearken. 
Menoeroet fatsal wet itoe toean-toean jang pegang pengadilan mau taoe rasanja 
sipenoelis waktoe menoelis, dan boleh tanjak pada saudara Sneevliet apakah diwaktoe itoe ia 
kloearken rasa bentji dan sebaginja, dan kalau ia bilang tida siapa dan bagimanan tjaranja 
memboektiekan atau menjaksikan sebaliknja!  Saja kenal saudara Sneevliet sebagi soeatoe 
pemimpin jang hanja mempoenjai rasa hati belas kasian kepada siapa sadja jang terperas dan 
tertindas, dan soesahlah ia kalau ia melihat penindasan dan, perasaän itoe, tetapi di mana 
tempatnja dan diwaktoe apa ia kloearkan rasanja bentji itoe sampai sekarang saja belom 
mengatahoei.  Didalam memboeat critiek atau pertimbangan berhadapan dengan pemerintah 
dengan kaoem wang selamanja ia pakai ia poenje INGATAN DINGIN (koel verstand), tetapi 
tida pakai ia poenja RASA. 
Pendek, toean voorzitter, saja moehoen dengan sangat-sangat soepaja dari karangan 
itoe padoeka pengadilan djangan sampai kira kira sadja atau menoedjoem rasa apa jang 
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Semaoen went on to point out the unfairness of the colonial legal system.  He pointed 
out the discrimination involved in a legal system that tried native people at the native 
court or the Landraad, while Europeans were tried at the Raad van Justitie.  This 
dichotomy in the Indies legal system was of course well known to the judges.  Why, 
then, did Semaoen need to make this point?  In a sense it was obvious.  Arguably 
Semaoen was making a statement for the benefit of the audience present at the trial 
and his readers outside the courtroom, not for the judges in front of him.  Most 
important was his “assessment” that such separate courts were unjust.  Semaoen had 
prepared his defence with multiple audiences in mind – the judges, his sympathizers 
who were among the audience, as well as the readers of Sinar Hindia.  He thus went 
on, 
 
Previously I have used the word “hopefully” because even though essentially 
the Raad van Justitie and the Landraad are the same, “the way cases are being 
tried” or “the technique of trying cases” in front of the Landraad is different 
from that in front of the Raad van Justitie. 
 The difference in “techniques” can exert influence in such a way that 
the accused in front of the Landraad may feel actually in a less advantageous 
position compared than if he were in front of the Raad van Justitie.  I have 
mentioned above, that the prosecutor of the Landraad is not required to 
present formally the charges, and the punishment requested in front of the 
                                                                                                                                       
sipenoelis soedah keloearkan dan djoega dari sebab katentoean dalam fatsal-fatsal wet 
terseboet diatas begitoe adjaib, sangatlah permoehoenan saja soepaja dipoetoes jang ini perkara 
tida boleh dipoetoes dan tida bisa dipoetoes salah, sebab tida ada jang menjaksikan atau 
memboektikan, atau kira-kirakan perasaän apa jang penoelis soedah kloearkannja. 
Adapoen karangannja sendiri tida bisa mengloearkan rasa, kerena itoe karangan mati 
belaka. 
Sampai disinilah saja kira soedah tjoekoep memboektikan bahwa itoe karangan sama 
sekali tida melanggar katentoean-katentoean dalam fatsal 154 dan 155 dari strafwetboek dan 
sekarang saja akan melandjoetkan boekti-boekti jang itoe karangan sama sekali tida mengasoet 
soldadoe-soldadoe dari balatentara boeat mogok diatas prentah-prentah dari pembesarnja. 
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accused and the public (openbare), whereas in the Raad van Justitie this 
officer is obligated to do so.237   
 Secondly, in the Raad van Justitie, the judge is not allowed to punish 
the defendant on charges other than those cited in his “letter of summons” 
(surat panggilan) and “requisitoir” of the Prosecutor, whereas in the 
Landraad he can find other excuses after the accused or defendant has 
expressed his or her statement of defence to contradict the original charges.  
So it looks like the second charges have been brought up only after the 
original charges have been rebutted without any further rebuttal allowed for 
the accused.   
 So I hope, Your Honors, of this Landraad will not so act in my case. 
 Other than that I am also adding this further information, so that Your 
Honors can take into consideration how difficult is it for me to make this 
rebuttal letter: 
Although I never thought that I would be brought to the Landraad on 
the 6th of February 1919, because I remember Chief Prosecutor (Hoofd Jaksa) 
saying to me at the time when I was being asked about the case of an article 
by S(ubroto) M(atirogo), that even though the Landraad had the power to 
allow only three days between the delivery of the summons and the trial in 
front of the Landraad, usually in this type of cases, more than fourteen days 
are usually given between the summons and the presentation of self [at the 
court], so that the accused has enough time to prepare evidence to prove that 
he is not guilty of the charges.  But what happened [in my case] was not like 
that.  Now I have to come before you, but the letter of summons came on 
                                                
237 What Semaoen was implying here is that by not reading the formal accusation, the accused 
sometimes did not know what the precise charge was. 
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Friday dated the 31st of January 1919, at 8 o’clock in the evening, so I have 
had only five days to prepare evidence that I am not guilty.  In the case of 
Sneevliet and Dekker, they were given more than fourteen days by the Raad 
van Justitie, so in this case the difference between the Raad van Justitie and 
the Landraad is very obvious; since we the native journalists must report to 
the Landraad, we are already at a disadvantage compared to Dutch journalists 
who report to the Raad van Justitie.  This unfairness is magnified if you take 
into consideration that according to Nieuws van den Dag and other Dutch 
newspapers, Dutch journalists have better knowledge and intelligence 
compared to indigenous journalists.  Yet it seems like our justice system here 
assumes that we indigenous journalists are smarter than Dutch journalists [by 
granting lesser time to prepare for our defence].  Whichever is correct, it’s up 
to the public to decide.  But two things are clear: if we are stupid, then the 
way the government allots time as I mentioned above is very unfair compared 
to the amount of time given to Dutch journalists; or, if the government 
considers the present system is already fair, then newspapers like Nieuws van 
den Dag and others must be trying to plant seeds of hatred between the natives 
and people of other groups by insulting indigenous journalists, in which case 
the government must punish the editors of Nieuws van den Dag and other 
Dutch newspapers.  But if this is not true, then it means the court is unfair. 
Mr. President!  I brought up this issue so that Your Honors of the 
Landraad can take into consideration that such a short time reduces the 
evidence I could gather to prove my innocence, and if you listen to my 
defence, I hope you take into consideration this lack of time.  The time was 
already short, but the way the letter of summons was delivered to me also 
made it more difficult to prepare a defence against the accusation, which in 
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my opinion is without any basis.  While Dutch journalists like Dekker and 
Sneevliet and others received copies of the letters of summons, stating the 
exact charges, indigenous journalists, like I on that Friday, do not receive a 
copy of that summons.  Instead, Mr. Assistant Wedono read it in front of me.  
But my case is so complicated that one hour was spent just to read the letter, 
so that by the end I had forgotten [the exact charges].  In addition to the fact 
that the letter was being read in front of me at my house, I was sick.  So up to 
now it is not clear to me on what grounds I am accused, making it even harder 
for me to prepare an appropriate defence.   
 It can be argued that my case has been postponed to this day (12 
March), but the reason it was delayed was because I was sick.   
 I am sick, and up to now you can see that my hand is still being 
bandaged, that I am still not fully recovered, that I cannot prepare the letter of 
defence to the best of my ability, because my mind is still being burdened by 
my ailment. 
 So I hope this is taken into consideration, and if there is any 
explanation that is not yet clear, I hope Your Honor would ask so I can clarify 
it.   
 Above I have explained the difference of “techniques” in front of the 
Raad van Justitie and the Landraad, so that Your Honors of the Landraad 
here can neutralize or remove these disadvantages with a fair decision.238  
                                                
238 Semaoen, Persdelict Semaoen, pp. 27-29. 
Diatas saja soeda kata “moega-moega” sebab meskipoen dasarnja memberi pengadilan dari 
Raad van Justitie dan Laadraad ada sama, tetapi “tjaranja oeroes perkara” atau “technieknja 
oeroesan perkara” di moeka Landraad ada lain dari pada dimoeka Justitie. 
Ini perbedaännja “tjara” atau “techniek” bisa berpengaroeh begitoe roepa, sehingga 
pesakitan dimoeka Landraad bisa berasa di roegikan dalam perkaranja kalau ditimbang dengan 
pesakitan jang misti mengadap dimoeka Justitie. 
Tadi saja soedah tjeritakan, bahwa toean Djaksa sebagi Officier van Justitie dimoeka 
Landraad tida diwadjibkan mengadakan “soerat toedoehan dan permintaän oekoem” dimoeka 
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orang banjak dan dimoeka pesakitan (openbaar), sebaliknja dimoeka Justitie toean Officier van 
Justitie diwadjibkannja. 
Kedoea, oeroesan dimoeka Raad van Justitie tida memperkenankan boeat Justitie 
mengoekoem pesakitan dengan alesan lain dari pada jang terseboet dalam “soerat panggilan” 
dan “requisitoir” dari Officier van Justitie poenja, sedang Landraad boleh tjari alesan lain 
“sesoedahnja” pesakitan didengar perlawanannja boeat membatalkan toedoehan jang pertama.  
Saolah-olah toedoehan jang kedoea jang di bikin baroe sesoedahnja perlawanan jang kesatoe di 
tetapkan dengan tida pakai perlawanannja pesakitan. 
Moega moegalah padoeka Landraad dalam perkara saja ini tida berboeat begitoe. 
Selain dari itoe saja mengatoerkan katrangan lagi sebagi di bawah ini, soepaja 
padoeka bisa menimbang kesoesahan hamba bikin soerat perlawanan: 
Soenggoehpoen saja tida mengira bahwa doeloenja saja misti mengadap Landraad 
pada tanggal 6 Februari 1919, karena saja ingat perbilangannja toean Hoofddjaksa di waktoe 
saja di tanjak perkaranja karangannja S(oebroto) M(atirogo), bahwa meskipoen Landraad ada 
hak membri tempo tjoema 3 hari di antaranja kadatangan panggilan dan pengadoean di moeka 
Landraad, biasanja di dalam perkara perkara seroepa ini, begitoelah kata toean Hoofddjaksa 
kepada pesakitan, diberi tempo lebih dari 14 hari antara panggilan dan pengadapan, sehingga 
pesakitan dapat tempo tjoekoep boeat mengadakan boekti-boekti bahwa ia tida berdosa sama 
sekali.  Adapoen kedjadiannja tiada begitoe.  Sekarang saja misti mengadap, tetapi panggilan 
datangnja pada hari Djoemahat tanggal 31 Januari 1919 djam 8 malam, sehingga saja hanja 
dapat tempo 5 hari boeat bersedia menoendjoekan jang saja tiada berdosa.  Di dalam 
perkaranja Sneevliet dan Dekker merika diberi tempo lebih dari 14 hari oleh Justitie hingga di 
sini soedah kenteranlah perbeda’annja antara Justitie dan Landraad, sehingga kita kaoem 
Journalist Boemipoetra misti mengadap Landraad itoe soedah dapat pengadilan koerang dari 
pada Journalist Belanda jang misti mengadap di moeka Justitie.  Perkara jang koerang adil ini 
tembah kelihatan besarnja kalau difikir bahwa menoeroet Nieuws van den Dag dan lain-lain 
soerat kabar belanda, Journalist Journalist bangsa belanda memoenjai tingkat pengataoen dan 
kapinteran lebih tinggi dari pada Journalist Boemipoetra.  Tetapi roepa-roepanja pengadilan 
pamerintahan di sini seperti memandang jang kita Journalist Boemipoetra lebih tjerdik dari 
Journalist bangsa belanda.  Mana jang betoel terserah pada fikirannja orang-orang diloear.  
Tetapi doea perkara jang terang: kalau kitaorang lebih bodo, maka tjaranja pemerintah 
memberi tempo sebagi diatas ada tida adil kalau dibandingkan dengan memberi tempo pada 
Journalist Boemipoetra; atau pemerintah menbilang soedah adil, maka soerat kabar Nieuws 
van den Dag dan lain-lain ternjata menanam binih perbentjian antara Boemipoetra dan lain-lain 
golongan pendoedoek dengan menghina Journalist Boemipoetra itoe, sehingga disini wadjiblah 
pemerintah mengoekoem Redacteur Nieuws van den Dag dan lain-lain soerat kabar belanda.  
Tetapi kalau tiada kedjadian mengoekoem tentoe lagilah teradjoenja pengadilan ada 
mendjoempelang berat sebelah belaka.  
Toean President!  Saja menoenjoeken hal2 di atas ini soepaja padoeka Landraad 
soeka menimbang, bahwa tempo jang sedikit itoe soedah mengoerangi boekti-boekti saja jang 
tiada berdosa dan kalau toean mendengarkan perlawanana saja ini, saja mengharap menimbang 
halnja kekoerangan ini tempo djoega.  Tempo soedah koerang, tetapi bagi manakah tjaranja 
itoe soerat panggilan dihadapkan kepada saja, lagilah ternjata menjoesabkan saja boeat bikin 
perlawanan di atas toedoehan jang sepandjang fikiran saja tiada beralesan belaka.  Sedangnja 
Journalist bangsa belanda sebagi Dekker, Senevliet dan lain-lain dapat toeroenan dari soerat 
panggilan dimana terseboet perkara-perkara jang djadi toentoetan, tetapi kita Journalist 
Boemipoetra sebagi saja pada hari Djoemahat terseboet di atas tiada dapat toeroenan itoe dan 
hanja toean Assistant Wedono membatja dimoeka saja itoe soerat jang di dalam perkara saja 
ini amat pandjang lebarnja sehingga habis satoe djam sahadja sesoedahnja dibatja maka saja 
soedah loepa, ditambah lagi di waktoe itoe soerat di batja di moeka saja “diroemah saja,” saja 
masih merasakan sakit, dan hingga sekarang tiada taoe terang apakah jang didjadikan boekti 
dalam penoedoehan dosa saja, hal jang mana bikin tambah soesah boeat bikin perlawanan jang 
betoel. 
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After Semaoen’s hour-long defense statement, Mr. Luijten, the defense lawyer, 
explained the reasons why the law could not be rightfully applied to Semaoen’s case.  
They both requested that Semaoen be released from punishment.  Subsequently, the 
public trial adjourned, and the Landraad continued the discussion on its own for 
roughly one hour.  At one o’clock after lunch break, the trial was reopened and a 
decision read:  1) The article in question insulted the government (article 154 of 
strafwetboek), 2) It did not incite (try to influence) soldiers (article 160 of 
strafwetboek), and 3) A sentence of two months in prison for Semaoen.  Semaoen was 
given 21 days to consider filing an appeal.  
These excerpts of Semaoen’s trial are as transcribed in the “red book.”  The 
trial was open to the public, but many observers were never able to enter the 
courtroom.  Approximately a thousand people reportedly came to witness the trial.  
Semaoen was a popular leader and many had wanted to see what was going to happen 
to him, or how he was going to defend himself.  When he came out from the 
courtroom, the crowd applauded and greeted him, but he was quickly escorted into the 
car by the police and taken home.  For those who did not make it into the court, the 
newspaper prepared the book version of the trial proceedings, so readers could follow 
the exchanges between Semaoen and the President.   
Four months after the trial, Semaoen commenced his jail term.  He was 
imprisoned from July 24 until November 21, 1919.  His prison term was extended 
because the authorities were troubled by his growing popularity and influence among 
                                                                                                                                       
Alesan-alesan ini boleh dibantah bahwa perkara saja soedah moendoer sampai ini hari 
(12 Maart) tetapi sebabnja moendoer jalah karena saja sakit. 
Sakit, dan sampai sekarang toean bisa liat dari tangan saja jang terboengkoes ini, 
bahwa saja belom semboeh betoel hingga koeranglah ketjakapan saja bikin soerat perlawanan, 
karena fikiran saja teroes meneroes masih diberati kesakitan ini. 
Djoega ini perkara soepaja mendjadikan timbangan dan kalau ada katerangan saja jang masih 
koerang terang, agar soepaja padoeka bisa tanja lagi boeat menerangkan lebih djelas. 
Di atas saja soedah terangkan beda bedanja “techniek oeroesan” di moeka Justitie dan 
Landraad, sebab jang saja maksoedkan dengan itoe jalah: soepaja pandoeka Landraad di sini 
bisa “neutraliseeren” atau “mengilangkan” perbeda’an itoe dengan poetoesan jang adil sekali. 
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the people, even though originally he was sentenced to only two months.239  The day 
before he was moved to prison, he contributed an article to Sinar Hindia – “Sampai 
ketemoe lagi” (Till we meet again) – and when he was released he wrote 
“KETOEMOE LAGI” (We meet again), published on December 1, evidently to inform 
the readers of his release.240   
During his four-month “internment” Semaoen conceived and wrote the original 
version of the novel “Hikajat Kadiroen” (The Story of Kadiroen).  Originally 
published as a feuilleton between 1919 and October 1920 on the front page of Sinar 
Hindia, it was later published in book form in May 1920 by Kantoor PKI (PKI’s 
office).  The novel is the earliest Malay novel about communism in the Indies, which 
uniquely combines the elements of communism, Islamism, and Javanese Hindu-
Buddhist tradition.241  IPO of 1920 described it as a tendentious novel (tendenz 
roman), since it contains a distinct political message and ideology.242  One line from 
the content reads: “In the contemporary era, there is no other way to respect the people 
but through Communism, for this way is opened by Allah’s intention.”243 
 
The Case of Parada Harahap: Translations of Press Law and the Newspaper 
Business  
As a journalist contemporary with Semaoen’s, Parada Harahap (1899-1959) 
emerged as “The King of the Java Press,” in the late 1930s.  The appellation was 
                                                
239 Life in prison differed from place to place.  In Padang, when Datoek Soetan Maharadja was 
imprisoned for one year due to press offence in 1919, he could enjoy some freedom, keeping in touch 
with family and friends, and getting meals from home almost on daily basis.  “Persdelicten,” Oetoesan 
Melajoe, No. 252 (December 15, 1919) in IPO No. 52/1919. 
240 Sinar Hindia, March 12, 1919 and December 1, 1919. 
241 For an analysis of Hikajat Kadiroen, Yamamoto Nobuto, “Reading and Placing Semaoen’s Hikajat 
Kadiroen: A Thought on Political Discourse and Institutional Politics in Early Indonesian Nationalism,” 
Keio Journal of Politics, No. 9 (1997), pp. 49-79; Hendrik Maier, “Geschreven in het licht en de 
gevangenis: de Hikajat Kadiroen van Semaoen,” in C. M. S. Hellwig and S. O. Robson (eds.), A Man of 
Indonesian Letters: Essays in Honor of Professor A. Teeuw (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986).  
242 IPO, 1920. 
243 Semaoen, Hikajat Kadiroen, p. 121. 
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accorded to Harahap in a secret colonial document.244  In his capacity as a leading 
journalist, in 1924 he translated to his readers the colonial penal code regulating 
journalism from Dutch into Malay, and published it as a book entitled Journalistiek: 
Pers-en Spreekdelictenboek (Journalistic: A Book on Press and Speech Offences).245  
Persdelict articles or hate-sowing articles were naturally the main topic in this book.  
But his explanation of the law and the way in which he presented it is quite different 
from Semaoen.  His activities and understanding of the newspaper industry reflected 
the mood that prevailed in the business world of newspapers at the time, which 
somehow was quite detached from the world of activism in which Semaoen lived. 
Born on December 15, 1899 in Pargaroetan, West Sumatra, Parada Harahap 
studied at the Teacher’s Training School (Kweekschool) in Bukittinggi.  At the age of 
14 he began to work as a clerk with a rubber company in Pulau Perca, Pesisir Timoer, 
West Sumatra.  From early on he showed great interest in newspapers, subscribing to 
the two major newspapers of Sumatra, Pewarta Deli (Medan) and Andalas (Padang), 
and writing frequent letters to Soetan Parlindoengan, the editor-in-chief of Pewarta 
Deli.  In his autobiography, Harahap also recalls that he was moved by articles on 
plantation labor published in Benih Merdeka, whose editor-in-chief was Mohamad 
Samin.  Between 1918 and 1921, he worked as editor of Sinar Merdeka in Padang 
Sidempuan and then as editor-in-chief of a Batak dialect Poestaka in Sibolga, while 
also devoting his time as leader of the SI’s Padang Sidempuan branch. 
At the age of 22 Harahap moved to Batavia.  With a recommendation from a 
high adat (tradition) official and a noted Minangkabau journalist Datoek 
Temenggoeng he was able to get a position as editor at Neratja, the second most 
circulated newspaper in Batavia at that time after the Chinese-Malay daily Sin Po, 
                                                
244 Mr. 988x/1938 in Vb. 20-1-39-F2. 
245 Harahap, Journalistiek. 
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while regularly contributing articles to Tjaja Hindia.  He learned much from the 
paper’s editors such as Abdoel Moeis, Hadji Agoes Salim, and Djojosoediro.  He also 
took Dutch lessons.  A year later, in 1923, Harahap started to publish Bintang Hindia, 
first as a monthly journal and then as a weekly.  For this periodical he worked as 
manager and began focusing on the business of publishing.246  Bintang Hindia brought 
Harahap success as an entrepreneur, which made it possible for him to launch daily 
Bintang Timoer in 1926.  Bintang Timoer in turn also emerged as a big success, in part 
because it was assisted financially by the government – information that Harahap 
failed to disclose in his autobiography.  He also claimed that Bintang Timoer was the 
most circulated daily in Java.  Unfortunately, the Great Depression forced the 
termination of Bintang Timoer in 1931, as the government had to stop subsidizing it.  
When the economic situation improved in the middle of the 1930s, Parada Harahap 
returned to the press business and began publication of Tjaja Timoer. 
Just as he started his publishing business with Bintang Hindia in 1924, 
Harahap published a book entitled Journalistiek: Pers-en Spreekdelictenboek 
(Journalistic: A Book on Press and Speech Offenses).  He begins the book’s 
introduction by claiming that he is an experienced journalist and understands well the 
law regarding journalism as specified in the Penal Code. 
 
The writer has witnessed many cases involving the press and speech offences 
(spreekdelicten) in this country, and himself has experienced 12 charges of 
press and speech offences, three of which have brought the writer to jail, for a 
total of 7 months.247 
 
                                                
246 The first issue of Bintang Hindia was printed by the Neratja press, but the second issue onwards by 
de Unie. 
247 Harahap, Journalistiek, p. 6.   
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Here Harahap mentions the fact that he was victimized by persdelict in 1919, when he 
was an editor of Sinar Merdeka in Padang Sidempuan. Then he goes on to say: 
 
Hopefully this book can be of good use for gentlemen who work in the fields 
of journalism and politics, like a flashlight to illuminate the way forward, so 
they do not step on those innumerable thorns.248  
 
Harahap suggests that by providing a Malay translation of the Penal Code relating to 
journalism, he could help prevent journalists from inadvertently violating the law and 
being punished for lack of knowledge.   
 This was the first book in Malay on journalism and the Penal Code articles of 
press and speech offences.  It included chapters on journalistic ethics, freedom of the 
press, author’s rights, sample cases of persdelict, sample cases of speech offences, the 
history of Malay press, and the history of journalism in the Indies.  When it came to 
the section on legal matters, he gave his Malay translation of the legal articles first and 
then followed this with his explanation (keterangan penoelis) and analysis.  He 
explained for instance that the press and speech offence law consisted of articles 154, 
155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161, calling them the most infamous articles for 
journalists and proponents (pengandjoer) of free press in the Indies.  These articles 
focus on expression in the press or in assembly that may stir up hatred (kebentjian) in 
the society, and thus, he notes, are aimed at maintaining public security and order 
(keamanan). 
However, Harahap points out a fundamental problem of ambiguity in the 
terminology used in the articles, as for example in the lack of definition given for what 
constitutes “hatred.”  As Harahap notes, whether or not the Indies state should punish 
                                                
248 Harahap, Journalistiek, pp. 6-7. 
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a person depends entirely on the extent to which the judge or prosecutor feels 
provoked (uitlokking), leaving authorities (orang jang berkoeasa) with large degree of 
freedom in deciding what words and deeds to construe as dangerous and inappropriate.   
The odd thing is that the government was subsidizing his publishing business – 
the daily Bintang Timoer, as well as Neratja, where he worked as editor.  Given that 
the Indies state invested in and “protected” his newspaper business, it is 
understandable that it was Parada Harahap who “introduced” the Malay version of the 
Penal Code on journalism and in effect helped the government socialize this particular 
regulation.249  But he did this under the appearance that he was providing guidance for 
fellow indigenous journalists to avoid falling victim to the “thorns” of the newspaper 
trade.  While Harahap might have been himself, as he claimed, charged with press and 
speech offences twelve times, these incidents occurred early on in his career, before he 
won the favor of the authorities. 
Nevertheless, as I have described above, persdelict charges could result not 
only from the publication of one particular article, but what was deemed by the 
authorities as the cumulative impact of series of articles and deeds by a journalist.  In 
other words, knowing the regulations did not always help journalists protect 
themselves, as it could be difficult from them to recognize when specifically they 
crossed the invisible line.  For individual journalists, deciding whether or not to heed 
the law that Harahap aimed at explaining with his book came down to a matter of the 
principles they held.  For those with a penchant for anti-colonial or anti-government 
opinion, charges of persdelict came about rather easily and frequent.  These journalists 
tended to be more willing to confront the accusation and defend themselves.  Indeed, 
as in the case of Semaoen, a journalist could turn the tribunal into a good opportunity 
                                                
249 It is to be noted, however, that his translation often does not make any sense, in part because he was 
not familiar with legal term, and also because his Dutch ability was insufficient. 
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for effective propaganda.  As I will explore more closely below, however, this brand 
of journalism however was very different from the motivation that inspired the 
journalistic activities of Parada Harahap and the publication of his book on persdelict. 
Furthermore, although Harahap’s book was the first guidebook to be published 
on behalf of journalism in the Malay language, the arbitrary nature of Dutch colonial 
governance in action rendered the book’s explanations unclear and far less useful to 
journalists than immediately apparent.  The Indies state had introduced Western-
modeled laws to manage journalistic expressions and maintain order in the colonial 
society.  Yet, the actual law enforcement was not impartial or systematic at all.  In 
practice, individual law enforcement officials were free to decide which article of the 
Penal Code was applicable, what constituted a punishable offence, and what the 
specific parameter of free speech/press in effect were. 
This legal ambiguity ironically enough formed the basis for the colonial 
society.  The colonial society that John S. Furnivall projected in the 1930s was in 
nature a plural society, which he defines as a society “comprising two or more 
elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political 
unit.”250  
In his book, Parada Harahap not only attempted to identify the ambiguous lines 
that delineated transgressions against the prevailing legal code, but also encouraged 
fellow journalists to stay away from those lines.  His success in making money out of 
the newspaper business gave him the authority to “guide” his fellow indigenous 
journalists.  The middle of the 1920s saw a fundamental shift in the world of the press, 
that is, from a vehicle and organ of expression for nationalistic movement being 
pushed forward by particular political associations to a driving force of capitalistic 
ventures.  Journalists of the 1910s and early 1920s were political activists and 
                                                
250 Furnivall, Netherlands India, p. 446. 
 171 
propagandists, and were usually affiliated with one or more political organizations.  
The rise of indigenous political movement allowed newspapers to play a crucial role in 
spreading the party ideas to a wider audience.  Even popular newspapers could be 
party organs. But as the indigenous middle class grew in the 1920s, a new type of 
audience emerged that did not like partisan newspapers, demanding instead that 
newspapers provide them with entertainment and apolitical content.  This was the 
trend that Harahap astutely observed, and he seized this new business opportunity. 
 
[The partisan newspaper] is what has caused the slow advancement of 
journalism in the Indies, albeit the development of such political propaganda 
was rapid.  Appropriately, a journalist does not join any party, so his 
assessment in the newspaper can be uncontaminated (zuiver) and neutral.251 
 
Harahap was certain that the newly emerging urban middle class preferred non-
partisan newspapers.  Therefore, his newspaper Bintang Timoer proudly announced 
that it did not have any affiliation with any political party.  He was confident of the 
profitability of starting a newspaper business. 
 
Is the Indies conducive for a profit-oriented newspaper? 
In my opinion, why not? 
50,000,000 Indonesians speak Malay, and now 10% are literate, that is five 
millions […] who can read, and this number will increase every hour. 
A newspaper enterprise, if run appropriately, can be a vital business, that is, it 
can bring profit to other enterprises as well, because a newspaper is 
intertwined with daily needs and commerce, so people are willing to pay to 
                                                
251 Harahap, Journalistiek, p. 124. 
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read the news and to pay to advertise, and as such, being a well of money 
(djadi soemoer oewang) is good for the newspaper.252 
 
Harahap saw the newspapers as commercial ventures and in this sense became himself 
a “modern” journalist as well as a business executive.  In his other book Pers dan 
Journalistiek, he emphasized on the need to produce a new kind of newspaper and to 
explore a new readership.  He explicitly points out that the urban middle class does not 
always pay attention to partisan politics and affiliated party organs, and therefore non-
partisan neutral newspapers would theoretically attract the emerging urban middle 
class.  “Newspapers have their market (pasar) and necessities (keperloean)”253 and 
“have already become a commercial product (pers djadi perdagangan).”254  Harahap 
had confidence that his newspaper would be profitable because its market consisted of 
the growing urban middle class.  Of course, in order to run a publishing business 
smoothly, he needed to maintain a good working relationship with the colonial 
authorities and generally accept with the colonial order of things.  Socializing the 
journalistic laws was obviously a favorable development in the government’s eyes.  
The colonial secret documents never mentioned Parada Harahap as a radical journalist 
or a dangerous movement leader, except for one instance where one of his articles was 
listed among persdelict cases in 1919.255  
The Tjahaja Hindia Company, which Harahap started in Batavia in 1926, 
reflects Harahap’s conviction.  This newspaper company was capitalized at 75,000 
guilders and had sales agents in Batavia as well as Medan and in Bandjarmasin in 
Borneo.  Besides Tjahaja Hindia, the company also published four other newspapers, 
                                                
252 Harahap, Journalistiek, pp. 120-121. 
253 Harahap, Pers dan Journalistiek (Medan: Handel Mij. Indische Drukkerij, 1941), p. 54. 
254 Harahap, Journalistiek, p. 120. 
255 IPO, No. 43, 1919.  Despite of his claim, except for the case in 1919, I cannot identify any evidence 
in which Harahap was victimized by persdelict many times and imprisoned for total seven months. 
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Bintang Hindia, Djawa Barat, Sinar Pasoendan, and Berita Preanger, and the weekly 
Semangat.  Tjahaja Hindia however was its best-selling newspaper and circulated 
widely in comparison to other indigenous newspapers at the time.  4,500 to 5,000 
copies were printed daily, with a subscription fee of 6 guilders for four months.  By a 
simple calculation, its net profit was 1,000 guilders a month.  This profit was reflected 
in the salary of Tjahaja Hindia’s employees.  The editor-in-chief earned 450 guilders a 
month plus a company-car, the first editors received 225 guilders, second editors 175 
guilders, third editors 125 guilders, reporters 100 guilders, and accountants 175 
guilders each.256  These figures were higher than the standard income of an urban 
middle class in the Indies.  
The rise of such apolitical and commercial oriented newspapers symbolized, 
on the one hand, the permeation of the colonial order and principles into the society.  
On the other, it also reflected the growing presence of an urban middle class that was 
politically conservative and whose primary concern was to maintain its standard of 
living.  Commercial newspapers also covered the general development of the 
indigenous political movement, but they tended to discuss culture, religion, education, 
and woman’s emancipation in a way that reflected the readers’ interests.  Articles 
concerning material wellbeing were naturally more appealing.   
Writing and publishing travel books became another business interest that 
Harahap pursued, tapping into the growing popularity of “light” journalistic writings 
among middle class readers.  While similar travel accounts had been popular among 
Europeans in the Indies, it was Harahap who introduced this new genre of writing to 
the indigenous middle-class.  His major travel accounts include Dari Pantai Kepantai 
(From Coast to Coast, describing a trip to Sumatra in 1925 and 1926), Menoedjoe 
Matahari Terbit (Towards Sunrise, about a journey to Japan in 1933 and 1934), 
                                                
256 Harahap, Pers dan Journalistiek, p. 20. 
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Mengelilingi Poelau Djawa (Traveling around Java), and Sepandjang Boekit Barisan 
(Along Bukit Barisan, featuring the volcanic mountain range on the western part of 
Sumatra).   Like most writings in this genre, Harahap’s travel accounts illustrate the 
panorama of cities and villages he visited, what he encountered in those places, and 
the people he met during those visits.  Political discussions and propaganda are 
noticeably absent.  This non-partisan and apolitical perspective enhanced the 
popularity of his travel books. 
While on the surface, it is true that Harahap’s travel logs appear to be non-
political, there is more to them than simply leisure.  His descriptions sometimes 
carried certain intentions.  Half of Dari Pantai Kepantai is about Padang and 
Minangkabau, which covers youth movement, journalists, women’s movement, 
education, history, and the customs of the Minangkabau.  Though the book appears to 
be informative mainly for purposes of leisure, a politically informed reader can easily 
recognize the names of political and religious activists and journalists whom Harahap 
had met or was acquainted with in Sumatra.257  In other words, for those who were 
interested in the indigenous religious and nationalistic movements in Sumatra, this 
travel account actually provided precious information.  And since Harahap had a close 
working relations with the Dutch authorities, it is possible that his information was 
more beneficial to the colonial government than to ordinary readers.  The fact that he 
could travel to many places in the Indies relatively freely seems to corroborate this 
assumption.  In fact, Bintang Hindia, another newspaper managed by Harahap often 
ran advertisements for Balai Poestaka, the state publishing house and engineer of IPO 
(in which, Bintang Hindia was categorized as a moderate nationalistic newspaper). 
                                                
257 Parada Harahap, Dari Pantai Kepantai: Perdjalanan Ke-Soematra October-Dec. 1925 dan Maart-
April 1926 (Weltevreden: Uitgevers Maatschappij Bintang Hindia, 1926).  It is also to be noted that he 
traveled West Sumatra, his home country, a year before the communist uprising, but nothing about such 
secret plot can be detected from his travel account. 
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Table 4-2: Urbanization in the Indonesian archipelago, 1890-1930 
Number of towns by number of inhabitants Urban population 
  
Year Islands 20,000-49,999 50,000-99,999 100,000 or more absolute 
in % of total 
population 
  
1890 Java 4 4 1 471,068 2 
1920 Java 23 2 4 1,434,152 4.2 
 Sumatra 2 1   113,297 1.9 
 Borneo 1     41,661 2.7 
 Celebes 1     44,605 1.5 
1930 Java 23 4 6 2,121,127 5.2 
  Sumatra 3 1   189,414 2.5 
  Borneo 2 1   108,393 5.4 
  Celebes 1 1   85,492 2.1 
[Source: Hans Gooszen, A Demographic History of the Indonesian Archipelago, 1880-1942 (Leiden: KITLV 
Press, 1999), p. 52.] 
 
Table 4-3: Population size and growth, 1905-1930, for cities on Java  
with 50,000 or more inhabitants in 1930 (indigenous population) 
Population size 
  
Average annual population 
growth (in %) 
  
  
  1905 1920 1930 1905-1920 1920-30 
Batavia 99,320 186,837 325,978 4.2 5.6 
Bandung 41,393 79,017 130,028 4.3 5.0 
Meester Cornelis 29,828 42,819 83,677 2.4 6.8 West Java 
  Buitenzorg 26,214 36,111 51,935 2.2 3.7 
Semarang 76,413 126,628 175,457 3.4 3.3 North 
Coast of 
Java Pekalongan 36,816 43,226 56,954 1.1 2.8 
Yogyakarta 72,641 94,254 121,979 1.8 2.6 South-
central 
Java Surakarta 109,524 123,005 149,585 0.8 2.0 
Surabaya 124,473 148,411 271,275 1.2 6.1 Eastern 
Java Malang 24,274 35,165 70,662 2.5 7.1 
[Source: Hans Gooszen, A Demographic History of the Indonesian Archipelago, p. 90.] 
 
Table 4-4: Population size and growth, 1905-1930, of Sumatran towns  
with 20,000 or more inhabitants in 1930 (indigenous population) 
East Coast of 
Sumatra Medan 3,191 23,823 41,270 13.5 5.6 
West Sumatra Padang   28,754 40,744   3.5 
South Sumatra Palembang 50,703 60,720 86,882 1.2 3.6 
Southeast 
Sumatra Teluk Betung 2,774 12,811 20,518 10.3 4.8 
West Borneo Pontianak 13,278 19,074 27,160 2.4 3.6 
South Borneo Banjarmasin   41,661 57,822 5.4 3.3 
East Borneo Balikpapan   11,823 23,411   6.9 
South Celebes Makassar 20,178 44,605 65,445 5.3 3.9 
North Celebes Manado 6,669 12,229 20,047 4.1 5.1 
[Source: Hans Gooszen, A Demographic History of the Indonesian Archipelago, p. 109.] 
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Under these circumstances, Parada Harahap was able to write as follows just 
before the conclusion of his book Journalistiek: 
 
There will be more supplementary [legal] articles. 
Because of the large number of persdelict in recent years and even this year, it 
is very likely that soon there will be additional articles in the law concerning 
“hate-sowing” cases, that is class hatred, or group hatred, for instance between 
the capitalists and the workers.258 
 
As this quotation suggests, Harahap regards discussions of class antagonism and 
conflict between capitalists and laborers in the Indies as manifestations of hatred-
related discourse in the press.  It is worth noting that, unlike Semaoen, a communist 
leader in the late 1910s and early 1920s who attributed the economic gap in the society 
to racial distinctions,259 Harahap saw class difference as a factor in hatred-related 
incidents.  Rather than focusing his newspaper on problems of class difference, 
Harahap chose to direct his attention to the emerging middle class as the most 
promising consumers for the newspaper industry.  He was not, however, the only 
manager and journalist who saw the growing potential of the Malay print market, as 
“the Table 4-5: Number of Malay Periodicals” indicates below.  The middle of the 
1920s ushered in a rapid increase in the number of Malay periodicals, and this showed 
an expansion of Malay readership in the Indies, which Harahap had correctly assessed. 
After having gone bankrupt in the early 1930s due to the government’s cutback 
of subsidies for major indigenous newspapers, Harahap made a comeback in 1936 
with a new paper, Tjaja Timoer (Light of the East).  This daily subscribed to the Pan-
                                                
258 Harahap, Journalistiek, p. 141. 
259 Semaoen, Persdelict Semaoen; Semaoen, Hikajat Kadiroen.  See also Yamamoto, “Reading and 
Placing Semaoen’s Hikajat Kadiroen.” 
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Asianism that the Japanese government had been promoting in the Indies since the 
early 1930s, as well as in other Asian regions.  It indicates Harahap’s close connection 
with the Japanese authorities as their political influence increased in the 1930s, just as 
he was in the 1920s with the Dutch authorities.  It also signals that Harahap relied on 
economic patronage for his business.  His conservative political stance can perhaps 
explain why Indonesian history textbooks on the nationalist movement have neglected 
his name, despite his contributions to the development of “Indonesian” journalism and 
newspaper industry. 
 
Table 4-5: Numbers of Malay Periodicals listed in IPO from 1918 to 1929 
 Newspapers Magazines Chinese Periodicals 
 Java Outer Islands Java Outer Islands Java Outer Islands 
1918 33 18   6 2 
1919 34 19     
Jan. 1920 31 24   6 2 
Nov. 1920 34 22   6 2 
Mar. 1922 28 9 11 11 10 4 
Aug. 1922 25 11 16 16 13 4 
Jan. 1923 28 16 28 20 12 4 
July. 1923 27 19 31 24 11 4 
Oct. 1923 26 20 26 24 12 4 
Mar. 1924 25 18 30 33 14 5 
July. 1924 27 20 22 28 13 4 
Oct. 1924 26 21 24 29 14 5 
Jan. 1925 28 21 32 31 16 6 
Apr. 1925 33 20 40 36 17 7 
Aug. 1925 36 21 31 37 18 9 
Dec. 1925 38 33 28 38 20 9 
June. 1926 36 25 24 37 21 10 
Sept. 1926 30 23 25 30 20 7 
Mar. 1927 26 20 27 27 20 12 
Apr. 1928 33 27 28 20 26 14 
Sept. 1929 46 33 45 22 27 11 
[Source: IPO, 1918-1929] 
 
Parada Harahap was the first to publish the Malay translation of Dutch 
regulations on the press, and offered “guidance” to his fellow indigenous journalists 
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wishing to survive in the industry.  His writings support the view that legal measures 
were important to maintain social order.  There was no hint that he would confront the 
authorities as he profited from their patronage; compliance was “necessary” in order to 
run a business in the colonial setting.  Unlike Tirto and Semaoen, Harahap conceived 
of the newspaper as a means to make money.  Unlike the indigenous press in the 
1910s and early 1920s, which had played a major role in confronting the colonial 
authorities, newspaper business under Parada Harahap played along with the basic 
tenets of the colonial order, and in fact derived advantage from his collaboration with 
the authorities.  He was after all one of the most distinguished and controversial 
indigenous journalists in the Indies.  It was this commercially minded attitude that 
pushed the expansion of the Malay print market from the 1920s onwards. 
 
The Case of Chinese-Malay Press  
Concerns regarding persdelict for the Indies Chinese press manifested in 
different forms compared to Indonesian newspapers.  Since the Indies authorities paid 
more attention to the political consequences of the Indonesian nationalist movement 
than to the Chinese, colonial documents did not really cover persdelict cases against 
Chinese journalists.  In order to trace the Chinese cases, one needs to read the Indies 
Chinese press, which covered the Chinese as well as Indonesian cases.  In the 1920s, 
Chinese-Malay newspapers had larger circulation than their Indonesian counterparts, 
because the former were less political than commercial and entertaining.  
Nevertheless, Chinese journalists were also frequently imprisoned due to persdelict.  
The question then arises: How did it come about that these less political Chinese 
journalists were victimized by persdelict?  In order to understand this paradox, we 
need to turn our attention to the characteristics of Chinese-Malay newspapers in the 
Indies. 
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In late 1921 the renowned Dutch novelist Louis Couperus traveled “back” to 
the Indies where he had spent his younger days, and began churning out nostalgia-
ridden travelogues.  His travel accounts were first published in De Haagsche Post 
between December 1921 and May 1923 for readers back in The Hague, then appeared 
in book form in 1924 and was subsequently translated into English.260  The 
travelogues were originally designed for newspaper readers in The Hague to give them 
an idea about how calm and exotic the Indies was.  Although Couperus admitted that 
he was surprised by the changes in Batavia, his description mainly centered on the 
way of life of the local people, their manners and cultures.  When he traveled through 
Sumatra and Java from October 1921, the latter had been experiencing radical 
indigenous political activism, and his accounts create the impression that the Indies 
was the same peaceful and exotic place that Dutch people had always imagined it to 
be.  Considering that Couperus was a recognized figure in the Netherlands journalistic 
circle, there is little doubt that his writings attracted the interests of the Dutch middle 
class who were contemplating a career move, if not a visit, to the Indies.  
The “calm” that Couperus sensed in the Indies was mostly legally engineered.  
The Dutch authorities had been working rather hard on disciplining “tendentious” 
newspapers.  In 1925 Rinkes, as the director of Balai Poestaka specifically pointed out 
that Api and Sin Po were bold newspapers that liked to draw government’s attention.  
Both newspapers were popular because of their political orientation.  Api was an organ 
of PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) and People’s Association (Sarekat Rakjat, SR) 
since 1925.261  Its editor-in-chief was Soekabat, who was the former editor-in-chief of 
Sinar Hindia.  Considering that PKI claimed between 1,000 and 1,300 members by 
1924, while Sarekat Rakyat had 30,000 and 50,000 members, Api could potentially 
                                                
260 Louis Couperus, Eastward (translated by J. Menzies Wilson and C. C. Crispin) (London: Hurst & 
Blackett, 1924). 
261 SR was the PKI’s mass based organization, formerly known as Red SI, leftwing of SI. 
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claim 30,000 to 50,000 subscribers.  But in reality Api faced severe supervision from 
the authorities.  Unlike other media in the vernacular press, it had to get official 
approval for each issue before its distribution.  In 1925 the police began to harass Api 
by confiscating not only copies of the disapproved issues, but also its typing 
equipment from time to time.  The authorities also forbade civil servants to subscribe 
to Api and eventually it was pushed to near bankruptcy by the end of 1925.262 
By contrast, Sin Po did not get such severe harassment from the authorities.  
As a Batavia-based Chinese-Malay daily, it was politically oriented to China and had 
promoted Chinese nationalism among the overseas Chinese in the Indies since 1911.  
It was launched in the form of a weekly journal with its first edition in October 1, 
1910.  In April 1912, Sin Po began to be published as a daily newspaper with the 
former Controller, a Dutchman, J. R. Razoux Kuhr as the director.263  In the 1910s, it 
was common practice for vernacular press newspapers to employ, Dutchmen and 
Indos in order to protect themselves from the authorities.  This changed in the 1920s 
as Chinese assumed the role of running newspapers by themselves.  According to 
IPO’s list, Sin Po’s chief editors were Tjoe Bou San (1920 – August 1925) and Kwee 
Kek Beng (December 1925 – September 1929).  It was the most circulated Chinese-
Malay newspaper and in 1938 had 6,000 subscribers.  But even popular Sin Po was 
not free from persdelict as Sin Po Weekly articles about the boycott of Japanese goods 
published in June 9, 1923 drew persdelict charges from the colonial authorities.  For 
the offense, editors – Kwee Kek Beng and Ang Jan Goan – were sentenced for one 
year and fined ƒ 200.264   
                                                
262 McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, p. 306. 
263 Kwee Kek Beng, Doea Poeloe Lima Tahon sebagi Wartawan 1922-1947 (Batavia: Kuo, 1948), p. 
21.  But in 1916 Kuhr had to resign due to his involvement in a sex-related murder case and his jail 
term. 
264 Kwee Kek Beng, Doea Poeloe Lima Tahon sebagi Wartawan, pp. 16-18. 
 181 
Apart from politically opinionated newspapers, apolitical newspapers (as 
Parada Harahap had correctly foreseen) were gaining market share.  As new kinds of 
newspapers emerged and as these conformed to new kinds of audiences, concern grew 
among the Dutch officials.  This concern related to specific characteristics of Chinese-
Malay newspapers, which had colored the journalistic landscape in the Indies since the 
nineteenth century.  Questioning the quality of these newspapers, then director of 
Balai Poestaka G. W. J. Drewes derided that the “American Yellow Press” (de 
Amerikaansche yellow press) had emerged in the Indies.265  “Yellow press or yellow 
journalism,” in the words of Frank Mott, is characterized by “the familiar aspects of 
sensationalism – crime news, scandal and gossip, divorces and sex, and stress upon the 
reporting of disasters and sports.”266  As a matter of fact, newspapers translations, and 
elaborated accounts of actual events had been major reading materials in the Indies 
since the turn of the twentieth century.  Reportage of various sensational and bizarre 
occurrences that took place throughout the Indies was a significant characteristic of 
the Chinese-Malay press.  The newspapers were filled with accounts of murder, rape, 
adultery, fraud, robbery and other crimes.  These accounts provided a rich resource for 
the Indies Chinese popular fiction.267  Similarly, many popular novels at the turn of the 
twentieth century contained some elements of sensationalism. 
                                                
265 G. W. J. Drewes, “De strijd om de persvrijheid en de oudste Inlandsche couranten,” Koloniale 
Studiën, 1934, p. 34.  Drewes was considered an expert on indigenous intellectual affairs and was in the 
position to look over the vernacular press.  His description of the history of indigenous press ended in 
1926, although it was published in 1934, probably in that year he was transferred from a position at the 
Office of the [Acting] Native Affairs Advisor to the Bureau for Popular Literature, one of whose 
functions was to monitor the vernacular press.  For Drewes’ career, see A. Teeuw, “In memoriam G. W. 
J. Drewes, 28 November 1899 – 7 June 1992,” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Vol. 150, 
No. 1 (1994), pp. 27-49. 
266 Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism: A History: 1690-1963 (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 
539, quoted in W. Joseph Campbell, Yellow Journalism: Puncturing the Myths, Defining the Legacies 
(Westport, London: Praeger, 2001), p. 7.  Yellow journalism reflected “the familiar aspects of 
sensationalism – crime news, scandal and gossip, divorces and sex, and stress upon the reporting of 
disasters and sports.” 
267 Nio Joe Lan, Sastera Indonesia-Tionghoa, p. 34. 
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Even though this type of journalism and popular literature came to be 
associated with the Chinese later on, Eurasians had long been its preceding proponents 
in the Indies.  As was the case of Sin Po, Chinese-Malay newspapers in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries collaborated with Dutch and Indo journalists 
for their political protection.268  Three popular journalists and writers are worth 
mentioning: F. H. Wiggers, H. Kommer and F. Pangemanann.  The first two were 
Eurasians (Indo), and the third Menadonese.  Wiggers was an editor of Batavia-based 
Pembrita Betawi in 1903, while Kommer was an editor of Soerabaja-based Pewarta 
Soerabaja (Soerabaja Herald).  Their literary and journalistic works were popular 
among the Eurasians and Indies Chinese communities.  Wiggers translated Le Comte 
de Monte Cristo, among the most popular books at that time, with the help of a 
Chinese, Lie Kim Hok.269  Lie himself would become the pioneer of Chinese-Malay 
literature.270  Wiggers’ original novel, Njai Isah in 1903 has been described as “full of 
sensational events, clandestine meetings, illicit relationships and mysterious 
preternatural occurrences.”271  Pangemanann’s prose work, Tjerita Si Tjonat (The 
Story of Tjonat, 1900) features bandits (perampok), who terrorized the countryside 
around Batavia with various murders, kidnappings, and thefts.272 
Since late nineteenth century, Malay newspapers such as Selompret Melaju 
(Malay Trumpet) and Bintang Soerabaia (Soerabaia Star) regularly published 
                                                
268 For the rise of Chinese-owned press, see Adam, The Vernacular Press and the Emergence of 
Modern Indonesian Consciousness, pp. 63-71. 
269 Lie Kim Hok was also a very popular contemporary writer.  
270 Njo Joe Lan, Sastera Indonesia-Tionghoa, p. 28. 
271 C. Watson, “Some preliminary remarks on the antecedents of modern Indonesian literature,” 
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Volume 127, No. 4, (1971), p. 420.  Njai “refers to the 
women who kept house for Dutch or other European and sometimes Chinese men and who often bore 
children by them.”  At the turn of the twentieth century, njai stories became popular because they 
reflected social anxiety generating from the increasing separation of groups in the Indies.  But at the 
same time, as James Siegel points out, “the family composed of a European man and a native woman 
was thought to be the equal or perhaps more of the Dutch family.”  Siegel, Fetish, Recognition, 
Revolution, p. 55. 
272 Watson, “Some preliminary remarks on the antecedents of modern Indonesian literature,” p. 421. 
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serialized fiction, usually on the front page.  Since the 1880s, the Chinese-Malay 
newspapers carried many sensational articles, which emulated the style of minor but 
influential Dutch journalists of the day.  It was also a standard practice for Chinese-
Malay novelists and poets to draw from events reported in newspapers.  The writing 
sources were also harvested from newspaper coverage.273  In this sense, it is arguable 
that the Chinese-Malay press was removed from politics, at least in the context of the 
Indies (although some were in fact promoting Chinese nationalism).  With regard to 
the indigenous political movement, no Chinese-Malay newspapers were affiliated with 
any political parties in the 1900s to 1920s, and so proved themselves to precede 
Parada Harahap in pursuing a politically neutral and market-oriented press form of 
journalism.  Because of their non-partisan outlook, the general audience consumed 
Chinese-Malay newspapers as entertainment.  As Von Faber put it: 
 
The newspapers [in the Indies] are not, as in America, hastily scanned in train, 
tram or restaurant, but are quietly perused at home after the day’s work is 
done; up-country, and in the plantations, which are frequently remote from the 
large towns with their cinemas, dancing-halls and plays, concerts or other 
shows, the newspaper and the wireless constitute for many the only pleasant 
and harmless diversion in the evening hours.274 
 
Reading thus took place “after the day’s work” in late afternoon or in the evening 
hours, and, consequently, evening newspapers were many in number.  Commercial 
newspapers in the Indies offered a wide range of such “diversion” – light news, 
                                                
273 One of the first examples was a poem entitled Sair Kadatangan Sri Maharadja Siam di Betawi 
[Verses on the Royal Visit of the King of Siam in Batavia] published in 1870, which was based on a 
newspaper (Bintang Barat) article on the visit of Siam King to Batavia in the same year. 
274 Von Faber, A Short History of Journalisms in the Dutch East Indies, p. 111. 
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amusing personal anecdotes, satires, captivating feuilleton, fantasy-inducing 
advertisements, and practical information.  Many popular authors published their 
compositions first as serialized stories in popular newspapers.  In the colonial setting, 
newspapers were certainly the “one-day best-sellers” as Benedict Anderson has 
imagined,275 but they were also consumed repeatedly, belatedly, even several days 
after their publication.  Once the reading habit was established, it became hard to 
break, even by the claw of censorship.  Popular demand kept print market going, while 
the colonial authorities continued to look for ways to contain and tame it.  In the 
middle of the 1920s, when Dutch officials were busy corresponding about how to 
contain press excesses and Indonesian journalists were trying to resist persdelict, the 
habit of reading had taken root in the daily life of some segment of the society.  The 
number of literate people continued to increase, thanks to the proliferation of school 
education since the beginning of the twentieth century, and it was to this new audience 
the Chinese-Malay newspapers appealed.  Even the government made a distinction 
between the Chinese-Malay and Indonesian newspapers, in reality there was much less 
separation in terms of readership.  
This was the general mood of the newspaper industry when Sin Jit Po (New 
Daily)276 was launched in Soerabaja in 1923.  It was to become among the most 
influential Chinese-Malay newspapers in the East Java region in the 1920s.  Forced 
out of business in November 1929 due to legal disputes with rival Chinese-Malay 
newspapers Soeara Publiek (Public Voice) and Pewarta Soerabaja, on December 2, 
1929, Sin Jit Po was reincarnated as Sin Tit Po (New Direct News).277  Here a little 
                                                
275 Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 30-36.  Anderson refers the phrase “one-day best-sellers” to 
purchasing of newspapers.  Newspapers would become “out of date” after a new edition of the next day 
is published.   
276 The Chinese name of Sin Jit Po was 泗水新日報.  The literal meaning of Sin Jit Po (新日報) was 
“New Daily,” although the Chinese name read “Soerabaja’s New Daily.” 
277 Sin Tit Po’s Chinese name was 新直報, which literary means “New Direct News.”  Liem Koen 
Hiam intentionally dropped the name of Soerabaja from his newspaper.   
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background explanation helps illuminate the complicated relationship among Chinese 
journalists.  It was not unusual for Chinese journalists to quarrel with each other.  As 
mentioned above, in 1925 Liem Koen Hian launched his newspaper Soeara Publiek.  
He often attacked the leaders of Sin Jit Po, especially P. H. Phoa and Raden Mas 
Bintarti, as opportunists, cowards, and not professional, while Liem’s colleague, Kwee 
Thiam Tjing, satirized Phoa in many essays.278  In the end, those who attacked Sin Jit 
Po took over the newspaper and in 1929 made it Sin Tit Po.  In its inaugural issue on 
December 2, 1929, the fiery chief editor Liem Koen Hian promised to reveal the 
“dirty” politics behind Sin Jit Po’s demise.279   
Why did Liem and Kwee take over Sin Jit Po and what was the attraction of 
the newspaper?  Sin Jit Po had no political organization behind it, but as the market 
started to expand since the 1920s, the colonial authorities, i.e. the Office for Chinese 
Affairs, kept a close watch on local newspapers and from time to time applied 
disciplinary measures against them.  Although it was relatively independent, Sin Jit Po 
had a liberal and critical outlook in that it often challenged the repressive approach of 
the authorities.  During its run Sin Jit Po was an active agent in the reporting of 
persdelict cases in the vernacular press, and in this role gave rise to an interesting 
journalistic practice that I refer to as “the culture of citation.”  The story of its 
particular approach to covering of persdelict cases reveals how the colonial authorities 
tried to restrain liberal newspapers through intimidation of their reporters and how the 
newspapers fought back. 
In its early days, Sin Jit Po had P. H. Phoa as the editor-in-chief.  Oei Kie Hok 
and R. M. Bintarti in Surabaya, and Ang Hoay Lie in Samarinda, made up the editorial 
                                                
278 I owe this relationship among Chinese journalists to Benedict Anderson.  For Kwee Thiam Tjing, see 
Anderson, “Kata Pengantar,” in Tjamboek Berdoeri, Indonesia dalem Api dan Bara, pp. 1-78.  
Tjamboek Berdoeri was Kwee Thiam Tjing’s pen name. 
279 “Sin Tit Po,” Sin Tit Po, December 2, 1929; “Menghina: Sin Jit Po contra Tjioe Hwie Bing,” Sin Tit 
Po, December 16, 1929. 
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board.  The director was Oei Ping Bie; its administrator, Njoo Khee Tjo.  It had its 
own printing house, the N. V. Handesldrukkerij Sin Jit Po.  Its distributing agents 
extended from East Java (Madioen, Malang, Wonogiri), Central Java (Jogjakarta, 
Bangil), West Java (Soekaboemi, Blitar), Celebes (Makassar, Toeloengagung, 
Gorontalo), Borneo (Samarinda), and even to the Netherlands.  After Liem Koen Hian 
took over the editorship and changed its name to Sin Tit Po, it became among the most 
politically influential dailies in the Chinese-Malay language between the 1920s and 
the 1930s, not only in Soerabaja and East Java, but also in other parts of the colony.   
Sin Jit Po, like other newspapers of the time, covered various kinds of news 
and articles not only on Soerabaja and the Indies, but also on China and other parts of 
the world.  The basic format is as follows. 
 
Section 1:  Page 1: City of Soerabaja; Feuilleton: “White Blood or News 
without limits,” as told by Th. H. Phoa 
Page 2: Overseas Chinese and China; Commercial News 
Page 3: Wired News; Indies and Other Countries 
Page 4:  Advertisements 
Section 2:  Page 1: Sports News; Indies and Other Countries 
Page 2:  Overseas Chinese and China 
Pages 3-4:  Advertisements 
Section 3:  Page 1:  Indies and Other Countries; “Tong See Han Yan Gie: An 
exciting Chinese story, meticulously written, and charming,” by Nemo 
Page 2:  continuation of Indies and Other Countries from page 1 
Pages 3-4:  Advertisements 
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The organization of sections suggests that Sin Jit Po did not really emphasize any 
segment because the same subtitles recur in all the sections.  Its general-sounding 
headings allowed it to carry an eclectic variety of contents – a compilation of local 
news on Indies Chinese, news on China and overseas Chinese, and world news.  One 
can say that Sin Jit Po maintained such flexibility in order to cover a wide range of 
content in line with readers’ interests.  To be able to carry such a variety of news and 
content from a wide geographic area, it was imperative for a newspaper to establish 
and rely on a network of correspondents and news agencies, to obtain reports where it 
did not have its own correspondent, and to cite articles from one another.  At that time, 
the semi-official news agency, Aneta (Algemeen Nieuws En Telegraaf Agentschap, 
Netherlands Indies news and telegraphic agency) had a monopoly of news from 
abroad and its distribution.280  A culture of citation emerged out of such journalistic 
practice, which allowed newspapers to transcend not only its locality and lack of 
personnel, but also language barriers.  Thanks to citations, Malay-speaking Chinese 
could follow the contents of Dutch, Javanese, and Chinese newspapers, which might 
be of interest to him, but would otherwise be inaccessible.  For the journalists 
themselves, the culture of citation provided the basis to imagine a kind of a journalistic 
community – complete with friends and foes. 
Even though it was not connected to any political organization, Sin Jit Po 
featured many politics-related reports and news along with articles on culture.  It also 
carried many commercial advertisements from Soerabaja as well as other major cities 
in Java.  Among its miscellaneous contents, coverage of persdelict cases was a 
                                                
280 Aneta was established an Indies-born media tycoon Dominique Willem Berretty. Aneta had another 
meaning in Dutch, that is, “Altijd Nummer Een Trots Alles” (Always number one in spite of 
everything).  In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Aneta eventually monopolized news from and to the 
Indies.  Aneta’s monopoly of news distribution did not really affect the development of the vernacular 
press.  Vernacular presses did not have enough funds to buy news from Aneta, so they cited Dutch press 
articles instead.   
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frequent feature in Sin Jit Po.  In a period of one year alone, from July 1925 to June 
1926, the newspaper carried 40 articles related to persdelict.  Because persdelict was a 
convenient disciplinary measure against “unruly” press, it was invoked for a variety of 
reasons.  Other than to politically sensitive and hate-provoking writings, it also applied 
to (offensive) writings of influential persons or families, to accounts based on hearsay 
or false witness, to criticism of other imperialist powers, even for using words (terms) 
unfamiliar to the authorities.  Additionally, any offended person, not only the 
authorities, could invoke persdelict articles. 
Take for instance the case involving a local Chinese official.  The daily Keng 
Po was slapped with persdelict because a former Kapitan Tjina (a civil official 
appointed by the colonial authorities to oversee a local Chinese community) in 
Tjeribon filed a complaint.  As cited in Sin Jit Po, Keng Po had published an article 
accusing the Chinese official of embezzlement.  “Mr. Oeij Thiam Tjoan embezzled ƒ 
3,600 – the money belonging to the association Hoa Ho Siang Kiok.”281  The Kapitans 
were usually very rich people and their job was to control the various Chinese 
communities.282  Considering their social status and job, therefore, the accusation of 
the fraud by the Kapitan stirred the concern in Chinese communities and became the 
victim of persdelict. 
Another case concerned religion and the colonial authorities.  In June 1926, 
Mr. Wardi, editor of the weekly Soerapati, was questioned for a phrase he used in an 
article, “Agama dipake kedok” (Religion used as a mask), published on October 3, 
1925.283  He was interrogated under the persdelict law because the authorities 
suspected that the phrase conveyed hatred against the Regent of Bandoeng. 
                                                
281 Sin Jit Po, September 17, 1925 (Th. 3, No. 60), L2-1. 
282 On the Kapitan system, see Mona Lohanda, The Kapitan Cina of Batavia 1837-1942 (Jakarta: 
Djambatan, 1996). 
283 Sin Jit Po, Juni 22, 1926 (Th. 3, No. 134), L2-2. 
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Among journalists the existence of PID was a well known fact.  The PID was 
established in 1919 and became a powerful government tool for the suppression of 
radical activities against the authorities.  It was a public agency, with local offices, and 
employed a good number of spies and informers.  While Balai Poestaka and its IPO 
used a monitoring approach to censor potential trouble (albeit not always effectively), 
the PID dealt with actual people and organizations in the field.  Interestingly, this 
supposedly secret force communicated with and through the press in its dealings.  
Journalists were often summoned to a local PID station for discussion or questioning.  
All journalists knew who the local PID officers were.  Sin Jit Po, for instance, reported 
receiving letters from PID, which disputed its article on the Political Information 
Service.284  In this way the readers were made aware of the existence PID, and it was, 
to a great extent, no longer a “secret.”  However, by making its existence so visible, 
PID may have tried to induce self-control from the press and other “unruly” voices in 
the society. 
Persdelict also provided the opportunity for journalists to demonstrate an 
appearance of journalistic valor.  Court hearings on persdelict cases gave them the 
opportunity to poke fun at the authorities not only for the perceived injustices,285 but 
also for the general ignorance of Dutch officials with regard to local language and 
knowledge.  Many persdelict cases led to prison terms for journalists as most of them 
refused to pay the fine, and chose instead to go to jail for a period of weeks, months, 
even a year.  On the contrary, journalists who chose to pay fine in order to avoid 
imprisonment were often derided by other newspapers as “cowards.”  Thus in spite of 
many persdelict charges against it, Sin Jit Po and its personnel were rather proud of 
                                                
284 Sin Jit Po, November 5, 1925 (Th. 3, No. 99), L1-2. 
285 Making fun of authorities at courts was a common strategy by nationalistic leaders since the late 
1910s as the case of Semaoen’s persdelict discussed above. 
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their tenacious attitude; it eagerly reported about them and took the charges as a sign 
of its commitment to principled journalism.   
This tradition of anti-authority is also reflected in the number of articles on 
Boven Digoel, the internment camp for political prisoners, which Sin Jit Po featured 
beginning in December 1926.  The first news regarding the communist movement 
(later it was called “communist rebellion” by the colonial authorities) in West Sumatra 
was reported in Sin Jit Po on December 3, 1926 under the title “Gerakan kaoem 
Communist di Sumatra Barat: Keadaan di Djawa hendak ditjontoh” (“The 
Communist movement in West Sumatra: Wanting to emulate the situation in Java”).  
It was followed with the article “Rahasia Communist di Soematera Barat terboeka: 
Pemboenoehan di Kamang” (“Secrets of the West Sumatran Communists Exposed: 
Murders in Kamang”) on 24 December 1926.  On April 13, 1927, “Kedatengannja 
orang-orang jang diboeang di Tanah Merah (Boven Digoel)” (“Arrival of Exiles in 
Tanah Merah (Boven Digoel)”) reported that the first group of the alleged 
Communists had reached Boven Digoel, the internment camp for Communists.  Then 
the trial of the uprising case was related on April 29, 1927 issue (“Papreksaan perkara 
pembrontakan di Sumatra Barat” [“The Examination of the Rebellion Case in West 
Sumatra”]).  Thus Sin Jit Po continuously and closely followed developments 
associated with Boven Digoel in 1927.286 
Another case involved an influential Chinese family.  Then editor-in-chief of 
Sin Jit Po, Th. H. Phoa, was tried for persdelict after the newspaper carried a 
feuilleton, which was based on the actual murder of a man named Oei Siem Nio.  
Beginning with the October 25, 1925 issue, “Drama di hotel Oranje kamar No. 33: 
Pemboenoehan Oei Siem Nio: Ditoetoerken menoeroet katerangan2 jang sah” (Drama 
in Room No. 33 of Oranje Hotel: The Murder of Oei Siem Nio, Recounted Based on 
                                                
286 A closer analysis of Boven Digoel related news articles, see Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
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Legitimate Sources) was serialized.287  For this story and other related accounts,288 the 
wife of the murder victim filed a lawsuit against Sin Jit Po.  Mrs. Oei and her friends 
were reported (also by Sin Jit Po) as testifying in the court.289 
On another occasion, Th. H. Phoa faced a charge of false accusation in his 
article in Indische Courant, a Batavia-based Dutch newspaper.  The alleged accusation 
was against Mr. Abdullah Chasan, whom Th. H. Phoa had described as a dangerous 
person because he was said to be a communist.  Mr. Abdullah Chasan gave his 
statement in the court, stating that he was not a communist, but only an ordinary 
peasant and member of SI.290  Considering that Th. H. Phoa was a resident of Malang, 
as was Mr. Abdullah Chasan, it is possible that the description of Chasan was based 
on hearsay.  As noted earlier in this chapter, being a member of SI did not necessarily 
make one a communist.  However, Malang had a history of strikes, among others the 
famous Tram Company strike in 1920, initiated by Semaoen.  Since it was not unusual 
for a person to become member of multiple organizations in those days, being a 
member of SI did not eliminate the possibility that one was also associated with local 
communist groups.  In this persdelict case, the court ultimately ruled against Phoa and 
sentenced him a fine of ƒ50, substitutable by 10 days in prison and payment of court 
fee. 
This Chasan vs. Phoa case highlights some noteworthy issues.  Compared with 
other cases of persdelict involving politics or anti-government expressions, the penalty 
was relatively light.  Furthermore, it seems unlikely that an ordinary peasant could file 
a lawsuit against an influential journalist in Soerabaja and Malang.  The original 
                                                
287 Sin Jit Po, October 25, 1925 (Th. 3, No. 90), L2-3.   
288 Sin Jit Po, November 4, 1925 (Th. 3, No. 98) also put the announcement of new story of “Hikajat 
Kakedjian” (Story behind Brutality), which also investigates the background of the same murder case. 
289 Sin Jit Po, December 8, 1925 (Th. 3, No. 127), L1-2. 
290 “Persdelict,” Han Po, December 16, 1926.  This article is based on the report in Pewarta Soerabaja, 
a leading Chinese-Malay newspaper in Soerabaja in the 1920s. 
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article, published by the Dutch paper Indisch Courant, was written in Dutch, which 
made it even less likely that an ordinary peasant could read it, unless he received 
assistance for its translation.  Th. H. Phoa was himself reportedly subject to some kind 
of harassment, but Sin Jit Po remained vague with regard to the source of this 
intimidation. 

The above-mentioned cases of persdelict and related articles give us some 
indications with regard to the commercial as well as entertainment value of the 
newspapers in which they appeared.  Liberal minded Sin Jit Po attracted its readers’ 
attention not only with its market-oriented eclectic contents, but also with its 
journalistic bravado.  It used other newspapers (including its local rivals) as sources as 
well as object of reporting, while its coverage attracted other newspapers interests, too.  
Sin Jit Po-related persdelict cases tell a story that is different from those of political 
activists like Semaoen, working in the context of indigenous movements.  Those 
living in the world of movement like Semaoen exposed how the authorities, including 
the indigenous bureaucrats, abused their power on daily basis.  On the contrary, 
persdelict cases against or reported in Sin Tit Po touched upon the abuse of power by 
local Chinese officials, grievances from locally influential persons or families, 
religious issues, and individual false accusations.  The audience of Sin Jit Po and 
others were familiar with such abuses of power, grievances, or personal squabbles.  
Reading cases of persdelict became like exchanging gossip over meals, and therefore 
each article was relatively short and entertaining to read. 
It was obvious that post-publication censorship like persdelict might even 
encourage journalists to write provocative articles and give them a platform to 
broadcast their views.  In the 1920s, persdelict was not only a legal principle that 
colonial authorities abused to secure their power, it was also a tool to which influential 
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people appealed to secure their protection from journalistic reporting.  Hence 
persdelict related articles in the vernacular press increased the commercial value of the 
newspapers in which they appeared.  As the above-mentioned persdelict cases reveal, 
persdelict-related articles satisfied the demands of the newspapers’ audience.  The 
time for the Indies government to reconsider persdelict and censorship had arrived.
 194 
CHAPTER 5 
 
THE END OF ETHICAL ERA:  
THE FATE OF BALAI POESTAKA AND PRESS MONITORING  
 
In the middle of the 1920s the government started to contain radicalized 
communist- related movements in Java and parts of Sumatra.  This growing radical 
activism corresponded with the increasing number of persdelict cases, while the 
number of vernacular newspapers also increased over the last decade, that is, from 63 
in January 1920, 60 in January 1923, and 71 in January 1925 to 100 in April 1928.  
While newspapers and popular literature continued to be printed, circulated, and 
consumed, after the unexpected communist revolts of 1926 in West Java and 1927 in 
West Sumatra, the political situation surrounding print culture changed drastically.  
Coincidentally, communist revolts occurred several months after the new 
Governor-General, Andries Cornelis Dirk de Graeff, assumed his office in Batavia on 
March 26, 1926.  Initially, de Graeff was a Dutch ambassador to Japan from 1919 to 
1922, to the United States from 1922 to 1926, and was considered a close co-worker 
of the former liberal Governor-Generals Idenburg and Van Limburg Stirum.  In the 
wake of criticism being voiced in the Netherlands at the ways in which the former 
conservative Governor-General Fock had taken a hard stance towards Indonesian 
radicals, de Graeff was expected to restore cooperative relationship between the 
government and Indonesians.291  However, de Graeff found himself caught off guard 
by the revolts and immediately took firm steps to reorganize shaken government 
institutions to regain confidence.   
 
                                                
291 McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, p. 328. 
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Table 5-1: The Number of Malay Periodicals Listed in IPO, 1918-1929 
 
[Source: various issues of IPO, 1918-1929] 
 
Serious blame was directed to Balai Poestaka, which was an apparatus for 
surveillance.  In its political mission of monitoring the press, Balai Poestaka had failed 
to detect the shifts in the indigenous public opinion, especially the mood of anti-Dutch 
sentiments in potentially “dangerous” places.  As Rinkes had argued, the vernacular 
press was transmitter of social feelings and sentiments, and the IPO was supposed to 
be the thermometer to measure such social temperatures.  In the years preceding the 
revolts, IPO had continued to produce weekly summaries, and its issues had in fact 
gotten thicker after 1923.  But it turned out that regardless of their size, thick press 
summaries had proved useless in helping the government detect signs of impending 
communist revolts. 
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As symbol of the Ethical Policy, Balai Poestaka was faulted for yet another 
failing.  Bertram Schrieke,292 a professor of sociology at the University of Batavia 
from 1924 to 1929, a specialist on Islam and also Advisor on Native and Arab Affairs, 
saw Balai Poestaka’s “failure” as a consequence of the ethical policy and by-product 
of Balai Poestaka’s progressive mission to “uplift” the natives.  In essence Schrieke 
blamed the expansion of indigenous education.  He contended that school education 
for indigenous people produced followers of the communist movement, and that it was 
precisely the teachers of such schools who were among those actively involved in the 
uprisings.293  This line of argument naturally deepened the negative view that was 
emerging of Balai Poestaka since it was responsible for providing “safe” reading 
materials for students of indigenous schools. 
An additional administrative measure to curb excessive press was 
reconsidered.  The recent implementation of a judiciary measure, “crimes against the 
public order” or articles 153 bis and ter of the Penal Code had proved to be 
insufficient to contain political radicalism.  But after a series of discussions among 
high level of colonial authorities, all fingers seemed to be pointing to the failure of the 
Ethical Policy.  The dominant view coming out of many evaluations in the secret 
colonial documents was that the Ethical Policy, which was supposed to guide and 
supervise the indigenous population on the path of progress, had instead had  
“negative” effects on society.  This view also questioned the effectiveness of Balai 
Poestaka’s political role as a cultural advocate and vernacular press watchdog.   
Consequently, the problem of evaluating Balai Poestaka and reconsidering how to 
                                                
292 Bertram J. O. Schrieke served in the Indies as a language officer at the advisor for native affairs 
(1917-1920), adjunct advisor at the advisor for native affairs (1920-1922), curator at Royal Batavian 
Society (1923-1924), a law college professor (1924-1929), and director of education and worship 
(1929-1934). 
293 Bertram Schrieke, “The Causes and Effects of Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra,” in 
Bertram Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke, Part I (The 
Hague: W. van Hoeve Publishers, 1955), pp. 85-166. 
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affect successful curbs on the Indies press dominated the government agenda in the 
late 1920’s.  As more effective long-term solutions and policies were being weighed, 
the authorities sought more immediate solutions to the problem of containing political 
discourses by enacting administrative measures aimed at preventing the vernacular 
press from stirring up public opinion and social disorder.   
 
Doubts on the Cultural Project 
In the period before the communist uprisings, Balai Poestaka’s cultural project 
enjoyed sufficient support from the Netherlands.  On July 25, 1924, the Council of 
Netherlands Indies issued advisory reports to the Netherlands government on colonial 
matters, one of which regarded cultural policy, specifically Balai Poestaka’s activities 
in countering the communist movement’s influence and propaganda in the society.  
The Council of Netherlands Indies contended that distributing “appropriate” reading 
matters could be an effective counter-propaganda against the radical nationalist 
movement. 
 
The Council considers the Bureau of Popular Literature’s dissemination of 
useful reading materials (especially periodicals like the monthly Sri Poestaka 
and the weekly Pandji Poestaka) to be a workable instrument, not for directly 
counteracting the excesses of the Native press, but rather for mitigating their 
damaging consequences.  For counter-propaganda against extremists, such 
issues should not be underestimated, of course; but the practical significance 
of this lies in the indigenous reading public, which is rapidly increasing and is 
slowly welcoming attractive forms to learn, to make it understand that in the 
world there are other things to buy than the purely negative and destructive 
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slogans carried in part by the native press.  Such reading is therefore a useful 
counterbalance.294 
 
This view of Balai Poestaka was consistent with the strategy Rinkes had tried to 
realize through the institution.  Rinkes had successfully persuaded the Governor-
General not to make Balai Poestaka a mere organ for government propaganda, since 
he was convinced that the goal of stamping out “subversive” publications would be 
much better achieved by maintaining oligopolistic control over the book market and 
enabling Balai Poestaka to secure hegemony over schooled indigenous youth.   A 
close evaluation of developments in the Indies publishing industry reveals, however, 
that such hegemony was never actually realized. . 
A statement from Balai Poestaka itself reveals its vulnerable position in the 
literature market during the colonial period.  In October 1948, three years after 
Indonesia declared independence from the Netherlands, the state publishing house and 
bureau for popular literature released a thirty-five-page booklet detailing its history 
and development in the late colonial period.  It described its accomplishment in the 
field of literature as an institution that fostered the creation of modern Indonesian 
                                                
294 Advises van de raad van Nederlandsch-Indië, July 25, 1924, No. IX. Afschrift. Mr. 1924 no. 586x, in 
R. C. Kwantes (ed.), De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië 
(Bronnenpublikatie), Tweede stuk, medio 1923-1928, p. 80. 
Ten slotte vestigt de Raad de aandacht op een in de stukken niet ter sprake gebracht punt, dat 
voor de onderhavige aangelegenheid indirect van groot belang schijnt.  Als een werkzaam 
middel, niet om excessen der Inlandsche pers rechtstreeks tegen te gaan, maar wel om de 
schadelijke gevolgen daarvan te temperen, beschouwt het College de verspreiding van nuttige 
leesstof door den dienst der Volkslectuur, inzonderheid de uitgifte van periodieken zooals de 
Sri Poestaka (maandblad) en de Pandji Poestaka (weekblad).  Voor contra-propaganda 
tegenover gestook van extremistische zijde kunnen dergelijke uitgiften natuurlijk niet dienen, 
maar de practische beteekenis daarvan is hierin gelegen, dat het lezend Inlandsch publiek – 
hetwelk snel toeneemt – gaandeweg in aantrekkelijken vorm leert begrijpen, dat er in de 
wereld nog wel iets anders te koop is dan de louter negatieve en destructieve leuzen, waarop 
het door een deel der Inlandsche pers steeds onthaald wordt.  Die lectuur vormt dus een nuttig 
tegewicht.  
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literature.  Towards the end of the booklet, however, it describes a challenge that Balai 
Poestaka faced in the last two decades of Dutch colonial era.   
 
Since 1924 the Chinese-owned publishers have put out books of fiction in the 
form of magazines on monthly or bi-monthly basis.  These stories are usually 
about crime, lewdness, and the likes. 
In 1939 these stories grew in numbers, and everywhere emerged the 
type of publishers that produced this kind of “literary journal.”  These 
phenomena shook the society and were talked about in many newspapers and 
magazines.  Even prominent political leaders interfered.295 
 
As stories of “crime and lewdness” grew popular among Dutch Indies consumers of 
novels and newspapers, Balai Poestaka’s position in the popular literature and 
journalism markets grew increasingly weak. Chinese-Malay novels of the time were, 
by contrast, clearly dominant.  More specifically, crime and detective stories enjoyed a 
wide audience.  For instance, in the early years of the twentieth century, the popular 
writer Lie Kim Hok (1853-1912) translated numerous Rocambole stories into Malay 
(presumably from Dutch) and published them in Batavia.296  Rocambole, a fictional 
adventurer, was the creation of Pierre Alexis Ponson du Terrail in the middle of the 
nineteenth century.  Between 1910 and 1913 Lie put out 53 Rocambole stories, 
collected in five separate titled volumes.297  These translations of Rocambole opened 
the gate for adventure novels and crime fiction in the Indies.  In addition, in Malay 
                                                
295 Balai Pustaka, Balai Pustaka Sewadjarnja 1908-1942, p. 29. 
296 C. W. Watson, “Some Preliminary Remarks on the Antecedents of Modern Indonesian Literature,” 
Bijdragen tot Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde, Vol. 127, No. 4 (1971), p. 418; Nio Joe Lan, Sastera 
Indonesia-Tionghoa, pp. 16, 29, 112. 
297 Tio Ie Soei, Lie Kimhok 1853-1912 (Bandung: L. D. “Good Luck,” 1958), p. 86. 
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literature, fictional characters such as Gagaklodra, Patjar Merah, and Elang Emas298 
had turned into popular heroes in Indonesia from the late 1920s on.  Chapter 8 of this 
dissertation shall be devoted to the creation the popular hero Patjar Merah in 
particular, which I argue emerged as the byproduct of repressive censorship. 
Ironically, the proliferation of non-political newspapers that were consumed 
for their entertainment value, which Balai Poestaka considered safer precisely because 
they were non-political, had also given way to the propagation of a sensational kind of 
literature that Balai Poestaka bemoaned.  In the age when crime, scandals, or wretched 
incidents could be turned into commodities and consumed in massive numbers, it was 
easy to see why the docile literature that Balai Poestaka promoted was less attractive 
than, and therefore could not compete with, the Chinese-Malay popular publications.        
The passage from Balai Poestaka’s booklet that I cite above did not 
acknowledge this fact, as it did not reveal the names of the “Chinese-owned 
publishers” or “the literary journals” that the bureau found disturbing.  It did not 
specify how such “crime and lewdness” stories “shook the whole society,” or who the 
“prominent political leaders” who interfered were.  This veiled criticism and vague 
                                                
298 Examples of popular detective and “adventure” series include Gagaklodra, Patjar Merah, and Patjar 
Koening.  While Patjar Merah and Patjar Koening circulated mainly in the late 1930s and the dawn of 
the 1940s, Gagaklodra series by a popular writer Njoo Cheong Seng continued from 1930 until 1952.  
Popular “fictional” characters such as Gagaklodra and Patjar Merah were not produced as a literary 
series; Njoo Cheong Seng wrote Gagaklodra in various journals, whereas for Patjar Merah several 
authors contributed in different occasions.  Elizabeth Chandra, “Fantasizing Chinese/Indonesian Hero: 
Njoo Cheong Seng and the Gagaklodra Series,” Archipel, No. 81 (2011 forthcoming); Noriaki 
Oshikawa, “Patjar Merah Indonesia and Tan Malaka.”  In the late 1930s detective films such as 
Sherlock Holmes became popular at cinemas as advertisements of newspapers show, while many 
popular literatures by the Chinese and Indonesians featured “local” “private” detective heroes.  For 
Sumatran writers’ adaptation of Sherlock Holmes, see Doris Jedamski, “The Vanishing-Act of Sherlock 
Holmes in Indonesia’s National Awakening,” in Doris Jedamski (ed.), Chewing Over the West: 
Occidental Narratives in Non-Western Readings (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009), pp. 349-379.  It is to be 
noted that Jedamski’s piece of Sumatran “rejection” of Sherlock Holmes misunderstands the reason 
why and how the “criminal” heroes, such as Patjar Merah and Elang Emas, were conceived.  
Considering peranakan Chinese popular literature was widely read even among Muslims in Sumatra, it 
is safe to assume that they were the imitation of Njoo Cheong Seng’s Gagaklodra.  I owe this point to 
Elizabeth Chandra.  For the discussion of how Njoo Cheong Seng conceived and developed the figure 
of  “criminal” hero, see Chandra’s article on Gagaklodra.   
 201 
allusions suggest the vulnerability of Balai Poestaka as a counter-force – a cultural 
(constructive), as opposed to legal (repressive), censorship – against “undesirable” 
influence in the society.  In the end, as the unforeseen communist uprisings 
underscored, the cultural project of Balai Poestaka had failed to achieve hegemony or 
dominance in the publishing market. 
A look at publication statistics of the period also shows that popular literature 
and popular journalism attracted a wide range of readership in the 1920s and 1930s 
and overwhelmed state-sponsored literature.  As my computation of published books – 
Table 5-2: The Number of Malay Publications (1871-1942) – shows (although it is far 
from complete), Chinese-Malay publications began circulating in the late nineteenth 
century, and continued to grow in the 1910s through the 1930s with steady numbers of 
new books and literary journals.  Balai Poestaka began regularly publishing its books 
in the middle of the 1920s, while private indigenous publishers began to produce 
books in sizeable number in the late 1930s.  Throughout this period, Balai Poestaka’s 
publications never exceeded the number of private publications, especially those by 
the Chinese.  In noting that “(i)n 1939 these kinds of stories grew in numbers, and 
everywhere emerged this type of publishers,” Balai Poestaka’s report cited earlier 
refers to the indigenous private publishers, which at that point were trying  to mirror 
the Chinese-owned publishers and their products by publishing their own the monthly 
literary journals and detective stories.  By 1940 and 1941 when the threat of war was 
looming, the output by private indigenous publishers exceeded those of the Chinese, 
and together the Chinese and indigenous private publications overwhelmed Balai 
Poestaka’s books. 
Clearly then, Balai Poestaka had difficulties in competing with what the 
colonial authorities called “wild,” and widely popular literary publications by Indies 
Chinese as well as indigenous publishers.  While Balai Poestaka disapproved of 
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sensational stories produced in considerable number by Chinese-owned publishers, the 
fact remains that in terms of market share and popularity it never won the competition.  
In the beginning in the late 1910s, Balai Poestaka’s cultural project already faced a 
significant challenge.  The shaky foundation of its self-proclaimed hegemony (over 
indigenous school youths) begs reevaluation in terms of its efficiency as a mechanism 
of censorship.  To understand what was really going on with Balai Poestaka in the 
1920s, one needs to examine its financial status and the fate of press monitoring that it 
was carrying out. 
 
Table 5-2: The Number of Publications in Malay (1871-1942) 
 
[My computation is based on the following sources: Salmon, Literature in Malay by the Chinese in 
Indonesia; Balai Pustaka, Balai Pustaka; G. Ockeloen, Catalogus dari Buku-Buku jang Diterbitkan di 
Indonesia, 1937-1941, Djilid 2: Buku dalam Bahasa Melaju, Djawa, d.l.l (Bandung: G. Kolff & Co., 
1950). The actual number is attached as the appendix at the end of this chapter.] 
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Balai Poestaka’s Money Troubles 
Balai Poestaka’s cultural project required abundant resources.  Because of its 
nature, it needed heavy subsidies from the government, which presented a drain on the 
government budget, especially when it was hit by economic recessions.  In addition to 
changing political circumstances, at the end of the Ethical era, the government’s 
financial burden that had accumulated over the years weakened the bargaining 
position of Balai Poestaka.   
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the bureau claimed that it could cope well 
with the growing numbers of vernacular newspapers and periodicals, which needed to 
be monitored on the regular basis.  The number of newspapers listed in IPO jumped 
from 67 in 1918, to 175 in March 1927, and to 265 in September 1929.  In August 
1937, the number reached 472, which means an increase of more than seven times in 
twenty years.  However, in 1927 when discussion about the reorganization of the 
institution took place, Balai Poestaka proposed that it simplify the IPO both in terms 
of form and content, because there were too many papers and periodicals (between 
250 and 300) it had to deal with every week.299  As this discussion indicates, it had 
become impossible for Balai Poestaka to keep monitoring all of the vernacular press.  
The reason was simple – there were too many newspapers, and Balai Poestaka did not 
have enough personnel to handle their growing number year after year. 
This reality conflicted with Balai Poestaka’s own claim, that IPO regularly 
monitored 200 publications of the vernacular press,300 a figure that did not seem to 
reflect the actual number of papers and periodicals it monitored either in the 1920s or 
the 1930s.  Making the press lists in IPO was an easy task, because all copies of the 
press were sent to Balai Poestaka.  However such regularly published lists did not 
                                                
299 Mr. 2246/27. 
300 In December 1925, for instance, 198 periodicals were listed in IPO.  See Balai Poestaka’s pamphlet, 
Brondgeest, Bureau voor de Volkslectuur, p. 21. 
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reflect the actual monitoring activity by Balai Poestaka.  It was almost impossible to 
read all copies of the papers and make summaries of them.  In reality, no more than 60 
publications were cited and actually summarized in IPO.  Moreover, while the number 
of newspapers grew in the 1930s, the number of pages of each IPO issue actually 
decreased after 1932, and only approximately 10 newspapers were cited in it.  The 
Press Bureau division of Balai Poestaka seemed to have selectively monitored and 
made summaries, rather than reviewing all papers.  It relied in particular on major 
vernacular newspapers, which were considered important and risky for the Indies’ 
security and order.  In fact, even though the newspapers under Balai Poestaka’s 
scrutiny changed from time to time, only about 10 representative newspapers were 
constantly reviewed and summarized throughout the twenty-three year history of its 
press monitoring.   
With the declining function and credibility of the press survey, Balai 
Poestaka’s activities began to decline as a whole.  Changes in expenditures and the 
number of employees of Balai Poestaka clearly reflect how inconsequential the 
institution had become for the political security.  Once its importance declined, the 
Indies government had no reason to allot huge funds for Balai Poestaka.  The ups and 
downs of its expenses in the 1920s and 1930s support this argument.  Its budget grew 
rapidly in its first five years, that is, from ƒ 184,264 in 1918 to ƒ 523,192 in 1923, 
with a peak of ƒ 741,521 in 1921.  For three years after 1924 its budget stabilized 
around ƒ 530,000.  Thanks to its aggressive promotion by T. J. Lekkerkerker,301 who 
was the director of Balai Poestaka from 1927 to 1929, its budget jumped to ƒ 631,558 
                                                
301 Lekkerkerker was known as an expert in agricultural engineering and had been affiliated with the 
Department of Agricultural Trade and Handicrafts before being appointed as a new director of Balai 
Poestaka.   In the 1910s he introduced and promoted agricultural education in the Indies.  As the 
director of Balai Poestaka, he got the institution more efficient, and made two subdivisions – linguistic 
and administrative sections.  His career as the agricultural engineering, see Suzanne Moon, Technology 
and Ethical Idealism: A History of Development in the Netherlands East Indies (Leiden: CNWS, 2007), 
p. 112.  
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in 1928, and in 1930 reached ƒ 696,241 as a counter-propaganda organ against the 
communist movement.  But after 1932 the budget started to fall, from ƒ 568,200 in 
1932 to ƒ 258,070 in 1936, while the years of 1938 and 1939 saw a slight recovery to 
more than ƒ 300,000.302  The most striking point to be made from these figures is that 
its budget rapidly dropped after 1932 following the reorganization of all colonial 
institutions as a result of the Great Depression.  If one looks at personnel expenses, 
this tendency becomes clearer.  In the beginning of the 1920s, personnel expenses 
were around ƒ 200,000 to ƒ 250,000, while from 1928 on they exceeded ƒ 300,000, 
and in 1931 recorded ƒ 359,200.  After 1933, however, personnel expenses shrunk to ƒ 
244,300 in 1934, and ƒ 133,100 in 1938.   
The salaries of the employees, on the other hand, remained stable.  For 
instance, the salary for the chairman was ƒ 1,150 a month in 1927.303  As for the 
administrative staff, a chief of the board earned ƒ 400 per month, and a first-class 
bookkeeper earned the same amount, while clerks earned ƒ 45 to ƒ 75 a month.  Chiefs 
of Press and Translation Bureaus earned ƒ 625 per month, which was the highest 
salary for non-administrative staff, whereas others like editors earned ƒ 110 a month.  
These figures are taken from 1927, but the salaries themselves did not change that 
much throughout the colonial era.  If so, it is logical to assume that the decrease in 
Balai Poestaka’s expenses reflected a reduction of the number of staff.  In fact, its 
employees dropped from around 50 persons in 1923 to less than 30 persons after 1933.  
Moreover, the number of Dutch committee members of Balai Poestaka, which was 36 
                                                
302 Figures are taken from Handelingen van de Volksraad, 1920 to 1939, and Mr. 1436x/33.  It is 
difficult to trace the real budget of Balai Poestaka, for even Handelingen van de Volksraad givers 
different figures for the same years over its 20 years statistics.  For convenience’s sake, I have picked 
up the highest figures for each year from Handelingen van de Volksraad, otherwise relying on figures 
from Mr. 1436x/33. 
303 Rinkes’ initial salary when he was appointed as the chairperson of Balai Poestaka was f 1,500 per 
month.  For the comparison, G. A. J. Hazeu, who was reappointed as the advisor for Native and Arab 
Affairs in 1917 in replacement of Rinkes, earned f 2,000 a month.  Vb. 22 Dec. 17 no. 45. 
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in 1921, shrunk rapidly to 8 in 1931 and 4 in 1940.304  The figures for personnel 
expenses of the institution show that the number of its employees was 109 in 1928, 
137 in 1930, 93 in 1935, and 87 in 1936.305 
The problem of managing Balai Poestaka efficiently became more acute in the 
post-Ethical era.  Unlike in 1928, when the bureau had briefly regained a higher 
profile as a counterweight to communist activities, by the time of the post-Ethical area, 
the economic situation of the Indies had changed drastically as the Great Depression 
took its toll and forced a general cutback of the government budget.  Balai Poestaka 
sections targeted for staff reductions were the Translation and Press Bureaus, which 
were responsible for putting together IPO.  In 1932 its journal Sri Poestaka was 
discontinued due to its huge deficit.306  The journal was initially published to stamp 
out “wild” literature and vernacular press, but by this point it was considered 
ineffective and wasteful, partly because it failed to compete with the “wild” 
publications on the market, and in part because the Indies state had adopted 
persbreidelordonnantie (Press Curbing Ordinance, hereafter persbreidel) since 1931.  
Balai Poestaka continued to decline throughout the 1930s.   
In late 1933, a rumor spread that Balai Poestaka was to be taken over by the 
Dutch private publisher Kolff & Co. in Batavia.307  This rumor originated from the 
proposal made by the director of Department of Education and Religious Affairs, B. 
Schrieke, in order to “help” his subordinate institution, Balai Poestaka, so that it could 
maintain its cultural activities.  He argued that Balai Poestaka needed to become self-
sufficient, because it had been losing a large amount of money.   
                                                
304 Regeerings-Almanak, 1918-1940. 
305 Handelingen van de Volksraad, 1920-1939.  But the actual number of employees seemed to be 
higher than these figures.  Balai Poestaka’s annual reports recorded that it had 250 employees.  Balai 
Poestaka, Resultaten van voor de Volkslectuur 1927 (Batavia: Balai Poestaka, 1928), p. 5. 
306 Handelingen van de Volksraad, 1933-34 Bijlagen. 
307 Mr. 1436x/33. 
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Table 5-3: Financial Trend of Balai Poestaka, 1921-1932 
Expenses Income 
Year Personnel Material Total  
1921 321,855 419,666 741,521 105,000 
1922 259,866 242,656 502,522 126,769 
1923 249,291 273,901 523,192 128,001 
1924 207,688 219,353 427,041 193,946 
1925 236,251 265,809 502,060 177,733 
1926 283,540 289,565 573,105 241,811 
1927 272,634 268,716 541,339 263,142 
1928 299,236 331,882 631,558 254,296 
1929 328,236 322,637 693,241 261,545 
1930 331,453 361,788 693,241 261,545 
1931 327,043 323,593 650,636 241,582 
1932 292,700 275,500 568,200 175,000 
Total 3,410,222 3,595,066 7,005,288 2,425,100 
Loss -4,580,179  
[Source: Mr. 1436x/33] 
 
The total loss was ƒ 4,580,179 in the twelve years between 1921 and 1932.  
While the total budget from 1921 until 1932 was ƒ 7,005,288, which consisted of ƒ 
3,410,22 for personnel expenses and ƒ 3,595,066 for material ones, the total income 
for the same period was only ƒ 2,425,109.308  Schrieke disclosed that over the period 
of twelve years the Press Bureau and the Translation Bureau had spent ƒ 50,000 and ƒ 
20,000, respectively, and suggested that the expenses of these two bureaus should be 
cut back.  As shown earlier, the chiefs of these two bureaus earned the highest salaries 
among the non-administrative staffs, because their jobs involved important political 
functions.  Due to reasons mentioned above, the budget of the Press Bureau was cut, 
and this in turn led to the huge cutback in IPO. 
                                                
308 Mr. 1436x/33. 
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The declining political role of IPO and the budget tightening forced Balai 
Poestaka to reorganize itself, resulting in the reduction of its cultural and political 
projects and activities.  The number of people’s reading rooms, of books being 
checked out, and of readers who accessed Balai Poestaka all gradually declined in 
1930s.  Despite the claim by literary scholars that it enjoyed a hegemonic position in 
the field of publication and literature,309 Balai Poestaka faced a bleak destiny, which 
its founding father Rinkes had never expected.   
 
Between Monitoring and Curbing  
Its failure as a truly hegemonic institution notwithstanding, Rinkes had been 
nominally successful in building Balai Poestaka into a major cultural agency in 
colonial Indies.  Another of Rinkes’ projects, effective press monitoring, had by 
contrast been faced with opposition from the beginning, as questions were 
immediately raised about the efficacy of Rinkes’ approach.310  As early as in the late 
1910s and the early 1920s, when Balai Poestaka’s press-monitoring system by Balai 
Poestaka was first operationalized, many discussions took place among high Dutch 
officials on the excesses of the press and how to deal with them.  In particular, 
discussions centered around whether new administrative measures should be 
introduced or criminal laws improved.  For a time, the he general mood supported the 
view that the existing penal code would be adequately effective in supervising the 
vernacular press. 
The strongest voice opposing this viewpoint was raised by the Governor-
General Van Limburg Stirum (1916-1921).  Van Limburg Stirum was known as for 
                                                
309 Setiadi, “Kolonialisme dan Budaya, Balai Pustaka di Hindia Belanda,” pp. 23-41; Jedamski, “Balai 
Pustaka,” pp. 23-46. 
310 For a detail study on censorship policy debate in the 1920s, Maters, Van zachte wenk tot harde hand, 
pp. 137-149; 156-169. 
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the administrative reforms he had initiated in the Indies, such as the introduction of 
People’s Council (Volksraad) and decentralization.  Yet, despite his reformist 
reputation, he had been bothered by the development of the vernacular press.  After 
taking office in 1916, Van Limburg Stirum wrote several proposal letters to the 
Minister for Colonies, Th. B. Pleijte (1913-1918).  In a letter date on October 20, 
1916, he castigated the vernacular press and signaled tougher attitude towards it:  
 
I have a lousy impression of the native press, which is always biased against 
the government, and never says a word of appreciation for our officials. […]  I 
had prepared a wire giving you my views on the matter.  In it I added my view 
that so long as the natives think in this damnable way about what’s reported in 
their press, they will have nothing to contribute to the future of the country.311  
 
About half a year later on April 4, 1917, just before Balai Poestaka began its press 
monitoring, Van Limburg Stirum wrote another letter to Pleijte.  In the letter he noted 
that major socio-political changes had affected the Royal Decree of March 19, 1906 
concerning press regulations, which had weakened administrative control over the 
press.  He went on to say that it was the time for the Indies government to introduce 
new ways to rein in the vernacular press excess.  Implicitly he expressed misgivings 
on the effectiveness of press monitoring that Rinkes proposed.  Instead, Van Limburg 
                                                
311 Een brief van 20 okt. 1916 (particulier; archief Pleijte) schreef Van Limburg Stirum aan Pleijte uit 
Buitenzorg, in R. C. Kwantes (ed.), De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging in 
Nederlandsch-Indië (Bronnenpublicatie) Eerste stuk 1917-medio 1923. Groningen: H. D. Tjeenk 
Willink, 1975), p. 1. 
Van de inlansche pers heb ik de allernaarste indruk, scheeve voorstelling van zaken is regel, 
nimmer een woord van waardeering voor de ambtenaren […].  Ik had een telegram klaar om u 
te zeggen hoe ik hierover denk eraan toevoegende dat als de mentaliteit van het volk naar de 
persuitingen beoordeeld moet worden te vreezen is dat het niet in staat zal zijn iets bij te 
dragen tot den vooruitgang van dit land. 
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Stirum recommended that the Minister for Colonies introduce a license system, or at 
least increase the possibility of prosecution by criminal law.312 
This recommendation however was not realized, because not only Pleijte but 
also his successor as the Minister for the Colonies, A. W. F. Idenburg (1918-1919), 
did not approve of Van Limburg Stirum’s idea.  On June 14, 1919, Idenburg who was 
a former Governor-General in the Indies wrote to Van Limburg Stirum, saying that he 
was not willing to take up the latter’s proposal for a license system in order to curb 
press excesses.  Idenburg recommended instead that two new articles be added to the 
Penal Code, which should suffice for the purpose.  The intention was to make the 
Penal Code more extensive and forceful toward the press, that is to deter excesses with 
the threat of stiff penalties.  For that, Idenburg suggested adding articles 483a and 
484a, which read “Whoever publishes text or imagery after receiving a written 
warning from the Governor-General deeming the material as being of criminal nature 
shall be punished with imprisonment not exceeding one year and four months or fine 
for a maximum of 300 guilders.”313   
Van Limburg Stirum was not satisfied with Idenburg’s recommendation.  After 
Idenburg was succeeded as Minister for the Colonies by S. de Graef (1919-1925), he 
sent another petition with a new proposal on April 3, 1920.  He proposed that the 
Minister of the Colonies consider the possibility of temporarily suspending the printer 
responsible for publishing troubling articles, using as reference the Printing Presses 
Ordinance that was just introduced in the British Straits Settlements.314  Yet, once 
again his proposal was turned down.   
                                                
312 Gouverneur-Generaal (Van Limburg Stirum) aan Minister van Koloniën (Pleijte), April 4, 1917, in 
No. 272/1. Vb. 14 juni 1919 no. 26 in Kwantes, De ontwikkeling, I, pp. 1-10. 
313 Minister van Koloniën (Idenburg) aan Gouverneur-Generaal (Van Limburg Stirum), June 14, 1919, 
No. 26/859.  Minuut. Vb. 14 juni 1919 no. 26 in Kwantes, De ontwikkeling, I, pp. 128-132, especially, 
pp. 130-131. 
314 Gouverneur-Generaal (Van Limburg Stirum) aan Minister van Koloniën (De Graeff), April 3, 1920, 
No. 31a/4x. Vb. 15 juni 1920 no. 2, in Kwantes, De ontwikkeling, I, pp. 261-265. 
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After Van Limburg Stirum was retired in 1921, Fock (1921-1926) took the 
position of Governor-General.  He was an experienced politician and his impressive 
curriculum vita shows that he served as a parliament member of the Dutch House of 
Representatives (1901-1905, 1913-1920), the Minister of the Colonies (1905-1908), 
and the chairperson of the House of Representatives (1917-1920).  Unlike his 
predecessor, Fock seemed to be of the opinion that the existing criminal law was 
enough to combat “evil” elements of the press.  On February 27, 1922, in a letter to 
the Prosecutor General G. W. Uhlenbeck (1916-1922), Fock expressed his hesitation 
at the adaptation of such administrative measures as the suspension of publication or 
the introduction of license system.  He also had misgivings about the addition of 
articles to the criminal law for the purpose of eradicating press excesses and 
recommended that it should be considered only if necessary.  Fock even questioned if 
“hate-sowing articles” in the Penal Code were necessary, arguing that although they 
were established to punish those who expressed feelings of enmity, hatred, or 
contempt against one or more groups in the Indies, one could not eliminate the 
possibility that a prosecution under those articles could evoke social condemnation.315  
His cautious attitude toward curbing excesses of the press was peculiar, given the fact 
that radical movements had grown and spread in Java since the late 1910s, and many 
journalists and activist were being penalized under the press offence articles.  
Moreover, Fock had been under pressure from Dutch conservatives to take additional 
measures against the Communists. 
In the early 1920s, in the eyes of Dutch officials, social disorder became 
increasingly apparent day by day.  This trend corresponded with rapid social change 
that the Indies was going through.  Sensationalism became popular in the press of both 
                                                
315 Wd. gouvernementssecretaris aan Procureur-Generaal (G. W. Uhlenbeck), Feb. 27, 1922, No. 139x 
geh. Afschrift. Mr. 1922 no. 278x, in Kwantes, De ontwikkeling, I, pp. 461-462. 
 212 
Dutch and Malay languages.  The 1920s saw large numbers of new Dutch middle class 
immigrants arriving in the Indies.  This new audience coincided with the rise of 
market-oriented journalism in the circle of Dutch-language newspapers, which were 
increasingly characterized by its commercialism, sensationalism, and fear mongering.  
The Dutch author Couperus, finding himself the target of criticism in the press upon 
visiting the Indies, described its mob mentality thus:  
 
 [It was] the Scornful Press.  If the tourist is someone who is more or less 
well-known – famous or notorious – he will most certainly be attacked by this 
plague.  It is inevitable.  “But,” someone tried to comfort me, “you share this 
with all distinguished people who come to Java: consider all these abusive 
articles which the editors of many Indies papers have thrown at you as a 
compliment.” 316 
 
In his travel account, Couperus appears to be quite comfortable with the advice he 
cites in this passage:  Well-known Westerners being targeted for scornful press attacks 
should not over-react, and should simply regard such attacks in a different light, as 
“compliments” on their success.317   
For many Dutch officials, however, the scornful native press was simply 
irritating, not flattering.  They were especially exasperated with radical political 
activism and radical political discourse in the press.  After taking office as the 
                                                
316 Couperus, Eastward, p. 244; I changed the translated word “Indian” to “Indies.”  To be precise, since 
Couperus passed away due to sepsis in July 16, 1923, this travel essay was published posthumously as a 
book.  The travel was arranged and sponsored by De Haagsche Post and was originally planned to 
include a visit to the Indies, China and Japan.  But due to unstable political situations in China in 1922 
Couperus briefly stopped at Hong Kong after the Indies and went straight to Japan.  His travel account 
on Japan was later published in book form in 1925, and was translated into English in 1926.  Louis 
Couperus, Nippon (translated by John De La Valetta) (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1926). 
317 Couperus’ generous attitude makes sense if one understands the background of his account. 
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Prosecutor General in 1922, D. G. Wolterbeek Muller (1922-1926) did not waste any 
time in taking up renewed efforts to rein in political activists that he felt had been 
operating all too freely.  Muller was known as a tough Prosecutor General, especially 
towards the communist movement.  Not satisfied with the punitive measures already at 
his disposal, Muller openly contemplated instituting more drastic measures for curbing 
the press.  During his five-year tenure, he interned and deported communist leaders 
such as Tan Malaka, Semaoen,318 Darsono, Alimin, Aliarcham, and Mardjohan; and in 
October 1923 he ordered the arrest of the PKI executive members.  On January 23, 
1924, he made a proposal to Governor-General Fock to add two articles to the Penal 
Code, which echoed the suggestion by Idenburg back in 1917.  Muller urged “the 
addition of a temporary censorship in times of tension and the expansion of the hate-
sowing articles to include expression on class hatred, which would provide a practical 
weapon, in the opinion of its proponent, especially against the native press.”319  In July 
1924 the Council of the Netherlands Indies expressed hesitation to take further actions, 
saying that at the moment the general political situation of the Indies did not 
necessitate taking more stringent measures against the press.320   
Between late 1924 and 1926 PKI and its affiliated unions appeared to be 
pushing for more radical activities.  Consequently, anarchic situations due growing 
incidents of labor unrest emerged in Java and Sumatra.  With the party’s 
encouragement agitation among its base in rural areas increased from s 1925 onward.  
Threats to public order spread in cities in Central Java, such as Jogjakarta, Soerakarta, 
                                                
318 Gouverneur-generaal (Fock) aan Minister van Koloniën (De Graaff), May 16, 1923, no. 45/1x. 
Afschrift van minuut. Vb. July 14, 1923 no. 15, in Kwantes, pp. 560-564.  Semaoen, after having 
travelled to China, Russia, Europe and Thailand, was arrested and forced to leave the Indies in August 
1923.   
319 Procureur-Generaal (D. G. Wolterbeek Muller) aan Gouverneur-generaal (Fock), January 23, 1924, 
in R. C. Kwantes ed., De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië 
(Bronnenpublikatie), Tweede stuk, medio 1923-1928 (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1978), pp. 66-71. 
320 Advies van de raad van Nederlandsch-Indië, July 25, 1924, No. IX. Afschrift. Mr. 1924 no. 586x, in 
Kwantes, ontwikkeling, I, pp. 77-81. 
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and Semarang, as well as in Batavia, Medan and Soerabaja.  These developments 
corresponded with the party’s new propaganda in 1926.  In its January 2, 1926 issue, 
the party organ Api began publishing quotations from Bakunin in italics on its front 
page.  It had turned Bakunin into its prophet, though Darsono’s own advice in 1924 
was for “PKI to remember that the Communism of Marx and not the anarchism of 
Bakunin must govern the party.”321   
This political development forced the Council to change its attitude regarding 
the expansion of the Penal Code.322  In April 1926 the Indies state introduced two 
additional articles to those concerning “crimes against the public order,” known as 
articles 153 bis and ter, 154, 155, 156, 157, and 161 bis of the Penal Code.323  Article 
153 bis reads: 
 
Whoever deliberately states their opinion by speech, writing, or image, 
whether by mockery, either explicitly or covertly promoting the disruption of 
public order, overthrowing or violating the authority of the Netherlands or the 
Netherlands-Indies government, or inciting thereto, shall be punished with a 
maximum imprisonment of six years or a maximum fine of three hundred 
guilders.324 
 
Article 153 ter reads: 
 
                                                
321 McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, p.  325. 
322 For a survey of the process of legislation, J. Th. Petrus Bloemberger, De Communistische Beweging 
in Nederlandsch- Indië (Haarlem: H. D. Tjeenk Willink, 1928). 
323 “bis” is a Latin term for a first supplement, and “ter” for a second addition. 
324 D. M. G. Koch, Verantwoording; een halve eeuw in Indonesië, (‘s-Gravenhage: W. Van Hoeve, 
1956), pp. 89-90. 
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Whoever by writing or image, by mockery, either explicitly or covertly 
promotes or disrupts public order, overthrows or undermines the authority of 
the Netherlands or the Netherlands Indies government, shall be punished with 
a maximum imprisonment of five years or a maximum fine of three hundred 
guilders. 
 
Article 161 bis reads: 
 
Whoever intends to disturb the public order or to cause the disruption in the 
economy, or whether knowingly or unwittingly disturbs public order or 
disrupts the economic activities, causing or making other people unable to 
fulfill their obligations, or even after being formally instructed, refuses to 
perform the labor to which they are bound or obliged by contract, shall be 
punished with a maximum imprisonment of five years or a maximum fine of 
one thousand guilders.325 
 
The additional articles became a practical legal weapon to arrest prominent and radical 
nationalists from the middle of the 1920s until the end of the colonial era.  They 
pushed Balai Poestaka to change the composition of IPO, which was struggling to 
survive in its role as another weapon against subversive elements of the press.  For 
nearly seven and half years since its birth in 1918, IPO had basically kept the same 
format.  Each issue started with a section on “Malay press in Java,” and was followed 
by sections on “Press in Outer islands,” “Javanese press,” “Extremist press,” 
Nationalistic press,” “Religious press,” “Women’s press,” “Minahasa press,” “Neutral 
press,” “Trade Union press,” “Arabic press,” and “Chinese-Malay press.”  I Without 
                                                
325 Koch, Verantwoording, p. 137. 
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notice or explanation, this format changed in May 1926, and the new order was; 
“Religious press,” “Trade Union press,” “Outer islands press,” “Outer islands native 
journals,” “Native journals in Java,” “Press in Java,” “Arabic press,” “Japanese-Malay 
press,” “Periodicals in the Netherlands,” and “Chinese-Malay press.”  With the new 
format, IPO increased in size and was now packed with summaries of vernacular 
press.  However, this change was not accompanied with any new methodology, and 
consumption of IPO proceeded much in the same pattern as before. 
On the surface the new political weapon appeared to be more effective that the 
old one.  The additional articles in the Penal Code successfully paralyzed the central 
command of the Communist Party.  But these additional measures in the end helped 
trigger new uprisings in West Java in 1926 and in West Sumatra in 1927, uprisings 
that had been opposed even by the chairperson of the Commintern in Southeast Asia, 
Tan Malaka, who felt them to be premature.  
Soon after the implementation of the new articles of the Penal Code, local 
journalists expressed their confusion in the press.  
 
Persdelict is like a flood all day long. […] 
Why then do such harsh rules still need to be applied in the Indies? […] 
With the existing articles, the press already sees its pathway very narrow, now 
with the new articles, the ability of the press to express itself will be even 
more constricted.326 
                                                
326 “Moeloet pers semakin dikekang: Artikel 153 bis dan 153 ter moentjoel lagi,” Pewart Deli, April 23, 
1926. 
Persdelict bagaikan bandjir sepandjang hari. […] 
Apakah sebabnja di Hindia masih berlakoe atoeran atoeran jang begitoe keras? […] 
Dengan artikel artikel jang soedah ada sadja, memang kaoem pers soedah merasa amat sempit 
perdjalanannja, sekarang ditambah lagi artikel artikel baroe jang njata boleh menambahi 
sempitnja pers bersoeara. 
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Naturally, local journalists questioned the intention of the colonial government in 
adding new articles.  They were not aware of the long series of correspondence on 
how to deal with press excesses that had been taking place among high colonial 
officials since the middle of the 1910s.  On the one hand, the existing persdelict laws 
for them were already quite suppressive, and they wanted more independence and 
freedom of expression.  On the other hand, they knew that they had to live with the 
new articles of the Penal Code, and that freedom of the press was illusory.  Even after 
the communist uprisings were crushed and the party was banned, these additional 
articles continued to be invoked against those who supported the nationalist 
movement.327  In the end, the authorities became less and less tolerant of political 
activism of any kind. 
Contrary to the hopes of the Indies colonial authorities, one can say that the 
new laws also failed their target as radical newspapers continued to print their 
opinions, and, most importantly, the communist uprisings broke out at the end of 1926 
and the beginning of 1927 despite the new laws.  The uprisings undoubtedly altered 
the political circumstances concerning press monitoring as the Indies government lost 
its confidence in the effectiveness of this activity.  Ironically, a person nicknamed 
“Rapp” who had worked for IPO confirmed the ineffectiveness of the press survey.  In 
its September 1928 issue, IPO carried a summary of an article by the Medan-based 
daily Pewarta Deli.  The article hinted that the Indies state would reassess and change 
the weekly journal IPO by Balai Poestaka, and that the objectivity of the survey would 
be lost.  A “footnote” to this summary written by a IPO censor confirmed that the 
survey was tasked with covering more than 200 newspapers, weeklies, and other 
                                                
327 This is an observation by an activist who spoke up at the meeting of Bandoeng branch of Association 
of Political Organizations of the Indonesia People (Pemoefakatan Perhimpoenan-perhimpoenan Politik 
Kebangsaan Indonesia, PPPPKI) on October 7, 1928.  Mr. 1017/1928. 
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periodicals, that it had been gradually failing to review all of them, and that the writers 
of the summary never exercised objective survey.328   
Coincidentally, when this footnote was published, an intense debate regarding 
the press was taking place under the guidance of Governor-General De Graeff (1926-
1931).329 The core of this debate centered on whether or not to adopt administrative 
measure against excesses of the press, which the colonial authorities were hesitant to 
do since the Press Act of 1906 was introduced.  Finally, new administrative measures 
appeared to be imminent.  On June 1, 1928, the Council of the Indies advised on the 
draft ordinance with regards to restrictions of freedom of the press on certain 
newspapers and periodicals, and proposed a few amendments to underline the 
exceptional character of the temporary suppression of certain newspapers.330  On July 
3, 1928, acting on orders from De Graeff, the first secretary of the government sent the 
outlines of the final decision on the regulation of the press to the Director of Justice, J. 
J. Schrieke.  His plan revealed that print materials that might endanger public order 
were to be curbed and that the regulatory measures would include a ban on printing, 
publishing, and distributing such publications.331 
Threatened with becoming irrelevant, Balai Poestaka did not quietly sit back, 
but attempted to regain its clout in the colonial institutional arrangement.  Although 
the credibility of its press survey was almost gone, those who were attached to this 
institution still tried to regain the government confidence in IPO, by trying to make it 
more suitable for its purpose.  From October to November 1928, Van der Plas (the 
                                                
328 Pewarta Deli, September 25, 1928, in IPO 1928, p. 604. 
329 Before being appointed as the Governor-General, de Graeff served as official general secretary 
(1895-1905), first government secretary (1905-1913), general secretary (1913/1914), member of the 
Council of Netherlands Indies (1914-1916), vice-president of the Council of Netherlands Indies 
(1917/1918), and Dutch ambassador to Washington (1919-1926). 
330 Advises van de raad Nederlandsch-Indië, 1 Juni 1928, in Mr. 685x/1928, and also in Kwantes (ed.), 
De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië (Bronnenpublicake). Derde 
stuk 1928 - Aug. 1933 (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff/Bouma’s Boekhuis, 1981), pp. 58-61. 
331 Eerste gouvernementssecretaris aan de directeur van justitie (J. J. Schrieke), July 3, 1928, Mr. 
262x/1928, in Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling, III, pp. 69-72. 
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advisor for the Native Affairs), J. Hardeman (the Director for Education and Religious 
Affairs), H. A. Helb (the first secretary of the government), and Lekkerkerker (the 
senior officer of Balai Poestaka) organized a series of discussions on how to 
reorganize the press survey.  In his letter on October 29, 1928, Van der Plas pointed 
out that the weekly survey of Chinese and Chinese-Malay press by the Office for 
Chinese Affairs was better organized (meaning topically categorized) and carried a 
more systematic overview of the press than the one prepared by Balai Poestaka.332  
This point suggests that the demands for and consumption of press surveillance had 
shifted from a summary to an overview format.  From the beginning in 1917, IPO was 
known to focus on carrying various kinds of news summaries of the vernacular press, 
whereas the Office for Chinese Affairs developed regular press overviews according 
to topical headings.  Defenders of IPO argued that it was more important to show what 
kind of articles individual newspapers carried than to issue the compact overviews 
according to selected topics that the Office for Chinese Affairs put out.  IPO’s “rich” 
contents allowed readers who knew which newspaper and person to watch to keep an 
eye on those publications.  It did not provide any political context, but rather passed on 
indigenous “voices” to keeping state officials updated on the political temperature in 
the Indies.  Reading IPO guaranteed sufficient information on indigenous “nationalist” 
and “extremist” activists, organizations, and movements without reading the actual 
vernacular newspapers.333  The lesson that communist uprisings taught, however, was 
that IPO’s press summary failed to provide the information needed to better predict 
what would happen in the future.  In its voluminous pages, the numerous indigenous 
                                                
332 “Wekelyksch persoverzicht Inlandsche en Maleisch-Chineesche pers,” in Mr. 1046/28.  The way in 
which the Office for Chinese Affairs classified and summarized Chinese press, see Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation. 
333 IPO has contributed to reconstruct Indonesian nationalist history in the postcolonial era, although it 
may have some Dutch bias on indigenous movement as Lekkerkerker acknowledged in his report.  It is 
convenient to have the summary of vernacular press, considering that many vernacular newspapers 
from colonial days were not available any longer, and it can be read like another colonial documents. 
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“voices” that IPO had hoped to capture for its readers became instead vague “noises” 
for colonial officials, who became lost in the flood of information provided and thus 
were prone to read the summaries only selectively depending on their interests.  
Consequently, it appears that the colonial authorities decided that an organized press 
overview – rather than simply a press summary – would be more useful for 
understanding what was going on with regard to social movements among the 
indigenous population of the Indies. 
Nine months later, on August 27, 1929, Lekkerkerker submitted to Governor-
General De Graeff a proposal for change at Balai Poestaka.  While admitting that the 
current level of Balai Poestaka’s staffing was inferior to that of the Office for Chinese 
Affairs, he pledged that the institution would provide adequate education and 
sufficient levels of fluency in the Indies indigenous languages to enable the new 
bureaucratic staff to meet the emergent demands.  He also suggested that it was 
possible for Balai Poestaka to make a better and more organized press survey.  His 
argument essentially was that reading IPO was still worth it, since Balai Poestaka was 
now committed to improving its quality.334  But Lekkerkerker’s proposal turned out to 
be difficult to realize; IPO did not show any major reorganization of the way it 
summarized the vernacular press, and the size of IPO remained as “thick” as before.  
Officials continued to find it difficult to extract relevant information from IPO’s 
voluminous pages, and no fundamental improvement of the situation occurred.  It had 
proved a little too late to reconstruct IPO.  Once confidence and trust in its press 
monitoring capabilities were lost, IPO could not recover, and the age of press 
monitoring began drawing to a close. 
                                                
334 “Mogelykheid van een meer overzichtelyke indeeling van het persoverzicht,” De Hoofdambtenaar 
voor de Volkslectuur en aanverwante aangelegenheden (Lekkerkerker) aan Gouverneur-Generaal  (De 
Graeff) in Mr. 819x/29. 
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The decline of the political role of Balai Poestaka and its IPO reflected the 
institutional change of the Indies state that had been gradually taking place since 1919.  
With the government decree of September 24, 1919, the General Investigation Service 
(Dienst der Algemeene Recherche, ARD) was established within the police force.  
This office was expected to alert the Prosecutor General of problems in the Indies, and 
to advise him on directives and information that ought to be provided to the regional 
investigation service.335  Its monthly survey Politiek-Politioneel Overzicht (PPO, 
Political Policing Survey) gained trust among intelligence officers in the 1920s, and 
especially after the communist uprisings of 1926/1927, it became a must-read item.336  
The publication consisted of five sections: Extremist Movement, National and Islamic 
Movement, Chinese Movement, Trade Union Movement, and “Abroad.”337  With a 
very limited circulation among high-level officials, PPO gave concise information on 
an incident and the place, persons or organizations it involved, but provided no 
sociological and cultural background information.  PPO only paid attention to 
dissidents and threats to the state, as this was the information considered to be 
sufficient for understanding the political situation in relation to security.  Compared to 
IPO, PPO gave more concrete and direct information.  As the importance of PPO 
increased, it IPO’s political role appeared to be effectively over. 
As the failure of IPO’s reconstruction became evident, discussions concerning 
press curbing reached the final stage in 1930. In his letter of May 2, 1930, the Director 
of Justice J. J. Schrieke (1929-1934)338 introduced a draft ordinance for the purpose of 
                                                
335 Shiraishi, “A New Regime of Order,” pp. 47-74. 
336 Harry A. Poeze (ed.), Politiek-politioneele overzichten van Nederlandsch-Indië: bronnenpublikatie 
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982-1994).  This four volume series covers PPO from 1927 to 1941. 
337 The format is similar to that of MMC. 
338 J. J. Schrieke served at the Indies government as a judicial officer (1909-1913), secretary general 
officer (1913-1916), adjunct officer for decentralization (1919/1920), principal officer for director of 
education and worship (1920-1922), government agent in the People’s Council (1922-1928), and 
director of Justice (1929-1934). 
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press control.  He presented three possible cases in which the ordinance could be 
invoked: if the tone of the press against the government went beyond the reasonable 
bounds; if the disturbing writing affected the good understanding (goede 
verstandhouding) of the people; and if one published inaccurate news.  But 
interestingly, Schrieke also outlined some objections to the regulation that he was 
requesting to be signed into law, and he proposed that certain changes be made.  He 
was of the opinion that measures to curb press excessiveness needed to be placed 
under the jurisdiction of the preventive police.339  According to this draft, the final 
decision on whether or not a certain newspaper needed be suspended was to be made 
by the Prosecutor General.  Two months later, in a report dated on July 4, 1930, the 
Council of the Netherlands Indies advised against Schrieke’s ideas, citing its unease 
with the apparent government intervention in the freedom of the press that his 
proposal would signify.  “A major act of the government to affect, albeit abusive, 
press freedom should undoubtedly be seen with the greatest possible precaution for 
careful and thoughtful use of resources,” the Council advised.340   
Having received these two different suggestions, in a letter dated on August 
17, 1930, Governor-General De Graeff reviewed the exchange of ideas that had been 
taking place for more than a decade.  In his letter to the Minister for the Colonies, De 
Graeff referred to the Printing Press Ordinance of 1920 in the British Strait 
Settlements and the Press Act of 1910 in the British India, which introduced political 
control over the press in the British colonies.  Although still asking for the Minister’s 
views, De Graeff made it clear that it was time to contain press excess for the sake of 
public order, and that he would approve the introduction of administrative measures 
                                                
339 Directeur van justitie (J. J. Schrieke) aan gouverneur-generaal (De Graeff), May 2, 1930, Vb. 14 
oktober 1930 1r. W22, in Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling, pp. 432-435. 
340 Advise van de raad van Nederlandsch-Indië, July 4, 1930, Vb. 14 okt. 1930 1r. W22, in Kwantes, De 
Ontwikkeling, pp. 435-437, and the quotation is in p. 436.
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against the press on his own authority.341  It took one year before his firm decision was 
realized in the form of persbreidel of 1931. 
 
Apolitical Fields 
With the end of the Ethical Policy in 1928, Balai Poestaka as a manifestation 
of the policy was bound to decline as well.  It had been a major responsibility of Balai 
Poestaka to monitor vernacular language newspapers in the Indies since 1917.  But 
after the reorganization of the colonial administration in 1931, Balai Poestaka’s budget 
was significantly reduced and consequently its activities declined, while its regular 
mail report to the Department of Colonial Affairs since 1932 no longer carried a 
general survey of local press.  “Algemeen overzicht van de Indonesische, Maleisch-
Chineesche en Arabische Pers over October 1931” (“The general survey of 
Indonesian, Chinese-Malay and Arabic Press of October 1931”) was the last Algemeen 
sent by the mail report under the file number of secret mail report no. 1268 of 1931 
(Mr. 1268x/31).  From 1932 on, IPO became drastically thinner – its pages reduced to 
less than twenty for each issue.  Thus the role of Balai Poestaka’s press monitoring 
was basically terminated 
The circumstances around the print world gradually changed in the mid 1920s.  
While discussions about curbing the press mainly focused on how to stamp out 
political discourse, indigenous religious, social, educational, and cultural organizations 
had started to publish their own periodicals, prose works, and school textbooks 
through their own publishing houses.342 
                                                
341 Gouverneur-generaal (De Graeff) aan minister van koloniën (De Graaff), Aug. 17, 1930, in Vb. 14 
okt. 1930 1r. W22, in Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling, pp. 474-481.  See also C. F. Yong, Chinese 
Leadership and Power in Colonial Singapore (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1992), pp. 308-321. 
342 On the development and reorganization of nationalist movement in West Sumatra, which had great 
impacts on the development of the publishing business in Sumatra, see Audrey Kahin, Rebellion to 
Integration, Chapters 2 and 3. 
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Trying to find a way out of the colonial anxiety after the unexpected 
communist uprisings, from September 1927 to March 1928 Ch. O. van der Plas, the 
temporary acting Adviser for Native Affairs, wrote a series of notes on how to deal 
with revolutionary propaganda.  His instruction was to come up with possible 
measures to “neutralize and control” the revolutionary propaganda, and in his long 
memo on this, he proposed a number of measures.343  He made one important 
suggestion with regard to print matters, that is, that the government encourage 
“religious movements and moderate political movements” such as Moehammadijah, 
Nahdlatoel Oelama, Boedi Oetomo, and Taman Siswa, if necessary by giving 
subsidies.  What Van der Plas was proposing was to encourage native religious, social, 
educational, and cultural activities within a framework that was inoffensive to the 
colonial government.  In so far as people talked about matters pertaining to culture, 
education, religion, and society in general, which were generally considered outside 
the realm of politics, authorities were not to intervene.  The role of Balai Poestaka was 
not mentioned at all.  This proposal turned out to secure the survival of publications in 
the 1930s in a major way because it “defined” politically safe field. 
The time when the Dutch avidly listened to the voices of the indigenous 
population was now over.  Persbreidel opened a new era of political suppression, 
which was to stamp out radical political discourse.  On the surface, Indonesian 
nationalists and other political activists were being forced to silence themselves on 
political matters, while engaging in cultural, educational, religious and social 
activities.  As political circumstances concerning people’s voices and print culture 
changed, new kinds of “public opinion” emerged, which the Indies state did not 
                                                
343 “Overzicht van het rapport van Ch. O. van der Plas in voldoening aan Brief 1e 
Gouvernementssecretaris No. 38x Geheim van 29 Augustus 1927” in Mr. 121x/28.  See also 
“Neutralisering en bestrijding van revolutionarire propaganda onder de inheemse bevolking, in het 
bijzonder van Java en Madoera. Rapport van Ch. O. van der Plas, hoofdambtenaar t/b van de adviseur 
voor inlandse zaken, sept. 1927/maart 1928,” in Kwantes, ontwikkeling, II, pp. 700-733.  
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systematically monitor.  Meanwhile, popular literature not only persevered, but also 
broadened its audience.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
BOVEN DIGOEL: PROJECTING A NEW SOCIETY  
 
Because the camps were such tiny spots compared to the modernity at large, 
and reflecting everything, containing everything – the minis of our world – 
they remain so distinct, so sticking out, and so standing in our way wherever 
we try to move.  The camps were built fast, as fast as only few and only the 
most modern cities of our time are built: in a matter of weeks.  (Rudolf 
Mrázek)344 
 
On August 30, 1933, Soekarno, already a prominent Indonesian nationalist and 
leading organizer of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, 
PNI), wrote a “confidential” letter to the Prosecutor General.  Nearly a month earlier 
on August 1 he had been apprehended in Batavia and was confined in the Soekamiskin 
prison in West Java for the second time.  His letter begins: 
 
The purpose of this [letter] is to respectfully request that I be spared – and 
with that also my wife and child and my old mother and father – by releasing 
me from further judicial proceedings or internment.  I address myself to you 
and the Government with the prayer to set me at liberty.  I further promise to 
withdraw from all political activities and live as a quiet citizen to provide for 
my family by practicing as an architect and engineer, a practice I have very 
much neglected on account of my political activities.  I shall never break my 
                                                
344 Rudolf Mrázek, “Boven Digoel and Terezín: Camps at the Time of Triumphant Technology,” East 
Asian Science, Technology and Society: an International Journal. Volume 3, Number 2-3 (2009), p. 
312. 
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promise.  As a guarantee to that may this letter serve its purpose: were I to 
commit breach of promise, do then publish these lines and immediately intern 
me or in one manner or another penalize me.  A breach of promise can only 
harm me: the publication of this letter will surely spell my social death.345 
 
Sukarno’s letter betrays anxiety and despair.  He had just pledged that he would 
withdraw from his political life if the colonial government decided against sending 
him to the internment camp in Boven Digoel.  Years later, his pusillanimous words 
would surprise many Indonesians and historians, as they contradicted the image of a 
young and fiery nationalist activist that Soekarno had built in the course of his 
political life since the middle of the 1920s.  The arrest itself in 1933 was his second 
time, and yet this time was different from the first.  This time Soekamiskin was not 
only a place of temporary confinement; he was waiting for the final decision from the 
Prosecutor General on whether or not he needed to be isolated further from political 
action by exile outside Java.  His fear of being banished to Boven Digoel, the remote 
internment camp for political prisoners of the Dutch Indies located in western New 
Guinea, had led him to beg for the Prosecutor General’s mercy.  It appears that the 
latter was not moved by his plea and decided to exile him anyway.  The place of exile, 
however, was to be the town of Ende on the island of Flores, not Boven Digoel.  The 
rationale was to keep him apart from the communist prisoners who had been sent to 
the latter camp, so that he could not influence them.  The futility of Soekarno’s plea, 
however, is not what concerns us here.  Rather, the point is that Soekarno was so 
terrified of being banished to Digoel that he was willing to give up his political 
                                                
345 Sukarno’s “confidential” letter to the Prosecutor General on August 30, 1933, in secret mail report, 
Mr. 1276/1933, translated by B.B. Hering, From Soekamiskin to Endeh (Centre for Southeast Asian 
Studies, Occasional Paper, No. 1, James Cook University of North Queensland, 1979), p. 154. 
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aspirations and career.  For the purpose of this paper, it can be said that the letter is a 
good example of how Indonesian nationalists had imagined Digoel. 
In the 1930s Indies, Boven Digoel was an “(in)famous” (terkenal) place.346  It 
was also known by another name, Tanah Merah (Red Land), initially because of the 
color of the soil, but later on also because of this title’s association with political 
leftists, or “reds.”  Those who were exiled to Digoel were called “orang buangan” 
(“exiles,” or, literally, “those who are thrown away”).  Established after the 
communist revolts in Java in 1926, Digoel was a colony for those subject to mass 
internal exile.  The colonial government took firm actions to destroy the communist 
mass following, and 13,000 persons were rounded up as suspects in connection with 
the revolts.  More than 5,000 were placed in temporary preventive detention, of which 
4,500 were sentenced to prison after trial.  Those who were considered dangerous, 
particularly key components of the PKI leadership, were penalized severely.  As a 
consequence of the revolts, the government outlawed the PKI and decided to use its 
power of banishment on a massive scale.  It ordered the deportation of 1,308 
individuals, including non-communist political activists and family members who 
desired to accompany the interned spouses and parents.  They were sent to a location 
on the upper reaches of the Digoel River in New Guinea, hence the Dutch name Boven 
Digoel (upper Digoel, hereafter Digoel),347 where no internee would be able to escape 
from the camp. 
Digoel was a place where the internees were supposed to live “away” from 
Indonesia.  It was not exactly a penal colony, nor a concentration camp.  It was 
designed to be a place where “communists” were transplanted from their home 
communities in order to be placed under close surveillance and “re-educated” by the 
                                                
346 Oen Bo Tik, Darah dan Air-Mata di Boven Digoel (Bandoeng: Boelan Poernama, 1931), p. 2. 
347 Rudolf Mrázek, Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell 
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authorities.  Unlike the standard concept and image of the internment camp – a place 
of isolation and oppression – the Digoel project had the typical attributes of colonial 
engineering.  The fact that some internees were allowed to bring family members to 
Digoel suggests that the authorities intended to let the internees have some degree of 
“normal” life there.  In fact, none in Digoel was physically abused or directly 
murdered, as in the German concentration camps.348 
Legally, internees were not “criminal.”  The Penal Code of 153 bis allowed the 
government to isolate the persons who were considered to pose a danger to public 
order without a trial and any charges.  “The Dutch instructions explicitly stated that 
the Boven Digoel internees, locked in, for sure, had the same duties and the same 
privileges (in the camp) as everybody else in the colony.”349  At the same time, 
according to the same Penal Code, they could be put away for an indefinite period of 
time.  “As in the case of the Jews, there was no time set for their release.”350  Thus 
Digoel symbolized indefinite isolation for the “exiles,” and that terrified Indonesians.  
There is no doubt that Digoel was a symbol of political suppression in the 
Indies in the late 1920s and the 1930s.  The colonial government was partially 
responsible for engineering this powerful but complicated representation.  To turn it 
into a symbol, the government allowed Malay language newspapers as well as the 
Dutch language ones to carry reports on Digoel from many aspects that on the one 
hand created an impression of normalcy in the internment camp.  The normalcy was 
fabricated, of course, and maintained through tight supervision by the police.351  On 
the other hand, by virtue of its very existence, Digoel projected a terrifying image and 
message to the Indonesian people.  From reading the newspapers, Indonesians were 
                                                
348 Pluvier, Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling der Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesië in de jaren 1930 
tot 1942, pp. 42-43. 
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made aware of what it meant to be exiled to Digoel, and the Dutch regime relied 
heavily on journalistic reporting to place its Digoel project in the public consciousness 
and thus to deter further political activism.352  This is what we see being reflected in 
Soekarno’s letter, in his intense fear of being banished to Digoel. 
To understand the process of the general public’s conception of Digoel, 
newspaper coverage of the camp deserves our attention here.  The colonial regime 
promoted Digoel in order to intimidate Indonesians, and it did so by relying on 
newspaper reports.  The content of articles on Digoel was, of course, carefully 
controlled.  Coverage on Digoel were of two kinds: the first type carried reporting on 
the life there, while the second one provided personal accounts on what was going on 
there.  Essential for understanding the impact of these reports is an examination of the 
authors as well as how and from whose perspective Digoel was presented.  All of 
these facts were shaped by the process of censorship, which prompts us to ask: What 
kind of censorship was at work with regard to Digoel?  How did this particular 
censorship shape Indonesia’s popular politics?  
 
Censoring Digoel   
Media reports played a vital role in spreading the image of Digoel among 
Indonesian intellectuals.  The latest internment to and release from Digoel were 
frequent topics of news reporting.  Private letters to internees’ families and relatives, 
and personal interviews were also available in the newspapers. 
There were two kinds of newspapers that carried reports on Digoel.  The first 
was Dutch language newspapers.  While colonial officials had the right to access 
colonial (secret) documents for their information on Digoel and on other internment 
camps, Indonesian intellectuals and leaders of the nationalist movement such as 
                                                
352 Shiraishi, “The Phantom World of Digoel,” p. 94. 
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Soekarno relied on Dutch language newspaper reports to stay informed about 
decisions being made by the Dutch authorities.  Some Dutch language newspapers in 
the Indies served as semi-official mouthpieces of the colonial government.353  These 
newspapers regularly covered Digoel, and they even had their own special 
correspondents for Digoel who traveled there to observe and to report.  Such Dutch-
centered discourse shaped the intellectual sphere in Indonesia.  It represented a limited 
and regulated intellectual sphere.  It was limited because only a small number of 
indigenous elite could attend the Dutch-Indigenous Schools (Hollandsche Inlandsche 
Scholen, HIS) and read Dutch newspapers; it was regulated because Dutch was the 
official language of communication for the Indies administration. 
The second type of newspaper coverage that carried reports about Boven 
Digoel was the Malay language press, and to a lesser extent popular Malay-language 
novels.  The Malay newspapers that regularly covered Digoel distinguished 
themselves in three ways:  Those which sought to perceive Digoel mainly as a place 
for criminal elements rather than political prisoners; those that covered only facts; and 
those that carried personal accounts of persons who had experienced living or being 
interned in Digoel.  Since most Malay language newspapers were not allowed to send 
their journalists to Digoel, many had to rely on Dutch language newspapers as the 
source of information on the camp and its development.  They ended up citing and 
translating articles from Dutch newspapers into Malay. 
Popular novels also played an important role in transmitting the image of 
Digoel.  Three or four years after its establishment, Digoel seemed to become a 
fashionable topic for popular novels.  In 1931 the Chinese-Malay literary monthly 
Boelan Poernama (Full Moon) published two different books on Digoel.  This 
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 232 
Bandung-based journal had a circulation of 10,000 copies and was quite popular 
because its contributors included contemporary well-known writers such as Tan Hong 
Boen (pseud.: Im Yang Tjoe and other names), Njoo Cheong Seng (pseud.: Monsieur 
d’Amour), and Lie Tjoei Khia (pseud.: Tjoekat Liang).354  The number of subscribers 
reading Boelan Poernama suggests that its two books on Digoel were likely circulated 
quite widely.  The author of the first book, titled Antara Idoep dan Mati, atawa 
Boeron dari Boven-Digoel (Between Life and Death, or Fugitive from Boven-Digoel), 
was an ex-Digoelist by the name of Wiranta,355 The second book, Darah dan Air-Mata 
di Boven Digoel (Blood and Tears in Boven Digoel), was written by Oen Bo Tik.356  
Wiranta went on to publish another Digoel novel entitled Minggat dari Digoel (Escape 
from Digoel) published by Awas in Soerakarta.357  Another popular literary journal, 
Tjerita Roman based in Malang, also published novels on Digoel: Liem Khing Ho’s 
Merah (Red), which references the communist uprisings in 1926 and 1927 (Tjerita 
Roman, No. 99, March 1937), and Pouw Kioe An’s Api jang Tida Bisa Dibikin Padem 
(Flames That Cannot Be Extinguished) (Tjerita Roman, No. 126, 1939).  Kwee Tek 
Hoay published two novels related to Digoel: Drama di Boven Digoel (Drama in 
Boven Digoel), which was first serialized in the journal Panorama from December 15, 
1929 to January 1, 1932, and then republished by Moestika in Bandoeng from 1938 to 
1941;358 and Penghidoepan Satoe Sri Panggoeng (Life of A Theater Actress, 1931), a 
novel about the communist uprisings in 1926 and 1927.  The Medan-based literary 
circle also published several Digoel novels written by former internees.  They include 
Abd’oelxarim M. S.’s Pandoe Anak Boeangan (Pandoe an Exiled Person) (Medan: 
                                                
354 Salmon, Literature in Malay by the Chinese of Indonesia, p. 408. 
355 Wiranta, Antara Idoep dan Mati atawa Boeron dari Boven-Digoel (Bandoeng: Boelan Poernama, 
No. 30, 1931). 
356 Oen, Darah dan Aer-Mata di Boven Digoel. 
357 The novel is included in Pramoedya Ananta Toer (ed.), Cerita Digul (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer 
Gramedia, 2001), which also has works by Wiranta, Abdoe’lxarim Ms., Turie, and D. E. Manu. 
358 Kwee Tek Hoay, Drama di Boven Digoel (Bandung: Moestika, 1938). 
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Aneka, 1933), D’Nian S. B.’s Ke Boven Digoel Dengan Kekasih (To Boven Digoel 
With My Love) (1939), D. E. Manu Turie’s Roestam Digoelist (Roestam the 
Digoelist) Medan: Tjerdas, 1940), and A. Oesman’s Mata Kerandjang (Wandering 
Eyes) (Medan: Doenia Pengalaman, 1940).359  The titles alone suggest the personal 
nature of the accounts given, which described the hardship and trials experienced by 
Digoel prisoners and which perhaps attracted readers’ interest the most.360  Since 
Digoel was an emerging and sensitive colonial project, during the first years of its 
existence, the colonial regime needed to carefully establish the image it hoped to 
promote.  The press coverage of Digoel was a key medium for this project and even 
while newspapers were allowed to carry articles on Digoel, they were published under 
careful censorship.  Internees were allowed to send out letters, but they had to be 
written in Malay (rather than in Javanese or other regional languages), so they could 
be read by the censoring officers before being forwarded.361  The few Indonesian 
correspondents from Malay language newspapers who successfully gained permit to 
be stationed in Digoel had great difficulties reporting, because “the censorship there 
was too tight” (“censuur disana terlampau … keras!”).362  
 Censorship figures prominently in the story of Boven Digoel in that it 
promoted and controlled the discourse related to the infamous camp.363  Censorship 
regulates who and what is included in or excluded from a particular discourse.  It gives 
legitimacy to a certain discourse by allowing it to circulate in the society.  This aspect 
                                                
359 Wiranta, Abd’oelxarim Ms., Turie, D.E. Manu, Digul (Jakarta, 1997) has Abd’oelxarim M.S.’s 
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dari Digoel,” Sin Jit Po, August 23, 1927. 
362 “Boven Digoel: Orang-orang jang ‘djahat’ memboeat ‘onar’: Orang-orang jang ‘baik’ menjanjikan 
‘Wilhelmus’,” Pewarta Deli, October 12, 1928. 
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of censorship works in a situation where power exerts itself by virtue of the sanctions 
it places over matters of the print and publishing industry.  In the case of Digoel 
coverage, not only journalists but also internees contributed their articles to 
newspapers.  Internees were able to contribute articles only if they passed a pre-
publication censorship review in Digoel.364  Pre-publication censorship was applied to 
all writings from Digoel, including personal correspondence.  It differed from the 
post-publication censorship of journalistic publications, which was then the standard 
procedure in the Indies.  Because of its nature as a government political tool, it was 
important for the Indies regime to make Indonesians familiar with the Digoel project.  
It was also a part of Dutch defensive act to prevent criticism from Europe 
 In sum, Digoel literature was allowed to be written and published by Indies 
Chinese and other writers to promote awareness of Boven Digoel’s existence and what 
life in the camp was like.  The authorities regarded stories from Digoel as political 
lessons for the readers, as they framed a new perception on the indigenous nationalist 
movement, in this case the communist radicals.  In general the political prisoners in 
Digoel were categorized into three: active collaborators, passive collaborators, and 
non-collaborators.  Due to the shortage of labor, they were ironically forced to help 
build and manage their own “prison.”  By participating in the management and control 
of Digoel, the prisoners were to learn the Dutch colonial law and order, and the 
necessity of self-policing.  It was like a miniature colonial “ward.”  In addition to 
Digoel literature, major Malay-language newspapers, both indigenous and Chinese, 
covered “news” on Boven Digoel until the beginning of the 1930s, and therefore 
Boven Digoel or Tanah Merah became a familiar place for the Malay readership.  The 
rationale was that since Boven Digoel represented the proper colonial order and 
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society, the more it was reported and described, the more the general population would 
learn what an ideal colonial society was like. 
Post-publication censorship was introduced under the Ethical Policy.  As noted 
in earlier chapters, journalists and nationalists who wrote extreme and provocative 
articles were penalized with jail time when they violated persdelict (press offense 
articles of the Penal Code).365  Essentially no newspapers were banned or shut down 
before 1931, after which the new administrative measure against newspapers, called 
persbreidelordonnantie, was introduced.366  It is to be noted that most reports on 
Digoel appeared during the transitional years from the Ethical Policy to a more 
suppressive policy.  For the most part the atmosphere was still rather lenient in the 
publishing world. 
Reporting about Digoel also provided the occasion for newspapers to cite each 
other’s articles.  For instance, Pewarta Deli carried an article entitled “Boven Digoel: 
Orang-orang jang ‘djahat’ memboeat ‘onar’” (Boven Digoel: “Unruly” people who 
are causing “trouble”) in its October 12, 1928 edition.367  The article opens with a 
telegram from Den Haag, which referred to articles written by a well-known Dutch 
journalist, Dr. Marcus van Blankenstein.  He was an editor of Nieuwe Rotterdamse 
Courant, which was then a very influential newspaper based in Rotterdam, and had 
several opportunities to visit the Indies including Digoel.  For many political activists 
in Indonesia and the Netherlands, his articles were considered to be a “guidebook ” 
(“penoendjoek djalan”) for information on Digoel.  Meanwhile, the same Pewarta 
Deli’s article cited a report on Digoel by Dr. Broesma, another Dutch journalist, which 
had been published in De Locomotief, a Semarang-based Dutch newspaper, and had 
also been cited by the government news agency, Aneta.  
                                                
365 See Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
366 See Chapters 7 and 9 of this dissertation. 
367 “Boven Digoel: Orang-orang jang ‘djahat’ memboeat ‘onar’,” Pewarta Deli, October 12, 1928. 
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Since Malay language newspapers had difficulties sending their own 
correspondents to Digoel, they needed to rely on Dutch or other European journalists’ 
accounts.  Dutch and European correspondents in general could get permissions to 
visit and stay in Digoel much more easily than indigenous or Chinese ones.  Some 
European journalists even went to Digoel several times.  Yet, they generally toed the 
government line and disseminated official accounts on Digoel, and therefore their 
reports were considered safe.368  A culture of citation, in which various newspapers 
appeared to be reporting on a particular topic but were in fact only citing each other, 
was thus encouraged.  This was another byproduct of censorship. 
Under the Ethical Policy, the vernacular press served as a symbol and means to 
educate the indigenous people; in a different way, the reportage on Digoel was 
supposed to serve the same purpose – a symbol of the “free” press and a means to 
socialize a government project.  One is tempted to ask: How did the authorities 
achieve these objectives?  What exactly was being communicated in those Digoel 
articles? 
 
Reporting on Digoel 
As an internment camp, Digoel was a new construction that had to be carved 
out of the tropical landscape.  The first several years of Digoel were mostly devoted to 
opening up the land and establishing an internment community.  It was the internees 
themselves who provided labor for the project.  For the many among the internees who 
were intellectuals and not used to doing hard manual work and land cultivation, this 
was especially difficult.  The area was malaria-infested, hot and humid, barren, and 
very sparsely populated.  The internees’ neighbors were the Papuan tribes, whose 
                                                
368 These Dutch and European journalists played a significant role to promote the image of Digoel as a 
healthy and ordered political camp among the European audience.  Being a small nation in Europe, the 
positive reporting on Digoel was a way to prevent the criticism from neighbor European nations. 
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rudimentary existence had earned them a stereotyped reputation as  “head-hunters” 
and “cannibals” in the eye of Indonesian readers.369  Three years after Digoel was 
established, in May 1930, the internee population reached its highest point when 1,308 
persons were recorded being interned there.  
During its construction, the Digoel project drew the attention of the general 
public.  It became a kind of theater – the newspaper version of reality show – in that it 
included accounts of internees’ departures from their original community, their   
arduous yet mundane life in Digoel, and their (often unexpected) return home.  The 
whole process was publicized and made open to the public.  The following accounts 
are exemplary. 
 
Departure:370  
In the May 14, 1927, edition of Sin Jit Po, a Soerabaja-based Chinese-Malay 
newspaper, in the “City” section, readers found the following scene of the departure of 
internees who were scheduled to leave for Digoel from Soerabaja.  
In the late afternoon a day earlier, even though it was raining, the Tandjoeng 
Perak seaport was unusually crowded (“terlaloe rame jang loear biasa”).  The 
Rumphius was scheduled to depart for Makassar at five o’clock.  At around four 
o’clock the internees arrived at the port in three buses, escorted by government 
officials.  When the prisoners came out, they and some of the spectators (“penonton”) 
saluted each other.  People recognized the internees because many of them were well-
known branch activists of Soerabaja PKI and had been branded troublemakers 
(“kaoem peroesoeh”) by the authorities.  Among the spectators were family members, 
friends, relatives, and sympathizers of the communist movement.  From out of the 
                                                
369 “Balik di Boven Digoel,” Pewarta Deli, April 19, 1928. 
370 “Ka Digoel,” Sin Jit Po, May 14, 1927. 
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throng, all of a sudden a man sprinted through hollering “Long live communists!” 
(“hidoeplah communist”).  The police seized him at once, and shortly after, the 
prisoners boarded the ship.  There were 41 indigenous persons, 6 ethnic Chinese, as 
well as 11 women and children who accompanied the internees.  On the Rumphius the 
prisoners were closely watched by 10 soldiers who were under the command of a 
Dutch sergeant.  After all internees were on board, the crowd dispersed, as if after a 
show that had just ended.  Excitement and anxiety mingled and lingered in their 
minds; they had no clue if and when they would ever see their family, friends, or 
comrades again.  
 
The internees:  
The names of internees were occasionally reported in newspapers following 
decisions released by the courts.  In the June 13, 1927, edition of Sin Jit Po, we find 
typical article reporting on new Digoel internees that lists nine persons who were 
sentenced to internment in Digoel and includes a short summary of their career as 
activists:371 
 
I. Makki alias I. Mangki, 38 years old, a small scale merchant, the chairperson 
of the Market Union (Passarbond) from the People’s Association (SR) and 
PKI-related Workers Union of Ships and Sea; he was last located in Makassar. 
Noeroet gelar Soetan Radja Endah, 37 years old, a former surveyor of 
Topography service, member of SR, secretary of the Market Union and 
Peasant Union (Sarekat Kaoem Tani), last located in Makassar. 
Pio, 22 years old, a former writing staff at Volkslectuur (Balai Poestaka), a 
designer of Workers Union of Automobile and Electronics (Sarekat Boeroe 
                                                
371 “Orang-orang jang dikirim ka Boven Digoel,” Sin Jit Po, June 13, 1927. 
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Bengkel dan Electrisch), a commissioner of SR and PKI, last located in 
Makassar. 
Pallaloi, 36 years of age, former street guard of dock-works in Makassar, a 
member and propagandist of SR, last located in Maros (South Celebes). 
Abdoel Hamid Daeng Marowa, 28 years old, a former writing staff and 
municipal secretary in Makassar, a member and propagandist of PKI, last 
located in Makassar. 
Moerad, 21 years old, a former intern clerk at the government inspector’s 
office in Maros, a commissioner of SR, treasurer of the Peasant Union, a 
chairperson of Drivers Union (Koetsierbond), a propagandist of PKI, and last 
stationed in Makassar. 
Oedin, 23 years old, a former designer and surveyor of forestry (Boschwezen), 
first secretary of the Peasant Union, the chairperson of International Debating 
Club, propagandist of PKI, last located in Makassar. 
Ishak, 28 years of age, a former student journalist and agent of the Singer 
Corporation, a member of SR, secretary of the Peasant Union, Drivers Union, 
and Market Vendors, and propagandist of PKI, last stationed in Makassar.372 
Mohamad Sjahmin gelar Pandji Nagara, 26 years old, a former journalist of 
the Department of Interior Affairs and of resident office in Telok Betong, but 
later lost his jobs, and chairperson and propagandist of PKI in Menggala, last 
located in Batavia. 
 
                                                
372 Ishak’s experience in Digoel would later be recounted in a novel by his close friend, the well-known 
Chinese author Njoo Cheong Seng.  See Monsieur d’Amour, Taufan Gila: Bung Daeng Mentjari 
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All internees in this listing were between 21 to 38 years old and activists of PKI-
related associations or labor unions, including some former government employees.  
The list makes evident that it was mainly PKI activists who were being banished to 
Digoel.  Ironically however, most of the listed internees in the list were active in 
Makassar, where there were no (communist) revolts in 1926 and 1927 as had been the 
case in West Java and West Sumatra.  Yet the authorities seized all well-known PKI 
activists based on their career and history of activism.373  This suggests how 
threatening the organization was for the Indies government, thus its members were 
treated accordingly by the authorities.  Since non-communists internees were rarely 
reported in newspapers, ultimately it was likely that readers would assume that those 
who were banished to Digoel must have been communist activists and the idea of 
Tanah Merah as the place of “the reds” (kaoem merah) became entrenched 
 
Arrival:  
An account of internee’s arrival was reported in Pewarta Deli on April 19, 
1928.  It was provided through interviews with wives of internees who had just 
returned from Digoel.  The article identified them as the wives of Soerodjojo and 
Mohamad Ashari, who returned to Semarang following the death of their husbands 
from high fever and elephantiasis in Digoel.  The interview itself was conducted in 
Semarang on March 26, 1928.  
According to these two sources, it took two days by ship from Surabaya to 
Makassar, three days from Makassar to Ambon, and then another 6 days from Ambon 
to Digoel. Newly arrived internees were usually assigned lodging at a temporary 
housing called internees’ camp (interneering kamp).  During this temporary 
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accommodation, they were supposed to make friends and help each other build their 
own cottages.  The government gave remuneration to the internees, a fixed sum of ƒ 
6.30 for every two weeks, or ƒ 0.30 per day.  The remuneration however was not paid 
in the form of cash, but in the form of rice and other basic necessities.  This is how 
their new life in Digoel started.374 
 
Daily life:  
Once the internees got used to the life in Digoel, their daily routines went 
relatively smoothly.  According to a letter by one of the first groups of internee, which 
was published in Bendera Islam and cited by Sin Jit Po on August 1, 1927, 375 there 
were six living quarters (“kampoeng”) in the camp; they were labeled kampoeng A, B, 
C, D, E, and F.  Kampoeng A was the center of all kampoengs. 
Their food rations generally consisted of rice, meat jerky, green peas, dried 
salted fish, brown sugar, shallots, salt, and the like.  They received these daily 
necessities from a government cooperative and other shops as part of their 
remuneration.376  By the middle of 1928 there were four shops opened and run by 
those who were not interned. In addition to the government-run cooperative, there 
were two shops run by Chinese from Malang (East Java) and one by an Indonesian 
from Makassar.  The shops usually acquired their materials from Ambon.  The 
residents spent ƒ 0.32 for daily food, while their daily stipend was ƒ 0.72, which was 
increased over the time of their internment.  They cultivated corn, long beans, 
radishes, Chinese cabbage, and other vegetables, but in general it was difficult to grow 
vegetables due to the poor soil.  The living quarters began to take form in the 
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meantime with each quarter consisting of less than one hundred residents.  The 
residents were allowed to elect their representative or “village head.”  
 
Health: 
In terms of residents’ health, Digoel had a big problem.  An interview with an 
editor of Algemeen Indisch Dagblad, published in Sin Jit Po on August 17, 1927, 
addressed the issue of health.377  Many in Digoel suffered malaria because a part of the 
internment camp was located in a swampy area and in general the place was invested 
with mosquito.  By August 1927 a hospital had been built for the residents who took 
quinine on daily basis to ward off malaria.  If a resident had a wife, the government 
provided two mosquito nets.  Those who were with children could get necessary 
medicines from the polyclinic.  Gradually though, Digoel brought a semblance of 
ordinary life to the residents.  According to the editor above, some were said to have 
good hopes (“orang-orang jang tinggal di Boven Digoel ada harepan baek”) and 
professed to enjoy living there (“orang merasa seneng tinggal di Boven Digoel”). 
 
Education: 
The April 17, 1928 editorial of Pewarta Deli described the importance of 
education in Digoel Town (Kota Digoel).  Since many of the internees were 
themselves intellectuals, education was high on their priority list.  Digoel had two 
types of schools; Dutch Indigenous School (Hollandsch Inlandsche School) and 
Indigenous School (Inlandsche School).  The Dutch Indigenous School was 
established by the government, while the other was supported by the internees.378  
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In another edition, dated on September 5, 1928, Pewarta Deli’s “special 
correspondent” (“Speciaal Corr.”) identified the names of teachers who taught at 
schools in Digoel.  Teachers at the Dutch school were Hermawan of Mandailing 
(Tapanoeli, Sumatra), Mhd. Said from Surabaya (East Java) and Mrs. Niti Soemanteri 
of Soekaboemi (West Java).  The Dutch school commission consisted of Soeprodjo 
from Bandoeng (West Java) and Said Ali from Padang (West Sumatra), who were no 
longer counted as internees.  In 1928 two other kinds of schools were established.  
One was the English School (Sekolah Inggeris), designed not only for children but 
also for grown-ups, taught by J. Berani from Tapanoeli (Sumatra).  The other was the 
Islamic School (Sekolah Agama Islam), built by the Digoel Islam Association 
(Vereeniging Islam Digoel).  It taught Islam and Arabic, and the instructors were Dt. 
Batoeah, Mardjoeki, and Raoef from Padang (West Sumatra), Hadji Achmad Chatib 
from Banten (West Java), and Haroenalrasjid and Dasoeki from Soerakarta (Central 
Java).379  The teachers were generally Digoel internees (Digoelisten) who were former 
PKI activists.  In terms of teachers and finance, the English and Islamic schools were 
both self-supporting 
 
Rumors: 
In the early years after Digoel was established, many kinds of rumors 
regarding the internees spread among the Indonesian public.  These rumors 
constructed an image of communists, whose experiences many readers followed 
closely.  Since those who were sent to Digoel were known to be radicals, people 
(especially their fellow communist sympathizers) generally expected them to continue 
their political idealism and resist the authorities in Digoel.  A look at the contradiction 
between some of these rumors and actual reality is instructive.  For example, in their 
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interview with the correspondent of Pewarta Deli, Mrs. Soerodjojo and Mrs. Ashari, 
the two Digoel returnees whose spouses had died at Boven Digoel, refuted two 
specific widely circulating rumors with eyewitness accounts that painted a very 
different picture of the camps residents.  
One rumor had it that several Digoelists had disappeared from the camp, and 
many were inclined to believe that they had tried to escape from Digoel.  This story of 
triumph over Dutch colonial authority was contradicted, however, by the accounts 
given by Mrs. Soerodjojo and Mrs. Ashari, who relayed that the internees in question 
had simply lost their way in the forest while gathering firewood.  When one internee 
from Sumatra actually did try to escape, he hid himself in the forest for more than 
twenty-four hours, but lost his way trying to get out of it.  He managed to return to the 
camp only after he was rescued by indigenous tribesmen who showed him the way. 
Another rumor alleged that a communist had publicly spat on the Governor of 
Ambon when the latter visited Digoel for inspection.  Again the rumor was refuted by 
the returning wives, who noted that what really happened was that a sick internee on 
his way to the hospital at the same time the Governor was visiting accidentally 
vomited on the street.  The Governor himself was nowhere near the scene when this 
event occurred, so no contact between the Governor and the internee ever took place.  
The fact that this non-incident became a subject of conversation and was brought up in 
the newspaper suggests that what happened in Digoel, in the eye of the public, carried 
some significance.380  It appears that some ardent followers of the nationalist activists 
were quietly still hoping that the latter’s defiance was continuing in Digoel. 
 
Returnees:  
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Usually the news coverage about those who were released from Digoel and 
sent back to their hometowns was short, simple and far less significant than news 
coverage on those first being interred.  It carried only their names and their places of 
origin.  It did not provide any detail about the circumstances of their release stating 
only that the given list of people would be returning home because the authorities no 
longer considered them dangerous and were confident that they would abide by the 
law.381  
Early release was usually granted to people who were found to be not involved 
in politics at all.  There were cases of administrative “error,” which were usually 
exposed during discussions by Volksraad every year on problems related to Digoel.  In 
the late 1929 and early 1930, for instance, the Council deliberated on how to repatriate 
innocent internees back to their hometowns.  It had turned out that a number of 
Digoelists had no connection to PKI or other forms of political activism.  These 
individuals had ended up at the internment camp because their investigation had been 
distorted by local indigenous administrators (BB) bent on seizing the opportunity it 
offered to settle personal scores. 
Further investigations revealed that some of the innocent people were exiled to 
Digoel because they had refused to show the deference toward local indigenous 
bureaucrats required by feudal Javanese custom, so the officials had marked them as 
communist.  The government ordered those administrators who were shown to have 
abused their power to write new reports on those internees for whom there was reason 
to believe in their innocence.  After being monitored for one year in Digoel, thirty 
internees were allowed to return home (“boleh dikembalikan kenegerinja”) as free 
men who had been mistakenly imprisoned.382 
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Apolitical Digoel 
By April 1928, an article in Pewarta Deli had described Digoel as the most 
“developed” place in Indonesia “(paling ontwikkeld di Indonesia kita ini”).  Since this 
appeared to be far more true in an educational and political, rather than economic and 
material sense, the term “most enlightened” would probably be a better term for 
describing the Digoel community.  Most of the internees were well educated and 
intelligent (orang pandai) and possessed the ability to write and read with an 
independent mind (kemerdekaan).383  Reading was their most important pastime and 
essentially they could request any books they wanted to read.  They also read Malay 
language newspapers as well as Dutch ones as long as they were not too extreme.384  
Soeara Oemoem, the Soerabaja-based nationalist newspaper led by Dr. Soetomo, was 
one of the most popular newspapers.385 
Digoel was also administratively “developed” from the perspective of colonial 
management.  It showcased an ideal case of colonial self-governance, in which the 
Digoelists attempted to live an ordinary life under circumstances that were decidedly 
abnormal by virtue of, among other things, the lack of political activity as reported in 
newspaper articles or other documents regarding the internees’ life.  The abnormal 
nature of these circumstances is particularly striking when one considers that many 
Digoelists were former activists who were deeply committed to politics and activities 
such as unions and the labor movement.  This abnormal condition had become the new 
“normal” in Digoel.  
The task of creating a sense of normalcy affected the way Digoel was 
governed.  In practice, the authorities introduced two methods of governance.  The 
                                                
383 “Kota Digoel,” Pewarta Deli, April 17, 1928. 
384 “Balik dari Boven Digoel,” Pewarta Deli, April 19, 1928. 
385 “Pembitjaraan dengan seorang ex-Digoelist: Onderwys dan Hygiene, Kesenian dan Sport,” Pewarta 
Deli, March 3, 1938. 
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first was to organize the residents in categories in order to manage their attitudes and 
ways of thinking.  An example of this approach may be found in reports by the Dutch 
journalist Broersma, published on October 12, 1928, which was subsequently cited by 
Aneta.386  Broersma discussed the necessity to separate “good seeds” from “bad” ones 
(perloe diadaken soeatoe perpisahan antara bibit jang baik dan bibit jang djahat).  
Bad internees were those who caused trouble.  For the good ones, Broersma offered 
the example of those who joined in the singing of “Wilhelmus,” the unofficial Dutch 
national anthem,387 on August 31 and who repented for their past mistakes.  Such 
categorization coincided with the government’s own habit of classifying the residents 
according to behavior.  The government announced in the People’s Council in 
November 1928 that the Digoel internees were to be classified into three categories: 
the recalcitrants (de onverzoenlijken), those who complied half-heartedly (de 
halfslachtingen), and those with good intention (de welwillenden).388  Those in the last 
category would be rewarded with repatriation if they showed good behavior while in 
Digoel. 
This categorization affected the education of the internees’ children.  Children 
of werkwillingen, or those who were willing to be governed, could attend the standard 
school (in this case the Dutch Indigenous School), which was subsidized by the 
government.  This school had two teachers who were hired by the government and 80 
pupils.  Its language of instruction was Dutch.  By contrast, the colonial authorities 
provided no school for the children of naturalisten, or those who were not willing to 
                                                
386 “Boven Digoel: Orang-orang jang ‘djahat’ memboeat ‘onar’: Orang-orang jang ‘baik’ menjanjikan 
‘Wilhelmus’: Ataoe Digoel Commissie Perloe!,” Pewarta Deli, October 12, 1928. 
387 The official Dutch national anthem then was “Wien Nedêrlands bloed” (Those in whom Dutch 
blood), which was the national anthem from 1815 to 1932.  But “Het Wilhelmus” was the oldest 
national anthem, remained popular and was played at the investiture of Queen Wilhelmina in 1898.  It 
became the national anthem in 1932 again. 
388 Shiraishi, “The Phantom World of Digoel,” p. 98. 
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cooperate with the authorities.  These residents established their own schools with 
permission from the authorities, and were put under government supervision. 
The other method of governance was to devise solid administrative units.  
Keeping order and harmony at Digoel required the cooperation of the internees 
themselves.  Self-sustaining governance was the ideal form of government.  While 
there were still “revolutionaries” (revolutionair) as the Dutch authorities named who 
refused to cooperate with the authorities, more than a small number of former 
communists had a change of heart and became pseudo government officials.389  In 
kampoeng A, for instance, internees Gondhojoewono worked as the “village 
representative,” Ngadiran as an officer (rechercheur), and Soedibjo as a spy (spion).  
They worked closely with the Dutch controller of Digoel, Monsou, and were often 
invited to his house for social functions.  They even wrote a petition to the Governor-
General pleading that Controller Monsou not be transferred when his term ended.390  
On September 29, 1928, the authorities introduced the neighborhood watch system 
called “the guardian of order and peace” (Rust en orde bewaarder or “R.O.B.”).  The 
guards wore a yellow jacket uniform with necktie and “ROB” badge and had a job that 
consisted of three aspects.  First, they were to make sure that the ban on gatherings, in 
which politics and governmental regulations were discussed, was being observed.  The 
second was to spread propaganda in order to make people more willing to work with 
the government.  The third was to inform the residents of the conditions for their 
repatriation, essentially meaning that they could go home if they followed the rules, in 
addition to petitioning for the Governor-General’s pardon. 
Those who did not cooperate were deemed unrepentant and committed to 
communist ideas.  The most radical ones were placed in a separate location in South 
                                                
389 “Pergaoelan orang boeangan di Boven-Digoel,” Pewarta Deli, July 21, 1930. 
390 “Pergaoelan orang boeangan di Boven-Digoel,” Pewarta Deli, July 24, 1930. 
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Digoel, where living conditions were much worse than in the “developed” North 
Digoel.  These internees were often described as “bad people” (orang djahat) and 
ignorant (bodoh) like the indigenous Papoean tribes, thus implying that they deserved 
to be relocated there.  What was embarrassing for the authorities was the fact that the 
number of “bad people” actually increased over time and almost reached a hundred 
based on the statistics that the government conducted.  How to deal with this 
undesired, as well as unexpected, tendency became a sensitive issue for the authorities 
and those who worked for them. 
“Bad people” and their cohorts were particularly troublesome for the internees 
who became government collaborators.  When Gondhojoewono, the representative of 
kampoeng A, had the opportunity to meet with the Assistant Resident from Ambon, he 
brought up an issue regarding dependents of the internees.  More specifically it 
concerned the practice of sending female residents back to their hometowns.  He said 
that there were some female residents who came to Digoel with the status of wife of a 
communist and after a while took an interest in and learned about communism.  So he 
was not in favor of the idea of sending them home (or allowing them to leave 
whenever they chose to do so), because there was a big possibility that they would 
spread communist ideas among the people back home.391  As a reformed communist, 
Gondhojoewono showed that he was concerned with containing the influence of 
communism not only in Digoel, but beyond.  The Assistant Resident, however, replied 
somewhat indifferently, saying that it was the government policy to allow female 
residents who had chosen to come with their husband or father to leave on their own 
accord, with only one condition that they would not be allowed to return to Digoel.  
                                                
391 Gondhojoewono’s expression deserves an attention because he used the phrase of “return to 
Indonesia” (poelang ke Indonesia).  It implies that Digoel was considered out of Indonesia as if it was 
an independent colony.  This way of understanding Digoel was different from the one that colonial 
authorities and European journalists had, which treated Digoel as a part and a model of colonial 
Indonesia. 
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The Assistant Resident’s response suggests that at this point the Indies government 
was no longer very concerned about the spread of communism in Java (Indonesia).  
Communism, which had been a major threat to the colonial government, had now 
become an insignificant problem confined to Digoel.  
Those who took the side of the government were called “rightists” (orang 
“kanan”) by their fellow Digoelists.  In his interview with reporter “F. A.,” published 
in Pewarta Deli on July 21, 1930, Hasanoesi, an internee (seorang geinterneerde) who 
was then hospitalized away from Digoel due to serious illness, provided a list of 
collaborators, some of whom used to be distinguished activists and leaders of PKI-
related organizations, their names often mentioned in newspapers and political 
gatherings, and therefore widely recognizable.  Fourteen collaborators appeared on 
Hasanoesi’s list: 1. Gondhojoewono from Semarang (the representative of Kampoeng 
A), 2. Soeprodjo from Bandoeng, 3. Soekindar from Semarang, 4. H. S. S. Parpatieh 
from Padang, 5. Prapto from Semarang, 6. Ngadiran (the officer) from Malang, 7. 
Abdoel Karim from Langsa, 8. Soendag from Ternate, 9. Moeh. Sanoesi from 
Bandoeng, 10. Mardjohan from Semarang, 11. Mochtar Balok from Padang, 12. Niti 
Soemantri from Bandoeng, 13. Ngilman from Bantam, 14. Soediono (the spy) from 
Soerabaja.   In addition to exposing these names, Hasanoesi advised communist 
activists to choose their leaders carefully, so they did not end up with false leaders 
who betrayed their comrades.  These fourteen former communists, he contended, were 
now only seeking their own comfort; their change of heart had contributed to the 
success of the government project in Digoel. 
In the interview Hasanoesi went on to describe three kinds of internees in 
Digoel, his own categories differing from those developed by the government, which I 
described earlier, and derived from his own observations as an internee.  For 
Hasanoesi, the first type of internees included those who still believed in communism 
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and in the future independence of Indonesia.  The second was those who try to make 
profit from the situation in Digoel, but by being self-sufficient and working 
independently from the government.  These were the merchants in Digoel.  Finally, 
the third of Hasanoesi’s categories included those who collaborated with the 
government and as such were outright traitors to the people.392 
In reality, once confined at Digoel, former political leaders often had difficulty 
exercising the political skills that they had acquired and developed back home.  A 
good example can be drawn from the following verbal exchange between Mas Marco 
Kartodikromo393 on one side, and the collaborator Gondhojoewono and the Controller 
on the other, which took place at a government organized meeting (vergedering) in 
kampoeng A.394  This account was also provided by correspondent “F. A.” based on 
his interview with Hasanoesi.  
The said meeting was called to inform residents of kampoeng A of the 
government decision, that as of March 1929 the bi-weekly allowance would be 
reduced gradually, until by the end of 1929 when it would be abolished completely.  
Obviously this change in remuneration would significantly affect the internees’ life.  
Gondhojoewono first took the stage and remarked that Digoel was now developed 
because the officials had done a good job.  He also pointed out that the living 
standards of its residents had become adequate, which in effect justified the reduction 
of allowance from the government.  He then advised the gathering that if they wished 
to earn more money, they could work for the government or at the local agencies.  He 
                                                
392 “Pergaoelan orang boeangan di Boven-Digoel,” Pewarta Deli, July 25, 1930. 
393 Marco had been interned to Digoel since 1927; he was one of the most prominent contemporary 
Indonesian nationalists.  He contributed articles for Malay language newspapers about daily life and 
problems that internees confronted in Digoel. Pewarta Deli, a Medan based nationalistic newspaper, 
carried his serial story (feuilleton) from 1927/1928 and 1931.  The form of serial story deserves an 
attention because it was considered to be entertainment reading.  Seven decades later, a portion of the 
series was published in a book form, as, Pergaulan Orang Buangan di Boven Digoel (Social Life of 
Exiles in Boven Digoel) (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Popular Gramedia, 2002), covering the 51 series 
originally issued in 1931, but excluding those from earlier years.  Marco died in 1932 from malaria. 
394 “Pergaoelan orang boeangan di Boven-Digoel,” Pewarta Deli, July 24, 1930. 
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went on to say that those who objected to government policies should address their 
objections to the Controller in Digoel, and that it was unnecessary to write letters to 
the Governor-General, to the People’s Council, to the Governor of Ambon, or to the 
Parliament (Tweede Kamar) in the Netherlands. 
Towards the end of the meeting, when the question and answer time came,, 
Mas Marco stood up and raised questions.  His questions were rather sensitive and 
drew attention from the gathering, as people knew him as a crafty political activist. 
 
Marco: Gentlemen, I don’t have to argue with what the village representative 
has said; as the Dutch proverb says: A person with a sharp mind only needs 
half the words.  We read the newspapers and people know what’s written 
about the situation here.  I am saying this because I need to ask the Controller 
about something that concerns myself and the plan to suspend the allowance 
(onderstand) in the future. 
 If our allowance were going to be suspended, I am asking the 
Controller that when I send letters to my family in Java to ask for monetary 
assistance to support my living here to make up for the suspension of our 
allowance, my letter be dispatched by the censor office (censuur), because it 
has happened in the past (in December 1927) that when the allowance was 
going to be suspended too, a number of people who wrote about it in their 
letters later found that their letters were being returned by the censor (the 
Wedono [a native regional administrator]).  I have also sent a letter to Java 
using the registered service (aangetekend) (in October 1928) but to this day I 
have never received a receipt.  I have no way of knowing if the letter has 
really been sent or not, and who is at fault in this case: the censor or the post 
office? 
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Gondhojoewono: Regarding that matter, Mr. Marco, you can complain 
directly to the Controller, and there’s no need to bring it up here, because it 
has nothing to do with the discussion on the allowance. 
Marco: My question is actually related to the allowance.  Moreover, as 
residents of this village are here, I have to raise the subject here, because it 
was not only my letter that was returned, but also others’. 
Controller [interjecting]: Was that the letter to Ir. Soekarno? 
Marco: Yes. 
Controller: Was that the letter in the Javanese language and script at the time 
when the Wedono had already left? 
Marco: No, the Wedono was still here. 
Gondhojoewono became irritated: Your words, Mr. Marco, are trying to 
influence the people who are present here and manipulate them into blaming 
the government. 
Marco: No, I am not trying to manipulate [anyone]. 
Gondhojoewono pounded the table to silence Marco, to stop his words. 
Controller: Don’t act up here! 
Marco: I am not acting up. 
Controller: Shut up! 
Aspirant Controller interjected: Shut up! 
At once Marco left the gathering.395 
                                                
395    Marco: Toean toean, saja tidak perloe membantah apa jang dikatakan oleh wakil kampoeng;  
peri bahasa Belanda soedah berkata: een goed verstaander heft maar een half word noodig 
(Seorang jang tajam pikirannja soedah tjoekoep dengan separoh perkataan sadja).  Kita orang 
telah membatja Koran Koran dan orang mengetahoei apa jang tertoelis tentang keadaan disini.  
Saja berkata ini perloe bertanja kepada Controleur dan meloeloe oentoek keperloean saja 
sendiri jang berhoeboneg dengan tjaboetan onderstand jang akan dating.  
Kalau onderstand kita itoe mesti ditjaboet, saja minta kepada Controleur, bila saja 
kirim soerat ketanah Djawa kepada familie kami disana boeat minta bantoean oeang boeat 
hidoep karena onderstand telah ditjaboet, soepaja soerat kami dilangsoengkan oleh censuur, 
sebab doeloe (dalam boelan December 1927) ketika onderstand hendak ditjaboet katanja, kita 
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The issue of the suspension of allowance revealed the difficult living situation in 
Digoel, despite the government campaign to portray it as a developed and well-
governed community.  Marco had used the occasion presented by the discussion about 
the matter to bring up the issue of government censorship of letters that the internees 
had tried to send to their families or associates.  It was known that all letters were 
subject to censoring, but Marco’s veiled criticism of this regime had put the local 
officials on the defensive.  The Controller however did not hesitate to acknowledge 
that he was aware of Marco’s letter to Soekarno, leader of the Indonesian nationalist 
movement.  The content of the letter was not disclosed, but it is safe to assume that it 
carried some political significance.  In addition, the letter had been written in the 
Javanese language and script, which not only violated the rule that all letters had to be 
written in the Malay language, but naturally invited suspicion.  The Controller could 
sense that Marco’s questions might have political intent and therefore he quickly 
                                                                                                                                       
orang tidak boleh kirim soerat jang menjeboetkan tjaboetan onderstand, sedang orang orang 
jang telah terlandjoer kirim soerat tentang hal itoe, soeratnja dikembalikan oleh censuur 
(Wedono).  Dan djoega kami kirim soerat ketanah Djawa dengan aangeteekend (boelan 
October 1928) sampai sekarang tidak ada recunja.  Kami tidak tahoe apakah itoe soerat 
dilangsoengkan atau tidak dan djoega tidak mengetahoei kesalahan siapakah hal ini: censuur 
atau post? 
Gondho: Hal itoe toean Marco bias tanja sendirian kepada Controleur, tidak perloe ditanjakan 
disini, karena hal itoe tidakberhoeboengan dengan onderstand ini. 
Marco: Pertanjaan kami ini memang berhoeboeng dengan onderstand jg. dibijtarakan.  Lagi 
poela kami sebagai pendoedoek kampoeng ini, perloe hal terseboet kami tanjakan disini, 
karena tidak soerat saja sadja jang dikombalikan, tetapi lain orang poen begitoe djoega. 
Controleur: Apakah itoe soerat kepada Ir. Soekarno? 
Marco: Ja. 
Controleur: Itoe soerat bahasa dan hoeroef Djawa itoe waktoe Wedono soedah pergi? 
Marco: Tidak, Wedono masih disini. 
Gondho mendjadi marah: Perkataan toean Marco ternjata masoekkan pengaroeh kepada orang-
orang jang berhadhir dan mengasoet soepaja orang menjalahkan bestuur disini. 
Marco: Tidak: saja tidak mengaroet. 
Gondho mengetok medja soepaja toean Marco diam, tidak meneroeskan perkataanja. 
Controleur: Disini djangan koerang adjar! 
Marco: Saja tidak koerang adjar. 
Controleur: Diam! 
Asp. Controleur toeroet tjampoer: Diam! 
Marco teroes meninggalkan itoe verg.  
The citation is taken from “Pergaloeran orang boeangan di Boven-Digoel,” Pewarta Deli, Juli 24, 1930. 
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became agitated.  The village representative, the Controller, and the Aspirant 
Controller then silenced Marco so that the gathering would not be influenced. 
The exchange between Marco and the authorities reveal the “truth” about 
Digoel and the kind of political environment that internees faced and to which they 
had to adjust.  Essentially no actual dialogue between Marco and the Controller 
occurred. Rather the communication was one-way as the authorities refused to engage 
in Marco’s query, cut him off summarily, and enjoyed the last word.  When his 
objection was dismissed, Marco offered no further argument and left the meeting.  
Readers no longer see the same intensity in Marco that they had seen in his 
electrifying political speeches and activism on Java.  It is possible members of the 
Indies public reading about this exchange in Pewarta Deli would find themselves 
disappointed to see that a political firebrand like Marco had not only been banished 
from their midst, but effectively silenced.  Furthermore, they would have seen that his 
resistance had been effectively discouraged by the threat of escalating punishment.  
While Marco had been allowed to first express his opinion as part of the discussion, he 
clearly stayed shy of crossing the limits set by authorities which, once trespassed, 
would have provided grounds for banishment to Tanah Tinggi, the final destination for 
the recalcitrant. 
The interview in Pewarta Deli’s article does not mention how attendees of the 
gathering reacted to the exchanges between Marco and the officials.  But the absence 
of such account suggests that there was no further demonstration of defiance worthy of 
mention.  Their attitude was very different from the spirited crowd who gathered at the 
seaport in Soerabaja in May 1927 to see them off.  The spectators at the port came at 
their own will to show their moral support for the “heroes.”  They were still optimistic 
about political activism (pergerakan) and the future of Indonesia.  The formal 
gathering in Digoel consisted of former communist activists, Marco’s comrades, yet 
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they did not speak up with him.  They might still be supportive of his ideals, but their 
silence suggests that they had been transformed; they had become “good” citizens of 
Digoel.  Their attitude was similar to another kind of spectators – the newspaper 
readers.  The Digoel project had produced a passive audience who did not participate 
in actual gatherings and only imagined the political stage through print words.  The 
last two types of audience represented the demobilized popular politics that would 
emerge in the 1930s. 
It is important to note, however, that although Marco’s words were silenced by 
the authorities, the readers were able to follow his noncompliance through the 
newspapers.  In this way a kind of communication between readers and activists was 
established.  Mobilization politics were no longer feasible, but print media could 
transmit political ideas as well as be the site of activism.  Under the “normalcy” being 
created by the government, a new form of politics was about to emerge in colonial 
Indonesia.  In the 1930s, the politics of print words came to shape popular politics.396  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the political aspect of the Digoel project, and, more 
specifically, the hidden messages the colonial regime was able to broadcast via news 
coverage of the camp, intended to depoliticize political activism.  Informing the public 
about the lives of internees in Digoel did not necessarily “scare” Indonesians, although 
political activists may have perceived a different message.  Many readers were rather 
eager to follow the accounts on Digoel.  Colonial authorities had some specific 
motives in promoting the Digoel project through the news media.  Readers of Malay 
language newspapers became familiar with the “normalcy” in Digoel because the 
ordinary daily lives of the internees, who after all were supposed to be banished from 
                                                
396 See Chapter 8 of this dissertation. 
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the public’s view, were frequently reported on and their intimate details disclosed.  
Readers were able to follow the expansion and development of Digoel, perhaps even 
more closely than they did the developments occurring in their own immediate 
communities.  The internment camp had become a popular topic for consumers of the 
print media.  
The development of Boven Digoel as a major colonial project was 
phenomenal.  The number of internees increased rapidly in the first three years after it 
was established, reaching 1308 people in May 1930,397 but thereafter declined rather 
drastically.  In January 1931 the number of residents was 1178; in January 1932 this 
number had decreased to 793 and then by January 1933 to 553.  In January 1934 there 
were only 440 residents in the camp, less than one third the number that had been 
present at the camp’s highest point.398  Back in 1928 Dr. Soetomo, a prominent 
nationalist leader who would establish the Association of Indonesian Nation 
(Persatoean Bangsa Indonesia, PBI) in 1930, had made a projection that the more 
people being sent to Digoel, the stronger the movement would be (“Semakin banjak 
orang jang dikirim ke Digoel, pergerakan semakin tambah-tambah koeat”).399  In 
reality however, this turned out to be not the case, because after a while, the 
communist movement lost its steam.  When this happened, newspapers also seemed to 
have lost their appetite for covering Digoel.400  The declining number of internees and 
news reports, however, was of no importance to the overall impact of the Digoel 
                                                
397 “Rapport van het lid van de raad van Nederlandsch-Indië, W. P. Hillen, over de interneringskampen 
aan de Boven-Digoel, 22 juli 1930,” in R. C. Kwantes (ed.), De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische 
Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië; derde stuk 1928-Aug. 1933 (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1981), 
p. 463. 
398 “Nota van de afdeling Kabinet van het department van kolonien, 15 okt. 1937,” in R. C. Kwantes 
(ed.), De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië: Aug. 1933-1942 
(Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1982), pp. 468-469. 
399 “Meskipoen “diperboeat” satoe Boven Digoel: Politiek mesti ada ditengah-tengah pergaoelan ra’iat,” 
Pewarta Deli, September 12, 1928. 
400 Sin Jit Po, for instance, covered Digoel for twenty one times in 1927, while it carried only two 
articles in 1930. 
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project.  It was in the first several years that mass publications on the internment camp 
mattered helped achieve the project’s success.  As newspapers reported intensively on 
Digoel between the years 1927 and 1930 they were pivotal in helping frame the image 
of and discourse on this artificial community. 
The political aim of journalistic representations of the Digoel project was to 
educate the general public.  While reports on Digoel served as a deterrent for potential 
firebrands out there, they also show-cased the camp as a good model of a well-
governed and self-sustained community that the rest of the Dutch Indies colony could 
learn from.  Finally, it was also designed as a place of no return for political offenders.  
The ideal colonial project operated on principles of tight surveillance as well as 
betrayal and mutual scrutiny.  
No mobilization politics was allowed to emerge in Digoel as well as in 
Indonesia in the 1930s.  The message was clearly understood by activists and general 
readers alike.  Soekarno himself got the message, and therefore took the risk of writing 
a letter asking for clemency from the Prosecutor General, placing his reputation at 
stake.  He understood that political activity had consequences; that as far as he obeyed 
the colonial law and order, and behaved like a “good” (baik) citizen he would not be 
considered dangerous.  Soekarno tried to save himself from being sent to Digoel by 
promising that he would quit political life.  The fear of permanent exile in Soekarno’s 
mind altered his political will.  The Digoel project successfully compromised his 
idealism and activism, and the “scary” image of Digoel was firmly entrenched. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
PERSBREIDEL AND NATIONALIST POLITICS  
 
The new decade – the 1930s – began with anxiety for the Indies state; anxiety 
that political activism might grow in uncontrollable ways and that the wave of the 
Great Depression would have unpredictable effects on colonial management.  In terms 
of censorship, the new decade opened with an administrative measure – persbreidel – 
against journalists and especially the publishing business.  Again, its main justification 
was to maintain public law and order.  This emphasis on public law and order more 
than ever posed particular challenges for print culture in the 1930s.  
Scholarship remembers the 1930s Indies as the period when political activities 
by Indonesian nationalists were suppressed by the state and controlled by the secret 
police as well.  By 1934 Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir and many other 
prominent Indonesian nationalists had been exiled to remote islands, while their “non-
cooperative” movement was crushed.401  Freedom of expression and freedom of 
association were severely restricted, and the Indies state finally became “a police 
state” in the 1930s.402  In the latter half of the 1930s the “whole country went into 
exile,” as Rudolf Mrázek puts it,403 and the people came to believe that the nationalist 
movement was a “taboo.”404  Thus at this point the Indies state faced diminishing 
challenges from political activists.  The quelling of the nationalist movement 
                                                
401 Harry J. Benda, Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia: Collected Journal Articles of Harry J. 
Benda (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1972), pp. 237-238. 
402 Mrázek, Sjahrir, p. 155. 
403 Mrázek, Sjahrir, p. 154. 
404 Pluvier, Overzichten van de Ontwikkeling der Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesië in de Jaren 
1930 to 1942, p. 42. 
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intensified the image of the repressive, strong, and efficient colonial state, which 
corresponded with the appearance of political tranquility in the colony.405   
All of this became possible following a “political-administrative revolution”406 
that had taken place in the Indies state since the nineteenth century.  With the changes 
that this revolution brought about, the strength and autonomy of the state were 
guaranteed by a new infrastructural power that may be defined as the “institutional 
capacity of a central state […] to penetrate its territories and logistically implement 
decisions.”407  From the perspective of infrastructural power408 the Indies state seemed 
to have achieved all three levels of power: It established an efficient and capable 
central state, secured its territory, and achieved a stable social order.  Hence it became 
what scholars call a “beambtenstaat” (bureaucratic state), or a state with a thorough 
and efficient bureaucratic machine.409 
The image of this repressive period of the Indies state has been associated with 
the lack of “free speech and expression” under the colonial power.  Describing the late 
colonial state after Indonesia gained its sovereignty, Yale University professor of 
anthropology and sociology, Raymond Kennedy,410 wrote in 1946, “The censorship 
laws of the Indies have been almost unbelievable in their repressiveness, and the 
                                                
405 The Indies was not the only repressive and authoritarian state in the early twentieth century, but in 
fact most states were more or less repressive.  For the cases of the US, see Robert Justin Goldstein, 
Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to 1976 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
2001). 
406 Robert Cribb, “Introduction: The Late Colonial State in Indonesia,” in Robert Cribb (ed.), The Late 
Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations of the Netherlands East Indies, 1880-
1942 (Leiden: KITLV, 1994), p. 5. 
407 Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” p. 113.  
408 Soifer, “State Infrastructural Power: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement.” 
409 Harry J. Benda, “The Pattern of Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia,” Journal 
of Asian Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1966), pp. 589-605; Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite; 
Benedict R.O’G. Anderson, “Old State, New Society: Indonesia’s New Order in Comparative Historical 
Perspective,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1983), pp. 477-496. 
410 Kennedy started to establish Southeast Asian Studies at Yale University.  Since 1930 Kennedy 
conducted research on the people and society in the Indies and he served for the Department of State 
during the war period while kept stationing in the Indies and Southeast Asia.  For Kennedy’s career, see 
John F. Embree, “Raymond Kennedy, 1906-1950,” The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1951), 
pp. 170-172. 
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restrictions on free assembly and free speech have been almost as bad.”411  As an 
expert of the Indies/Indonesia, Kennedy noted the stringent and comprehensive 
censorship laws installed by the Indies government to target the indigenous press.  He 
lists seven forms of expression that were prohibited by the Indies government:  
 
1. expressions of sentiments of hatred or contempt for the Government of 
either the Netherlands or the Netherlands East Indies, or for any groups of 
the population of either;  
2. propagation of revolution by inciting disturbance of the peace or assailing a 
public authority;  
3. circulation of articles or pictures which violate the censorship laws for the 
purpose of publicity;  
4. publication of false reports for the purpose of sowing dissension;  
5. publication of secret military or governmental information;  
6. insulting a member of the Royal Family, the Governor-General, the ruler of 
a friendly nation, or the representative of a friendly nation accredited to the 
Netherlands Government;  
7. insulting any public institution or private person in the Netherlands or the 
Netherlands East Indies.412   
 
As Kennedy observes, in their aggressive application by the Indies colonial state, these 
rules profoundly affected the Indies print culture.  He went on to remark that 
“violation of any of these rules brought warnings, and then, if repeated, suspension of 
the offending publication.  After two suspensions, additional offenses might be 
                                                
411 Kennedy, “Dutch Plan for the Indies,” p. 101. 
412 Raymond Kennedy, “Indonesian Politics and Parties,” Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 14, No. 10 (May 23, 
1945), p. 131. 
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penalized at the discretion of the court, even to the extent of prohibiting the publishing 
concern and all individuals involved in it from ever again conducting journalistic 
activities in the Indies.”413  To a certain extent, Kennedy was right that the Indies state 
conducted repressive press policy in the 1930s.  But he had confused persbreidel and 
persdelict (press offence articles of Penal Code), and overlooked the fact that 
persbreidel targeted not only the indigenous press but also the Dutch and especially 
(Indies) Chinese press.  Kennedy’s misinterpretation and overemphasis on the 
suppressive aspect of Dutch colonial censorship has led to the general impression that 
Indies censorship was especially authoritarian.  His focus on suppressive censorship 
obscured for his readers a clearer view and deeper understanding of how the Indies 
state actually applied persbreidel.  
The conventional wisdom exemplified in Kennedy’s work treats persbreidel as 
another symbol of the suppression of free press.  In turn, the most frequently cited 
work reflecting this view was J. M. Pluvier’s Overzichten van de Ontwikkeling der 
Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesië (“Overviews of the Development of 
Nationalistic Movement in Indonesia”) published in 1953.  This review notes that up 
until 1936 twenty-seven Indonesian nationalistic newspapers were temporarily shut 
down on account of persbreidel.414  Although Pluvier did not specify his source for 
this number, it was actually based on an account published in 1936 by a prominent 
Indonesian journalist, Saëroen.415  A closer look at the data reveals that even Saëroen 
did not know the exact number of cases.   
 
 
                                                
413 Kennedy, “Indonesian Politics and Parties,” p. 131. 
414 Pluvier, Overzichten van de Ontwikkeling der Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesië, p. 165.  
415 Saëroen, Dibelakang Lajar Journalistiek Indonesia (Batavia-Centrum: Drukkerij Olt & Co., 1936), 
pp. 93-94. 
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Table 7-1: Numbers of Persbreidel, 1932-1940 
Year 1st phase416 2nd phase 
1932 1 0 
1933 6 2 
1934 16 1 
1935 3 0 
1936 8 3 
1937 3 3 
1938 13 6 
1939 7 6 
1940 2 5 
Total 59 26 
[My own counting from the Mailrapporten.] 
 
My own examination of secret colonial documents of the time suggests that 
there were thirty-seven cases of persbreidel up until the last case that Saëroen tallied 
in his book.  If counting includes the latter half of the 1930s, the number of newspaper 
closures in the Indies exceeded eighty.  This jump in number may be attributed to the 
fact that other newspapers – including Chinese and Dutch press publications – in 
addition to Indonesian nationalistic ones became the victims of persbreidel.  This fact 
suggests that the policy priority concerning persbreidel had changed in the course of 
the 1930s. 
In order to understand the political implications of this development, 
persbreidel needs to be examined in the context of wider political trends in the 1930s 
Indies.  Unlike persdelict, which targeted individual journalists and involved a trial 
process at the district level, persbreidel relied on administrative coordination from the 
district level up to the Governor-General, and this administrative judgment dealt with 
newspaper agencies in place of court trials.  Because persbreidel was an 
                                                
416 Persbreidel action was usually applied in two phases; the first phase could shut down the publisher 
up to eight days, while the second phase could suspend it up to one year. 
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administrative measure, it was subject to the policy priorities of the colonial state, 
which changed over the time depending on political and social circumstances.  Hence 
persbreidel worked in the manner of preventive surveillance (preventief toezicht)417 
against newspapers and periodicals in the 1930s. 
 
Persbreidel 
 In September 1931, the Press Curbing Ordinance, known as persbreidel, was 
introduced.418  This ordinance, ushered in by Governor-General De Graeff on 7 
September 1931, was put into effect by Governor-General Bonifacius Cornelis de 
Jonge, who succeeded De Graeff five days after its enactment.  The core of this new 
press law rested on the power of the Governor-General to temporarily proscribe the 
publication of a newspaper or periodical on the grounds of maintaining public order.  
It was evidently meant to be an instrument of intimidation against the emerging 
nationalist press, allotting much arbitrary power in the hands of the Governor-General.  
Articles of the persbreidel ordinance read: 
 
Article 1 
(1) If in his opinion it is necessary for the sake of maintaining public security, 
after consultation with the Council of the Netherlands Indies, with one legal 
decision the Governor-General can forbid the issuance of a particular 
publication for a period of time.   
(2) This decision then by (or by the order of) the Prosecutor General shall be 
notified to the publisher and printer, and also to person(s) under the editorship 
                                                
417 Mr. 604x/34. 
418 The official name of the ordinance was “Bescherning van de openbare order tegen ongewenschte 
periodiek verschijnende drukwerken, Ordonnantie van 7 September 1931, Staatsblad 1931, no. 394” 
(Ordinance of the Governor-General dated 7 September 1931, To protect public order against the 
publishing of undesirable periodicals, State Decree 1931, no. 394).  
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of the suspended publication, as long as the name and place of residence of 
this person is known. 
(3) If this act of maintaining public security by the Governor-General is no 
longer necessary, this decision by him, regarding all or part of this particular 
publication, can be rescinded. 
(4) Unless revoked earlier, the decision is valid for one year.  
 
Article 2 
(1) If the above measure does not bring desired results, the Governor-General 
after consultation with the Council of the Netherlands Indies, can prohibit the 
printing, publishing, and distribution of the said publication, for a maximum 
of eight days for daily newspapers and for the duration of three issues in a row 
for magazines. 
(2) The decision instructed by the Governor-General will be announced in the 
Javasche Courant.  The decision is to take affect one day after the 
announcement is published in Javasche Courant.   
(3) When the period of suspension expires and the publisher of the publication 
resumes, a new prohibition can be issued as written in Article 1.  For daily 
newspaper, the second and subsequent suspension(s) shall be for a maximum 
of thirty days in a row.   
 
Article 3 
(1) The prohibition mentioned in Article 2 shall be notified to the Assistant 
Resident in Java and Madoera and to the head of the local administrator in 
other places where the publication is printed. 
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(2) The Assistant Resident or head of the local administration shall 
immediately take steps so that during the period of suspension the proscribed 
publication not be printed, published, or distributed, for which case he has the 
power to confiscate the printing machine and other equipment, and shut the 
shops used for printing with a seal.  He has the authority, if necessary with the 
help of the police, to enter properties that are closed, including houses. 
(3) As much as possible he shall inform those who are implicated, as referred 
to in point No. 2 of Article 1. 
Article 4 
(1) Whoever violates the proscription in Article 2 shall be penalized with 
prison sentence for a maximum of one year.   
(2) The same punishment shall apply to whoever knows of the proscription 
but cooperates or helps compose or manage the proscribed publication.  
(3) Such punishable cases by this article are regarded as crimes. 
 
Article 5 
This ordinance is to take affect on the day after it is announced in Javasche 
Courant (announced on September 11, 1932).419 
 
The major points of the ordinance may be summarized as follows: 
Article 1 empowers the Governor-General to designate certain publications for 
temporary suspension.  If, subsequently, the designated publication soft-pedaled its 
criticism, thereby reducing the threat to public order, the designation could be partly or 
totally revoked.  Otherwise it would remain in force for one year.   
                                                
419 Translated from Saëroen, Dibelakang Lajar Journalistiek Indonesia, pp. 90-91.  See also Staatsblad 
van Nederlandsch-Indië 1931/394. 
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Article 2 authorizes the Governor-General to prohibit the printing, publishing, 
and distribution of designated publications.  In the case of a daily newspaper, the ban 
could remain in force for up to eight days, and for periodicals, for up to three times the 
period between consecutive issues.  A previously banned publication could again be 
banned after resuming publication.  For further offenses, a newspaper could be banned 
for up to thirty consecutive days on each occasion.   
According to Article 3, the decision to ban a publication would be transmitted 
to the head of the local government in the region, where it was printed.  Since 1932 
this official, had to hold the rank of Assistant Resident, at least on the islands of Java 
and Madoera.  The same article allows this official to take immediate measures to 
prevent the printing, publishing and distribution of the publication concerned by 
confiscating the printing presses and other materials used in the production process, 
and closing its premises.  Where necessary, the police were authorized to gain entry 
into barred premises including private houses.   
Article 4 specifies the penalties that would be meted out for violation of the 
ordinance.  Deliberate offenses against Article 2 were punishable by a one-year 
maximum prison term. The same sentence would apply to a person who, aware of the 
ban on a publication, further collaborated in the editing or organization of its contents, 
or its printing.  All these acts were categorized as crimes. 
However, the exact way in which persbreidel would be issued remained 
obscure in the official text of the persbreidel ordinance.  Many journalists and 
Indonesian politicians expressed their worries about persbreidel, wondering to what 
extent it would affect the press.  Initial reactions after the introduction of persbreidel 
came, predictably, from the nationalist camp.  In the January 16, 1932, edition of the 
nationalist-leaning Pewarta Deli of Medan, the special advisor for the Congress of 
Great Indonesia (prae-adviseur Kongres Indonesia Raja), R. Soekardjo 
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Wirjopranoto,420 contributed an article entitled “Press and Persbreidel.”421  Soekardjo 
was a prominent Javanese politician and lawyer.  He acknowledged that he could not 
really explain how persbreidel was exercised, even though he was a member of 
Volksraad, where the proposal of persbreidel was consulted and discussed.  He 
provided an exposition of this new ordinance and tried to explain how it was different 
from the existing one, which was the persdelict.  In this article, Soekardjo also points 
out that, unlike in the Netherlands, Indonesians cannot express their mind freely 
because they are not in a free country.  Even though to write and to express one’s 
thoughts is part of one’s basic rights (hak kodrat), Indonesians live in a cage where 
unjust regulations are installed unjustly.  Since the press is an important medium for 
the expression of the people’s will, spirit, and their (nationalist) movement, he urges 
everyone involved in the press to oppose the Persbreidel Ordinance, as the People’s 
Council had tried to do.  He calls on them to pay no heed to the law and to continue to 
stand behind the people’s movement as they would otherwise do.  In other words, 
Soekardjo was making a case that persbreidel posed a major threat to the press’ ability 
to speak out against the colonial authorities and to political activism in general. 
From Soekardjo’s article, we also learn that the government had introduced 
persbreidel because it was not satisfied with the existing law, handled by courts, 
which generally allowed journalists to go free after paying a fine.  He noted that the 
Indies government had already had a suppressive penal code, represented by the 
infamous articles of 161 bis and 153 bis and ter concerning public order and security.  
In his view, persbreidel added new repressive means to the existing penal code and 
was made even more dangerous by the fact that the Governor-General held the power 
                                                
420 Born on July 5, 1903, in Kesoegihan, Tjilatjap, Central Java, Soekardjo graduated from law school 
in 1923, worked at government courts, and then opened his own law office “Wisnu” in Malang, East 
Java.  He was elected at the People’s Council (Volksraad) in 1931, while established Persatoean Bangsa 
Indonesia (PBI) with Dr. Soetomo. 
421 R. Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, “Pers dan Persbreidelordonnantie,” Pewarta Deli, January 16, 1932. 
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to decide its application.  In other words, the persbreidel ordinance allowed 
government officials to circumvent the court.  For Soekardjo, this sidestepping of the 
court made possible by persbreidel was the crux of the problem – since persbreidel 
operated “outside of the book of laws,” it was especially authoritarian.  It is 
imperative, he contends, that the government allows judges to decide if a newspaper is 
truthful or not, as is the case in the system of persdelict where accusations are allowed 
to be debated in court.  By contrast, he emphasizes, persbreidel provides extrajudicial 
power for the authorities to suppress the press.  The decision to invoke this ordinance, 
he argues, would be largely subjective and shaped by whether or not the authorities 
feel secure (aman) and peace (tenteram).  It is this point – how exactly persbreidel 
would be applied – that Soekardjo emphasizes he cannot explain, because it can be 
invoked in an arbitrary (willekeur) way.  Soekardjo warns that for journalists, 
protecting themselves from the arbitrary application of persbreidel would be the 
biggest challenge.  If politicians like Soekardjo were concerned about the controlling 
aspect of persbreidel, some journalists focused more on the economic effects.  Sin Tit 
Po, a Surabaya-based Chinese-Malay newspaper and organ of the Chinese Indonesian 
Party (Partai Tionghoa Indonesia), gave a slightly different view.  In an article 
entitled “What is the meaning of Press Curbing Ordinance to Journalism,”422 a writer 
pen-named “Sar.”423 contends that the main purpose of the ordinance is essentially to 
interrupt the newspaper’s business and cause financial damage to the paper.  If a paper 
is suspended for a week or so, it would not only lose subscribers, it would also lose 
advertising sponsors, especially the European ones, who would not want to be 
                                                
422 Sar., “Artinja persbreidel boeat Journalistiek,” Sin Tit Po, 14 August 1933. 
423 The author behind the initial “Sar.” appears to be J. D. Syaranamual, who was an editor of Sin Tit Po 
(a colleague of Liem Koen Hian) at the time and later moved to Soeara Oemoem, the organ of the 
Soerabaja-based Party of the Indonesian Nation (Partai Bangsa Indonesia) led by Dr. Soetomo. 
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associated with politically problematic newspapers.  For “Sar.” this is how the 
government kills nonconformist newspapers. 
From “Sar.” and Soekardjo, we get a sense of how journalists and nationalists 
perceived the newly installed persbreidel.  On the one hand they were troubled by its 
extra-judicial nature, and on the other they also paid attention to its economic effects 
on individual newspaper business.  With such double impact, persbreidel exerted great 
pressure on newspapers to perform a kind of self-censorship in order to avoid 
suspension. 
Newspaper reports on persbreidel did not quite expose how the ordinance 
worked.  When it was introduced, the standard process to apply persbreidel had 
already been fixed.  According to the ordinance’s text – that is, on paper – it was up to 
the regional Resident to submit a document to the Prosecutor General, in which he 
provided the name of the periodical and the actual article that was perceived to be 
potentially threatening to public order and peace.  Sometimes, the local secret police 
or the Bureau for East Asian Affairs (Dienst der Oost-Aziatische Zaken) prepared this 
document and reported to the regional Resident.  At this stage, the Resident made a 
recommendation as to the phase of persbreidel that was to be invoked for a given 
periodical as penalty.  After having received this suggestion, the Prosecutor General 
proposed the punishment to the Governor-General.  With the proposal, the Governor-
General then authorized the application of persbreidel against the periodical.  The 
Resident or Assistant Resident of the related region was then informed of the decision.  
This whole process usually took four to five weeks.  According to the way the 
ordinance was written, persbreidel was to involve a fairly careful process of 
investigation that would typically last four to five weeks; in reality, as we shall see, the 
manner in which the ordinance was actually executed in specific cases varied greatly, 
having more to do with the political interests of the state than any interest in proper 
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and consistent application of an administrative measure.  Thus according to the official 
format to be followed for the execution of persbreidel, the regional administrative 
apparatus was to play a central role in identifying local newspapers that were 
threatening to cause instability in the public order through their news coverage or were 
publishing material that was offensive towards other members of the community.  The 
Regional administrative apparatus was also to take an active role in stipulating the 
punishment to be meted out in persbreidel cases.  But as I will describe later, this 
format was altered in the latter half of the 1930s, when persbreidel mainly focused on 
the Chinese press in the Indies.  
The actual process of applying persbreidel was more complicated.  The first 
case of persbreidel was applied just two months after it went into effect and was 
announced in Javansche Courant.  This case involved Warna Warta (News Variety), a 
Chinese-Malay newspaper in Semarang, which formally drew persbreidel charges on 
November 19, 1932.424  The Resident of Semarang stated in a secret document 
addressed to the State Governor of Central Java (No. 530/G.P.Z.) dated September 22, 
1932, that since June 7 of that year, persdelict Warna Warta had been publishing a 
series of articles that could be charged with.  Warna Warta had a history of more than 
thirty years of publication in Semarang and had a great influence on the local Chinese 
community.  The Resident’s report insisted that Warna Warta had carried a series of 
articles on the ongoing conflicts between Japan and China, which he maintained could 
spur an anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese community.  The State Governor 
of Central Java subsequently submitted a proposal to the Prosecutor General on this 
matter on September 29 (no. 1758/68 secret document).   On October 17, the 
Prosecutor General wrote a summary of legal action to the Governor-General (no. 
4872/A.P. secret document), in which he maintained that since inter-racial relations 
                                                
424 Mr. 1161x/32. 
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were generally worsening in the Indies, it was advisable to take a punitive action 
against Warna Warta that would also prevent its reporting from further exacerbating 
the race-relations problem.  The Prosecutor General then decided to apply the first 
instance of persbreidel to Warna Warta.  On the same day the Prosecutor General sent 
a letter to the State Governor of Central Java (no. 4871/A.P.), explaining that even if 
persdelict could be applied in the case of Warna Warta, taking into consideration the 
socio-political situation in the Indies, the troublesome articles could destabilize inter-
racial harmony in the Indies and endanger the public order, therefore persbreidel was 
to be invoked.  On October 31, the Council of the Netherlands Indies (Raad van 
Nederlandsch-Indië) discussed the Prosecutor General’s summary of legal action 
(Commisoriaal no. 4267 to the Council of the Netherlands Indies, secret document, 
dated October 17).  Five days later the Council decided to act on the summary, and on 
November 19 the Governor-General approved the application of persbreidel (no. 
286/A, secret document).  It was the first implementation of persbreidel in the first 
phase, and Warna Warta had to temporarily shut down its operation.  The whole 
process took approximately two months, which showed that in this initial case, the 
authorities took serious consideration in applying persbreidel.   
The application of persbreidel proceeded from the bottom-up of the 
administrative structure.  It was the residents or governors who had the authority to 
propose persbreidel charges and specify the period of suspension of the publisher’s 
business.  The other government administrators involved in the process had only to 
assess whether or not the proposal was adequate.  With the exception of only one case, 
the length of punishment proposed by the resident to the Prosecutor General was never 
reduced.425  In other words, once the governor or resident decided to apply persbreidel 
                                                
425 Mr. 1356x/1935.  This was the case of Pahlawan Moeda, which was shut down temporarily on 
December 18, 1935.  The original proposal insisted on the application of the second phase of 
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to a certain newspaper and its publisher and printer, it was most likely to be approved 
by the higher administrators.  While formally the government had specified a careful 
process of consideration that would take months to complete, in fact, persbreidel 
charges were often rammed through, reflecting their essentially political function.  So 
the key to the question of whether or not persbreidel was applied depended on how the 
governor or resident thought about certain newspaper and its coverage. 
 
Trends of Persbreidel Cases 
During the course of ten years from 1931 to 1940, based on my tally there 
were eighty-five cases of persbreidel reported in the secret colonial documents.  It is 
difficult to confirm the final accuracy of this number because persbreidel cases were 
decided behind closed doors and documentation was kept secret, but the evidence 
shows that persbreidel clearly worked to stifle the press.  
 
Table 7-2: The List of Newspapers charged with Persbreidel 
Date 1st phase 2nd phase Newspaper City 
11/8/1932 X  Warna Warta (M) Semarang 
6/15/1933  X (3 wks) West-Java Courant (D) Batavia 
8/21/1933  X  Persatoean Indonesia <PI> Batavia 
9/21/1933 X  Fikiran Rajat <PPPI> Batavia 
9/21/1933 X  Berdjoang Oentoek Merdeka <*PI> Pekalongan 
10/30/1933  X (30 days) Persatoean Indonesia <PI> Batavia 
11/7/1933 X  Soeara Oemoem <PBI> Soerabaja 
11/21/1933 X  Medan Ra’jat <PMI> Padang 
12/2/1933 X  Pahlawan Moeda <HPII> Fort de Kock 
1/5/1934 X  Pewarta Padang 
1/6/1934 X  Api Madioen 
1/7/1934 (?) X  Proletar <PBKI> Soerabaja 
1/10/1934 X  Sikap Jogjakarta 
1/13/1934 X  Indonesia Raja <PPPI> Batavia 
                                                                                                                                       
persbreidel, which stopped publication for a period of four months.  But for unclear reasons the 
Governor-General decreased it to the first phase. 
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Table 7-2 (Continued) 
2/1934 (?) X  Pelita Padang 
2/2/1934 X  Soeloeh Rakjat <PI> Pangkalpinang 
2/2/1934 X  Garoeda Merapi <IM> Jogjakarta 
2/17/1934 X  Indische Courant (D) Soerabaja 
2/17/1934  X  
Algemeen Handelsblad voor 
Nederlansch-Indië (D) Semarang 
2/17/1934 X  Midden-Java (D) Jogjakarta 
3/14/1934 X  Sipatahoenan (S, Pasoendan) Bandoeng 
7/20/1934 X  Soeara Kalimantan Bandjarmasin 
10/1934 (?) X  
Nieuws van den Dag van Nederlandsch-
Indië  (D) Batavia 
11/9/1934  X (6 days) Pewarta Padang 
12/15/1934 X  Indië -Hou-Zee (D) Batavia 
12/18/1934  X (?)  Pahlawan Moeda <HPII> Fort de Kock 
6/13/1935 X  Oetoesan Indonesia Jogjakarta 
6/13/1935 X  Adil Soerakarta 
12/18/1935 X  Pahlawan Moeda <HPII> Fort de Kock 
1/8/1936 X  Indonesia Berdjoang Soerabaja 
2/4/1936 X  Al-Islaah (M) Bangkalan 
4/17/1936 X  Radio (M) Padang 
5/5/1936 X  Sin Po (M) Batavia 
6/23/1936 X  Indonesia Moeda <IM> Batavia 
7/8/1936  X (3 months) Al-Islaah (M) Bangkalan  
8/27/1936 (?) X  Sumatra Bin Poh (C) Medan 
9/1936 (?) X  Masjarakat Batavia 
10/15/1936  X New China (C) Medan 
10/25/1936 (?) X  Sin Po (C) Batavia 
10/27/1936  X (8 days) Sin Po (M) Batavia 
5/15/1937 (?) X  Thien Sung Yit Po (C) Batavia 
5/19/1937 X  Tay Kong Siang Po (C) Soerabaja 
6/5/1937  X (14 days) (?) Sumatra Bin Poh (C) Medan 
6/19/1937  X (8 days) (?) Thien Sung Yit Po (C) Batavia 
7/1937  X (8 days) (?) Tay Kong Siang Po (C) Soerabaja 
7/1937 (?) X  Soeara Mataram (M) Jogjakarta 
3/19/1938 (?) X  Sinar Selatan (M/J) Semarang 
4/5/1938 X  Het Nationale Weekblad (D) Batavia 
4/5/1938 X  Sin Tit Po (M) Soerabaja 
5/4/1938 (?) X  Soerabaja Post (C) Soerabaja 
6/28/1938 X  Thien Sung Yit Po (C) Batavia 
7/9/1938 X  Sin Po (C) Batavia 
7/9/1938 X  Chiao Sheng Weekly (C) Pontianak 
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Table 7-2 (Continued) 
7/9/1938  X (8 days) Sin Tit Po (M) Soerabaja 
7/14/1938 X  Tay Kong Siang Po (C) Soerabaja 
7/28/1938 X  Keng Po (M) Batavia 
8/6/1938 X  Ta Chung Shih Chieh Weekly (C) Batavia 
8/30/1938  X (8 days) Tay Siang Po (C) Soerabaja 
9/5/1938 X  Shang Pao (C) Soerabaja 
9/17/1938  X (8 days) Tay Kong Siang Po (C) Soerabaja 
10/5/1938 X  Hua Chiao Yit Pao (C) Makassar 
10/9/1938  X (8 days) Sinar Selatan (M) Semarang 
10/13/1938  X (3 wks) Ta Chung Shih Chieh Weekly (C) Batavia 
10/28/1938 X  Sinar Selatan (M/J) Semarang 
11/18/1938  X (3 wks) Het Nationale Weekblad (D) Batavia 
1/21/1939 X  Foto Journal (M) Batavia 
2/7/1939 X  Tohindo Nippo (J) Batavia 
2/24/1939  X (3 wks) Ta Chung Shih Chieh Weekly (C) Batavia 
3/3/1939 X  Hua Chiao Yit Pao (C) Makassar 
3/25/1939 X  Sin Po (M) Batavia 
4/26/1939  X (8 days) Sin Po (C) Batavia 
7/31/1939  X (3 wks) Ta Chung Shih Chieh Weekly (C) Batavia 
9/5/1939  X (?) Tay Kong Siang Po (C) Soerabaja 
9/11/1939 X  Thien Sung Yit Po (C) Batavia 
9/23/1939 X  Sin Po (C) Batavia 
9/30/1939 X  Tohindo Nippo (C) Batavia 
9/30/1939  X (14 days) Hua Chiao Yit Pao (C) Makassar 
11/25/1939  X (14 days) Sin Po (C) Batavia 
2/9/1940  X (6 wks) De Heraut (D) Bandoeng 
3/15/1940  X (8 days) Sin Po (M) Batavia 
3/15/1940  X (8 days) Sin Po (C) Batavia 
3/20/1940  X (8 days) Thien Sung Yit Po (C) Batavia 
3/21/1940  X (3 wks) Tohindo Nippo (C) Batavia 
3/23/1940 X  Pewarta Soerabaja (M) Soerabaja 
4/22/1940 X  Het Nationale Weekblad (D) Batavia     
[Source: Mailrapporten and Verbalen (1932-40) held in the Algemeene Rijsarchief, Den Haag] 
Dates indicate when Governor-General’s decision (besluit van Governor-Generaal) was made. 
Explanatory Remarks:  (14 days) means that a certain correspondent periodical has been ordered to shut 
down for its printing, publication and selling for the period of fourteen days. 
C: Chinese, J: Japanese, M: Malay or Chinese-Malay, D: Dutch, S: Sundanese languages. 
W: Weder toepassing 2de phase 
<> has the name of political party. 
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My examination of these cases reveals six key points about the way that 
persbreidel was applied in the Dutch Indies:  First, persbreidel did not solely target 
Indonesian nationalistic newspapers.  Out of eighty-five cases, it was invoked only 
twenty-seven times against twenty-two nationalistic-oriented newspapers.  
Newspapers representing three other “racial groups” found themselves subject to 
temporary closure due to persbreidel.  Eleven of these cases were against eight Dutch 
newspapers, and six cases were brought against three Japanese-owned newspapers.  
Most importantly, eighteen Chinese newspapers were temporarily shut down a total of 
forty-one times.  That is, nine Chinese newspapers were slapped with persbreidel 
more than twice. 
A second important point to note about persbreidel is that some significant 
changes in the application of this ordinance took place between the first and latter half 
of the 1930s.  In the first half of the 1930s persbreidel was applied largely to major 
radical newspapers in Java and Sumatra, whereas in the latter half of the 1930s 
Batavia and Soerabaja were particularly monitored by the colonial authorities.  After 
1936 cases of persbreidel doubled in number compared to the first four years.  Up to 
1935 there were only twenty-eight cases, while the other fifty-nine cases occurred 
between 1936 and 1940. 
A third feature of persbreidel in the Indies colony was the grouping that may 
be discerned among the Indonesian nationalist and radical newspapers that were the 
main target of the ordinance until 1935.426  These newspapers fell into four major 
categories:  
                                                
426 Here I will list the source of colonial documents are appeared. Mr. 977x/33, 992x/33, 1239x/33, 
1246x/33, 174x/34; Mr. 1321x/33, 1350x/33; Mr. 876x/36; Mr. 66x/34; Mr. 173x/34; Mr. 363x/34; Mr. 
1378x/35, 10x/36, 34x/36; Mr. 1179x/34, 654x/35, 840x/35, 1084x/35; Mr. 1131x/33, 1132x/33; Mr. 
1287x/33, 32x/34; Mr. 29x/34, 1238x/34; Mr. 57x/34; Mr. 606x/36, 686x/36; Mr. 653x/35; Mr. 
1296x/33; Mr. 1400x/33; Mr. 1452/33, 1356x/35; Mr. 110x/36, 613x/36, 661x/36; Mr. 29x/34, 50x/34, 
154x/34; Mr. 206x/35; Mr. 853x/34. 
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(1) Nationalist newspapers: Included in this category were Persatoean 
Indonesia (Indonesian Union, PI), known as the organ of the Indonesian Party (Partai 
Indonesia, PI) led by Soekarno, as well as Berdjoang Oentoek Merdeka (“Fighting for 
Independence,” Pekalongan in East Java) and Soeloeh Rakjat (“People’s Torch,” 
Pangkalpinang in West Sumatra) which were both local organs of the same party.  The 
Soerabaja-based Association of Indonesian Nation (Persatoean Bangsa Indonesia, 
PBI) led by Dr. Soetomo published the daily Soeara Oemoem (“Public’s Voice”), 
while the Batavia-based Association of Indonesian Students (Perhimpoenan Peladjar-
Peladjar Indonesia, PPPI) issued the daily Indonesia Raja (“Great Indonesia”), and 
the organization known as Indonesian National Education (Pendidikan Nasional 
Indonesia, PNI) issued Masjarakat (“Community”).  The category also includes 
Garoeda Merapi (“Merapi Eagle”) by the Mataram chapter of Young Indonesia 
(Indonesia Moeda), Pasoendan’s organ Sipatahoenan, and Soerabaja’s Indonesia 
Berdjoang (“Indonesia Fights”).  
(2) Radical newspapers: Falling into this group were those newspapers that 
generally propagated revolutionary political discourse and made attempts to mobilize 
the mass.  The category includes the Batavia-based youth organization Young 
Indonesia (Indonesia Moeda, IM), which published their main news organ under the 
same name, Indonesia Moeda, while local branches of the organization issued 
Oetoesan Indonesia (“Indonesian Envoy,” Jogjakarta in Central Java), Proletar (“The 
Proletarian” in Soerabaja, East Java), Fikiran Rakjat (“People’s Thoughts” in 
Batavia), Api (“Fire” in Madioen, East Java), and Pewarta (“Messenger” in Padang, 
West Sumatra).   
(3) Islamic-oriented newspapers: Moehammadijah’s branch in Soerakarta, 
Central Java had its organ Adil (“Impartial”), the Padang-based Indonesian Muslim 
Union (Persatoean Moeslim Indonesia) had Medan Ra’jat (“People’s Arena”), and the 
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Association of Islamic Youth (Himpoenan Pemoeda Islam Indonesia) in Padang and 
Fort de Kock, West Sumatra had Pahlawan Moeda (“Young Hero”).  Madoera-based 
Al-Islaah (The Reform) was somewhat later case of persbreidel for this category, 
forced to shut down for three months in 1936 because its editor, led by Moehamad 
Saleh Seaidhi, were repeatedly charged with persdelict. 
 (4) Offensive Presses: These are newspapers which were charged with 
offending the Indies government and were consequently shut down temporarily.  This 
category includes Sikap (“Stance,” Jogjakarta), Pelita (“Lantern,” Padang), and 
Soeara Kalimantan (“Voice of Kalimantan,” Bandjarmasin in South Borneo). 
A fourth important point to note about the history of persbreidel in the Indies 
is that Dutch newspapers were also subject to temporary suspension in the early and 
late 1930s.427  In the first half of the 1930s they included West-Java Courant 
(Batavia), Indische Courant (Soerabaja), Midden-Java (Jogjakarta), Algemeen 
Handelsblad voor Nederlandsch-Indië  (Semarang, Central Java), Nieuws van den 
Dag van Nederlandsch-Indië  (Batavia), and Indië -Hou-Zee (Batavia); in the latter 
half of the 1930s Het Nationale Weekblad (Batavia) and De Heraut (Bandoeng, West 
Java) were likewise victims of persbreidel.  The former cases involved the Zeven 
Provienciën uprising in February 1933, which was a munity due to the pay-cut that 
took place on a Dutch warship.428 As reporting on the uprising became ever more 
extensive and widely read, which could potentially stimulate labor unrest in the Indies, 
it was deemed threatening to public order in the Indies and Indies officials attempted 
                                                
427 Mr. 286x/33, 727x/33; Mr. 257x/34; Mr. 1393x/34; Mr. 1138x/34; Mr. 267x/38; Mr. 1057x/38, 
1084x/38 in Vb. 1-12-38-D39, 35x/39 in Vb. 9-3-39-S8; Mr. 315x/39, 572x/40 in Vb. 27-4-39-J16; Mr. 
109x/40 in Vb. 4-3-40-G14. 
428 On February 4, 1933, a group of ten Indonesian sailors seized the firearms and ammunition on board 
and took over the ship.  Almost all other Indonesian crew members aboard along with some Europeans 
joined the mutiny.  On February 10, an aeroplane dropped a bomb on the ship and the mutiny came to 
an end.  There existed the suggestion that a communist or Indonesian nationalist cell organized the 
munity, while a Dutch historian Blom rejected such view by relating it to the Dutch political debate in 
the parliament concerning how to handle the Indies unstable situation.  J. C. H. Blom, De muiterij op de 
Zeven Provinciën (Bussum: Fiblula-Van Dishoeck, 1975). 
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to contain.  By temporarily suspending the reporting papers, the authorities tried to 
contain the perceived threat.  This particular incident even led to talks of intensifying 
persbreidel and introducing even more severe censorship regulations in the Indies.  
According to this line of reasoning maintaining the public order and tranquility 
(bescherming van den openbare orde) during periods of tension in society (tijden van 
spanning) made thorough containment of anti-governmental campaigns (anti-
gezagscampagnes) a major imperative for the state.429  This argument however failed 
to get enough support and did not, in the end, lead to a more suppressive persbreidel.  
After 1938, the Indies state was mainly concerned with war-related articles in 
Europe.  The Dutch press in the Netherlands paid special attention to the rise of 
Nazism in Germany from the beginning of the 1930s.430  Yet in the Indies, the colonial 
government tried to contain reports on contemporary affairs in Europe, especially 
those related to Nazism.  Het Nationale Weekblad, which had changed its name from 
Indië-Hou-Zee in 1938, was suspended for carrying articles on the political situation in 
the Netherlands.  In the case of De Heraut the incriminating articles that triggered 
persbreidel action dealt with on subjects of war and anti-Nazism in Europe. 
A fifth point about persbreidel concerns the Chinese newspapers, which 
became the most frequent target of persbreidel action in the latter half of the 1930s.  
Here, victims included newspapers in both Chinese and Chinese-Malay languages.  
These newspapers drew persbreidel action for two major reasons: Articles deemed 
offensive to the colonial authorities, as was the case with Warna Warta in Semarang 
and Soerabaja Post in Soerabaja; and articles deemed to be anti-Japanese.  In fact, 
after 1936, the latter became the only cause for temporary suspension of Chinese 
newspapers.  
                                                
429 Mr. 604x/34. 
430 Frank van Vree, De Nederlandse pers en Duitsland 1930-1939: Een studie over de vorming van de 
publieke opinie (Groningen: Historische Uitgeverij Groningen, 1989). 
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Colonial authorities issued two types of colonial secret documents in 
connection with persbreidel action against Chinese newspapers.  The first type of 
document was the usual secret mail report, and the second, known as verbal, was 
comprised of secret mail reports organized under similar topics and affairs as similar 
press curbing cases occurred and were filed together.  The first type in ordinary secret 
mail reports dealt with the individual cases of Sumatra Bin Poh (Medan), New China 
(Medan), Thien Sung Yit Po, Tay Kong Siang Po, Ta Chung Shih Chieh Weekly, Tay 
Siang Po (Soerabaja), Sin Po, Hua Chiao Yit Pao, Radio (Padang), and Soeara 
Mataram (Jogjakarta).431  The second document type for persbreidel against Chinese 
newspapers consisted of three verbaalen in 1938, one in 1939, and two in 1940.  The 
verbaal of May 24, 1938432 involved the case of Sin Tit Po (Soerabaja), the news 
organ of the Indonesian Chinese Party (Partai Tionghoa Indonesia, PTI); the verbaal 
of June 7, 1938433 contained documentation on the cases of Shang Pao (Soerabaja) 
and Tay Kong Sinag Po (Soerabaja); and the verbaal of August 11, 1938434 included 
cases of Thien Sung Yit Po (Batavia), Tay Kong Siang Po, Sin Po (Batavia), Sin Tit 
Po, Keng Po (Batavia), and Chiao Sheng Weekly (Pontianak).  The verbaal of 
February 24, 1939435 documented the case of Foto Journal (Batavia).  The verbaal of 
January 24, 1940436 carried detail on the cases of Sin Po, Thien Sung Yit Po, Tay Kong 
Siang Po, Ta Chung Shih Chieh Weekly (Batavia), and Hua Chiao Yit Pao (Makassar).  
The verbaal of 5 April 1940437 is the last one in the colonial mail reports and dealt 
                                                
431 As appeared in order. Mr. 798x/36, 458x/37, 480x/37, 620x/37; Mr. 1021x/36, 599x/37, 250x/38, 
342x/38, 362x/38; Mr. 385x/37, 551x/37; Mr. 1053x/36, 431x/37, 600x/37, 853x/38; Mr. 890x/38; Mr. 
898x/38, 944x/38; Mr. 797x/38; Mr. 341x/36, 423x/36, 1053x/36, 1056x/36, 1102x/36; Mr. 859x/38, 
921x/38; Mr. 110x/36, 342x/36. 
432 Mr. 577x/38; Mr. 255x/38, 269x/38, 297x/38 in Vb. 24-5-38-F17. 
433 Mr. 400x/38 in Vb. 7-6-38-R18. 
434 Mr. 566x/38, 578x/38, 624x/38, 623x/38, 635x/38, 654x/38, 691x/38, 738x/38 in Vb. 11-8-38-C26. 
435 Mr. 87x/39 in Vb. 24-2-39-B7. 
436 Mr. 721x/38, 231x/39, 237x/39, 332x/39, 446x/39, 740x/39, 803x/39, 951x/39, 1007x/39, 1113x/39, 
1088x/39, 1371x/39 in Vb. 25-1-40-K5. 
437 Mr. 274x/40, 360x/40, 361x/40, 383x/40, 384x/40, 398x/40, 401x/40 in Vb. 5-4-40-M21. 
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with cases of Sin Po, Tohindo Nippo (Batavia), Thien Sung Yit Po, and Pewarta 
Soerabaja (Soerabaja). 
The sixth point to make about persbreidel actions in the Indies concerns the 
Japanese-owned newspapers, represented by Sinar Selatan (“Southern Gleam”) in 
Semarang and Tohindo Nippo (“Indies Daily”) in Batavia, which published Japanese 
as well as Chinese editions.  Sinar Selatan was considered a semi-official Japanese 
periodical in that it promulgated pan-Asianism.  It tried to stir sympathy among the 
indigenous population towards Japan with news coverage and editorializing that was 
anti-Chinese and anti-Western.  The colonial authorities consequently regarded Sinar 
Selatan as a dangerous element of the Indies press that encouraged harmful sentiments 
among ethnic groups in the Indies.438  After having been suspended by persbreidel 
action issued on October 28, 1938, Sinar Selatan discontinued its publication by the 
end of 1938.  Tohindo Nippo also promoted Japan’s pan-Asianism with similar anti-
Chinese and anti-Western tones.  It was suspended several times as a result.439  The 
Chinese weekly of Tohindo Nippo was also charged under the second phase of 
persbreidel, culminating in the weekly’s suspension in April 1940.440 
There is an important chronological dimension to the six features of 
persbreidel that I have outlined above.  Eighty-five cases of persbreidel in the Dutch 
Indies involved forty-nine newspapers, with a number of newspapers falling victim 
more than once.  Execution of persbreidel as an administrative measure, persbreidel 
did not happen haphazardly coincidence. Rather, persbreidel action came about as the 
result of consistent surveillance by the authorities, while different newspapers were 
targeted for different reasons.  A 1933 article in Sin Tit Po informs us that the 
                                                
438 Mr. 185x/37, 222x/38, 225x/38, 247x/38; 687x/38 in Vb. 11-8-38-C26, 893x/38; 957x/38, 976x/38, 
1018x/38 in Vb. 25-1-40-L5, 796x/39, 893x/38. 
439 Mr. 89x/39, 149x/39, 690x/39, 1137x/39, 1321x/39, 1401x/39, 1137x/39, 1321x/39, 1401x/39 all in 
Vb. 25-1-40-L5; Mr. 605x/39, 620x/39, 638x/39. 
440 Mr. 457x/40 in V 10-4-40-R24; Mr. 492x/40 in Vb. 24-4-40-V25. 
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government had prepared a watch-list of newspapers, and that individual papers would 
stay on the list for a year.441  Thus it appears that even before persbreidel was applied 
to individual cases, the authorities already knew which newspapers they had in their 
crosshairs and were waiting simply for a trigger that would set off administrative 
action.  The question then becomes:  What were the criteria used by the authorities to 
single out certain newspapers for persbreidel action?  To answer this, it is necessary to 
consider the wider political context in which persbreidel was applied.   
 
Soekarno, Soetomo, and Permi 
For the first half of the 1930s the Indies state focused its attention primarily on 
two areas – Batavia and West Sumatra – due to nationalistic and religious political 
activism in these regions.  In Batavia the state targeted the secular nationalist parties – 
Sukarno’s Indonesian Party, known in abbreviation as Partindo, and Hatta and 
Sjahrir’s Indonesian National Education (Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, PNI) or the 
New PNI (PNI Baru).  In the case of West Sumatra, two religious-based parties, which 
were founded or revived after 1928, and their leaders posed the biggest threat – Union 
of Indonesian Muslims or Permi (Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia), and the 
Minangkabau branch of the Indonesian Islamic League Party or PSII (Partai Sarikat 
Islam Indonesia).  The colonial state also paid special attention to radical religious 
activities that could potentially turn into a subversive movement. 
Placing the history of persbreidel action against this political context reveals 
the way in which colonial authorities used persbreidel to silence individuals or 
political and religious organizations that were deemed to be a major threat to the state.  
Residents in general kept surveillance over allegedly dangerous political figures and 
organizations, and waited for “the right time” to apply persbreidel.  All of the 
                                                
441 “Sebab Apa “Soeara Oemoem” kena Persberidel?,” Sin Tit Po, June 29, 1933. 
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persbreidel cases against the Indonesian press occurred after Soekarno was arrested 
for the second time in August 1933.   
Soekarno was the most provocative nationalist leader at the time.442  Born on 
June 6, 1901 in Blitar, East Java, he was admitted into a Dutch school and then 
attended a HBS school in Soerabaja in 1916.  In Soerabaja he received room and 
board in the house of boarded at Tjokroaminoto, the leader of SI of Soerabaja and a 
great preacher.  From Tjokroaminoto Soekarno learned the spirit of nationalism and 
political activism.  In 1921 he commenced his studies at the Technical Institute 
(Technische Hogeschool) in Bandoeng.  In 1927 he founded the Indonesian National 
Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI), advocating national emancipation and 
opposition to imperialism and capitalism, which he saw as only undermining the 
wellbeing of the Indonesian people.  Soekarno was arrested in December 1929 and 
sentenced to two years in prison.  Put on trial for sedition in 1930, Soekarno gave his 
eloquent speech in his own defense on December 2, 1930, that was later published as a 
book entitled Indonesia Menggoegat (“Indonesia Accuses”).443  By the time he was 
released, he had become a popular hero and political legend.  In 1932 he established 
the Indonesian Party, Partindo, because PNI had been dissolved in April 1931 while he 
was in prison.  Partindo soon gained thousands of members and supporters, which 
intensified the call for independence.  It was at this moment, in 1933,that Soekarno 
was detained for the second time.  Yet the colonial authorities were unsuccessful at 
suppressing political activism with his arrest and found themselves with growing fear 
                                                
442 For biography Soekarno, see Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian 
Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969); John D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography 
(New York: Praeger, 1972); Bob B. Hering, Soekarno, founding father of Indonesia: a biography 
(Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002). 
443 Its Dutch translation was published in 1931.  Soekarno, Indonesië klaagt aan!: pleitrede voor den 
Landraad te Bandoeng op 2 December 1930 gehouden door Ir. Soekarno (Amsterdam: De 
Arbeiderpers voor het “Fonds Nasional,” 1931).  Soekarno, Indonesia accuses!: Soekarno’s defence 
oration in the political trial of 1930 (Kuala Lumpur, New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
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that the nationalist movement would escalate.  This political atmosphere led to the 
aggressive application of persbreidel against radical vernacular press, resulting in six 
suspensions in 1933 and eleven in 1934.  This political context explains how and why 
it came about that certain vernacular newspapers were penalized with persbreidel.  In 
many of these cases, the administrative action taken did not follow standard procedure 
spelled out in the persbreidel ordinance.  To colonial authorities invoked persbreidel 
based on very quick administrative decisions – rather than on the results of careful 
investigation – that were often not recorded in any accompanying official, albeit secret 
documentation.  A persbreidel case against the Soerabaja-based Soeara Oemoem 
(“Public Voice”) is a notable example of such irregularity.  The newspaper was 
suspended for eight days, from August 16 until 23 due to persbreidel action444 that 
was not reported in any colonial secret documents.   
Soeara Oemoem was the news organ of the Union of Indonesian Nation or 
PBI, whose objective was to improve the social status of the Indonesian people.  It was 
established in 1930 by Dr. Soetomo, one of the pioneers of the nationalist movement.  
Born on July 30, 1888, in Lotjeret, Nganjuk, East Java, Soetomo studied at STOVIA, 
the colonial medical college for natives, in Batavia from 1903 and 1911.445  As a 
student in 1908, he founded Boedi Oetomo, an association generally regarded as the 
earliest nationalist organization.  After graduating from STOVIA in 1911, he worked 
as a government physician in Java and Sumatra for eight years.  Then he went to the 
Netherlands to study medical science from 1919 until 1923, during which he became 
chairman of the Indies (Students) Association (Indische Vereeniging) for the period of 
1921-1922.  Upon his return to the Indies, he established the Indonesian Study Club in 
Soerabaja in 1924, which six years later was converted into a political party, the PBI.  
                                                
444 “Soeara Oemoem” Ditoeteop: Moelai besok pagi sampe tanggal 23 Augustus,” Sin Tit Po, Augustus 
15, 1933. 
445 Savitri Scherer, “Soetomo and Trade Unionism,” Indonesia, No. 24 (October 1977), pp. 27-38. 
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He was not a great orator like his contemporary nationalist Soekarno, but he 
contributed many articles to various publications in the vernacular press, and his wit 
and charm attracted many young Indonesians as well as Chinese and even Japanese 
followers.  Participants of his private meetings enjoyed lively discussions with Dr. 
Soetomo and other attendants.446  Because of his popularity and influence, the colonial 
authorities watched him and his activities closely. 
Several aspects of Soeara Oemoem’s persbreidel underscore the irregularity of 
the case.  To begin, the basis of the charge was the commentary that the newspaper 
made in an article titled “Tinggallah sabar dan tenang” (“Stay patient and calm”) that 
was published in its August 2, 1933 edition.  The article was deemed dangerous 
(berbahaja) because it dealt with Soekarno’s recent arrest.447  But another Soerabaja-
based paper of the vernacular press, Sin Tit Po, was not charged with persbreidel, even 
though it too published articles on Soekarno’s arrest, including one titled “Ir. 
Soekarno Ditanggkep Lagi: Kenapa Diwaktoe Malem!” (“Soekarno Arrested Again: 
Why at Night!”)448 on August 3, 1933 and another, titled “Tentang Penangkepan Ir. 
Soekarno” (“Regarding Soekarno’s Arrest”),449 published on August 4.  Both articles 
reported that Soekarno was arrested because of his provocative speeches at political 
rallies, and that for the arrest, police applied article 153 bis and ter of the Penal Code 
concerning the violation of public order and peace.  The second remarkable aspect of 
this case was the speed with which the decision to invoke persbreidel was made.  The 
decision appeared to have been made in ten days, or only one-fourth of the time 
                                                
446 Interview with Ms Yasuko Hakim in Jakarta on February 17, 1999.  Ms Hakim was born in 
Soerabaja with Japanese father and Javanese mother.  Her father was a friend of Dr. Soetomo and her 
family was often invited to Dr. Soetomo’s second house.  The second floor of her father’s house was a 
hangout for Japanese journalists such as Kaneko, Mominoki, Kozumi, and Kondo, and moreover 
Indonesian journalists often joined nightlong discussions. 
447 “Sebabnja “Soeara Oemoem” Ditoetoep,” Sin Tit Po, August 17, 1933. 
448 “Ir. Soekarno Ditangkep Lagi: Kenapa Diwaktoe Malem!” Sin Tit Po, August 3, 1933. 
449 “Tentang Penangkepan Ir. Soekarno,” Sin Tit Po, August 4, 1933. 
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expected for standard persbreidel procedure.  It was through Javaasche Courant that 
on August 11 Sin Tit Po first learned of the news of the temporary closure of Soeara 
Oemoem.450  Clearly, the authorities were worried about something beyond the 
immediate impact of Soeara Oemoem’s article on Soekarno’s arrest, since many other 
papers of the vernacular press covered Soekarno’s arrest yet did not incur persbreidel 
action.  The obvious reason for the charge against Soeara Oemoem was Dr. Soetomo 
himself.  By taking persbreidel action against the newspaper, the Resident of 
Soerabaja was in effect acting against Soetomo, who was popular and influential 
among Soerabaja’s activists.  Soeara Oemoem had, after all, been on the government’s 
watch-list of newspapers since late June 1933, and could have been charged with 
persbreidel at any time.451  This particular case was the first suspension for Soeara 
Oemoem.  The second incident, this time recorded in a colonial confidential report, 
came three months later on November 7, 1933.  But, unlike many other nationalist 
newspapers, despite these suspensions, Soeara Oemoem did not fold.  Two main 
factors supported the newspaper’s survival.  To begin, Soetomo’s remained an active 
political leader until his death in 1938.  In the late 1935 he established the Great 
Indonesia Party or Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raya) to seek a collaborative 
relationship with the Indies government.  Its members included Soekardjo 
Wirjopranoto, Woeryaningrat, R. Pandji Soeroso, and Soesanto Tirtoprodjo.  
Secondly, Soeara Oemoem had solid financial support from the Indonesian National 
Bank (Bank Nasional Indonesia), which Soetomo had founded in 1930. 
Another example of the colonial authorities’ attempts to contain allegedly 
radical political activities using persbreidel can be found in the secret mail report of 
                                                
450 ““Soeara Oemoem” Ditoetoep: Boeat delapan hari,” Sin Tit Po, August 12, 1933. 
451 This is what Sin Tit Po claims in its article, “Sebab Apa “Soeara Oemoem” kena Persbreidel?,” Sin 
Tit Po, June 29, 1933.  The watch-list appears to include major local newspaper.  In January 1934, a 
Jokjakarta-base daily, Mataram, received the warning for persbreidel, allegedly, due to its articles that 
invoked hatred towards the government.  “Persbreidel di Vorstenlanden?” Sin Tit Po, January 4, 1934. 
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1296x/1933.  This report dealt with the persbreidel case of Medan Ra’jat in Padang, 
which was known as a center of Islamic religious and education-related activism, and 
an epicenter of the communist uprisings in West Sumatra in 1927.  Since the uprising, 
the Indies state kept a close surveillance on movement activities there, which forced 
organizers to adjust their political strategy.  Even so, their radical tendency 
continued.452 
The confidential mail report of No. 1296x of 1933 contained two confidential 
letters with an appendix as well as a copy of Medan Ra’jat, from which one can tell 
how the authorities censored the paper and what kind of expressions were picked up as 
problematic.  Medan Ra’jat was the news organ of Union of Indonesian Muslims or 
Permi, published in Nias Padang.  When the October 1, 1933 issue was published, its 
editor-in-chief, Iljas Yacoub, had been in jail since early September due to articles he 
had published on Permi activities.453 
By the time Medan Ra’jat was temporarily suspended in October 1933, Permi 
was considered to be a radical Muslim as well as nationalist organization by the 
authorities.  It was a direct descendant of the student organizations of the Sumatra 
Thawalib School, many of whose members participated in the Communist-led 
activities of the early 1920s.  With emphasis on both Islam and nationalism, Permi 
was particularly active in schools, educational associations, youth groups, and in 
publishing newspapers and pamphlets.  It was also associated with trade unions, 
religious organizations, and merchants’ associations.  Suppression of the revolt 
shattered the radical student associations within the schools, but in the early 1930s 
Permi was able to expand its influence in West Sumatra because of its clear anti-Dutch 
and anti-colonial position.  By December 1932, it had about 160 groups throughout 
                                                
452 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration. 
453 Along with Iljas Jacoub, other two Permi leaders, Muchtar Luthfi and Djaluluddin Thaib were exiled 
to Boven Digoel at the end of 1934.  Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, pp. 53-56. 
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West Sumatra, with about 4,700 male and 3,000 female members; at one point the 
total reportedly reached 10,000.  Its activities spread to Bengkulu, South Sumatra, 
Aceh, East Sumatra, and Tapanoeli.454  Newspapers reported that anti-colonial 
political activism led by Permi in West Sumatra and Tapanoeli was growing as well, 
which threatened to induce another rebellion.455  With this perceived threat to the 
colonial state growing, the situation around Permi’s activism was increasingly tense 
by the middle of 1933. 
On October 13, 1933, the Resident of West Sumatra in Padang wrote a 
confidential letter addressed to the Governor-General with a copy to the Prosecutor 
General.  Its title was “proposal to apply persbreidel to Permi’s organ Medan 
Ra’jat.”456  The Resident strongly recommended the application of persbreidel, 
especially Article 1, due to Medan Ra’jat’s revolutionary tendencies and language.  
The letter drew attention to a particularly incriminating article, “Disamping djalan 
National Reconstructie” (“By the Roadside of National Reconstruction”) in the 
newspaper’s October 1, 1933 issue.  A part of the Resident’s letter is as follows: 
 
Brief summary of the article entitled “Disamping Djalan National 
Reconstruction” in the 10-page daily Medan Ra’jat of 1 October 1933 is 
included. 
After a brief history of the “Indonesian” national movement over the 
past 25 years, Medan Ra’jat points out that when the people become 
conscious that if one has the right to self-determination one’s goal can be 
achieved, then they will strive to unlock their “colonial shackles”; the 
                                                
454 Audrey Kahin, “Repression and Regroupment: Religious and Nationalist Organizations in West 
Sumatra in the 1930s,” Indonesia, No. 38 (Oct. 1984), pp. 41-42. 
455 “Apa Sumatra maoe berontak?,” Sin Tit Po, June 7, 1933.  Sin Tit Po received the news from 
Pewarta Deli on June 6, 1933. 
456 Mr. 1296x/33. 
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newspaper adds that when leftist-political organizations in a colonized country 
openly pursue this freedom, the people will accept them with open arms and 
extraordinary interest. 
Is such a goal banned?  Can’t a people seek to obtain their rights?  The 
laws of the Netherlands Indies government give no assurance.  It is very bad 
that the movement, which is based on justice and fairness, is faced with 
obstacles on the road.  The civilized world recognizes that any emancipatory 
movement, based on human wisdom, should be legally recognized, as the 
following words of the former president of America Dr. W. Wilson 
emphasize: “Every people has the right to determine its own destiny.” 
In challenging the accusations launched against the leaders, the article 
points out that the (Indonesian) movement is not a product of the leaders; it is 
merely the manifestation of the feelings and spirit of the people.  So it will not 
take a wrong or dangerous path.  It may play cards, but is not a secret 
organization.  At public as well as closed meetings, it deals with the same 
topics, so the Government can be pleased to note that the movement plays its 
cards openly, and can be easily monitored. 
Because there is a real conflict between there (sana) and here (sini), it 
is no surprise that the white press incites the government and suggests that the 
movement’s throats and hands and feet be chained, until it disappears.  The 
article is not sure if the rigorous measures which the Government has taken 
against the popular movement – with the application of amended Articles a 
and b, in relation to the ban on gatherings, the reactivation of the travel-pass 
system, the house searches and the arrests of Ir. Soekarno and H. Moechter 
Loetfi – is known by the white press, as well the inaccuracy of the intelligence 
reports stating that the popular movement is planning another uprising.  There 
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is no evidence that the leaders are committed to any such action.  The article 
assumes that their arrest was made under “suspicion” or the “presumption that 
the public peace and order will be disturbed.”  It is very concern about what 
kind of punishment they will receive.  There are doubts about the accuracy of 
white press regarding the internment of more leaders. 
After reporting the police’s warning to the board of the PI’s Bandoeng 
branch not to take any political actions.  The paper goes on to say that 
extraordinary measures being taken are widening the political gulf between 
the Government and the people.  Recalling a remark in Pewarta that the “ninik 
and mamak” [adat chiefs]457 in Padang Pandjang might cooperate to eradicate 
the popular movement, the newspaper replies: There is always something 
going on in a colonial society.  
Then the paper points out that inflammatory reports of the Dutch 
extremist nationalists have further troubled atmosphere.  It advises that every 
action against the popular movement be first maturely considered, because 
this movement is rooted in world history, because it is a movement to pursue 
social reform.  No one should think that severe measures administered with an 
iron fist will be able to kill the emerging national spirit; on the contrary, the 
fortitude of the people will improve while their spirit will continue to spark.  
A hero of liberation in British India says: “Who is able to chain a people, if 
their minds do not desire to be chained?” 
Keep in mind that: 
1. The movement arises from the feelings of the masses, who make up 
the society, and not because of the leaders. 
                                                
457 Ninik-mamak is a Minang term for penghulu adat (adat chief).  Adat means custom. 
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2. The blood of the movement flows in the body of the youth, who will 
one day become its soul.  
3. Since world history shows that repression however powerful never 
weakens the popular movement, the paper is fully convinced that the popular 
movement will not die, instead it will persist and bloom, especially if it is 
based on conviction. 
Who will heal the wound in the hearts of the people, resulting from the 
arbitorary actions taken against the movement and its leaders, whom they love 
so much.  As long as the people have leaders who understand how to guide the 
movement, it will not fade away.  But who will be to blame, if the people 
deprived of the leaders snatched from their midst, then take a wrong path? 
Finally, the newspaper says: 
We, men of the movement, precisely at times like this, must strengthen 
our mind and conviction. 
Fear, indolence, weakness, sorrow, sighing and moaning and rashness 
– we must cast aside, so far as we can, because they are all deadly poison to 
our movement. 
Courage and vision we must not let go, because they are very sharp 
weapons in this battle. 
People, you who strongly want freedom, your ideals will certainly be 
realized.  Keep up your action!458 
                                                
458 Mr. 1296x/33 appendix. 
Kort Inhoudspogave van het artikel onder het hoofd: “Disamping Djalan National 
Reconstructie,” dat in het 10-daagsch blad “Medan Ra’jat” van 1 October 1933 is opgenomen. 
Na in het kort de ontwikkelingsgeschiedenis van de “Indonesische” volksbeweging 
gedurende de laatste 25 jaren te hebben gereleveerd, wijst de “Medan Ra’jat” er op, dat het 
volk, eerst nadat het ervan overtuigd en zich bewust geworden is, dat men zijn doel kan 
verwezenlijken, indien men zelfbeschikkingsrecht heeft, zijne verlossing van de “koloniale 
ketenen” nastreeft en dat de linke-politieke organisaties in een gekoloniseerd land met open 
vizier de vrijheid nastreven, door het volk met open armen worden ontvangen en op een 
buitengewone belangstelling kunnen rekenen. 
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Is zoo’n doelstelling verboden?  Mag een volk dan niet streven naar verkrijging van 
zijn rechten?  De wetten der N. I. Regeering geven daar geen bevestiging van.  Het is erg 
slecht om de beweging, die op rechtvaardigheid en billijkheid is gebaseerd, belemmeringen in 
den weg te leggen.  Dat de beschaafde wereld erkent, dat de vrijheidsbeweging er eene is, die 
gebaseerd is op het menschelijk gevoel, in verband waarmede haar bestaan door de 
maatschappij wettelijk erkend moet worden, blijkt wel uit de volgende woorden van den oud-
President van Amerida Dr. W. Wilson: “Ieder volk heeft het recht, om zijn eigen lot te 
bepalen.” 
Ter weerlegging van de aan het adres der leiders gelanceerde beschuldigingen, wijst 
het blad er o.m. op, dat de (“Indonesische”) beweging geen product is van de leiders; dezen 
zijn niets anders dan de wegwijzers aan de gevoelens en den geest van het volk, opdat het niet 
een verkeerden en gevaarlijken weg zal inslaan.  Zij speelt openkaart en is geen geheime 
organisatie.  Op de openbare zoowel als op de besloten vergaderingen worden dezelfde 
onderwerpen besproken, zoodat de Regeering zich erover verheugen moest, dat de beweging 
open-kaart speelt, waardoor het toezicht op hare handelingen wordt vergemakkelijkt. 
Indachting aan het bestaan van een belangen antithese tusschen “sana” en “sini,” 
verwondert het blad geenszins, dat de blanke pers de Regeering steeds opruit en suggereert, om 
de beweging te kelen en aan handen en voeten te ketenen, opdat zij zal verdwijnen.  Het blad is 
er niet zeker van, of de rigoureuze maatregelen, welke door de Regeering t.a.v. de 
volksbeweging zijn genomen – w.o. de toepassing van de rekbare artikelen bis en ter, de 
uitvaardiging van het vergaderverbod, de in werkingstelling van het passenstelsel, de 
verschillende huiszoekingen en de arrestatie van ir. Soekarno en H. Moechter Loetfi geweten 
moeten worden aan de blanke pers dan wel aan de onjuistheid van de geheime rapporten, 
waarin staat dat de volksbeweging voornemens is een opstand te verwekken.  Bewijzen, dat 
genoemde leiders verzet zullen plegen, zijn er niet.  Het blad veronderstelt, dat hunne arrestatie 
is geschied op grond van “wantrouwen” of op het “vermoeden, dat zij de openbare rust en orde 
zullen verstoren.”  Het is zeer benieuwd, welke straf zij zullen krijgen.  Het twijfelt aan de 
juistheid van het door de blanke pers gelanceerde bericht over de a.s. interneering van 
meergenoemde leiders. 
Na het persbericht gereleveerd te hebben over de waarschuwing, welke het P.I.-
bestuur te Bandoeng van de Politie kreeg om geen politieke actie meer te voeren, zegt het blad 
verder, dat door de buitengewone politieke maatregelen de klove tusschen de Regeering en het 
volk grooter is geworden, daarbij in herinnering brengend het bericht in de Pewarta, als zouden 
de “niniks en mamaks” in Padang Pandjang er aan medewerken om de volksbeweging uit te 
roeien.  Als antwoord op dit bericht zegt het blad: “Er is toch maar altijd wat in een koloniale 
maatschappij.” 
Daarop wijst het blad erop, dat het gestook van de blanke pers en de actie van de 
Hollandsche extremistische nationalisten de politieke atmosfeer h.t.l. nog meer vertroebelen.  
Het geeft den raad om elken maatregel tegen de volksbeweging eerst rijpelijk te overwegen, 
omdat deze beweging er eene is, die in de wereldhistorie wortelt, d.w.z. eene beweging, die 
een maatschappelijke hervorming nastreeft.  Men moet niet denken, dat die strenge en met de 
ijzeren vuist uitgevoerde regelingen in staat zullen zijn den oplaaienden volksgeest te dooden; 
integendeel, zij zullen de geestkracht van het volk vergrooten, terwijl zijn geest zal blijven 
oplaaien.  Een Britisch-Indische vrijheidsheldin zeide immers.  “Wie is in staat een volk te 
ketenen, indien zijn geest niet geketend wenscht te worden?” 
Indachtig dat: 
de beweging voortkomt uit de gevoelens van de massa, die de maatschappij vormt en 
niet een product is van de leiders, 
Het bewegings-bloed door het lichaam stroomt van de tegenwoordige jeugd, die de 
ziel der beweging zal worden in de toekomst,  
Door de wereldhistorie het bewijs niet is geleverd, dat een tegenwerking, hoe heftig 
die ook is, de beweging verzwakt, is het blad er ten volle van overtuigd, dat de volksbeweging 
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The editorial of Medan Ra’jat describes the spirit of the movement arising from the 
people’s aspiration to be independent from colonial rule.  By citing Wilson’s 
declaration, it argues for a nation’s right for self-determination.  It’s important to note 
that the language used was not particularly extreme, especially compared with other 
the writing that appeared in the news organs of other parties.  Voicing calls for 
independence was not unusual for a nationalist movement.  The article’s reference to 
the “white press” (i.e., the Dutch press) as spreading misinformation and provoking 
attacks on the indigenous people’s movement and its leaders might be troubling.  Yet 
such jabs were not uncommon in the general Indies press.  On the whole the article 
itself did not pose a particularly remarkable or extraordinary threat to the colonial 
authorities.  What appears to have carried more actual weight in bringing about 
persbreidel action against Medan Ra’jat is the political context in which this action 
was issued.  It is reasonable to conclude that Medan Ra’jat was temporarily shut down 
because it was the organ of Permi.  As described above, the Dutch authorities had long 
been concerned with the influence of Permi’s activities in Sumatra.  For more than a 
month before persbreidel action was taken up for consideration, the editor-in-chief of 
Medan Ra’jat, Iljas Yacoub, had been imprisoned due to persdelict, suggesting that 
                                                                                                                                       
niet dood zal gaan, integendeel dat zij zal blijven bestaan en in bloei toenemen, vooral indien 
zij wordt gebaseerd op de overtuiging. 
Wie zalde wonde in het hart van het volk, als gevolg van willekeurige handelingen 
t.a.v. de beweging en hare leiders, die het met hart en ziel liefheeft, kunnen genezen?  Zoolang 
het nog over leiders beschikt, die den door de beweging te bewandelen weg kent, zoolang zal 
het niet verdwalen: maar aan wien zal het geweten moeten worden, indien het volk door het 
gemis dier leiders, omdat die uit zijn midden zijn weggerukt, later het verkeerde pad 
bewandelt. 
Ten slotte zegt het blad: 
Wij, mannen van de beweging, moeten juist in dezen tijd den geest en de overtuiging 
versterken. 
Vrees, indolentie, zwakheid, leedwezen, gezucht en gesteun en voorbarigheid moeten 
wij zoover mogelijk wegwerpen, omdat die alle voor onze beweging een doodelijk gif zijn. 
Moed en doorzicht moeten wij niet loslaten, omdat die in den strijd een zeer scherp 
wapen vormen. 
Volk, dat sterk naar de vrijheid verlangt. 
Uw idealen zullen zeker verwezenlijkt worden.  Ze Uwe actie voort! 
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the authorities were already waiting for the “right” article at right moment to slap the 
newspaper with charges of endangering public law and order. 
The official Dutch summary of Medan Ra’jat revealed the authorities’ main 
concerns.  After t communist-led uprising took the colonial government by surprise in 
1926 and 1927, conducting close surveillance over “dangerous” nationalist and/or 
religious organizations became the first priority, with the aim of maintain law and 
order and neutralizing any potential cause for social unrest.  PID and its field officers 
worked around the clock to monitor the activists and made reports whenever 
necessary.459  Permi was among those organizations whose activities and personnel 
were under constant surveillance by the secret police.  Knowing that leaders such as 
Iljas Yacoub had been removed from effective leadership with their persdelict 
imprisonment in September 1933, it was obvious that the authorities were aiming a 
further blow to Permi and its organ, Medan Ra’jat.  Executing persbreidel was the 
best possible strategy that authorities had to silence the voice of Permi’s membership, 
and so they took the action in October 1933. 
Colonial authorities stopped at nothing to effectively crack down on Medan 
Ra’jat, including tailoring the report that accompanied the persbreidel action.  The 
report’s “appendix” was a translated and “summarized” Dutch version of the Medan 
Ra’jat article that in actuality reflected upon only parts of the original article.  The 
censor (a member of the Resident’s staff) read Medan Ra’jat, made marks on the parts 
which he deemed “dangerous,” wrote some notes in Dutch on the margin of the 
newspaper so that, one may assume, his assistant would understand why these parts 
needed special attention, and then prepared a “summarized translation” of problematic 
articles/passages.  The report then intentionally copied and pasted parts of the original 
article to present a highly distorted version of the article’s main argument.  In one part, 
                                                
459 Shiraishi, “Policing the Phantom Underground,” pp. 1-46.  
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the report translated a whole paragraph of the original article in Medan Ra’jat, while 
in other sections supposedly translated paragraphs were actually cobbled together 
from several sentences that were taken from different paragraphs in the original 
article.  The awkward sounding summary quoted above was the ultimate result of this 
work.   
The Dutch “translation” also intentionally changed the original content of the 
article in question.  For instance, the activities of Permi had been a source of headache 
for the authorities, hence they suppressed its gatherings by applying Articles 153 bis 
and ter of the Penal Code.  Whereas the article of Medan Ra’jat made fun of exactly 
these two articles by clearly mentioning the numbers, the translation in the official 
secret report replaced them with “amended Articles a and b.”  Also the last sentence of 
the summarized translation does not correspond with the last sentence of the original 
article, which reads “People who believe shall triumph” (Bangsa jang jakin mestilah 
menang); rather, the summary closes with a combination of two sentences from the 
fourth paragraph from the last.  The original two sentences read, “We are activists of 
the movement.  In an atmosphere like now, we need to work to fortify our spirit and 
conviction” (Kita, kaoem pergerakan.  Dalam saat jang seperti sekarang oedaranja, 
kita perloe bekerdja membenteng semangat dan kejakinan). 
A series of communications in 1933 and 1934 among the Governor-General, 
the Prosecutor General, and the Director of Justice reflected the government’s 
suppressive attitude towards the vernacular press.460  Emphasized in this 
correspondence was the key phrase: “times of stress” (“tyden van spanning”).  As 
these three top officials of the Indies state all agreed, in the time of stress it was 
                                                
460 “Schema politiek maatregelen, Persbreidel” in Parket van den Procureur-Generaal (R. Verheyen), 
December 19, 1933, No. 6929/A.P. Geheim aan den Gouveneur-Generaal, in Mr. 1559x/1933; 
“Uittreksel uit de Nota der Algemeene Secretarie: Schema politieke maatregelen. Persbreidel,” in Mr. 
604x/1934. 
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incumbent upon the authorities to consider seriously applying persbreidel to 
newspapers and periodicals.  The law of persdelict applied towards confining “crimes 
against public order” (“Misdrijven tegen de openbare orde”) was not enough to 
maintain political stability.  Instead, so the officials argued, under the prevailing 
circumstances in the Indies, censorship suitable for “a state of war and siege” (den 
staat van oorlog en beleg) must be applied.  Accordingly, a “system of public control 
over the printing press” (Regeling van het Overheidstoezicht op de drukpers) should 
be installed immediately.  Arguing that protecting internal as well as external security 
of the Indies and protecting public order was essential, the officials argued state 
control over the press should be a role assigned to the Prosecutor General, not to the 
Governor-General or the Council of the Indies.461 
It could be said that the period between 1933 and 1934 was the high point of 
government suppression of indigenous political and religious organizations.  It was the 
time when leading nationalists like Soekarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir were exiled, while 
political organizations were forced to minimize their activities.  Persbreidel 
functioned as part of this mechanism of political suppression.  Political leaders and 
their organizations provided the motivation for the emergence of persbreidel in the 
Indies and were the real target of its application.  By issuing persbreidel against 
radical nationalist newspapers in conjunction with the aggressive seizure of political 
leaders and the harassment of organizations, the colonial authorities successfully 
contained radical political activism by 1935. 
The age of confrontational organized politics was about to end, which 
appeared to mean the end of radical Indonesian newspapers.  The number of 
Indonesian newspapers charged with persbreidel declined from sixteen in 1934 to 
                                                
461 “Uittreksel uit de Nota der Algemeene Secretarie: Schema politieke maatregelen. Persbreidel,” in 
Mr. 604x/1934.  This proposal was finally realized after the Netherlands was occupied by Nazi 
Germany in May 1940 as I will discuss in Chapter 10. 
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three in 1935, one in 1936 and none after 1937.  The question of what to do with 
elements of the press that did not emerge from a formal organizational base, however, 
remained for the Indies state.  This question would challenge the Dutch authorities in 
the latter half of the 1930s.  The means they found to handle this challenge will be 
examined in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
FANTASIZING STRUGGLE: 
PARI, ISLAM, POPULAR LITERATURE  
 
“[The office of the journal Al Munir (The Illuminative)] was full of 
newspapers from all over Indonesia, sent in exchange for copies of the Al 
Munir magazine.  In that office all the students Thawalib and Dinijjah 
gathered to read the newspapers, and expand their view of the situation both 
within the country and abroad.  And that office also became a ‘debating club’ 
both as training for discussing religious problems and for religious 
proselytizing.  In short Al Munir’s office was the Dinijjah and Thawalib 
students’ most influential meeting place, not only in spreading intellectual 
ideas but also in strengthening friendship, comradeship and unity.”  (Mansur 
Daud Dt. Palimo Kajo)462 
 
The age of persbreidel in the 1930s was remembered as the decade of political 
suppression.  But intellectuals and journalists did not stop writing; instead in the 1930s 
the number and variety of Malay periodicals continued to increase.  The Indies state 
restricted mobilizational and organizational politics, but literary, religious, and 
educational discourses were permitted so long as they were not politicized.  
Financially independent publishers and newly developed literary fields contributed to 
                                                
462 Recollection of Mansur Daud Dt. Palimo Kajo in Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, pp. 37-38.  Al 
Munir was the first modernist Islamic journal started in 1911 in Padang.  M. C. Ricklefs, A History of 
Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200 (Third Edition) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 213.  
Dinijjah and Tawalib were the private systems of modern elementary and secondary school originated 
and developed in West Sumatra.   
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this cultural phenomenon.  This phenomenon arguably was a product of state 
censorship, which concentrated too heavily on politics and left out apolitical fields 
where literary activities thrived.   Under the suppressive regime, therefore, Indonesian 
nationalists managed to continue their struggle for national independence, and to find 
ways to express themselves in unconventional ways. 
 
[Table 8-1: The Growth of Malay Periodicals, 1925-1940] 
 [Various sources] 
 
This independent cultural activity emerged in Medan, the East Coast of 
Sumatra, in the 1930s.  The ultimate form was roman pitjisan (dime novels), or 
Medan literature (sastera Medan), which started to appear in the late 1930s, as the 
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scholarship of Indonesian literature has noted.463  This literary genre was among those 
categorized as “wild literature” (bacaan liar, kesusasteraan liar),464 which simply 
means that it was not sanctioned by the colonial authorities.  The government had 
attempted to regulate the print (literary) market with the establishment of Balai 
Poestaka, a publishing house as well as bureau for popular literature.  Modernist 
Muslim writers, who were nationalistically oriented and nonetheless had connections 
with Balai Poestaka were the creators of “unruly” literature in Medan. 
Medan literature consisted of literary works and journalistic writings.   The 
Medan literary circle was well aware of the success and influence of the Chinese-
Malay literature, which had flourished in the Indies, particularly on Java, since the 
1900s.  This literature attracted a wide range of readers who were not only Chinese, 
but also Indonesian and European.  Although the contents of the Chinese-Malay 
literature became more varied towards the end of colonial period,465 Medan literati 
shared the view of Balai Poestaka that the Chinese-Malay literature was too focused 
on peranakan.466  Unlike the Chinese-Malay publications, however, Medan’s dime 
novels or roman pitjisan comprised a cultural project characterized by nationalistic 
elements.  This project aimed at promoting the spoken form of the national language 
Indonesian, which distinguished itself from the bookish form of “recognized” writers 
and Balai Poestaka.  It also carried Islamic messages as it aimed to provide the cultural 
and religious basis for the future Indonesian state. 
                                                
463 Roolvink 1950; A. Teeuw, Pokok dan Tokoh dalam Kesusasteraan Indonesia Baru, 1 (Jakarta: 
Pembangunan, 1955); Bakri Siregar, Sedjarah Sastera Indonesia Modern (Jakarta: Akademi Sastera 
dan Bahasa “Multatuli,” 1964), pp. 123-124. 
464 Teeuw, Pokok dan Tokoh dalam Kesusasteraan Indonesia Baru, pp. 67-70; G. W. J. Drewes, “Oud 
en nieuw in de hedendaagse Indonesische litteratuur,” De Gids, 96 (1932), p. 330.  
465 For instance, since the 1920s, works by the prominent peranakan writer Njoo Cheong Seng changed 
in terms of their contents and characters.  See Chandra, “Fantasizing Chinese/Indonesian Hero.”  
466 “Dari hal literatuur Melaju [Pemandangannja tuan Later, Hoofd dari Volklectuur (sic.)],” ABAD XX, 
Thn. 3, No. 1 (January 6, 1934), pp. 5-7.  
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These political implications represented a unique combination of elements for 
roman pitjisan as a cultural project – leftist politics, Islamic modernism, and aesthetic 
entertainment.  Questions emerge however: Why did this particular cultural project 
materialize in Medan?  Why and how did it develop in the 1930s?  In order to answer 
these questions, this chapter examines the characteristics of Medan, the circle of 
writers who gave rise to roman pitjisan, and the issues that they tried to engage in their 
literary works. 
 
Medan: Socio-Economic Characteristics 
Medan developed in tandem with the proliferation of plantations on the East 
Coast of Sumatra from the late nineteenth century onward.  It was an unconventional 
colonial city, because it did not have an extended historical background compared to 
other colonial cities in Java such as Batavia, Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Soerabaja, 
which all had either deep local historical roots or a colonial history dating to the 
seventeenth century.  By the mid-1920s Medan had become the most urban settlement 
in Sumatra.  In 1921 it was described as follows: “This city has a very special 
character; it appears neither European nor typically Indies-like.  Its orderly layout was 
kept from the beginning according to a plan, and its neatness distinguishes this city 
favorably from most other bigger places in the Indies.”467 
The island of Sumatra was rich in natural resources, which provided the basis 
for a plantation economy that was directly connected to the world market since the late 
nineteenth century.  The East Coast of Sumatra was not exceptional; much like other 
areas of Sumatra, key forces behind its development in the colonial era were the 
presences of agricultural estates and the availability of migrant workers.468  The 
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Sumatran East Coast experienced the tobacco boom era from 1870 to 1890.  In the ten 
years from 1873 to 1883, tobacco production increased ten-fold, from 9,238 to 93,532 
bales.469  In 1890 when tobacco was oversupplied in the world market and the United 
States imposed high import tariffs on imported tobacco, the profit, production, and 
investment of tobacco in the Sumatran East Coast sharply decreased.  In the 1890s 
many planters in the Indies began to look for alternative plantation crops, especially 
rubber.470  
 
Table 8-2: Population of the East Coast of Sumatra 
 Europeans Indonesians Chinese & other Asians Total Density per square km. 
1900 2,079 306,035 112,976 421,090   
1905 2,667 450,941 114,809 568,417   
1917 6,270 742,215 145,655 894,140 9.56 
1920 7,882 1,042,930 146,742 1,197,554   
1927 8,263 1,077,830 141,724 1,227,817   
1930 11,079 1,470,395 211,726 1,693,200 17.9 
% 
increase 
1900-
1930 
433 380 87 302  
[Source: Michael van Langenberg, “National Revolution in North Sumatra, Sumatra Timur and 
Tapanuli, 1942-1950,” p. 959.] 
 
The increase in population on the Sumatran East Coast reflected the economic 
boom.  In 1900 the total population was 421,090. By 1920 it had increased to 
1,197,554 in 1920and by 1930 to 1,693,200.  Thus in thirty years the population grew 
more than four times.  The “native” population, which grew from 306,035 in 1900 to 
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470 Thee Kian Wee, “Plantation, Agriculture and Export Growth: An Economic History of East 
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1,470,395 in 1930, accounted for most of the region’s population gain.471  Indigenous 
residents represented more than eighty-six percent of the population.  
 
Table 8-3: Indonesian Population According to Ethnic Group 1930 
East Coast of Sumatra Tapanuli 
 
Total % Total % 
Malays 334,870 23 16,834 1.62 
Karonese 145,429 9.98 8,921 0.86 
Simalungun 95,144 6.53 - - 
Javanese 589,836 40.51 13,301 1.28 
Pakpak/Dairi - - 19,936 1.92 
Toba 74,224 5.09 523,524 50.63 
Angkola 6,706 0.46 79,849 7.72 
Padang Lawas - - 65,414 6.32 
Mandailing 45,308 3.11 89,475 8.65 
Nias - - 194,939 18.83 
Minangkabau 50,677 3.48 9,868 0.95 
Sundanese 44,107 3.02 3,290 0.31 
Betawi 8,882 0.61 - - 
Banjarese 31,266 2.14 - - 
Others 29,408 2.01 8,552 0.82 
[Source: Michael van Langenberg, “National Revolution in North Sumatra, 
Sumatra Timur and Tapanuli,” p. 960.] 
 
The exceptional development of the Sumatran East Coast as a plantation region 
also resulted in the diversification of population.  The region was under-populated and 
under-developed until the late nineteenth century.  In order to develop the region and 
operate the plantations, migrant workers were brought in from other regions.  Large 
numbers of Javanese came as indentured laborers to work in plantations.  As a result, 
in 1930 the Javanese had become the largest ethnic group in eastern Sumatra, 
                                                
471 van Langenberg, “National Revolution in North Sumatra, Sumatra Timur and Tapanuli,” p. 959. 
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representing 40.51 percent of the local population.  They were followed by Malays 
with 23.00 percent.  The distinctive nature of this profile stands out when it is 
compared with Tapanuli, a neighboring region on the East Coast.  More than half of 
the population in Tapanuli included the Toba people, indigenous to the region, while 
Javanese made up only 1.28 percent of the local population.472  
The plantation economy in the Sumatran East Coast produced a highly 
stratified class structure.  At the top were the European planters, businessmen, and 
government officials.  Below them were the indigenous aristocracy (sultan, radja, 
tengku, datoek, and orang kaja), Western-educated professionals (doctors, lawyers, 
senior civil servants, etc.), and the wealthier members of the Chinese and Indian 
merchant communities.  A huge socio-economic gap separated this establishment from 
the mass population at the bottom of the pyramid. 
 
Table 8-4: Population of Medan, 1920-1930 
 Indonesians Chinese & Other Asians Europeans Totals 
1915 17,000 14,000* 2,000 36,000 
1920 23,823 18,297 3,128 45,248 
1927 23,332 20,072 3,516 46,920 
1930 41,270 31,021 4,293 76,584 
Increase 1920-
30 73.20% 69.50% 37.20% 69.30% 
[Source: Parada Harahap, Dari Pantai ke pandai, 1926, p. 215 for the rough data of 1915; 
Michael van Langenberg, “National Revolution in North Sumatra, Sumatra Timur and Tapanuli,” 
p. 963.] 
* This number only refers to the Chinese population. 
 
But unlike the rest of the East Coast, Medan had an even more distinctive 
composition of population.  Here the balance between Indonesian and Chinese was 
much more even than in other cities, towns, and villages in the region.  The population 
growth rate was also impressive; during the 1920s it recorded 69.3 percent.  Both 
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Indonesians and the Chinese represented the majority of the Medan population; during 
the 1920s the number of Indonesians in the city increased 73.2 percent, while the 
population of Chinese (and other Asians) increased by 69.5 percent.  In 1915, 
Indonesians were about 17,000 residents, which was 47.22 percent of the population, 
while the Chinese were 14,000, which was 38.88 percent.  Fifteen years later, in 1930 
Indonesians made up 53.8 percent of the city’s population, while the Chinese were 
40.5 percent.   
Once called “Paris of the Indies” (Parijs Hindia),473 as an urban center in a 
vast hinterland, Medan epitomized the conflicting faces of the Indies colony.  It was 
the city of giant agribusiness.  As the largest city in Sumatra, Medan was a symbol of 
the elite establishment, while the hinterland was composed of largely traditional 
indigenous societies and huge plantations.  Differing contemporary accounts of Medan 
and the wider Deli region of the time highlight these contrasts.  In his travel account of 
the early 1920s, the famous Dutch novelist Louis Couperus wrote of Medan as “a 
white town in the midst of green trees and beautifully-kept green lawns.”  His account 
portrays the city as a modern metropolis in an exotic colony, a dream-like place for 
Dutch people.  
 
Medan is a new town, with cool white buildings, situated in the midst of cool, 
green fields. […]  It is modern and European; there is a touch of England 
about it, and there is no doubt that the proximity of Singapore has had an 
influence upon Medan.  The “White Club,” the Post Office, the Town Hall, 
and the Java Bank, Hotel de Boer and Medan hotel, the imposing offices of 
various companies: Harrison and Crossfield, Deli Maatschappij, Deli 
                                                
473 Parada Harahap, Dari Pantai Kepantai: Perdjalanan Ke-Soematra, October-Dec. 1925 dan Maart-
April 1926 (Weltevreden: Uitgevers Maatschappij Bintang Hindia, 1926), p. 213. 
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Proefstation, Deli Railway Company, the firm of Van Nie and Co., they all lie 
there amongst the extraordinary fresh green of the rain-washed palm, fig-trees, 
and tjemaras; great white buildings, breathing prosperity, and telling of 
profitable work, and of admirable Western effort.”474   
 
By contrast, in the eyes of the popular communist leader Tan Malaka, Medan’s 
opulence presented a stark contrast with the reality found on Deli plantations.  
Between December 1919 and June 1921, Tan Malaka had stayed in the region of Deli, 
for which Medan was the capital city.  There he took a job teaching the children of 
contract coolies in a Swiss- and German-owned tobacco plantation.  In his 
autobiography, he wrote of the existence of class conflict and violent situations there. 
 
A land of gold, a haven for the capitalist class, but a land of sweat, tears, 
death. […]  There the sharp conflict between capital and labor, between 
colonizer and colonized, was played out.  The natural wealth of Deli gave rise 
to the most wealthy, cruel, arrogant, and conservative colonizing capitalist 
class as well as that most oppressed, exploited, and humiliated class, the 
Indonesian contract coolie. […]  
Deli was a region of the modern Indonesian nation, and a region of the true 
proletariat also. […] 
The conflict between the white, stupid, arrogant, cruel colonizers and the 
colored nation of driven, cheated, oppressed, and exploited slaves – a conflict 
which found a few Indonesians as skilled labour caught in the middle – fouled 
the atmosphere in Deli and gave rise to constant attacks by the coolies on the 
Dutch plantation.  Frequently just one insult or criticism was enough to cause 
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a coolie to draw his machete from his belt and attack the Tuan Besar [Big 
Master] or Tuan Kecil [Little Master] then and there, for his heart was filled 
with such a hatred for it all.475 
 
While Couperus was a traveler, Tan Malaka started his political career in the East 
Coast of Sumatra.  He started working with the Indies Social Democratic Association 
(ISDV) and irregularly contributed articles for its news organ, Soeara Rakjat (People’s 
Voice).  He also worked as a labor union activist and was involved in the 1920 strike 
of railroad workers.  Needless to say, Tan Malaka’s Medan projected a frontier of 
class struggle.   
Political, religious and education activists were disturbed to observe the 
extreme suffering caused by the colonial plantation system in the region, and the 
socio-economic disparity it fostered fueled the rise of wider anti-colonial sentiments 
among the people.  Replete with legal issues and disputes, Medan also attracted 
indigenous professionals such as lawyers and especially journalists from outside the 
East Coast.   
 
Medan as Publishing Center 
Medan in the 1920s not only was the capital of the East Coast of Sumatra, but 
also emerged as the center of Sumatran print culture, a position that Padang of West 
Sumatra had enjoyed since the nineteenth century.  In terms of Malay print culture, 
unlike in Java where private peranakan publishers overwhelmingly out-published 
Balai Poestaka, in Sumatra indigenous publishers dominated the field.  This had much 
to do with the penetration and spread of Islamic modernism that had taken place 
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through Islamic schools since the nineteenth century.  West Sumatra was the epicenter 
of the Islamic modernist movement, and for a long time the City of Padang in 
particular functioned as the publishing as well as administrative and commercial 
center of the island.  Accordingly, during the colonial period the Minangkabau people 
were said to have made up more than forty percent of the publishing businesses in 
Sumatra.476  From the beginning of the twentieth century, private publishers such as 
Pewarta, Timoer, Agam Limbago Minangkabau and De Volharding published 
periodicals, school textbooks, and Islamic reading materials.477   
In contrast to Padang’s role as the traditional publishing center in Sumatra, 
until the end of the nineteenth century Medan relied on the British Strait Settlements 
both economically and politically.  Even information about the Sumatran East Coast 
came to Batavia by way of the British colony.  This situation changed after the 
newspaper Deli Courant began circulation on March 18, 1885.  It was not until 1910 
that the region’s first Malay newspaper, Pewarta Deli (Deli Herald), circulated in 
Medan, as Chapter 2 has described.  Sumatra’s influential journalist of the time, Dja 
Endar Moeda started Pewarta Deli in the capacity of chief editor, and Sjarikat 
Tapanoeli was its publisher.  Later on other prominent journalists such as Soetan 
Parlindoengan, Mangaradja Ihotan, Kanoen, and Adi Negoro assumed his position as 
successors.  Most newspapers in Medan throughout the 1910s and the 1920s carried 
economic and commercial articles and advertisements.  Because of these features, 
even though the two leading newspapers, Pewarta Deli and the Chinese-owned 
Andalas,478 were rivals since the 1920s, for the most part they could stay away from 
local ethnic politics.  Few newspapers were associated with political organizations.  In 
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fact, the three major newspapers, Pewarta Deli, Sinar Deli (Gleam of Deli)479 and 
Pelita Andalas (Andalas Lantern, formerly Andalas), competed with each other for 
readership and advertisements, covering mainly economic issues and few political 
events.480  As essentially non-partisan newspapers, none of these papers were ever 
charged with persbreidel, which was instituted in 1931.  These facts helped Medan 
keep a low profile while the Indies state focused its press-curbing efforts primarily on 
Batavia and West Sumatra throughout the 1930s. 
Financial sources also shaped the development of print culture.  To finance 
publishing business, the National Bank (Bank Nasional), established in 1930 by 
Anwar St. Saidi, a Minangkabau entrepreneur originating from Bukittinggi, played a 
crucial role in Medan.  Anwar St. Saidi’s elder brother Djamaluddin Ibrahim was one 
of the former teachers at the Thawalib schools, where Islamic modernism and anti-
colonial ideas were taught, and by 1930 was a leading member of Tan Malaka’s Pari 
(Partai Republik Indonesia, Republic of Indonesia Party), a communist underground 
party.  Because of his brother’s influence, Anwar became politically consciousness as 
he grew up.  When Dr. Soetomo, the famous pioneer of the nationalist movement, 
established the first “Indonesian” (as opposed to foreign capitalized) bank in 
Soerabaja, Anwar was eager to found its branch in West Sumatra.  After the Bank 
Nasional Indonesia (National Bank of Indonesia) in Soerabaja refused his proposal, 
Anwar established his own bank, which was first called Abuan Saudagar (Merchants 
Savings Bank) and later changed to Bank Nasional.  This bank became a major 
financial institution supporting indigenous traders in the region, and most importantly 
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funding religious and educational organizations as well as publishing business.  
Against such political, religious, and financial backdrop of Minangkabau, Medan 
emerged a new publishing center in Sumatra in the 1930s. 
 
Political Immigrants 
The 1920s saw the emergence of radical political and social movements in the 
East Coast.  As an historian Lance Castles identifies, these movements can be 
classified into three categories: political movements seeking independence from the 
Netherlands, religious movements to purify Islamic practice of deviations from the 
original teachings of Mohammed, and social movements by the young generation who 
resented their low status under adat (customs) and were against the traditional 
authority, the elders, and the social restraints they represented.481  The first and second 
segments of these activisms were fostered by the political migrants to Medan, while 
the third was rooted in the local traditional power structure. 
The first kind of activism was set in motion upon the arrival of Iwa Koesoema 
Soemantri in February 1928.  He launched a new age of politics, that is, the age of 
movement in Sumatra.  Born on May 31, 1899 in Tjiamis, West Java, he studied at 
HIS, the Dutch high school for natives, the Training School for Civil Servants 
(OSVIA) Bandoeng, and the Law College (Rechtshogeschool) in Batavia.  After 
having worked for the Indies government as lawyer about a year, he went to the 
Netherlands and studied law at the University of Leiden from 1922 to 1925.  He was 
active in the Indonesian Students’ Association (Perhimpoenan Indonesia, PI) and was 
elected its chairman in 1923.  Other notable students involved with this organization 
included Mohammad Hatta, who later played a significant role in the Indonesian 
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nationalist movement.  The students became radicalized as they followed the news 
from Indonesia on the movement led by Semaoen in 1922-1923, and the association 
also became close with the Comintern.  After graduating from the law school in 
Leiden, Iwa spent one and half years in Moscow, from October 1925 until the middle 
of 1927.  He then went back to Indonesia in late 1927 and became friends with 
Soekarno in Bandoeng.  Several months later, he moved to Medan as a lawyer and 
became involved in politics there.  He began the politically oriented newspaper 
Matahari Indonesia (Indonesian Sun) in 1928 in Medan, and led the Medan branch of 
Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), which Soekarno established in July 1927.  He was 
able to bring together the party’s nationalistic propaganda and the major local political 
issues of the day, such as labor disputes and exploitation at the plantations.  He was 
successful in organizing unions among Indonesian workers and tried to reach out and 
organize coolie labor in the plantations.  Not surprisingly, his activities came under 
tight surveillance and were finally suspended after a year and a half, when he was 
arrested in the middle of 1930 and exiled to Banda.482 
Upon Iwa’s departure, the youths who were influenced by him directly or 
indirectly took over the nationalist movement in Medan.  These figures included 
Djauhari Salim (West Sumatra), Abdul Hamid Lubis (Southern Batak), Sutan Nur 
Alamsjah (West Sumatra) and Mohamad Djoni (Southern Tapanoeli).483  While none 
of these young activists had been born in the East Coast, many were to some extent 
connected with journalism in Medan.  These outsiders would draw attention to 
national-level matters, while activists with local roots would focus on local issues. 
Four nationalist leaders active in Sumatra’s East Coast region focused much of their 
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activity on working with groups that had connections to national-level political 
organizing.  Salim led PNI by working as editor-in-chief of the daily Oetoesan 
Sumatra (Sumatran Envoy), which was a semi-official news organ of the Medan 
branch PNI, but was discontinued in September 1932.484  Lubis was a regular 
contributor to Pewarta Deli, and in 1933 became secretary of the Indonesian Party 
(Partai Indonesia, Partindo) in the East Coast and the chief editor of its news organ, 
Pelita Andalas.  He was deemed a potential threat to public order and exiled to Boven 
Digoel in 1934.  Alamsjah was a younger brother of Sutan Sjahrir – the founder of 
Indonesian National Education Party (PNI-Baru).  He became chairman of the party’s 
Medan branch when it was set up in 1932, and later in 1936 became a member of Dr. 
Soetomo’s Great Indonesia Party (Parindra) in Medan.  Djoni was active in Partindo 
after its establishment in January 1932.  This secular nationalistic activism, however, 
did not successfully mobilize the mass, but was made public through newspaper 
reports.  For it, Pewarta Deli and Sinar Deli played a significant role in making those 
activists familiar to the public.  Both papers were not affiliated with any political 
parties, but carried reports on politics in the region as well as in the Indies.  Although 
both newspapers took a non-partisan stance, they were relatively pro-nationalist. 
Secular radicalism was gradually taken over by the religious movement, which 
migrated from West Sumatra in the aftermath of the communist uprising of 1927.  A 
major part of the Muslim intellectuals consisted of those from the Sumatra Thawalib 
schools, which had an extensive network of modernist schools offering both religious 
and secular education in Sumatra.  
In the 1920s, Minangkabau religious/political leaders had become more 
outspoken in their criticisms of Dutch rule and openly advocated an independent 
Indonesia.  They also aligned themselves with Tan Malaka, who had campaigned 
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against the rebellion prior to the uprising, but was only able to reach his comrades in 
Padang Pandjang in time.  As a result, by the time the communist rebellions broke out, 
while many communist leaders were caught in other regions, few of the prominent 
anti-Dutch leaders in West Sumatra, particularly from Padang Pandjang, remained free 
and active.   In the case of West Sumatra, government reports increasingly raised the 
alarm about potential threats to social stability by drawing parallels between the 
attitudes of religious political organizations in the early 1930s with those of the 
communists prior to the 1927 rebellions.  With this heavy government surveillance, 
the religiously motivated radical political activism in the 1930s was also destined to be 
crushed.  Luckily, because of its favorable socio-economic conditions, Medan 
attracted many of those leaders fleeing the colonial government crackdown in other 
parts of the island.  Still, even though many Minangkabau political and religious 
leaders had fled to the city, neither Permi nor PSSI developed into a major political 
party.  Instead, they took the form of religious and educational organizations and 
among others made use of Moehammadijah for their activities, this latter organization 
being favored because of its moderate modernist Islamic stance.  While during the 
1910s and 1920s Moehammadijah had not succeeded in penetrating Sumatra because 
of its still Java-centric nature, in the 1930s West Sumatrans took up the organization’s 
leadership in Medan.  Because political organizations had come under tight police 
surveillance in West Sumatra and other places in the Indies, the Minangkabau 
religious and political leaders did not want to take the same risk in Medan.  Instead, 
they kept a low profile and concentrated on religious, educational, and journalistic 
activities.  
 Political immigrants had brought a breath of fresh air to the nationalist politics 
in Medan of the late 1920s and early 1930s.  The question then became for them, how 
to sustain and promote this activist politics in the real life, because organizational 
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politics would inevitably confront the repressive colonial state.  The tool that these 
intellectual migrants turned to was the literary form, which had been left relatively 
outside of the political arena and beyond censorship scrutiny in the 1930s. 
 
Adi Negoro: New Journalism and Muhammad Yamin 
In late 1931, Adi Negoro or Djamaloeddin gelar Datuk Maradjo Sutan came to 
Medan to take the position of editor at the popular daily Pewarta Deli.485  Being 
trained in journalism in Germany, he had “modern” ideas on how to run a newspaper, 
and his editorship changed Pewarta Deli into a more politically conscious as well as 
entertaining newspaper. 
Born on August 14, 1904 in Talawi, Sawahlunto, West Sumatra, Adi Negoro 
studied at the European Primary School (Europeesche Lagere School, ELS) and the 
MULO.  In 1918 he moved to Batavia and entered the STOVIA.  As a student, at the 
age of eighteen, Adi Negoro began his career as journalist by contributing articles to 
the journal Tjaja Hindia, published by Landjumin Datuk Tumenggung who also 
published the daily Neratja.  While studying medicine, he became more interested in 
politics and social affairs, which drove him to change his career to journalism.   
In 1926 Adi Negoro went to Germany and studied journalism in Berlin, 
Munich, and Wuerzburg.  From Germany, he regularly contributed articles to Balai 
Poestaka’s journal Pandji Poestaka as well as to Bintang Timoer (Batavia, Parada 
Harahap was the editor-in-chief) and Pewarta Deli (Medan).  During his study, he also 
wrote three books in Malay – Darah Moedah (Young Blood, 1927), Asmara Djaja 
(Victorious Love, 1928), and Melawat ke Barat (Pilgrimage to the West, 3 volumes, 
1930-1932).  All three were published by Balai Poestaka.  Among them, Balai 
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Poestaka seemed to find Asmara Djaja favorable enough to publish it in Sundanese 
and Javanese in 1930 and 1932, respectively.486  Balai Poestaka chose Asmara Djaja 
to be circulated in two vernaculars.  It is likely that Balai Poestaka found this novel an 
acceptable piece because it was critical not only of the old tradition, but also of the 
young generation who criticized tradition without offering any clear vision.  Together 
with C. Spat, lecturer and grammarian of Malay, Adi Negoro also published a Malay 
pocket dictionary Kamoes Kemadjoean <Modern Zakwoordenboek> (Dictionary of 
Progress <Modern Pocket dictionary>) in the Netherlands in 1928.487 
When Adi Negoro returned to the Indies in 1930, he was hired as chief editor 
of Balai Poestaka’s Pandji Poestaka, but he left the position after six months for 
reasons that were unclear.   In early 1931 he decided to move to Medan to take the 
position of editor-in-chief of Pewarta Deli.  His editorship opened a new era of print 
culture in Medan.  Just after taking the job at Pewarta Deli, he also started to edit and 
publish a monthly popular journal, Abad ke-XX (20th Century), which continued as 
Abad XX from 1932 on.   
It was Adi Negoro’s mission to develop the Malay press in the Indies.  In 1928 
while studying journalism in Germany, he contributed a series of articles entitled 
“Pemandangan dari djaoeh” (View from a Distance) to Pewarta Deli.  In one of these 
articles, “Pemandangan dari djaoeh: Pers zaman sekarang” (View from Afar: The 
Press Today), he maintained that the Malay language was the door to modernity, 
because if one could read Malay, one could reach the outside world.  It was “the age of 
radio, electricity and steam,” he exclaimed, and one “can witness the nature of this 
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rapidly changing time in the Malay language.”488  The Malay press was a relatively 
new product, he argued, but it was the only solid and reliable way to transmit ideas 
and messages to the emerging audience in Indonesia; in places where there were “no 
postal system, telegraph, telephone and radio,” the tool to reach a wider audience was 
to be found in “only printing machines.”  Assuming everyone across Indonesia could 
read Malay, the press would be able to reach them and promote positive change 
among them.  It appears that Adi Negoro had clear ideas on the potential of the Malay 
language as a medium for educating Indonesians through print culture.  His remarks 
came just before the 1928 Youth Pledge that cemented Indonesia’s national language. 
Adi Negoro’s editorship introduced and developed two new fields – politics 
and entertainment – in the world of print culture in Medan.  On the surface, Adi 
Negoro was not politically active because he did not associate with any political 
parties.  But it was obvious from his writings and editorial style that his political 
orientation was nationalistic.  When he was in Germany he had become acquainted 
with European liberal thought,489 and wrote sympathetic essays in support of Semaoen 
and Darsono, who were both Indonesian communists exiled in Europe at that time.  In 
one of the articles he contended that Indonesians needed to publish brochures in the 
Malay language on the two distinguished communists just as Europeans did for their 
activists.490 
There is another factor that cannot be dismissed with regard to Adi Negoro’s 
political orientation, which was the influence of his elder brother and the 
communications between them.  The elder brother was Muhammad Yamin, who was 
                                                
488 Adi Negoro, “Pemandangan dari djaoeh: Pers zaman sekarang,” Pewarta Deli, October 5-6, 1928. 
489 His contributions to Pewarta Deli during his European days were theoretical and abstract, which 
reflected his theoretical and philosophical readings. 
490 Adi Negoro, “Pers kita dan negeri asing,” Pewarta Deli, October 22, 1928.   
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remembered by Indonesians as a poet, playwright, historian, as well as politician.491  
Yamin was born a year before Adi Negoro, on August 24, 1903, in Sawah Lunto, 
West Sumatra.  He studied at the HIS in Palembang, South Sumatra.  Then he went to 
Buitenzorg, West Java, to take courses on farming and husbandry.  In 1925 he enrolled 
at the General Middle School (Algemene Middelbare School, AMS) in Jogjakarta, 
majoring in history and Far Eastern languages, including Malay, Javanese, and 
Sanskrit.  Upon graduation in 1927 he was preparing for his departure to study 
language and history at Leiden University in the Netherlands when his father’s death 
forced him to call off the plan.  Instead, he began to study law at the School of Law 
(Rechtshogeschool) in Batavia, where he earned his law degree in 1932.  As early as in 
1920, Yamin had started to write in Malay for the Dutch-language journal Jong 
Sumatra (Young Sumatrans), which was the organ for the Association for Young 
Sumatrans (Jong Sumatranen Bond, JSB).  While up until the early 1920s his political 
affinity was oriented to Sumatra, rather than Indonesia, as his 1922 poem Tanah Air 
(Native Soil) shows, over the course of several years it shifted to Indonesia, as his 
1928 poem Indonésia toempah darahkoe! (Indonesia my homeland) demonstrates.492 
His political life started as an active member of the Association of Young 
Sumatrans in Padang, where he made friends with political activists Mohammad Hatta 
(later to become Indonesia’s first Vice President) and Amir Sjarifoeddin (to become 
Indonesia’s second Prime Minister).  In the 1923 celebration of the fifth anniversary of 
Young Sumatrans, Yamin delivered a speech “De maleisch taal in het verleden, heden 
                                                
491 Sutrisno Kutoyo, Prof. Mohammad Yamin S.H., pahlawan nasional (Jakarta: Proyek Biografi 
Pahlawan Nasional, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1975); Mardanas (et al.), Biografi 
Pahlawan Nasional (Djakarta: Lembaga Sedjarah dan Antropologi, 1972); T. B. Simatupang, Report 
from Banaran: Experiences during the People’s War (translated by Benedict Anderson) (London: 
Equinox Publishing, 2009), p. 252. 
492 Muhammad Yamin, Indonésia toempah darahkoe! (Weltvereden: Kenaga, 1928).  In the same year, 
he translated the collection of essays by Rabindranath Tagore, the famous Bengali literary figure. 
Rabindranath Tagore and Muhammad Yamin, Menantikan soerat dari radja: Karangan Rabindranath 
Tagore (Weltevreden: Balai Poestaka, 1928). 
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en toekomst” (Malay Language: Past, Present and Future) – ironically in Dutch.  He 
advocated a non-cooperative stance by Partindo against Dutch colonialism.  In 1928 
he participated in the historic Second Congress of Indonesian Youth, and played a 
major role in drafting “Soempah Pemoeda,” the Youth Pledge produced by the 
Congress.  It was a declaration made on October 28, 1928, proclaiming allegiance to 
three ideas – one motherland, one nation, and one language.  This congress was put 
together by various youth organizations: Association of Young Javanese (Jong Java), 
Association of Young Sumatrans, Association of Islamic Youth (Jong Islamieten 
Bond), Association of Young Batak (Jong Batak), Association of Young Minahasans 
(Jong Minahasa), Association of Celebes Youth (Jong Celebes), Association of 
Young Ambonese (Jong Ambon), Batavian Youth (Pemoeda Kaum Betawi), 
Association of Indonesian Students (Perhimpunan Pelajar Pelajar Indonesia, PPPI), 
and the likes.  Through the organization of Young Indonesians (Indonesia Moeda), he 
became an active proponent of making Malay the national and unifying language.  
In 1932 Yamin joined Partindo, which was a secular nationalist party founded 
by Soekarno.  In the same year upon graduation from law school, he was elected to the 
People’s Council (Volksraad).  It served as a forum for the non-European residents of 
the Indies to express their aspirations, but in fact lacked the power to pursue reforms, 
because the Governor-General held the power of veto on all acts of the Council.  After 
Partindo was disbanded in November 1936, Yamin formed the Indonesian People’s 
Movement (Gerakan Raykat Indonesia, Gerindo) in May 1937 with A. K. Gani (1905-
1958) and Amir Sjarifoeddin (1907-1948).  Gerindo’s aim was to raise public 
consciousness of nationalist ideas through mass organizations.  The background of 
Gerindo’s founding was a growing willingness on the part of many left-wing 
nationalists to cooperate with the Dutch.  This trend corresponded with the rise of the 
Popular Front in the early 1930s, a time when the Comintern under Joseph Stalin’s 
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leadership adopted a policy of forming broad alliances with almost any political party 
willing to oppose the fascists.  The willingness of Indonesian activist organizations to 
fall in with this trend arose both from despair over the prospects for effective 
nationalist resistance in the face of Dutch military and police power, and also from a 
conviction that collaboration against fascism, in particular Japanese fascism, had 
become the government’s highest priority.  Gerindo had hoped that through its 
cooperation, the Dutch could be swayed towards greater willingness to establish a 
separate legislature in the colonial territory.  Shortly before Japan took over Java, 
Amir Sjariffoedin received funds from the Dutch authorities to organize underground 
resistance against the Japanese.   
Meanwhile, Tan Malaka was known as the legendary hero mainly among his 
fellow Minangkabaus, like Yamin.  Around the time when Indonesia declared 
independence in 1945, the extent of Yamin’s association with Tan Malaka became 
evident as he published two small books on the legendary political fugitive.  One was 
written with Sakti Arga entitled Tan Malaka datang! (Tan Malaka has Come!) in 
1945,493 and the other is Tan Malaka: Bapak Republik Indonesia (Tan Malaka: Father 
of the Republic of Indonesia) in 1946.494  Later, Yamin joined Tan Malaka’s Murba 
Party (Partai Murba, the national-communist party) and edited its daily Mimbar 
Indonesia (Indonesia’s Pulpit).   
Mohammad Yamin is remembered as a powerful politician in Indonesian 
history, while his younger brother Adi Negoro kept a low profile on the national 
scene.  From the point of view of organizational politics, Adi Negoro appeared 
inactive, but in fact he took a leadership role in setting up unconventional literary 
                                                
493 Sakti Arga, Muhammad Yamin, Tan Malaka datang! (Bt. Tinggi: Tjerdas, 1945). 
494 Tan Malaka: Bapak Republik Indonesia (Djawa Timur: Moerba Berdjoeang, 1946); Tan Malacca, 
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experiments among the intellectual circles in Medan that were to have a significant 
long-term impact on the development of nationalism in the Indies. 
 
Entertainment Journal 
In March 1931 Adi Negoro launched the entertainment journal Abad ke XX.  
The journal’s motto reads, “Don’t pawn your nationhood!” (Djangan kamoe gadaikan 
kebangsaanmoe!).  The inaugural essay starts with these words: 
 
From Pandji Poestaka to ABAD ke XX… 
Their activities there are the same as here [Indonesia].  We are never hesitant 
or lazy to work, because we worship work.  The difference is here there is 
“self-activity” (autoaktiviteit). 
What did we say in one of our daily notes?  Self-activity above everything 
else (Autoaktiviteit ueber alles).  We set our goals high even though self-
activity proceeds slowly and its preparation and provisions are not quite 
complete and perfect.  But we will row our boat with the oars we can muster.  
Honor your work, especially work that is useful for the nation and homeland. 
Some people give up easily.  Not us.  Things around us can change, but the 
goals we set shine a light for our life’s path.  
We are not deliberately asking for sympathy or cheers from the crowd.  If it 
feels appropriate to you, Sir, you are welcome to use whatever we serve here, 
and if not, get out your pen and ink and write to us. 
All criticisms from the readers, even from the most humble, we shall accept 
willingly and attentively, because we live in the Twentieth Century in the 
spirit of democracy.  All equal, like Muslims praying in a mosque, no king or 
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servants, old or young, destitute or wealthy … there are only devoted 
Muslims! 
As the saying goes: “The mind is the lantern of the heart.”  The most powerful 
weapon is not big cannons and all those world-binding technologies, because 
they all come from the evolution of human mind.  In the end it is the human 
mind that can inspire. […]  A sharp and powerful weapon for advancement. 
There is no need to make this introduction long.  Most readers will sooner or 
later become familiar with us.  So we wish you: horas ba [a Toba Batak 
greeting]. 
With best wishes from us, 
Adi Negoro495 
 
                                                
495 Adi Negoro, “Kata Pendahoeloean,” ABAD ke XX, Thn. 1, No. 1 (March 1931), p. 1. 
 Dari Pandji Poestaka ke ABAD ke XX. 
Aktiviteitnja sama djoega disana dan disini.  Kita selaloe tidak segan dan tidak malas bekerdja 
keras karena memoeliakan kerdja.  Tjoema bedanja disini ada autoaktiviteit. 
Apa kata kita dalam salah satoe tjatetan kita sehari-hari?  Autoaktiviteit ueber alles.  Kita tarok 
dipoentjak tjita-tjita kita biarpoen autoaktiviteit itoe berdjalan dengan plan plan serta 
penjediaannja dan bekalannja tidak begitoe kompleet dan sempoerna.  Tapi kita dajoengkan 
kapal kita dengan pengajoeh jang kita bisa koempoelkan.  Moeliakan pekerdjaan, teroetama 
sekali moeliakan pekerjaan jang berpaedah bagi bangsa dan tanah air. 
Ada orang jang lekas poetoesan asa.  Kita tidak begitoe.  Keadaan-keadaan dikeliling kita 
boleh berobah, tapi tjita-tjita kita tetapkan bersinar pada djalan penghidoepan kita. 
Kita tidak sengadja minta sympathie atau tampik sorak orang banjak.  Kalau rasanja baik bagi 
toean-toean, toean pakai apa jang kami hidangkan kepada toean-toean, kalau rasanja koerang 
enak ambil pena dan tinta dan toelis pada kami. 
Segala kritiek dari pembatja kita terima dengan soedi dan kita perhatikan meskipoen datangnja 
dari pihak jang paling rendah.  Sebab kita hidoep dalam ABAD ke XX dengan semangat 
demokrasi.  Sma rata, sebagaimana orang Islam sembahjang dalam mesdjid tidak ada radja, 
atau hamba, toea atau moeda, hina atau kaja… melainkan ada Moeslimin jang pertjaja! 
Kata pepatah: “Fikir itoe pelita hati.”  Sendjata jang tadjam sekali boekan meriam jang besar-
besar dan technik jang membelit doenia sebab segala itoe berasal dari kemadjoean otak 
simanoesia.  Melainkan fikiran itoe jang bisa berpengaroeh… Sendjata jang tadjam dan koeat 
oentoek kemadjoean. 
Tidak oesah kita pandjangkan kata pendahoeloean ini.  Dengan sebagian besar dari pembatja 
lama atau lambatnja kita soedah berkenalan dan boekan asing lagi.  Sebab itoe kita oetjapkan: 
horas be dan 
 salam bahagia dari kami sekalian. 
 Adi Negoro 
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Independent action was called for, the spirit of democracy was pursued; the mood of 
Abad ke XX was very patriotic.  The journal proclaims, “it is the nationalistic age” 
(zaman nasional), when the nationalist movement (pergerakan nasional) seeks to 
attain self-government for the future.  The way Adi Negoro conceptualized the 
nationalist movement was interesting because he emphasized that nationalism was 
healthy (nationalisme is gezond).  He developed this idea of healthy nationalism in 
another article focusing on “national spirit” (semangat nasional).496  Against those 
who equated nationalist movement with communism – so that its activists needed to 
be reported to the police and banished to Digoel – Adi Negoro argued that 
nationalistic sentiments were in fact a sign of healthy mind and that people who 
regarded nationalists as criminals were the ones who needed to be sent to the mental 
hospital.  He also maintained that the nationalist movement was an arena where people 
could exchange ideas.  For this reason he established a journal that was designed to 
provide a space for discussion and to develop a healthy nationalistic spirit for the 
people. 
The association that Adi Negoro made between nationalism and health went 
beyond metaphors, because the journal also drew attention to health issues.  Articles 
on health (kesehatan) and detailed pictures of human bodies appeared on regular basis 
and distinguished the journal from other periodicals.  Having been educated in 
Germany, Adi Negoro seems to have been influenced by a concept of nationalism 
prevalent in Germany that was closely linked with ideas of masculinity, ideal 
physique, and bodily vigor; in this view, young men with healthy minds and bodies 
were best capable to realize the German nation.497  Adi Negoro’s journal, arguably, 
                                                
496 “ABAD XX: Bersemangat Nasional,” ABADD ke XX, Thn. 1, No. 11 (August 1931), pp. 185-186. 
497 George L. Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern 
Europe, (New York: H. Fertig, 1985). 
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was promoting this ideal – that healthy body and mind were an important combination 
for healthy nationalism. 
Abad ke XX also provided fiction and light reading.  It offered short stories, 
serialized stories, and stories about Western countries.  Among its most popular 
features were the stories it offered about criminals.  In its early years the journal 
carried an eccentric feature called “Mystery Story,” consisting of a one-page mystery 
story in English.  The first story was “Tale of the Poisoned Dagger.”498  It was a story 
of a Chinese detective, “Foo Wang, who at the time enjoyed the reputation of being 
the Sherlock Holmes of China.”  Foo Wang is put in charge of the investigation of 
murders by a poisoned dagger in Shanghai.  He finds clues that lead him to Chen-kin-
Lung, leader of the most notorious secret society, the Ko Lao Hui.  Foo Wang hunts 
down Chen-kin-Lung, but the latter is mysteriously gone after the two talk about the 
case.  Readers were reminded of this “Mystery Story” seven years later when they 
encountered an article in Abad XX entitled “Criminaliteit, Politie dan Detectiveroman” 
(Crime, Police, and Detective Novels), 499 which highlighted the stories of Al Capone 
(Al Capone), John Dillinger, Alvin Karvis (Karpis), and Paul Gorgouloff (Gorguloff).  
These figures were all contemporary American and Russian criminals: Capone (1899-
1947) was an American gangster who led a criminal syndicate in Chicago; Dillinger 
(1903-1934) a bank robber in the Midwest during the early 1930s; Karpis (1907-1979) 
was associated with the Barker gang in the 1930s United States; Gorguloff (1895-
1932) was a Russian émigré to France who assassinated French President Paul 
Doumer. 
                                                
498 “Mystery Story: Tale of the Poisoned Dagger,” ABAD ke XX, Thn. 1, No. 17/18 (December 1931), p. 
249. 
499 “Criminaliteit, Politie dan Detectiveroman,” ABAD XX, 3-dummy number, (January 25, 1939), pp. 
12-13. 
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Abad XX’s strategy of attracting an audience through the lure of criminal and 
detective stories turned out to be successful.  In one of the journal’s articles, “Roman 
Criminele di Inggeris” (Crime Novels in England), crime novels (roman criminele, 
roman pendjahat) and detective novels (roman detectief) were described as not only a 
form of entertainment, but also as a symbol of modern literature.  This, we are told, 
was the view in Britain, where this type of popular literature had been well established 
and prolifically published.  The article also noted that popular literature was not only 
widely read, but also lifted up the quality of English literature in general.500  Learning 
from the British experience, the writer was confident that producing and circulating 
popular novels would contribute to the development of modern Indonesian literature 
as well as modern Indonesian readers.  As I shall examine below, this was the 
philosophy that brought about the emergence of popular journals called “roman 
pitjisan” (literally, dime novels) as an important literary genre in the Indies from 1938 
onwards.  Abad XX’s modern style and content – complete with pictures – was novel 
to the reading public and attracted a wide range of readers.  Its distributors spread 
from Medan, Atjeh, Tapanoeli, West Sumatra, and South Sumatra, to Java, Borneo, 
Celebes, and even to Kuala Kangsar in British Malaya.  As I shall discuss below, this 
distribution network overlapped with those of Islamic journals. 
 
Espionage and Underground: Journalistic Challenge 
In addition to running an entertainment journal, Adi Negoro took up a literary 
challenge in the world of journalism.  His motivation was a desire to attract readers to 
Pewarta Deli and to encourage their participation in politics.  For this purpose, he 
decided to draw their attention to underground communist activity. 
                                                
500 “Roman Criminele di Inggeris,” ABAD XX, Vol. 4, No. 13 (March 30, 1940), p. 8. 
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After the failed uprisings in 1926 and 1927, the communist movement became 
a more sensitive issue than ever in the Indies.  This context fostered a unique 
atmosphere concerning press coverage of communist activities.  While introducing 
persbreidel, an administrative measure to suppress the press that had led to an age of 
darkness for political activism, the Indies state took advantage of this atmosphere to 
create the myth (as well as an engineered reality) of an ideal society.  The best 
example of this was the case of Boven Digoel, which was established as an ideal 
colony.  Press coverage of the colony had contributed to a widely publicized image of 
Digoel as a place of discipline, self-sufficiency, and advancement in comparison with 
other places in Indonesians.  
While Boven Digoel was a place for the reform of communists, many 
“fugitives” remained who were vulnerable to arrest.  After the PKI was banned, its 
spin-off communist associations, which went underground after 1927, became the next 
main target of the Indies state.  One communist underground was called the Republic 
of Indonesia Party (Pari) established in 1927, and its leader was the prominent 
communist, Ibrahim gelar Datuk Tan Malaka, or Tan Malaka.  Pari did not have a 
mass movement base, but instead had a transnational network in Asia.  For the Indies 
authorities, monitoring these transnational activities required a transnational 
surveillance system.   Ultimately, PID was assigned the task of destroying the 
network.  In order for PID to closely monitor Pari, it established international 
cooperation with British, French, American, and Siamese authorities.501  Spies and 
informants were stationed everywhere to crackdown on the communist movements.  
Their supposed secrecy, however, was doubtful, because people were well aware of 
                                                
501 Shiraishi, “Policing the Phantom Underground,” pp. 1-46.  The core member of Pari, Djamaloeddin 
Tamin wrote his autobiography in 1957, and it detailed how he fought against the international 
intelligence network.  Djamaluddin Tamin, Sedjarah PKI. Djilid III (Jakarta: 1957).   
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their existence and mission.502  Still, this cooperative international surveillance worked 
systematically, and the underground communist movement found it difficult to evade 
the intelligence community.   
The politically charged atmosphere concerning news coverage of communist 
activities opened the way for creative journalists to inform the general public of the 
existence of “underground” Pari in a unique way.  First of all, intelligence information 
gathered at the time had s a Janus-faced nature, which derived from the nature of PID.  
On the one hand, intelligence information was supposed to be secret and circulated 
only within a tight intelligence community; ordinary people had no access to it.  On 
the other hand, collecting this information required surveillance activity that drew 
from innumerable sources for thorough observation.  Unlike the classified information 
itself that the intelligence community shared, some of the details regarding the method 
and process of information collection were!easily observed by the public.  This 
exposure to the public derived from requirements of PID’s activity.  Although it had 
its own agents, the number of these was limited and covering the entire geographic 
area of Indonesia with a staff of this size was nearly impossible.  Hence PID needed to 
rely on many informal field agents to build a network able to cover Pari activities 
comprehensively.  For this, it recruited amateur spies and informants from ordinary 
people for daily surveillance and information gathering.503     
Recruitment of informal spies was an easy task for PID.  The intelligence 
service usually recruited people of educated background, and in this regard journalists 
often served as useful informal agents.  It did not have to train them; in fact it was 
                                                
502 “Spion2 oentoek membaoeni djedjaknja Communisten itoe banjak Sekali dipakai,” in “Spionnage 
dienst di Timoer Djaoh,” Pewarta Deli, February 17, 1934. 
503 Some audience was already familiar with daily spy and/or private detective activities.  For instance, 
in Semaoen’s popular novel of 1921, Hikajat Kadiroen, in his capacity of private citizen, Kadiroen, 
who is then a local official, disguises and wanders in the city and villages to collect information on 
ordinary people’s daily life.  During this private mission, no one can identify Kadiroen in the street.  
What Kadiroen does is not a spy operation, but rather is a work of private detective.  
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better to keep them as amateurs.  Important here is the tension that existed between 
what kind of information these informal agents gathered and the very limited 
information they themselves were allowed to see.  To a certain extent, conducting 
effective undercover work requires that spies have access to information about their 
targets.  Since informal spies were barred from access to confidential information that 
the formal intelligence community shared, another kind of information was needed 
that could be made available to them.  This dilemma opened a crack for the vernacular 
press in the Indies to report on Pari without immediate risk of government crackdown, 
which in turn made it possible for the audience to read about Pari’s mysterious 
underground activities.  Although Pari was a sensitive issue, the colonial government 
did not classify it as a forbidden topic.  Negative commentary against Pari would have 
been welcomed by the authorities, but positive coverage of it or passing on its political 
message was also allowed.  Among local periodicals, the Medan-based vernacular 
daily, Pewarta Deli, under Adi Negoro’s leadership, took advantage of this situation 
and covered Pari related news in the 1930s.  To report about Pari, it relied on Dutch 
press coverage such as that found in Java Bode, the publications of international news 
agencies, and sometimes the files of the Political Intelligence Service that was made 
available locally.  Java Bode’s reports on Pari were useful and “safe” (that is, 
acceptable by the authorities) because it was under an ultra- conservative Dutch chief 
editor H. C. Zentgraaf between 1932 and 1938 and regularly fulminated against 
Indonesian communists.504  By following this strategy, Pewarta Deli’s coverage of 
Pari was never questioned by the authorities or subjected to persbreidel.  Coincidently, 
Pewarta Deli’s coverage of Pari started a month before the first persbreidel case was 
approved by the Indies state.  Its coverage of Pari, however, was not comprehensive, 
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only sporadically published, and careful to stay clear of promoting Pari’s political 
message.  Over the period of seven years from 1932 to 1938, it had twenty-five 
articles that were related to Pari.  Despite its limited coverage of Pari, it published 
factual news about the organization and particularly about Tan Malaka and other 
movement leaders of the Sumatran regions.  With this coverage Pewarta Deli 
managed to contribute uniquely t to the creation of legendary figures.   
Tan Malaka and Djamaloeddin Tamin were two names that Pewarta Deli often 
mentioned after 1932, even though there were other top communist leaders in the 
1910s and the 1920s, such as Hadji Misbach, Semaoen, Darsono, Alimin, Moeso, and 
Soebakat.  Not coincidentally, the latter group of communists was Javanese, whereas 
both Tan Malaka and Djamaloeddin Tamin were Minangkabau.  Pewarta Deli closely 
followed the latter, presumably because Tan Malaka and Tamin came from Sumatra 
and their stories were more fascinating for the Minangkabau audience.  Pewarta Deli 
also introduced its readers to the world of spies and intelligence activities.  In a way 
the ambiguous border between press coverage and fictional stories had created a space 
for the audience to participate imaginatively in the struggle of Pari. 
 
Pari 
 On June 1, 1927, the three ex-PKI exiles, Tan Malaka, Djamaloeddin Tamin, 
and Soebakat, established Pari in Bangkok.  Its objective was to achieve full and 
complete independence for Indonesia.  Its operations however were based outside 
Indonesia.  All three of Pari’s leaders were international fugitives and desperately 
needed to find secure places of residence and sources of income.  After Pari’s 
establishment the decision was made to split its leadership up to better evade capture.  
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Soekabat remained in Bangkok, while Djamaloeddin Tamin left for Singapore and 
Tan Malaka for Manila.505   
Within days of his return to Manila in August 1927, Tan Malaka was arrested 
by the American authorities and deported to Amoy, China, with little possibility of 
maintaining contact with his comrades.  Soebakat found employment in Bangkok and 
remained active for two years until he was seized by the Siamese authorities in 
October 1929.  Djamaloeddin Tamin found a safe place in Singapore from where he 
could keep in touch with Indonesia and former PKI members, until his capture by the 
British authorities in September 1932.506 
Secrecy was the hallmark of Pari networking and activities.  Members kept a 
low profile in their respective places, and communicated using codes.  The codes 
devised to mask personal details, place names and political communications were 
elaborate, and from the outset Pari used them heavily in their documents. Even its 
manifesto was full of codes when referring to names and places.  The Dutch 
authorities were able to intercept many items of their correspondence, and yet failed to 
break all the codes.  Partially broken codes that were reported in secret Dutch colonial 
documents show how Pari members and former PKI activists corresponded with each 
other.  In 1935 the Dutch authorities translated and made a summary of the Pari 
manifesto.  This decoded translation goes as follows: 
 
Not long afterwards LIA (Boedi) and JATIM (the alias of Moeso) came to 
Hanoi (Amoy) and wanted to travel to Tokyo with two others.  This was not 
possible because of passport difficulties.  So DENMAS (Alimin) who was 
                                                
505 Helen Jarvis, Partai Republik Indonesia (PARI): Was It ‘The Sole Golden Bridge to the Republic of 
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506 Djamaluddin Tamin, Sedjarah PKI. Djilid III (Jakarta: 1957), pp. 61-82. 
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then in Tokyo with HASNI (Tan Malaka) conveyed this information.  LIA 
(Boedi) and JATIM (Moeso) telegraphed to HASNI (Tan Malaka) from Hanoi 
(possibly Amoy or Singapore) asking him to come there.  HASNI (Tan 
Malaka) proposed to hold calm discussions in Hanoi (Amoy) with the 
prominent leaders of the islands, since he surmised that things had taken place 
without the knowledge of Moscow. 
JATIM (Moeso) replied in a furious letter to HASNI (Tan Malaka).  He said 
that he had been appointed by the eleven leaders to go to HASNI (Tan 
Malaka) and to invite him to travel to Moscow to discuss banknotes (the 
revolution). […] 
Knowing that DENMAS (Alimin) was a member of the PKI leadership and 
had recently come from Java and, moreover, that he was in possession of 
legitimate papers from the Japanese authorities on Formosa, and considering 
that HASNI (Tan Malaka) was under treatment from a doctor, he (Tan 
Malaka) agreed.  He gave DENMAS (Alimin) the funds they needed for the 
journey.  To cover himself, he gave DENMAS (Alimin) a letter contained 
short theses, with which DENMAS (Alimin) approved.  […] 
KOEBAN and SJAK (possibly Soetan Said Ali and Abdul Karim) were 
already in Hanoi (Singapore).  A full code was worked out between HASNI 
(Tan Malaka) and DENMAS (Alimin).  The writers then state that DENMAS, 
although he had sufficient money, did not again raise contact, and did not 
bring forward the theses in the meeting (in Singapore).  Instead he set off for 
Moscow with JATIM (Moeso). 
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Then HASNI (Tan Malaka) later came to Hanoi (Singapore) and there met 
MOECTAR (Soebakat) and found there had been no proper meeting, and 
HASNI’s theses had remained unopened.507 
 
Tan Malaka and Alimin were mainly responsible for preparing the codes used in Pari 
correspondence.  Codes were used when their letters made reference to actual Pari-
related activists and activities, while former PKI leaders who did not have any contact 
with Pari were referred to using their real names, such as Baars, Sneevliet, Semaoen, 
Darsono and Soegono.  Pari’s leadership knew that they were kept under severe 
surveillance and had to go about their business carefully and clandestinely; especially 
after the Dutch authorities broke the codes for major names and places in the 
manifesto. 
In the Indies there were ten cities where Pari had its associates.  On Java they 
included Soerakarta, Tjepoe, Soerabaja, Wonogiri, Kediri, and Batavia.  Outside Java, 
Pari members could be found in Banjarmasin (West Borneo), Medan (East Coast of 
Sumatra), Sungei Gerong (South Sumatra) and Riau (South Sumatra).508  Active 
members were Sarosoan and Danoewirjo in Soerakarta, Soenarjo in Soerabaja, 
Soetedjo in Tjepoe, Ngadimin in Wonogiri, R. Moerdono in Kediri, Jachja Nasution 
and Daja bin Joesoef in Batavia, Mardjono and Moenandar in Bandjarmasin, Iwa 
Kusuma Sumantri in Medan, Mohammed Arif Siregar and eight others in Sungei 
Gerong, and Umar Giri Abdurrachman and Subandi in Riau.509  Despite the 
organization’s secrecy these Pari members were arrested by the authorities and sent to 
Boven Digoel.   
                                                
507 “Summary of the Manifesto of the Partij Republik Indonesia (PARI) from Mailrapport 446x/36, 
translated in Jarvis, Partai Republik Indonesia (PARI), “Appendix 2,” pp. 6-8. 
508 Intriguingly, none of those cities belong to Minang territory where Tan Malaka originated. 
509 Jarvis, Partai Republik Indonesia (PARI), Footnotes, pp. 4-5. 
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Arrest of Pari associates took place abroad, too, where the organization was 
under international surveillance from the beginning.  The British, French, American, 
and Siamese counterparts of the Dutch intelligence service were all primed to detect 
communist activities in the region.  The colonial powers believed that the Comintern 
was planning to cause disturbances in the colonies.  Regular reports by consular 
officials and secret police in the region reinforced this idea by adding a section on the 
Comintern related movements and activities.  Western officials saw the Comintern’s 
hand behind the communist uprisings in 1926 and 1927 in the Indies, and the Nghe 
Tinh Rebellion of 1930-1931 in French Indochina.510  Warning signs had been notable 
in the region already, and these incidents turned these incipient developments into real 
threats.  There was no doubt that intelligence agencies of multiple nations were 
watching Pari closely and exchanged information on its activities.  This transnational 
intelligence network paid off for the Dutch government.  Major arrests of Pari 
members took place in 1928, 1929 and 1932.  
As PID and its international counter partners uncovered Pari’s underground 
activity in the region, the resulting series of captures almost destroyed the 
organization.  Those who were arrested in foreign countries were sent “back” to the 
Indies and sent off to Boven Digoel.  Despite international intelligence cooperation, 
however, Pari’s leader, Tan Malaka, remained elusive and became famous for his 
international “fugitive” status throughout the 1930s. 
 
Tan Malaka 
Tan Malaka’s uncanny ability to elude detainment earned him comparison with 
the Scarlet Pimpernel, the mysterious fictional hero in Baroness Emmuska Orczy’s 
                                                
510 Anne L. Foster, “Alienation and Cooperation: European, Southeast Asian, and American Perceptions 
of Anti-Colonial Rebellion, 1919-1937,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1995). 
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adventure novels set during the French Revolution.  “Patjar Merah,” the Malay 
translation of “Scarlet Pimpernel,” came to be attributed to him.  As early as in 
October 1932, the local office of the Political Information Service (archief Politieke 
Recherche) in Medan had already described Tan Malaka as “the scarlet pimpernel” in 
its file.511  
Ibrahim Datuk Tan Malaka had been the most popular communist figure in 
Indonesia since before the 1920s.  Born in Padang Gadang near Suliki, West Sumatra, 
in 1894, he was educated at the teacher’s training school in Bukittinggi.  He then was 
sent to the Netherlands to further his studies, so he could get a teacher’s license to 
teach at Dutch schools in the Indies.  But his encounter with Christiaan Snouck 
Hurgronje512 changed his mind, and he spent most of his time reading books.  It was 
the time of World War I when Europe was experiencing rapid social change and 
socialist thought was spreading among intellectuals.  Tan Malaka thus began to lean 
towards socialist ideas, and Marx’s Capital became his favorite book.513  Upon his 
return from the Netherlands in late 1919, he taught at school for a while in a plantation 
in East Sumatra.  The inhuman conditions under which contract coolies worked there 
increased his passion for communism.  In 1920 he moved to Semarang, Central Java, 
where he founded People’s Schools (Sekolah Rakyat) based on communist principles.  
In late 1921 he replaced Semaoen as the leader of PKI.  Accused of delivering 
inflammatory speeches and writings, he was arrested by the Indies authorities and 
exiled to the Netherlands in March 1922.  In late 1922 he moved to Berlin and then to 
                                                
511 “Djamaloeddin Tamin,” Pewarta Deli, October 18, 1932.  The scarlet pimpernel is Baroness 
Emmuska Orczy’s classic play in 1903 and her adventure novel in 1905.  The story is set during the 
reign of terror during the French Revolution when the mysterious Scarlet Pimpernel and his league 
rescued aristocrats through underground channels and sent them to Britain. 
512 Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936) was professor of Oriental cultures and languages at Leiden 
University, and an Advisor on Native and Islamic Affairs to the Netherlands government. 
513 For Tan Malaka’s encounter with Snouck Hurgronje and socialist ideas, Nagazumi Akira, Indonesia 
Minzoku Ishiki no Keisei (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1980), pp. 227-228. 
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Moscow, where he became involved with the politics of the Communist International 
(Comintern).  In mid-1923 he was appointed as Comintern representative for 
Southeast Asia.  He subsequently established his headquarters in Canton, China, in 
December 1923, moving to Manila in 1925, and to Singapore in 1926.  He traveled to 
Canton, Manila, Bangkok, Shanghai, Tokyo and other places.  In June 1927 in 
Bangkok, he founded the new party, Pari as an underground organization with a 
relatively small membership, but an international network.514  
For readers of Pewarta Deli, Tan Malaka was known as “mysterieman” 
(mystery man),515 although in the first half of the 1920s his name was well publicized 
in the press in the Indies as well in newspapers of other countries.  Also he was 
considered “dangerous” to public order by the Indies state.  The authorities worried 
about his political influence over the public, including the effect of his published 
writings.  In one example of this concern, an October 1926 news article in Perwarta 
Deli reported that a person named Raoef Waktoe was arrested by the police for the 
possession of the book Naar de Republiek Indonesia (Towards the Republic of 
Indonesia) written by Tan Malaka.516  But in most of the press coverage of the Indies, 
Tan Malaka’s name disappeared from the latter half of the 1920s onwards, partly 
because of his “alleged” involvement in the communist rebellions of 1926 and 1927, 
and partly because PKI was banned.  The rare exception to this pattern was Pewarta 
Deli, which continued to cover news on Tan Malaka and his party, Pari through the 
1930s.  In fact, it was Pewarta Deli’s articles that turned Tan Malaka into the 
“mystery man” and a legend.   
                                                
514 Harry Poeze, Tan Malaka: Strijder voor Indonesië's vrijheid: levensloop van 1897 tot 1945 (’s-
Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1976); Benedict Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1972), pp. 269-274. 
515 “Tan Malacca benar soedah dapat ditangkap?: Bersama Djamaloeddin Tamin akan diasingkan ke 
Boven Digoel,” Pewarta Deli, December 23, 1932. 
516 “Toean Oesman glr. St. Keadilan,” Pewarta Deli, October 6, 1926.  Naar de Republiek Indonesia 
was written in Dutch and published in Tokyo in 1925. 
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Even small “factual” articles contributed to the creation of his legendary 
image.  For instance, the section “Indonesia” in the newspaper’s July 14, 1926, issue 
carried an article on Tan Malaka.  It was probably one of the earliest occasions that his 
name appeared in the press after he was exiled from the Indies.  The article reported 
that an alleged Tan Malaka had stayed at a Chinese hotel in Pajacombo in West 
Sumatra, and that the local police had come to search for him.  When registering at the 
hotel, he signed his name as “Tan Min Siong.”  In December 1925 he reportedly left 
Singapore and came to Pajacombo by way of Bengkalis.  Dressed in Chinese attire, he 
told the hotel owner that he worked as a contractor who dealt with Chinese coolies in 
Bangka.  People were suspicious of him because he pretended not to understand the 
Indonesian language and always spoke Chinese.  When he checked out of the hotel, 
intentionally or otherwise, he used a ticket with the name Tan Malaka.517  The ticket 
was the clue that the police used to identify him as Tan Malaka, whom they had 
known to be a smart and tricky leader (pemimpin jang tjerdik), as well as a famous red 
movement leader (pemimpin merah jang terkenal).  The police searched for him 
everywhere in town, but in vain.  This incident left many unanswered questions.518 
It is not clear if the mysterious person described in the Perwarta Deli report 
was really Tan Malaka.  The more important issue, however, is the fact that the local 
police believed him to be Tan Malaka, and that the press reported it as such.  By 
reading these newspaper articles, readers obtained an idea of who Tan Malaka was and 
how he moved around surreptitiously.  Since articles did not inform readers of the 
intention of Tan Malaka’s actions, they could only speculate what his appearance in 
any given location actually signified.  This is how the legendary figure of Tan Malaka 
was created.   
                                                
517 The article does not specify what kind of ticket that he used, but presumably he used it to pay his 
room. 
518 “Tan Malaka alias Tan Min Siong,” Pewarta Deli, July 14, 1926. 
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Since 1932 Pewarta Deli reported sporadically on Tan Malaka and his 
underground political party, Pari, along with its affiliated activists; Articles covered 
news of the main figures of the party against the context of international espionage 
activities that were carried out by the colonial powers, and which were reported as 
actual fact drawn from documents obtained from colonial authorities or stories 
reported by the international press.  Little if any reference was ever made to statements 
made by Pari leaders themselves. Writers of Pewarta Deli maintained that they simply 
collected their information from existing, often secondary sources to create their own 
news stories.   
By disguising himself and traveling under different names, Tan Malaka moved 
far afield in Asia and became known as a political figure who wandered overseas 
(orang politik jang mengembara diloear negeri).  While sometimes arrested, he 
somehow always managed to escape from jail.  A variety of anecdotes built up the Tan 
Malaka’s image.  Instructive is the rumor spread in December 1932 that Tan Malaka 
was captured by the British police in Hong Kong and would be sent back to Indonesia.  
Reports and rumors of his alleged arrest had already circulated numerous times before.  
In this instance, Perwarta Deli reported that while a press report of Tan Malaka’s 
arrest in Hong Kong existed, rumor also had it that Djamaloeddin Tamin, who resided 
in Singapore, was actually Tan Malaka.  Noting that in the case of Tan Malaka, most 
news coverage turned out to be false.  Pewarta Deli concluded its article with a 
question, “Was he really arrested?  We are waiting for the truth regarding this 
news.”519  Six weeks later, the newspaper appears to confirm that Tan Malaka was 
captured in Hong Kong and was now on his way to be sent back to Indonesia.520  The 
report was somber in tone:     
                                                
519 “Ibrahim Tan Malaka djago Communist ditangkap?: Oleh politie Inggeris di Hongkong, katanja: 
Akan dibawa ke Indonesia,” Pewarta Deli, December 5, 1932. 
520 “Iman Mahdi dari “Pari” (Partai Republiek Indonesia),” Pewarta Deli, January 14, 1933. 
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Sometimes his escape is so close that people think, for instance, that after he 
departed Hong Kong, his life depended on a strand of silk.  Whether or not he 
is still alive is a big question mark.” 
 
Two months later, however, yet another article in Perwarta Deli poked fun at the 
rumor of Tan Malaka’s arrest.  The headline asks, “Is it really true that Ibrahim Tan 
Malaka has been arrested in Hong Kong?,” but the subtitle gives away the answer.  
The article promises a “news update that is awe-inspiring, surprising, sensational,” 
especially for certain (presumably Dutch) elements of the “press which have been 
reveling and laughing [since the news of the arrest] and are now stunned.”521  
In its June 30, 1933 edition, Pewarta Deli made reference to Tan Malaka as the 
Scarlet Pimpernel for the first time, almost nine months after its reporter found a file at 
the office of the PID in Medan drawing an analogy between Tan Malaka and “the 
scarlet pimpernel” of Baronesse Orczy’s famed adventure novel.522  The fugitive is 
said to be “shrewd as the Scarlet Pimpernel” (litjinnja sebagai Patjar Merah).523  The 
analogy seemed to catch on as “Patjar Merah” came to be established as Tan Malaka’s 
nickname. 
On February 2, 1934, Pewarta Deli shared some confusing information that 
had been reported in the Dutch newspaper Java Bode.  The article essentially 
                                                
521 “Apa betoel Ibrahim Tan Malaka soedah ditangkap di Hongkong?: Pekabaran jang menta’adjoebkan, 
heran, menggemparkan, pers sama berdjingkerak-djingkerak dan tertawa2 achirnja melongo,” Pewarta 
Deli, March 3, 1933. 
522 “Djamaloeddin Tamin,” Pewarta Deli, October 18, 1932.  
523 This is the first time Pewarta Deli referred Tan Malaka as “Patjar Merah.”  “Tan Malaka dan soal 
rechtspositienja di djadjahan Amerika,” Pewarta Deli, June 30, 1933.  The first Malay translation of 
Baronesse Orczy’s Scarlet Pimpernel was published in 1926 by Balai Poestaka under the title Patjar 
Mérah.  The translator, R. Poeradiredja, was the chief editor for the Sundanese language in the office of 
Balai Poestaka; see Mikihiro Moriyama, Sundanese Print Culture and Modernity in Nineteenth-Century 
West Java (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), p. 124.  The word “pachar” means 
“trafficking” in Bengali, but in this case “patjar” is more likely to refer to a type of bushy flower, 
similar to pimpernel, called “pacar cina” (Aglaia odorata) in Malay. 
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emphasized the deep mystery that surrounded the true whereabouts of Tan Malaka.  
One rumor had it that he was in Singapore, while another reported his sighting in 
Medan.  In both cases the local authorities confirmed the reports as false.524  In the 
end, noted the article, nobody seemed to know where Tan Malaka really was; 
Shanghai, Canton, Singapore, Atjeh, Medan, Soeliki, Pajakoemboeh had all been 
reported as possible places where he appeared to be.  In the first half of the 1930s, 
reports of sightings were limited to a variety of places in Asia.  By the second half of 
the 1930s his fame traveled beyond Asia.  In 1938 a rumor from Cairo said that the 
British intelligence agency had captured Tan Malaka in Tehran, but later he escaped.  
In Egypt, Iran, Afghanistan, India, Ceylon, and Russia, he was now known as “the 
Indonesian Scarlet Pimpernel” (Pachar Merah Indonesia).525  Rumors of Tan 
Malaka’s arrest always came with names of international or local intelligence 
agencies, but he often prevailed over and made a mockery of foreign authorities by 
escaping from prisons.  For his ardent followers in Indonesia, it did not really matter 
whether or not these rumors were true; they took pleasure in reading about “his” 
adventure and conjuring images of him outsmarting the colonial authorities. 
 
Djamaloeddin Tamin 
Djamaloeddin Tamin was the number two leader of Pari, but significantly 
lesser than Tan Malaka in the eyes of Pewarta Deli readers.  From Singapore Tamin in 
fact “almost single handedly” ran Pari’s network in the Indies.  Yet he kept such a low 
profile until his arrest in September 1932 by British police that in December 1932 
                                                
524 “Tan Malak di Singapoera?,” Pewarta Deli, February 10, 1934. 
525 Muhamad Iskandar Ishaq, “President Partai Republiek Indonesia tertangkap ditanah Iran,” Pewarta 
Deli, April 5, 1938. 
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Pewarta Deli still described him as “only a minor leader whose name was not known 
before” (leider ketjil sadja jang doeloean tidak begitoe terkenal namanja).526 
Born in 1900 in Kota Gedang, Padang Pandjang, Tamin graduated from a 
government elementary school in 1913.  He then studied at the Sumatra Thawalib 
School in Padang Pandjang where he met Hadji Rasoel, who was the founder of the 
Islamic Union (Sarikat Islam) in West Sumatra.  The intellectual and philosophical 
influence of Hadji Rasoel led Tamin to join the PKI in 1922.527  Tamin recalled 
Padang Pandjang in 1920 as follows: 
 
Padang Panjang, a small town in Central Sumatra, was the gathering place and 
centre of Religious schools and students of mysticism from all of Sumatra, 
and there from the beginning of 1920 the Socialism-Communism of the Red 
League [Sarikat Merah] began to be discussed.  So, from the beginning 
Padang Panjang became the centre of the red group, became the red town in 
Sumatra, simply by establishing the BOPET MERAH [sic: Red Canteen] as 
the Red group’s cooperative branch there, that is five or six months before the 
PKI was born in Semarang in 1920.528 
 
There he joined the communist movement (gerakan merah) with his friend 
Baharoeddin Saleh.  In 1923 Tamin collaborated with Hadji Datuk Batuah in editing 
the newspaper Pemandangan Islam (The View of Islam), which “sought the common 
ground between Islam and communism in their struggle against capitalism and 
                                                
526 “Tan Malacca benar soedah dapat ditangkap?: Bersama Djamaloeddin Tamin akan diasingkan ke 
Boven Digoel,” Pewarta Deli, December 23, 1932. 
527 Kahin, From Rebellion to Integration, p. 39. 
528 Tamin, Sedjarah PKI, p. 10. Translation is taken from Kahin, From Rebellion to Integration, p. 38.  
Emphasis in original. 
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colonialism,” 529 and hence was considered the ideological mouthpiece of Islamic-
Communism.530 
The story of Tamin’s activism begins with his arrest.  One day Tamin and his 
friend went to Kota Lawas to give speeches at a communist political gathering.  
Government spies (spion spion Pemerentah) were all over the event.  At the gathering 
Tamin delivered a speech which was immediately charged as a “speech offence.”  He 
was sentenced to nine months in prison by the court in Padang Pandjang.531   
Intriguingly, Pewarta Deli reconstructed Djamaloeddin Tamin’s life based on 
clippings from Dutch newspapers and police reports.  It relied on available “safe” 
sources, and only reported “events” in which Tamin was involved.  In this sense its 
coverage of Tamin was similar to the reports that the police would make.  There was 
no relaying of Tamin’s remarks, so readers could not know his real thoughts.  
According to Pewarta Deli’s reconstruction of his political career, Tamin was 
stationed in Singapore, and because of its geographical position he was able to 
function as the cornerstone of the regional communist movement, interacting with the 
people from Europe and China who came and went there.  The Kuomintang 
movement was propagating bolshevism in Singapore, which influenced the Chinese in 
the Indies.  Meanwhile, Tamin had connections with Chinese communists from China 
who were working in the Straits Settlements as well as those who were active in the 
anti-Dutch movement.  In Singapore Tamin was regarded as a leader of the communist 
movement.532  He organized political action (actie) with Chinese revolutionary figures 
and with them committed to the establishment of the South Seas Communist Party, 
                                                
529 Kahin, From Rebellion to Integration, p. 39. 
530 Taufik Abdullah, Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927-1933) 
(Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1971), pp. 72-73. 
531 “Jamaloeddin Tamin,” Pewarta Deli, October 18, 1932. 
532 “Djamaloedin Tamin, pengadjoer “Partai Republiek India”: Soedah dibawa ke Betawi: Organisatie 
pergerakannja di Singapore,” Pewarta Deli, December 19, 1932. 
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which oversaw communist movements and actions in the British Malaya, the Indies, 
Siam, and French Indochina.533  In 1934, Tamin was charged with and found guilty of 
attempting subversion because of his commitment to the 1927 uprising in West 
Sumatra, but before the actual uprising he managed to escape to Malaya and then 
headed to the coast in South China.534 
Later Tamin moved to Singapore where he lay low.  He also became involved 
in forming and leading Pari, along with Tan Malaka and Soebakat, before the latter 
was captured in Bangkok and later committed suicide in his home in Java.  In June 
1930 Tamin became involved in secretly working with underground Chinese 
communists in Shanghai, which also involved contact with leaders active in 
organizing efforts towards an international communist movement, including Lefanc 
Serge, an agent from the Third International, and “Noullens,” the leader of the Pan 
Pacific Labor Union.  While the arrest and imprisonment of these latter collaborators 
cut these secret efforts short, Tamin often gave speeches at political gatherings in 
Shanghai as member of the South Seas Communist Party, and made several trips to 
Moscow and Vladivostok.  According to the account of Dutch government spies in 
1932, Tamin had built relations with several people from Java and Sumatra, but until 
then his intention was not yet clear.  In September 1932 he was arrested in Singapore 
along with nine associates. 
Djamaloeddin Tamin was described as an influential activist not only in Pari 
but also in the context of the regional communist movement in Asia.  An October 
1932 article in Pewarta Deli, published one month after he was arrested in Singapore, 
was titled “The role of Djamaloeddin Tamin in the Communist movement in the 
Pacific part of Asia” (Rolnja Djamaloeddin Tamin dalam pergerakan Kommunist 
                                                
533 In fact, Tamin opposed to the idea that the South Seas Communist Party oversaw communist party 
activities in other regions. 
534 “Imam Mahdi dari ‘Pari’ (Partai Republiek Indonesia),” Pewarta Deli, January 14, 1933. 
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ditepi benoea Asia sebelah ke Laoetan Tedoeh) and covered the latter part of his 
activist career.535  Through this and subsequent reports, Pewarta Deli introduced and 
constructed an image of Djamaloeddin Tamin for its readers. 
But unlike Tan Malaka, who later became known as the Indonesian Scarlet 
Pimpernel in popular novels, no novel featuring Tamin as the main hero was ever 
written, nor much else was known about him.  Newspaper articles were the only 
medium through which people could get to know him.  The way in which Pewarta 
Deli constructed his image as an internationally active communist in Asia was similar 
to that of Tan Malaka.  The international intelligence community was said to have had 
a hard time identifying both of them.  Reportedly, as Tamin and Tan Malaka appeared 
able to thoroughly change their appearances, the local police in Medan kept many 
pictures of both in their files in the hopes these would help them identify and capture 
the two activists.  Even pictures taken on the afternoon and in the evening of the same 
day showed them in guises that were completely different.536  Many times the 
intelligence agents were said to have become unsure that the persons they were 
monitoring were the right ones.   
 
Pari Smoked Out 
In the latter half of 1933, the news of Tamin’s arrest and the capture of 
Moehammad Arif Siregar alias M. Ajoep Siregar and his colleagues in Soengai 
Gerong shook the confidence of Pari supporters and audience.  Pari was supposed to 
be an underground organization and its activities were undercover, and yet its major 
activists and associates had got caught.  These high profile arrests not only caused 
                                                
535 “Djamaloeddin Tamin: Rolnja Djamaloeddin Tamin dalam pergerakan Kommunist ditepi benoea 
Asia sebelah ke Laoetan Tedoeh” Pewarta Deli, October 15, 1932. 
536 “Djamaloeddin Tamin: Rolnja Djamaloeddin Tamin dalam pergerakan Kommunist ditepi benoea 
Asia sebelah ke Laoetan Tedoeh” Pewarta Deli, October 15, 1932. 
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anxiety and diminishing hope for revolutionary action among Pari supporters, but also 
demonstrated the power of the PID in the Indies to successfully identify and 
eventually capture underground activists, despite the latter’s efforts at keeping a low 
profile in their respective hiding places.  The PSI’s achievement alarmed the public, 
and made them aware of the presence of government “eyes” watching from every 
corner.   
Tamin’s detainment seriously damaged Pari, because of his important role in 
leading the organization’s activities in the Indies from his base in Singapore.  Upon 
this turn of events, some vernacular press newspapers held anti-Pari campaigns.  In an 
editorial of Bintang Timoer, Parada Harahap openly questioned whether Pari really 
existed, and whether any particular activity or ideology could actually be ascribed to 
it.  Another vernacular press, Han Po, shared this view and doubted the reality of Pari.  
Considering that Han Po was a Chinese-Malay newspaper in Palembang where the 
major arrest operation took place at Soengei Gerong on September 17, 1932,537 it was 
possible that the newspaper had tried to calm down members of the local community, 
among whom rumors on Pari’s seizure were spreading. 
As a pro-Pari media, Pewarta Deli felt the need to respond to the above 
allegations by other newspapers.  It also needed to regain shaken confidence of its 
audience.  So about a year after the Soengei Gerong operation, Pewarta Deli 
acknowledged that major Pari members had been detained and were scheduled to be 
sent to Boven Digoel. The newspaper revealed that it had received letters from a Pari 
detainee and published them in the October 5, 1933, issue.  The article was titled 
“Partai Republiek Indonesia: Satoe pergerakan revoloesioner jang tersemboenji bagi 
oemoem” (“The Republic of Indonesia Party: A revolutionary movement hidden from 
                                                
537 Palembang was an important oil-refining center in the Indies and Soengei Gerong was where the 
American company Standard Oil refineries adjoining the eastern side of the Dutch Shell refineries.   
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the public”), and it contained “two letters” from Mohd. Arif Siregar along with some 
explanations about Pari’s current circumstances.538   
Pewarta Deli admitted to have been hesitant about publishing the letters, 
taking into consideration Pari’s secretive nature, and explained that it finally decided 
to open the letters to the public in order to prove wrong the allegations that Pari was 
only a fabrication.  For this reason, too, the paper had decided to present the account 
of this particular Pari member in the original first-person narrative.  It was very rare 
for a first-person narrative to be publicized in Perwarta Deli, but in this case, the 
newspaper’s editors knew the report had to sound convincing enough for the readers to 
be certain about Pari.  
The author of the letters was Arif Siregar, who was an active associate of Pari 
in Soengei Gerong, Palembang.  He was detained by PID on September 17, 1932, 
spent one year at HV Bewaring Struiswijk prison in Batavia, and then was deported to 
Boven Digoel in September 1933.  According to Pewarta Deli the two letters were 
dated on September 25 and 26, 1933, respectively, though one letter clearly showed 
that it was written on September 23.539  When he wrote these letters, Arif Siregar had 
just been transferred from the prison, and brought to Tandjoeng Priok, the seaport of 
Batavia, on his way to Boven Digoel.  Due to his status as detainee, he was under tight 
security and had little time to write letters, and hence the notes were relatively concise. 
 
Your Excellency (Padoeka toean jang terhormat): 
Our intention to write this is not solely for Mr. Parada Harahap. 
                                                
538 “Partai Republiek Indonesia: Satoe pergerakan revoloesioner jang tersemboenji bagi oemoem” 
Pewarta Deli, October 10, 1933.   
539 In the letter, however, it says that “today 23 September 1933” (Ini hari 23 9-33), and so it can be 
assumed that the date of written was September 23, but the date of censored was September 25, which 
was the date that editorial of Pewarta Deli referred to. 
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We know that this writing is not normal, nor done in an especially 
refined way. 
We write this in haste on our way to deportation in Boven Digoel.  Of 
course everyone can understand how tight the security is, especially with our 
hands being handcuffed.  But even in this condition we still try to write this 
brief note, which happens to be in our possession. 
Today September 23, 1933, I, M. Arif Siregar alias M. Ajoob Siregar 
originating from Baringin (Sipirok) was released from HV Bewaring 
Struiswijk (Batavia Centrum) and sent to Boven Digoel, along with associates 
Djamaloeddin Tamin and Aifjasin Tenek alias Daja Joesoef, both from West 
Sumatra.  All three of us are victims from the Republic of Indonesia Party, 
which is shortened as “PARI.” 
On 2 June 1927, PARI was established, and since then, until the day 
we were arrested in Soengei Gerong (Palembang) on September 17, 1932, we 
lived to defend PARI.  With full conviction and resolution, we decided to 
defend PARI because we knew PARI, a revolutionary Proletarian Party, has 
relied solely on the consciousness and power of the Revolutionary Proletarian 
Laborers and Peasants in Indonesia. 
Enthusiasm of PKI leaders in the past and the misunderstanding of 
“Revolution” by our PKI associates have pushed PKI into an abyss, so that 
hopes which had brought us closer to our goals in the past, to this day are still 
neglected.540 
                                                
540 “Partai Republiek Indonesia: Satoe pergerakan revoloesioner jang tersemboenji bagi oemoem,” 
Pewarta Deli, October 5, 1933. 
 Padoeka toean jang terhormat: 
Maksoed kita menoelis ini, boekanlah semata2 terhadap diri t. Parada Harahap 
sendiri. 
Kita tahoe toelisan ini tidak menempoeh djalan setjara mestinja apa lagi dengan 
toelisan jang amat haloes poela.   
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The first short letter with some 240 words was clearly directed at Parada Harahap, 
who had questioned Pari’s existence in his newspaper Bintang Timoer.  Arif Siregar 
had apparently been aware of this allegation and his letter was in part a response to it.  
To substantiate his account, the letter contains concrete information such as dates, 
names of Pari members and their origins, and names of specific places.  The letter 
indicates clearly that was written on September 23, 1933, on the day the writer and his 
associates were to be deported to Boven Digoel.  They were self-described as Pari 
“victims” (korban korban).  The next paragraph reviews the history of Pari, the date of 
its establishment and the writer’s characterization of it as a revolutionary proletarian 
party.  The last paragraph bears a veiled criticism of PKI and its leadership, whose 
(mis)understanding of “Revolution” (as uprising) had led to its collapse and neglect of 
the original goal (independent Indonesia).  This view shares Tan Malaka’s stance on 
PKI’s failed “revolution.”    
The view also corresponds with the disapproving tone of the second letter, 
which opens with criticism of the Comintern in relation to local communist parties.   
 
Your Excellency: 
                                                                                                                                       
Kita menoelis dengan dengan tergopoh2 ialah dalam waktoe perdjalanan ketempat 
pemboeangan kita di Boven Digoel.  Semoea orang tentoe soedah makloem, bagaimana rapinja 
pendjagaan, serta poela dengan tangan jg selaloe dibelenggoe.  Dalam hal jg demikian ditjoba 
djoega menoelis beriefkaart ini, jang kebetoelan masih ada dalam kandoengan kita. 
Ini hari 23 9-33 kita M. Arif Siregar alias M. Ajoob Siregar asal dari Baringin 
(Sipirok) dikeloearkan dari H.v. Bewaring Struiswijk (Batavia C.) dan dikirim ke Boven 
Digoel, bersama kawan kawan, Djamaloeddin Tamin dan Aifjasin Tenek alias Daja Joesoef 
doea-doea asal dari S. Barat.  Kami bertiga ini, ialah korban korban dari Partai Republik 
Indonesia jang dengan pendek diseboet “PARI.”   
Pada 2 Juni 1927, PARI dibangoenkan, dan sedjak itoe, sampai harinja kita ditangkap 
di Soengei Gerong (Palembang) pada 17 Sept. 1932, kita hidoep oentoek membela PARI.  
Dengan kejakinan jang penoeh dan toenggan hati, kita setoedjoe dan membela PARI sebab kita 
soedah tahoe PARI satoe Partai Proletaat revoloesioner, jg semata mata bersoendikan 
kesedaran dan kekoeatan Proletaar Beroeh dan Tani Revoloesioner di Indonesia sendiri. 
Kerelahan2 pimpinan P.K.I. doeloe dan kesesatan paham “Revolutie” oleh kawan 
kawan PKI enz. Soedah mendjeroemoeskan PKI kedalam djoerang, sehingga harapan2 jang 
soedah mendekatkan kepada maksoed tempoh hari, sampai ini hari masih tertoenda. 
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Taking into consideration the obliteration of PKI as of January 1, 
1927; the postponement of Social Revolution and the Stabilization of German 
Capitalism by the Dawes Plan, and the betrayal by the Social Democrats in 
Germany in 1923; the leadership and attitudes by the Comintern and Soviet 
Russia, which want to decide on their own all the programs, tactics, actions 
and Revolution for all the Proletarians in the World, which brought 
catastrophe to the Communist Party of Asia (Canton, China) on May 1, 1927; 
and considering the regress and the weaknesses of Communist Parties in 
Proletarian countries, such as Europe and America, which have declined since 
1923; PARI has settled on a “beginsel-program, work program, and 
organization” all its own, which are not related to Moscow’s Commintern nor 
to its Foreign Politics. 
As long as the leadership and attitudes of the Communist are as such, 
as long as the Proletarian movements in all regions have not yet stood on their 
own consciousness and a power that is self-generated, PARI too will stand on 
its own, and built a Proletarian Republic of Indonesia.  Therefore, it should be 
clear to all Proletarians in Indonesia that from time to time the Indonesian 
Proletarian Party [PARI] will work together with all Proletarian Parties in the 
World, so long as PARI will have the opportunity to preserve its own basis 
and stances.  Certainly PARI as a Revolutionary Proletarian Party also moves 
toward “the Brotherhood of the World’s Poor,” which means “International 
Brotherhood.” 
I, together with associates Djamaloeddin Tamin and A. Tenek alias 
Daja Joesoef, are the third time PARI victims who have been Digoelized (di 
Digoelkan).  The first PARI victim to be Digoelized was associate Maswar 
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alias Oei Ah Thong, who was captured in Singapore on September 9, 1928 
and Digoelized in 1929. 
The second were associates Mardjono Soetedjo and six others who 
were Digoelized in 1931.  Other than that, one victim who will always be 
remembered by members of PARI (Paristen) is the death of associate 
Soebakat in Glodok prison on February 15, 1930, after he was arrested in 
Siam (Bangkok) in September 1929.541  
 
That is all the time we have: 
With respect, 
Mohd. Arif Siregar  
On the way to Boven Digoel542 
                                                
541 Another article reports that Soebakat committed suicide in the prison.  “Imam Mahdi dari “Pari” 
(Partai Republiek Indonesia),” Pewarta Deli, January 14, 1933. 
542 “Partai Republiek Indonesia: Satoe pergerakan revoloesioner jang tersemboenji bagi oemoem,” 
Pewarta Deli, October 5, 1933. 
 Padoeka toean jang terhormat: 
Mengingat kepada kehantjoerannja P.K.I. sampei 1 Janurari 27 mengingat 
tertoendanja Sociaal Revolutie dan Stabielnja – Kapitalisme Djerman oleh Dawes Plan, seria 
chianatnja Kaoem Sociaal Democraat di Djerman ’23; meingat pimpinan dan sikap2 
Kommintern dengan Sovjet Rusland, jang semata-mata maoe mentjetak sendiri, seloeroeh 
programma, taktiek, actie dan Revolutie oentoek seloeroeh Proletariaat di Doenia, sehingga 
membawa hantjoernja Partai Kommunist di Asia (Canton Tiongkok) pada 1 Mei 1927, dan 
mengingat kepada kemoendoeran dan kelemahan kelemahan Partai Kommunist dinegeri negeri 
Proletariaat sendiri, ja’ni Europa dan America jang beroentoen2 djatoeh sedari 1923, maka 
PARI menetapkan “baginsel-programma, werkprogramma, organisatie dan tactieknja sendiri,” 
ja’ni tidak berhoeboengan dengan Kommintern Moscow dan tidak poela dengan Politiek Loear 
Negeri. 
Selama keadaan pimpinan dan sikap sikapnja Kommunist jang demikian, selama 
gerakan Proletariaat di seloeroeh daerah, beloem berdiri atas sendi kesedaran dan kekoeatan 
jang lahir dalam karangan daerah2 itoe sendiri selama itoe pada Pari akan berdiri sendiri, dan 
mendirikan Republik Indonesia jang Proletarias.  Sebab itoe teranglah agaknja bagi seloeroeh 
Proletaar di Indonesia, bahwa sewaktoe2 Partai Proletaar Indonesia kelak akan bekerdja 
bersama2 djoega dengan seloeroeh Partai Proletariaat di Doenia, jang Pari djoega mendapat 
kesempatan seloeas2nja oentoek mempertahankan dasar dan sikap sikapnja.  Tegasnja Pari 
sebagai Partai Proletaar Revolutionair, djoega menoedjoe “Persaudaraan Kaoem Melarat 
Sedoenia” jakni menoedjoe “Internationale-Broederschap” djoega. 
Kita bersama kawan kawan Djamaloeddin Tamin dan a. Tenek alias Daja Joesoef, 
ialah korban korban Pari jang ketiga kalinja di Digoelkan.  Korban Pari jang pertama kali di 
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This letter implies that, in contrast to PKI, Pari made decisions according to local 
conditions, but with the common aspiration for “the Brotherhood of the World’s Poor” 
still very much in mind.  This was the dream and goal that Pari held, and yet at the 
moment, Siregar acknowledged that Pari was facing serious problems.  The letter 
acknowledges that many of its members had been captured, including one of founding 
members, Soebakat, had been apprehended in Bangkok in September 1929, sent back 
to Batavia where he had died in prison.  Another founding member, Djamaloeddin 
Tamin was soon to be Digoelized along with Siregar and A. Tenek in late September 
1933.  The second letter ends rather abruptly after listing the names of Pari associates 
who were Digoelized.  In closing, the writer notes that he has run out of time for 
providing any further details and the letter ends with no concluding remarks, no 
message for Pari supporters.  While the letters might have left the audience with 
uncertainty, they at least successfully communicated a message that Pari really existed 
and would continue to work to realize the proletarian Republic of Indonesia. 
 
The World of Espionage 
 While the letters in Pewarta Deli confirmed Pari’s existence, it offered only a 
brief history of its struggle.  There was no mention of concrete projects that the party 
had undertaken or planned to achieve.  The letters rather implied that the organization 
had been seriously damaged after the third wave of arrests of its members and that it 
                                                                                                                                       
Digoelkan ialah kawan Maswar alias Oei Ah Thong jg soedah ketangkap di Singapore pada 9 
Sept. 1928 dan di Digoelkan pada 1929. 
Dan jang kedoea kalinja ialah kawan2 Mardjono, Soetedjo dan dengan enam 
kawannja jang soedah di Digoelkan pada 1931.  Lain dari itoe korban jang selaloe djadi 
kenang kenangan Paristen ialah kematiannja kawan Soebakat dalam boel Glodok dengan tiada 
seadjalnja, ialah pada 5 Februari 1930, jang ditangkapnja di Siam (Bangkok) pada boelan 
September 1929. 
Sekianlah hanja kesempatan kita:  
Hormat kita 
Mohd. Arif Siregar 
dalam perdjalanan ke Boven Digoel 
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needed to reconsider its strategy.  As an unclear future lay ahead for Pari, news media 
like Pewarta Deli also had to take a cautious approach in reporting on the organization 
or its legacy.  Intriguingly, it did not stop its coverage of Pari, and instead beginning in 
1934 kicked off a new campaign to establish Tan Malaka as a “legendary” hero, 
inserting snippets into its news coverage every now and then to remind readers of Tan 
Malaka. 
 
The Indonesian public now takes pleasure in listening to sensational news, 
accepts and swallows them with joy.  Such news are always added with extra 
stories, so that those who are ignorant and narrow-minded can grasp that the 
fate of Indonesia is in the leader’s hands.  But now only Allah knows where 
he is!543 
 
In February 1934, Matu Mona, an editor of Pewarta Deli, wrote about the excitement 
concerning news on Tan Malaka and about his heroic exploits for the future 
independence of Indonesia.  On the occasion of the third major crackdown on Pari by 
PID and international intelligence agencies in 1932, copious news reporting on Pari 
and Tan Malaka detailed their clandestine activities.  But as time went by, the news 
carried less and less concrete evidence, and focused more and more on reporting the 
rumors that were circulating in the region, which had the effect of implying that Tan 
Malaka’s mysterious adventures somehow continued.  Once reported in the press, 
these rumors were consumed as “facts” that were nonetheless fascinating because, as 
one of the report says, “fact is stranger than fiction.”544   
                                                
543 “Takaran – pergerakan,” Pewarta Deli, February 17, 1934. 
544 “Litjin Bagian Belut,” ABAD XX, Thn. 3, No. 7 (February 17, 1934), p. 70.  This is a small notice 
about Tan Malaka (Tan Malacca).  Reportedly, it is taken from Java Bode and reports that Tan Malaka 
plans to return to Singapore in order to reorganize Pari. 
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Coincidentally, after news on Tan Malaka decreased, news on espionage 
(spionnage) increased.  It was a known fact that the British, French, Dutch, and 
American governments coordinated their surveillance against communist movements 
in the region.  They did this with a common desire not to underestimate the potential 
threat of regional communist movements and could not predict in which part of 
colonies communist movement would (re)emerge.  According to Pewarta Deli, 
international surveillance agencies were stationed in Moscow, Berlin, Canton, 
Shanghai, Singapore and among others; they were active wherever there was local 
communist connection.  They believed that Comintern took initiatives in worldwide 
communist activities.  But as I have described above, the readers of Pewarta Deli had 
already learned that this was not true, and that each country – China, Indonesia, 
Indochina and so on – had its own communist movement that was relatively 
independent.  A 1934 article published in Pewarta Deli, “Spionnage dienst di Timoer 
Djaoeh” (“Espionage services in the Far East”), implies that anti-communist 
international espionage network would fail because its operation was based on wrong 
assumptions.545  The article contended that the Comintern did not initiate regional 
communist movements, and that regional leadership based on individual local 
conditions was effective.  
Needless to say, accounts of regional and local espionage activities continued.  
Described in a 1935 story “based on the account of a former spy, ” secrets of the 
marine base in Singapore were said to have fallen into the hands of a German 
espionage unit.546  The domestic PID, too, was reported to have expanded its activity 
in Soerabaja.547  Pewarta Deli also featured legendary spies such as T. E. Lawrence or 
                                                
545 “Spionnage dienst di Timoer Djaoeh,” Pewarta Deli, February 17, 1934. 
546 “Pekerdjaan spionnage dan bagaimana rahsia marinebasis Singapore djatoeh ketangan spion 
Djerman: 20 tahoen jang lewat (Disalin dari karangan seorang bekas spion),” Pewarta Deli, February 5 
and 6, 1935. 
547 “Spionnage Dienst dan Spionnenberichten,” Pewarta Deli, May 16, 1935. 
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Lawrence of Arabia548 and Mata Hari.549  Its profile of Lawrence,550 a British Army 
officer who committed himself to the Arab Revolt of 1916 – 1918, appeared in a June 
29, 1934 story, describing the man as a “modern romantic hero” (pahlawan romantiek 
modern), because he played three different roles as British Army officer, British spy, 
and the Arab Scarlet Pimpernel.  Two and a half years later, a spy story appeared 
between November 3 and 8, 1937, as a serial by a writer identified as Aw. R. entitled 
“Spionnage.”551   
“Patjar Merah Indonesia” (Indonesian Scarlet Pimpernel) also made 
appearance in the Middle East.  This time Cairo became the source of Tan Malaka’s 
secret mission.  In April 1938 a rumor surfaced about the capture and subsequent 
escape of Tan Malaka at the hands of the British intelligent agency in Tehran.552  In 
October 1938 “Tan Malaka’s right-hand man,” Alimin, reportedly passed away.  His 
obituary revealed that he had been active in Palestine in the fight against the British.553  
An article two months later, in December 1938, reported that Tan Malaka’s associates 
were said to have spent five days in Alexandria and three days in Cairo.554 
                                                
548 “Generaal Lawrence, Generaal dan Spion Inggeris, Patjar Merah Arab: Pahlawan Romantiek 
Modern (Dimelajoekan speciaal oentoek Pe De oleh Ramona),” Pewarta Deli, June 29, 1934.  This 
sequence appeared as a series of essay by Aw. R. entitled “Spionnage” in November 1937.  
549 “Mata Hari” was the stage name of the Dutch exotic dancer and prostitute Gertrud Margarete Zele 
(1876-1917).  She was a double agent for both France and Germany, and in 1917 arrested in Paris and 
executed by firing squad.  Mata Hari had become synonymous with espionage that worked for Germany 
against France during World War I.  
550 “Generaal Lawrence, Generaal dan Spion Inggeris, Patjar Merah Arab: Pahlawan Romantiek 
Modern (Dimelajoekan speciaal oentoek Pe De oleh Ramona),” Pewarta Deli, June 29, 1934. 
551 Aw. R., “Spionnage,” Pewarta Deli, November 3, 6, 8, 1937. 
552 Muhamad Iskandar Ishaq, “President Partai Republiek Indonesia tertangkap ditanah Iran,” Pewarta 
Deli, April 5, 1938. 
553 Teungkoe Di Lamnjong, “Korban jang dimintak oleh tanah Palestina didalam sedjarah Indonesia, 
atau meninggalnja tangan kanan dari Patjar Merah Indonesia: Alimin meninggal doenia,” Pewarta Deli, 
October 19, 1938.  Alimin had been Tan Malaka’s enemy since they disagreed on the plot of communist 
rebellion in Indonesia in 1926, but British and other intelligences appeared to share the belief that Tan 
Malaka and Alimin worked closely.  Even in 1930 a report by Criminal Intelligence Department of 
Straits Settlements used the term “the Tan Malaka-Alimin gang.”  Cheah Boon Kheng, From PKI to the 
Comintern, 1924-1941: The Appreticeship of the Malayan Communist Party (Ithaca: Southeast Asia 
Program, Cornell University, 1992), p. 56.  
554 B. K. M, Perpindom, “Rol Patjar Merah Indonesia: Lima hari dengan SUN LANG TAN di 
Alexandrie, Tiga hari dengan M. Amin di Cairo,” Pewarta Deli, December 29, 1938. 
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 The Patjar Merah series of popular novels began publication in 1938.  An 
advertisement for the second book in the series, published in the same year, reads as 
follows: 
 
Coming out soon! 
Rol Patjar Merah Indonesia: Patjar Merah Indonesia Dibekoek [The Role of 
Patjar Merah: The Indonesian Scarlet Pimpernel Seized] 
A book long-awaited by the public.  Full of epic struggles.  Composed 
by the well recognized MATU MONA. 
Like other compositions by Matu Mona, this book is narrated with 
detailed inspiration, packed with mysterious affairs.  The public must have 
been familiar with the book Spionnage Dienst: Patjar Merah Indonesia 
[Espionage Service: The Indonesian Scarlet Pimpernel], which upon release 
had shaken the general public in Indonesia, was praised by our intellectuals 
and last but not least by all prominent journalists in Indonesia.  This book Rol 
Patjar Merah Indonesia: Patjar Merah Indonesia Dibekoek is a sequel to 
Spionnage Dienst.  Composed even more neatly, thicker, more fascinating, 
using novel-type paper.  Contents include among others: Person from Brussel, 
Magical Power, Darsonov to Spain, Where does Aliminsky Meditate, Patjar 
Merah in Palestine, The Pull of the Homeland, Musotte Heading to the 
Eastern Continent, Pan Malay Congress in India, Letters from Brussels, 
Breathing Homeland Air, Journey in the Caucasus, Patjar Merah cs. Seized in 
…  
Pre-publication price ƒ1.14 
Post-publication ƒ1.75 
Send order to “Centrale Courant”  
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Hakkastraat 31 – Medan 
Post-publication order of more than 12 receives 20% discount and free 
shipping.  Pre-publication order is fixed at ƒ1.14 a copy.555 
 
By 1938 a highly ambiguous line between fiction and reality had characterized Patjar 
Merah-related stories and guaranteed its popularity.  It had been four years since 
Pewarta Deli begun reporting the “rumors” on Tan Malaka.  The audience had already 
become accustomed to reading Patjar Merah as Tan Malaka, and now could recognize 
his presence in this emerging line of fiction.  Since 1933 Pewarta Deli had added Tan 
Malaka’s picture to news related to him, so his face had become recognizable; now the 
audience could project his face onto the fictional hero in the Patjar Merah novels.  In 
the novels, associations between the protagonist and Tan Malaka are scarcely 
obscured; in fact they are signaled, possibly for the extra thrill.  At least five Patjar 
                                                
555 An advertisement of Rol Patjar Merah in Pewarta Deli on October 12, 1938. 
 Bekal Terbit! 
 ROL PATJAR MERAH 
[Patjar Merah Indonesia dibekoek]  
Satoe boekoe jang soedah lama dinanti nantikan publiek.  Penoeh perdjongan jang hebat-hebat.  
Terkarang oleh MATU MONA jang tidak asing lagi. Sebagai biasanja karang2an Matu Mona, 
demikianlah kitab ini digambarkan dengan penoeh ispiratie, mengandoeng hal2 jang penoeh 
mystrius.  Publiek tentoe soedah kenal kepada boekoe “Spionnage Dienst” (Patjar Merah 
Indonesia), jang baroe sadja terbit soedah menggemparkan kalangan publiek di Indonesia, 
dipoedji oleh segenap para terpeladjar kita, last but not least oleh segenap kaoem wartawan jg 
besar2 di Indonesia.  Maka boekoe “Rol Patjar Merah Indonesia” (Patjar Merah Indonesia 
dibekoek) ini, ialah samboengan dari boekoe Spionnage Dienst tsb.  Diatoer dengan lebih rapi, 
tebal, menarik, dengan kertas roman-papier.  Antara lain2 isinja: Orang dari Brussel – Ilmoe 
gaib – Darsonov ke Spanjol – Dimana Alminsky bertapa – Patjar Merah di Palestina – 
Panggilan Tanah Air – Musotte menoedjoe benoea Timoer – Pan Malay Congres di India – 
Soerat2 dari Brussel – Mengejam Oedara Tanah Air – Melawat ke Kaukasus – Patjar Merah 
cs. Dibekoek di … 
Harga sebeloem terbit  f 1.14 
Sesoedah terbit  f 1.75 
Pesanan ke “Centrale Courant”  
Hakkastraat 31 – Medan 
Ambil lebih dari 12 sesoedah siap Korting 20 pCt ongkos kita tanggoeng. 
Sebeloem siap harga tetap 1 ex 1.14. 
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Merah novels were written by two different authors between 1938 and 1940.556  They 
include the titles Spionnage-Dienst (Medan: Centrale Courant en Boekhandel, 1938), 
Rol Patjar Merah Indonesia (Medan: Centrale Courant en Boekhandel, 1938), and 
Panggilan Tanah Air (The Call of the Homeland; Medan: Tjerdas, 1940) by Matu 
Mona; Moetiara Berloempoer, Tiga kali Patjar Merah datang membela (Muddied 
Pearl, Three Times Patjar Merah Comes to Rescue; Medan: Tjerdas, 1940), and Patjar 
Merah Kembali ke Tanah Air (Patjar Merah, Homeland Bound; Medan: Tjerdas, 1940) 
by Yusdja.  All of these novels were published as part of popular literary journals 
known as the dime novels, roman pitjisan.   
Tan Malaka’s adventures and underground activities were obviously 
entertaining to the audience.  He had been engaged in the forbidden communist 
movement to fight imperialism; moreover, his goal was to establish an independent 
Republic of Indonesia.  His cat-and-mouse game with the authorities had made the 
espionage world fascinating to the readers (especially in his native land Sumatra).  Not 
only the Dutch PID, but also the international intelligence community had tried to 
capture him; and if we are to trust the reports/rumors, the authorities had succeeded on 
several occasions only to be outfoxed by him.  Tan Malaka was a communist and also 
a nationalist.  As Pewarta Deli’s chief editor Adi Negoro argued, nationalists could 
not be equated with criminals.  Thus, with or without his intent, Tan Malaka became a 
hero and leader of the Indonesian nationalist movement, at least in the mind of his 
admirers in Sumatra.  The popularity of Tan Malaka went hand-in-hand with the 
popularity of popular literary journals.  They fed off each other. 
 
Islamic Journals 
                                                
556 For the best analysis of Patjar Merah series, see Oshikawa, “Patjar Merah Indonesia and Tan 
Malaka: A Popular Novel and a Revolutionary Legend.”  
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Around the time when reports on Pari decreased in Pewarta Deli, Medan saw 
the rise of Islamic journals.  These journals contained Islamic teachings, advice on 
how to be Muslim in the contemporary world, and information about contemporary 
affairs in the world and Islamic community.   
 
Table 8-5: Journals and Publishers in Medan 
Journal  Publisher (Editors)                                                       
Dewan Islam Badan Penerbit Dewan Islam (M. Arsjad Th. Loebis) 
Soeloeh Islam Komite kesadaran Islam (Hamka) 
Pandji Islam Poestaka Islam (Hamka, Zainal Abidin Ahmad) 
Pedoman Masjarakat Mij Soematra (Hamka) 
Tjahaja Islam s.n. 
Tafsir Alquranoelkarim  Islamijah 
Pedoman Islam  Badan As Sjoera (Hamka) 
Poernama Poestaka Islam (M. Saleh Oemar) 
 
Starting in 1934, eight new Islamic journals were established in the period of 
six years; and new Islamic journals came out almost every year.  Overall, among the 
twenty-five journals published in the 1930s in Medan, one-third of them were Islamic.  
They were, in chronological order, Dewan Islam (Islamic Council, 1934), Soeloeh 
Islam (The Torch of Islam, 1934), Pandji Islam (Banner of Islam, 1934-1942), 
Pedoman Masjarakat (Community Guidance, 1935-1941), Tjahaja Islam (Light of 
Islam, 1936), Tafsir Alquranoelkarim (Interpretations of Holy Quran, 1937), Pedoman 
Islam (Islamic Guidance, 1939), and Poernama (Full Moon, 1940).   
One institution that played a key role in the flourishing of Islamic journals in 
Medan is the Islamic organization Moehammadijah.  The Moehammadijah movement 
took hold in Sumatra after the communist revolts in 1927 failed.  Established in 
Jogjakarta in 1912, initially the Moehammadijah movement sought to promote Islamic 
reformist teachings, to disseminate Islamic publications, as well as to establish schools 
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and hospitals in order to promote social welfare in the Islamic community.  Its 
activities were concentrated mainly in Java in the 1910s and 1920s, and failed to 
attract people’s interest in Sumatra.  In West Sumatra, the Thawalib Schools with 
strong anti-colonial sentiment were dominant in the Muslim community.  But the 
socio-political circumstances changed in 1927.  Taking Tan Malaka’s advice before 
the uprising, many Muslim communists in West Sumatra relocated to Medan and other 
places.557  The tightening colonial surveillance in West Sumatra after the uprising was 
another factor in this migration, as many former communists and radical Muslims fled 
to Medan.  To this effect De Locomotief, a Semarang-based Dutch newspaper, even 
warned the Indies government that “in East Sumatra now there are many 
communists!”558  These political refugees however did not continue with their 
organizational politics, but rather looked for political shelter under the 
Moehammadijah.559  Since the organization was not yet rooted in Medan, these 
newcomers eventually took it over.  
Taking over Moehammadijah was strategically important to spreading 
“modernist” Islamic thoughts beyond Java and penetrating into the North, South and 
East Coasts of Sumatra, South Borneo and South Sulawesi in the 1930s.  In 1935 the 
Moehammadijah increased its branches and groups to 809, in 1937 to 921, in 1939 to 
1,100, and in 1942 to 1,275.  In 1937 it had a total membership of 112,850.560  The 
organizational growth of the Moehammadijah led to the significant development of its 
activities in social, educational, and religious activities.  As part of its religious 
“education,” the Moehammadijah encouraged the publication of Islamic journals in 
                                                
557 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, pp. 49-57. 
558 “Di Soematera Timoer banyak communisme!: Karena itoe pemerintah haroes awas!, kata 
Locomotief,” Pewarta Deli, September 10, 1928. 
559 Kahin, “Repression and Regroupment.”  
560 Alfian, Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch 
Colonialism (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989). 
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Sumatra as well as the Indies in general.  Through its activities it carried reformist 
ideas, that by returning to the true orthodoxy of the Faith, Muslims would be able to 
gain novel and fresh interpretation of Muslim teachings, thus making the religion 
answerable to the ever-changing problems of the contemporary “modern” world.  
Moehammadijah contributed substantially to the process of socializing  “Indonesian” 
Muslims towards acceptance of the truth of the religion as their new value system or 
political ideology.  But it should be noted that Moehammadijah would not have been 
as successful if Minangkabau Islamic leftist activists were not forced to regroup after 
the failed uprising in West Sumatra. 
Hamka or Hadji Abdoel Malik Karim Amrullah was the key figure behind the 
growing popularity of making Islamic journals in Medan.  Hamka edited or led four 
out of the region’s eight Islamic journals, i.e. Soeloeh Islam, Pandji Islam, Pedoman 
Masjarakat, and Pedoman Islam.  He was a leader of the Islamic reformist movement 
and brought a new breed of writers to the Islamic publications in Medan.  Born on 16 
February 1908 in Manindjau, West Sumatra, Hamka did not attend high school, either 
secular or religious.561  He only attended the village school for three years and 
religious schools in Padang Pandjang and Parabek (near Bukittinggi) for nearly three 
years.  Coming from five generations of an ulama (Muslim legal scholar) family, 
Hamka had a gift for language and mastered Dutch, Malay and Arabic.  He appears to 
have inherited the talent to write from his father, Hadji Abdoel Karim Amroellah, who 
was known as Hadji Rasoel and one of the founders of the modernist Muslim 
movement in the Indies.  Hadji Rasoel founded the Sumatra Thawalib Schools, where 
people discussed Islamic principles along with ideas of socialism and communism.  
Sumatra Thawalib and Dinijjah schools played a significant role in the years leading 
                                                
561 Nasir Tamara, Buntaran Sanusi, Vincent Djauhari (eds.), HAMKA di mata hati umat (Jakarta: 
Penerbit Sinar Harapan, 1983). 
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up to 1933, and after the repression in 1933 they became a major locus of nationalist 
activities.  The government’s failure in its efforts to gain control over private 
educational institutions through the Teachers’ Ordinance and the Wild School 
Ordinance562 meant that even after the suppression of political party activities 
“thousands of national schools … kept alive and promoted the national ideals for 
which these parties had stood,” because these “schools were thoroughly 
politicized.”563  
In 1924, at the age of seventeen, Hamka joined Moehammadijah in Jogjakarta 
and SI in Pekalongan.  By 1930, Hamka had traveled to Java as well as to Mecca, 
South Celebes, and North Sumatra.  It was not unusual for an Islamic scholar to move 
easily from one Muslim community to another without experiencing any 
discrimination.  In South Celebes, he spent about four years as a muballigh 
(propagandist) of Moehammadijah.  This experience broadened his worldview and 
enhanced his sense of solidarity with people from all over the Indies.  In 1936 he 
moved to and settled down in Medan as the chief editor of the weekly Pedoman 
Masjarakat, Pandji Islam, and other literary journals. 
Pandji Islam was one of the most popular Islamic journals, printed by Sjarikat 
Tapanoeli and published three times a month.  Its agents covered many major cities in 
Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and Celebes.  Its subtitle reads “Journal of Popular Islamic 
Science” (Madjallah Wetenschap Islam Popoeler).  Zainal Abidin Ahmad, Hamka, 
and Mohammad Natsir were editors of the journal.  It had fifteen regular contributors, 
including Dr. Aboe Hanifah, M. Din Yatim, Dr. Nainggolan Oranje, Adi Negoro, 
Asnawi Hadisiswaja, Fachroeddin Hs., A. Hasjmy, Sjamsoe Hadiwijata, Soegondo 
                                                
562 The Wild School Ordinance required all the teachers to have license issued by the government.  Its 
intention was to control private schools unsubsidized by the government. Tsuchiya, Democracy and 
Leadership, p. 179. 
563 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 79. 
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Kartoprodjo, A. Damhoeri, A. Hamid Loebis, Digoel ‘Oemar ‘Oesman, Drs. Ahmad 
Ramail, and two regular female contributors – Rasoena Said and Fathimah Hasjim.  
All of these were also known as regular contributors for popular literary journals in 
Medan and West Sumatra.  
Known as an Islamic thinker and educator Mohammad Natsir was a key editor 
and regular contributor.  Born on July 17, 1908 in the religious and agriculturally 
prosperous area of Alahan Pandjang, West Sumatra,564 he entered the HIS in Solok, 
while attending the Sumatra Thawalib School directed by a follower of Hadji Rasoel.  
Then he attended the MULO (1923-1927) and the AMS in Bandoeng (1927-1930).  
There he joined the modernist United Islam (Persatoean Islam), where he attended 
classes by the influential Islamic teacher (ulama) Ahmad Hassan,565 and in 1929 he 
became member of the Association of Young Muslims (Jong Islamieten Bond) 
founded by Hadji Agus Salim.  Three years later in 1932 Nastir founded Islamic 
Education (Pendidikan Islam), which had primary and secondary schools as well as a 
teachers’ training school.   
Natsir saw Islam as a social and political system.  This understanding of Islam 
was expressed in an important term that he coined, “Kebangsaan Muslimin” (“Muslim 
nation”), which he introduced in an article entitled “Indonesisch Nationalisme” 
(Indonesian Nationalism) published in Pembela Islam (Defender of Islam).  The 
concept of “Muslim nation” prioritized Islamic principles and solidarity and took 
                                                
564 George McT. Kahin, “In Memoriam: Mohammad Natsir (1907-1993),” Indonesia, No. 56 (1993), 
pp. 159-165; Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942 (London and 
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 279-295. 
565 Ahmad Hassan was born in 1887 in Singapore, the son of a Tamil scholar and a Javanese mother.  
He was the chief figure in the Persatoean Islam established in 1923 in Bandoeng.  Howard M. 
Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia 
Project, Cornell University, 1970). 
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exception to territorially defined secular identity.566  This idea was fully expanded in 
his book Cultuur Islam (Islamic Culture) in 1936.567  
But in his 1939 book entitled Dengan Islam ke Indonesia Moelia (Towards 
Glorious Indonesia With Islam), Natsir’s opinion shifted to a positive recognition of 
territorially defined Indonesian state.  In a polemical discussion on nationalism with 
Soekarno that took place in Pandji Islam in 1939 and 1940, his view on nationalism 
was further revealed.568  Responding to Soekarno’s secular understanding of 
nationalism, Natsir wrote a series of articles in 1940 to argue that Muslims needed to 
accept modern concepts such as nationalism, which required an inclusive attitude in 
order to catch up with the challenges of modernity.  In his opinion, Muslims lagged 
behind modernity because they still abided by conventional views unquestioningly, 
and the time had come for them to practice ijtihad (reasoning).  Ijtihad is a 
terminology in the Islamic law for the process of making a legal decision 
independently from the Qur’an.569   
With this argument, Natsir opened the way for Muslim intellectuals to 
(re)interpret and apply modern (Western) concepts for the sake of establishing the 
Indonesian nation.  This view has been described as novel compared to other Islamic 
leaders of the time who looked down on secular nationalists because they were 
considered less Islamic.570  Natsir’s version of nationalism was new and radical in the 
sense that it criticized conservative Muslim attitudes towards social change and 
encouraged instead the adoption of secular ideas.  In short, he adjusted his old 
                                                
566 Mohammad Natsir, “Indonesisch Nationalisme,” Pembela Islam, No. 36 (October 1931), mentioned 
in Yudi Latif, Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2008), p. 209. 
567 Mohammad Natsir, Cultuur Islam (Bandoeng: Pendidikan Islam, 1936).  The advertisement of the 
book was found in all Islamic journals in Medan as well as Pewarta Deli in 1936 and 1937. 
568 On this polemic see Hering, Soekarno, pp. 262-264.   
569 Mohammad Natsir, Capita Selecta (Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1954).  
570 Luthfi Assyaukanie, Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 44-46. 
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aspiration for a Muslim nation in order to conform to the needs of the future 
Indonesian state, which might take a secular form.   
This understanding of nationalism and Muslim nation were reflected in 
modernist journals such as Pandji Islam, Soeloeh Islam, and others.  On the one hand, 
these journals regularly reported on international affairs and paid special attention to 
issues of the Islamic world.  On the other, they also attended to the mainstream 
nationalist movement and published special commemorative editions when leading 
Indonesian nationalist politicians, such as Dr. Soetomo and Thamrin, passed away.  
Exiled nationalist leaders such as Hatta and Soekarno contributed articles on various 
matters to those journals.  By bringing together nationalism and Islamism, they 
promoted Natsir’s version of Muslim nationalism in Indonesia.   
 
Roman pitjisan 
In the late 1930s, an Indonesian version of the dime novel emerged in Sumatra 
and gained popularity.  As early as 1939, Adi Negoro described this popular literary 
form as “roman pitjisan.”571  It was also called “roman Medan” (Medan literature) 
after the city that eventually became the center of this type of literature.  Roman 
pitjisan were generally published in full or in serialized form in literary journals by 
private publishers that were subsidized by indigenous Indonesians who entered the 
commercial publishing business in the 1930s.572  These journals represented a largely 
commercial mass publication of cheap books and were open to a broad readership.  
                                                
571 As far as I know, Adi Negoro was the first person that used the word “roman pitjisan” to describe the 
new phenomena in the printed culture. Pewarta Deli, (December 16, 1939).  “Roman pitjisan” literally 
means “dime novels.”  The term pitjisan came from “pitjis” that was the “large quantities of low-
denomination Chinese copper” since the late twelfth century, and its use spread from Java to Celebes, 
Borneo, and Sumatra.  Robert Cribb and Audrey Kahin (eds.), Historical Dictionary of Indonesia (2nd 
ed.), (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2004), pp. 101-102. 
572 Oshikawa, “Patjar Merah Indonesia and Tan Malaka”; Faizah Soenoto, “Tinjauan Bahasa Roman 
Indonesia Sebelum Perang,” Archipel, No. 20, 1980. 
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Some contemporary writers in 1939 even characterized the period as “bandjir roman” 
(flood of novels).573  This new type of novel was significant in terms of its literary 
form and popularity in certain regions.  And the fact that colonial authorities did not 
consider these novels to be politically dangerous or conducive to radicalism 
contributed to their fast rising popularity.  
 
Table 8-6: List of Roman Pitjisan Journals 
City Journals (year of publication, publisher, printer, editor)       
Padang Roman Indonesia (1934-40), Surya 
Fort de 
Kock 
Roman Pergaoelan (1939-41, Boekhandel & Uitgeverij “Penjiaran 
Ilmoe”; Tamar Djaja) 
  Perdjoeangan Ilmoe, Perdjoeangan Hidoep 
Benkoelen Roda Penghidoepan  (1937-38, Druk. Tjam; Typ. Drukkerij “Dempo,” M. Sabirin) 
Medan Doenia Pengalaman (1938-41, Boekhandel “Poestaka Islam,” Sjarikat Tapanoeli; A. M. Pamoentjak, A. Diningrat) 
  Loekisan Poedjangga (1939-42, Boekh. “Tjerdas”; Joesoef Sou’yb) 
  Doenia Pergerakan  (1940) 
  Loekisan Doenia (1940) 
Gorontalo Perdjoeangan Batin, Mizaan Doenia (1941) 
Soerakarta Doenia Pergerakan, Doenia Pengalaman 
 
Roman pitjisan were designed to be easy, entertaining reading.  These journals 
appeared once or twice a month, each time containing one 75 to 80-page novel, and 
sometimes one or two short stories to fill up the extra pages.  The novels were original 
(as opposed to being translations or adaptations), written by Indonesians, and 
consisted of spy stories, detective stories, historical and political novels, and romance 
stories.574  The journals were sold by subscription, and publishers encouraged letters 
                                                
573 A. S. Hamid, “Bandjir Roman,” Pedoman Masjarakat, 5-49 (6 Dec. 1939); Joesoef Sou’yb, “Bandjir 
Roman,” Pedoman Masjarakat, 5-50 (13 Dec. 1939); Pandji Islam, (1940), pp. 7801-7802. 
574 Oshikawa, “Patjar Merah Indonesia and Tan Malaka,” p. 128; C. W. Watson, “The Sociology of the 
Indonesian Novel, 1920-1955,” (M.A. thesis, University of Hull, 1971), p. 141; Eduard J. J. M. 
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and contributions from readers.575  Each journal had ten to twenty-five very productive 
writers.  
This style of publishing book-length prose in the form of monthly literary 
journals was not new in colonial Indonesia.  From the middle of the 1920s, peranakan 
had published popular novels as “monthly stories” (tjerita boelanan) with Soerabaja, 
Malang, Batavia, and Bandoeng emerging as centers of such publication.  The journals 
were inexpensive, in pocketsize book form, and approximately 100 pages in length for 
each edition.  They were widely popular, read not only by the Chinese but also by 
indigenous readers.  Even in heavily Islamic regions like West Sumatra, people 
enjoyed reading these publications.576  A key element in their popularity was the 
language.  Use of the colloquial Malay language as spoken in urban settings made the 
publications easy to read and accessible to people of various ethnic groups.  But in 
terms of content, the publications were overwhelmingly oriented to a Chinese 
readership.  It was this element that definitely impelled Muslim authors to produce 
their own literary journals, thus the roman pitjisan.  
In the period of four years, there emerged at least twelve roman pitjisan 
journals and in the span of only four or five years, more than 400 roman pitjisan were 
published.577  Doenia Pengalaman (World of Experience, Medan), Loekisan 
Poedjangga (Portrait of Writers, Medan), Tjendrawasih (Bird of Paradise, Medan), 
Doenia Pergerakan (World of Movement, Medan), Roman Indonesia (Indonesian 
Novels, Padang), Roman Pergaoelan (Social Novels, Fort de Kock) were popular 
                                                                                                                                       
Kimman, Indonesian Publishing: Economic Organizations in a Langganan Society (Hollandia: Baarn, 
1981), p. 98.  
575 Kimman, Indonesian Publishing. 
576 Interview with Audrey Kahin on January 10, 2010.  See also Yamamoto Nobuto, “The Chinese 
Connection: Rewriting Journalism and Categories in Indonesian History,” in Peter Post, Marleen 
Dieleman, and Juliette Koning (eds.), Chinese Indonesians and Regime Change (Leiden: Brill, 
forthcoming). 
577 Jakob Sumarjo, Novel Populer Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Nur Cabaya, 1982), p. 14. 
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roman pitjisan in the late 1930s.  Benkoelen’s Roda Penghidoepan (The Wheel of 
Life) is also worth mentioning.578  Outside Sumatra, the urban centers of Soerakarta 
and Gorontalo on Java also produced roman pitjisan journals.  Gorontalo had 
Perdjoeangan Batin (Inner Struggle) and Mizaan Doenia (World Discernment).  The 
two journals published in Soerakarta, Doenia Pergerakan and Doenia Pengalaman, 
shared the same names as those produced in Medan.  It is possible that they were sister 
publications, but no supporting evidence is available to confirm this.  In the case of 
Gorontalo, in July 1941 the publisher Mizaan Doenia launched its literary journal.  
The first book was written by Ibrahim B. A., the director of the publisher, entitled 
Rahasia Kaloeng Berliant: Satoe impian dalam Kapal Perang (Mystery of Diamond 
Neckrace: Dream on A Warship), and the next issue was S. Hassan, Achirnja … 
Bertemoe Djoea (Finally … We Met).579 
                                                
578 Sumarjo, Novel Populer Indonesia, p. 14.  Roda Penghidoepan from Benkoelen should not be 
counted as a part of Medan literature.  In its inaugural issue, the chief editor Mhd. Sabirin expresses that 
they intend to publish novels in the ordinary Malay language (bahasa Melajoe biasa), which is not 
Betawi Chinese Malay (bahasa Melajoe Tiong Hoa Betawi) that was widely consumed in the Indies.  
He wishes to get attention from our people (bangsa kita).  Mhd. Sabirin, “Sepatan Kata,” Roda 
Penghidoepan, Thn. 1, No. 5 (May 1937).  Sabirin shared the idea of providing popular reading 
materials in ordinary Malay, but it appears not to have a clear political mission to combine nationalism 
and Islamism that Adi Negoro group had demonstrated.  
579 Ibrahim B.A., Rahasia Kaloeng Berliant: Satoe impian dalam Kapal Perang (Gorontalo: Mizaan 
Doenia, 1941); S. Hassan, Achirnja … Bertemoe Djoea (Gorontalo: Mizaan Doenia, 1941).  As for the 
two literary journals in Gorontalo, H. B. Jassin appeared to have some influences on them, because they 
began to be published after Jassin stationed there for the period of half a year.  He was known as a 
literary critique and writer.  Born on July 13, 1917 in Gorontalo, he studied at the Dutch Native School 
(HIS) in Balikpapan, East Borneo, then at the Advanced Primary Education (MULO) in Tondano, 
North Celebes, and at the Dutch High School (Hogere Burger School, HBS) in Pangkalan Brandan, 
North Sumatra.  Jassin moved many times in his adolescent years because of his father’s occupation, 
but the move to Sumatra brought him closer to one center of the Indonesian literary movement.  When 
he studied in Pangkalan Brandan from 1932 to 1939, he read popular journals and newspapers 
published in Medan such as ABAD XX, Pandji Islam, Pedoman Masjarakat, and the emerging roman 
pitjisan journals.  Because Pangkalan Brandan was only 100 kilometers away from Medan, Jassin was 
able to go to Medan rather frequently and met Adi Negoro.  While he worked for Pewarta Deli as 
translator, he also contributed several articles for journals.  Upon his graduation from HBS in 1939, he 
went back to Gorontalo for several months and worked as assistant at the office of the local Assistant 
Resident.  In the period of five months, it appears that Jassin found friends who were interested in 
publishing short-lived popular journals.  Then in February 1940, he took a job at Balai Poestaka, the 
state bureau for popular literature, where he worked with many prominent Indonesian writers (many of 
whom originated from Sumatra) such as Sutan Takdir Alisjabana, Armijn Pané, Sanoesi Pané, Nur 
Sutan Iskandar, and Aman Datuk Madjoindo, as well as regular contributors to Balai Poestaka such as 
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However, existing studies on roman pitjisan, which tend towards content 
analysis, fail to understand the process that gave rise to this literary form.580  The 
phenomenon of roman pitjisan should be contextualized in the political situation that 
prevailed in Medan in the 1930s.  Adi Negoro and his colleagues had been successful 
in marketing popular literary and Islamic journals since the early 1930s.  Following 
this tradition, roman pitjisan plots generally focused on contemporary issues and were 
set in the new urban milieu; they avoided descriptions of supernatural power or actions 
exceeding human capability.581  One of the characteristics of roman pitjisan is, as 
literary scholar Noriaki Oshikawa describes, that they manifest the concrete realities 
of politics through their fictional portrayals, with satirical twists involving spies and 
secret police and the nationalist’s loves, friendships, and betrayals.  In roman pitjisan, 
he continues, “politics” means trickery and disguise, evasion of enemy, the 
transportation of secret documents, defamation and slander, separation and escape, and 
finally rescue.582  This kind of “politics” reflected the political reality in the 1930s 
Indies; literature, rumor, and news reports fed off each other and came to constitute 
“politics.” 
Against this backdrop, the ultimate goal of Medan literature was to promote an 
Indonesian national language based on the colloquial Malay.  In addition, its 
nationalistic, Islamic, and entertaining content gained popularity among the audience.  
These elements seem to have resonated among the ordinary readers.  Roman pitjisan 
were able to combine them within the journal form, in a language accessible by the 
                                                                                                                                       
the illustrious poet Chairil Anwar and journalist Rosihan Anwar.  “Biography of Hans Bague Jassin,” 
The 1987 Ramon Magsaysay Award for Public Service, available at http://www. 
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580 “Patjar Merah Indonesia and Tan Malaka”; Doris Jedamski, “The Vanishing-Act of Sherlock 
Holmes in Indonesia’s National Awakening,” in Doris Jedamski (ed.), Chewing Over the West: 
Occidental Narratives in Non-Western Readings (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009), pp. 349-379. 
581 Hamka, “Mengarang Roman,” Pedoman Masjarakat, 4-51 (December 21, 1938), pp. 1033-1034. 
582 Oshikawa, “Patjar Merah Indonesia and Tan Malaka,” p. 20. 
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general public.  The publishers and writers of this literature often overlapped with 
those of literary and Islamic journals.  They were mostly Islamic nationalists, some of 
whom called for the creation of an “Indonesian Library” (Perpoestakaan Indonesia).  
Both Tamar Djaja, the editor and contributor of Roman Pergaoelan, and A. 
Pamoentjak, another popular writer, emphasized the importance of “enriching the 
library of our nation/Indonesia” (memperkaja perpoestakaan bangsa kita/Indonesia), 
and declared in the first issue of Roman Pergaoelan that the journal’s publication 
would certainly contribute to it.583  The publishers also printed books written by well-
known nationalist politicians, in some cases during exile.  For instance, Penjiaran 
Ilmoe published Soekarno’s Soerat-Soerat Islam dari Ende (Muslim Letters from 
Ende), Mohamad Hatta’s Mentjari Volkenbond dari Abad ke Abad (Searching for the 
League of Nations over the Centuries), and so on.  Their publications included books 
on Islam such as Natsir’s Cultuur Islam (Islamic Culture), and others by roman 
pitjisan writers such as Hamka’s Dibawah Lindungan Ka’bah (Under the Protection 
of Ka’bah) and Tenggelamnja Kapal van der Wijck (The Sinking of the Van der 
Wijck), and Matu Mona’s Panggilan Tanah Air (The Call of the Homeland).  As I 
have mentioned above, this mixture of nationalism and Islamism was a principal 
characteristic of roman pitjisan or the so-called Medan literature. 
 
Doenia Pengalaman 
A better understanding of roman pitjisan is possible with a close look at 
Doenia Pengalaman, one of the most popular roman pitjisan journals published in 
Medan.   Publication of this journal started in October 1938 with the subtitle 
“madjallah roman-detective popoeler” (popular journal of detective novels).  It was 
edited by Joesoef Sou’yb, S. Djarens, Matu Mona, and Muchtar Nasution (Emnast), 
                                                
583 Roman Pergaoelan, 1-1 (June 1, 1938), pp. 3-5. 
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under the leadership of A. M. Pamoentjak and A. Diningrat, published by Boekhandel 
Poestaka Islam, and printed by Sjarikat Tapanoeli.  Popular writers like Or. Mandank, 
Hamka, Soeman Hs., and Selasih were among its regular contributors.  These writers 
usually contributed their works to each other’s literary journals; some even produced 
short novels every month.  From 1938 to 1941, for instance, Joesoef Sou’yb, the 
editor-in-chief of Loekisan Poedjangga, published more than 50 novels, Matu Mona 
more than 20 novels, and Tamar Djaja, the chief editor of Roman Pergaoelan, more 
than a dozen. 
 
Table 8-7: Journal Doenia Pengalaman (I-1 [Oct. 38] -- III-5 [May 40]) 
A. Damhoeri  Azimat Toea Dari Abad 17 (Topeng Hitam) I-1 (Oct. 38) 
Joesoef Sou’yb Ratjoen Nicotine atau Pembalasan Dendam Chasoemat I-1 
Joesoef Sou’yb Elang Emas Ketawa I-2 (Nov. 38) 
A. Damhoeri Depok, Anak Pagai (Lamoenan Ombak di Pantai Poelau2 Mentawai) I-2 
Joesoef Sou’yb Pengepoengan Kota Bondjol I-3 (Dec. 38) 
Jahjaniah Boeaja Deli Disergap Matjan Singapore I-3 
S. Djarens Terlambat I-3 
A. Damhoeri Hantoe Laoet di Selat Malaka II-1 (15-1-39) 
S. Djarens Dokter Pentjoeri Majat (Kegelisahan Dr. Zin) II-2 (30-1-39) 
A. Damhoeri Majapada II-3 (15-2-39) 
Joesoef Sou’yb Keringkasan Riwajat Hidoepkoe II-3 
* Aria Diningrat Rahsia Kaloeng Moetiara II-4 
* Si Oema Pemboenoeh Dr. Wolf Gloucer II-5 
* Sahiboel Hikajat Membalaskan Dendam II-6 
* A. Damhoeri Pahlawan Padang Pasir II-7 
* Soeman Hs Teboesan Darah II-8 
* Musra Sjahboeddin Maga Borala II-8 
* S. Djarens Sidjoendai II-9 
* A. Damhoeri Hoeloebalang Teukoe Oemar II-10 
Joesoef Sou’yb Memikat Elang Emas II-11 (14-6-39) 
Inangda Timboenan Majat di Abad ke 17 II-12 (24-6-39) 
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Table 8-7 (Continued) 
Musra Sjahboeddin 
Raihulamar Naga Borala (Gadis Disarang Penjamoen) II-12 
Joesoef Sou’yb Perdjoeangan di Bandar Malaka II-13 (5-7-39) 
Joesoef Sou’yb Pengorbanan di Medan Perang (Oentoek memperingati Perang Tiongkok-Djepang) II-14 (15-7-39) 
A. Damhoeri Pertanda II-15 (5-8-39) 
Joesoef Sou’yb Elang Emas II-16 (15-8-39) 
Mhd. Hassan Tansa Hantoe Koeboer ...! II-17 (5-9-39) 
* II-18     
Joesoef Sou’yb Elang Emas di Pagar Roejoeng II-19 (5-10-39) 
Joesoef Sou’yb Rahsia Pengoekir Patoeng II-20 (15-10-39) 
S. Djarens Dr. Zin, Manoesia Kedjam II-21 (25-10-39) 
Joesoef Sou’yb Spionnage dalam Perang Doenia Kedoea II-22 (5-11-39) 
Joesoef Sou’yb Siapa Pemboenoehnja?? II-23 (15-11-39) 
S. Djarens Taboet II-24 (25-11-39) 
Emnast Pembalasan II-25 (5-12-39) 
Matu Mona Detectief Rindu (Tjintjin berlian dari Golconda) II-26 (15-12-39) 
Surapati Tanda Tangan Palsoe II-27 (25-12-39) 
S. Djarens Elba III-1 (5-1-40) 
* III-3     
* III-4     
Si Oema Darah Perwira III-5 (15-2-40) 
* S. Djarens Mr. Chan III-6 (25-2-40) 
* Surapati Letoesan Bom di Solo III-7 (5-3-40) 
Katja Mata Palang Merah III-8 (15-3-40) 
Enmast Tan Malaka di Medan III-9 (25-3-40) 
* Synoe and Thomas Toekang Keboen Rahasia III-10 (5-4-40) 
Si Oema Pemboenoeh Jang Ta’ Bersalah III-11 (15-4-40) 
* III-12     
S. Oesmany Dr. Chung III-13 (5-5-40) 
A. Samad dan N. 
Soetan Meninggalkan Palang Salib III-14 (15-5-40) 
S. Oesmay                                       Mr. Bacht III-15 (25-5-40)  
 [*: missing from the National Library of Indonesia] 
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As with the Chinese-Malay journals in Java, there is ethnic bias in terms of 
authors contributing to Doenia Pengalaman.  Looking at the list of authors above, one 
notes the presence of both Minang and non-Minang writers, yet the Minangkabau 
representation is undoubtedly the greater.  The journal’s major contributors, such as 
Damhoeri, Sou’yb, Jahjaniah, Sahiboel, and Musra Sjahboeddin, were ethnic 
Minangkabau,584 and Minangkabau writers accounted for the compositions in nearly 
half of Doenia Pengalaman’s issues.  The most regular contributors over the four-year 
period from 1938 to 1941 included Sou’yb, whose writings appeared twelve times, 
and Damhoeri, who appeared five times.  However, some non-Minang writers were 
also represented, such as Emnast, who was Mandailing Batak from South Tapanoeli, 
and Djarens whose ethnic origin was also not Minang and who appeared seven times 
in Doenia Pengalaman between the years 1938 and 1941.  Still, all in all, 
Minangkabau writers were the much more frequent contributors to Doenia 
Pengalaman and exerted heavy influence over the publication. 
Doenia Pengalaman appeared once a month in 1938, twice a month in the first 
half of 1939, and then three times a month from July 1939 to the end of 1941.  For 
each issue, 3,000 copies were printed, and normally all the copies were sold out in a 
few months.  The subscription was 25 cents a month from 1938 to June 1939, and then 
was raised to 50 cents a month.  The daily newspaper subscription rate was something 
like 75 cents to 1 guilder per month, so it was not very expensive, at least for the 
middle class Indonesian reading public. 
Agents or “propagandists” of Doenia Pengalaman reached across Soerabaja, 
Jogjakarta, Soerakarta, Tjirebon, Samarinda, Bandjarmasin, Amuntai, Kandangan, and 
Martapura, and naturally in many cities in Sumatra including Padang Sidempuan, 
                                                
584 Minangkabau and Mandailing Batak were the main writers of original works published by Balai 
Poestaka since 1920s. 
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Bindjai, Pajakumbuh, Sawah Lunto, Padang, Fort de Kock, Kota Radja, and Langsa.  
Thus its readership extended not only to Medan and cities in West Sumatra, but also 
through Central and East Java and South Borneo.   
The pattern of expansion of roman pitjisan has three distinctive characteristics.  
First, it spread in the Indies from Medan to other cities in Sumatra as well as to Java 
and Borneo.  This course contradicted the information and cultural flow in the Indies, 
which usually started from Batavia, the administrative center of the Indies 
government.  In this case, it was Medan that introduced this uniquely Indonesian 
popular literary journal in vernacular Malay to the rest of the Indies.  The literary style 
of the roman pitjisan, however, borrowed from the peranakan Chinese literary 
journals that originated in Java since the 1920s and circulated widely throughout the 
Indies.   
A second notable characteristic of this literary form’s expansion across the 
Indies was the geographic overlap between areas where roman pitjisan thrived and 
those where Islamic modernism, especially the Moehammadijah movement, was quite 
active.  To understand how roman pitjisan spread, it is important to consider the 
commercial centers in the 1930s, which were Medan and Soerabaja.  In terms of 
commerce, trade and administration, Medan was the center of the East Coast of 
Sumatra as well as Sumatra as a whole.  Both Central and East Java and such outer 
islands as South Borneo and Celebes belonged to the Soerabaja’s economic bloc.   
Thirdly Minangkabau merchants and traders who supported Islamic 
modernism were quite active in these areas, too.  It can be assumed, therefore, that 
roman pitjisan spread through Moehammadijah’s networks and the Minangkabau’s 
commercial networks.  This link is most clearly evident in the financial connections 
that existed between publishers and printers of roman pitjisan and the Minangkabau 
merchants, entrepreneurs, and financiers who funded them. 
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The publisher of Doenia Pengalaman, Poestaka Islam, was one of the leading 
publishers in Medan along with Mij. Sumatrasche Drukkerij, and had much to do with 
the Moehammadijah movement.  Besides Doenia Pengalaman, it published the 
weekly Pandji Islam (1934-1942) edited by Hamka and the monthly journal 
Poernama (1940-1942) edited by M. S. Oemar.  From 1940 on, Pandji Islam carried 
articles on Islam by Soekarno, who joined Moehammadijah in 1938 and became a 
“pious” Muslim during his exile on the island of Ende.  It also published many books 
on Islam and politics, such as Soekarno’s Indonesia Menggugat (Indonesia Acusses), 
Dr. Soetomo’s autobiography Riwajat Penghidoepan Dr. Soetomo dan 
Perdjoeangannja (Autobiography of Dr. Soetomo and His Struggle, by Abd. Wahid 
Rata), Tjokroaminoto’s book on the history of Islam Tarich Agama Islam (History of 
Islam), Hamka’s works on Islam and the likes.  Poestaka Islam also ran a lending 
library called “Hidoep!” (Live) in Medan where a member could borrow 28 books a 
month for a monthly membership fee of 65 cents. 
Printing houses such as N. V. Handel Mij. & Electrische Drukkerij Sjarikat 
Tapanoeli also contributed significantly to the development of roman pitjisan.  
Sjarikat Tapanoeli was established in Medan in 1910 by several “Indonesiërs” 
(Indonesians) from Tapanoeli when Pewarta Deli began circulation with Djaendar 
Moeda as editor and H. M. Thahir as the director.  By the late 1930s it had become 
one of the largest printing houses in Indonesia.585  As with other printing houses and 
periodicals in colonial days, Sjarikat Tapanoeli relied mainly on subscription fees 
from high-circulating daily newspapers such as, in this case, Pewarta Deli.  In 
addition to Doenia Pengalaman and Perwarta Deli, Sjarikat Tapanoeli printed other 
leading periodicals in Medan such as Abad XX, and Islamic journals such as Soeloeh 
                                                
585 "Memperkenalkan N. V. Handel Mij. & Electrische Drukkerij “Sjarikat Tapanoeli',” Abad XX, 3-15 
(May 13, 1939); 3-16 (May 20, 1939); 3-17 (May 27, 1939); 3-18 (June 3, 1939). 
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Islam, Pandji Islam, and Poernama.  The printing house was nationalistically oriented, 
too.  It produced nationalistic and Islamic books such as Tenggelamnja Kapal van der 
Wijk (by Hamka), Hak Perempoean dalam Hoekoem Islam (Women’s Rights in 
Islamic Law), Riwajat Dr. Rivai (Biography of Dr. Rivai), Riwajat Penghidoepan 
Dokter Soetomo dan Perdjoeangannja, and so on. 
Other publishers active in commercial publications such as roman pitjisan in 
the 1930s in Sumatra were Penjiaran Ilmoe of Fort de Kock (Roman Pergaoelan), 
Tjerdas of Medan, the Nove Company of Medan (Matahari), Surya Library of Padang 
(Surya, edited by Mohd. Thahar Rachmad and Suryabratha), and Boekhandel-
Bibliotheek-Leesgezelschap-Uitgever Alhambra of Medan (Moestika Alhambra, led 
by M. S. Radjo Magek, M. Chosen, Si Oema, Gaillardia [Emje], and Noerlelahayaty).  
Minangkabau merchants, entrepreneurs, and financiers funded most of these 
publishing enterprises.586  Penjiaran Ilmoe for instance was funded and assisted by 
Bank Nasional in Padang (established in 1930)587 and Handel Maatschappij 
INKORBA N.V., and grew rapidly in the late 1930s.  Dt. Pamoentjak who contributed 
a preface to the first issue of Roman Pergaoelan was the secretary of the director of 
Bank Nasional.  In sum the close relationship between the Medan literary circle and 
the Minangkabau network was the basis for the publication of Doenia Pengalaman. 
 
The Nationalism of Medan Literature 
In assessing the place of Medan literature in 1930s Indies, it is important to 
recognize that it would be misleading to equate Medan literature with no more than 
the roman pitjisan.  Doing so would neglect the process of how popular literature 
                                                
586 On the relation between the development of the Moehammadijah movement in Sumatra and the 
Minangkabau network, see Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, pp. 50-92. 
587 As for the history of Bank Nasional, see 40 Tahun P.T. Bank Nasional (27 Desember 1930 – 27 
December 1970) (Bukittinggi: P.T. Bank Nasional, 1970). 
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developed in Medan, which evolved as a lively a combination of Adi Negoro’s Abad 
XX, Islamic journals, and roman pitjisan.  Conceived in the early years of the 1930s, 
Medan literature was comprised of literary, popular, and Islamic journals that were all 
related and intertwined.  These publications shared not only this Medan context, but 
also the common use of a language that was emerging as a medium for self-
consciously national communication.  As Muhammad Yamin wrote to Abad XX in 
1934, in order to form a new society it was necessary for Indonesians to develop the 
Malay language and transform it into “bahasa Indonesia” (Indonesian language).588  
By creating the Indonesian language, Yamin imagined a solid foundation of the 
Indonesian nation.  In other words, Medan literature was part of the design to create 
the new (independent) Indonesian society.  It was conceived as a cultural project to 
establish the colloquial Malay, as opposed to the standardized Malay endorsed by the 
colonial authorities and the popular Chinese-Malay that widely circulated in the 
market, as the national language, and to make popular novels as the basis for 
Indonesian literature.   
In other words, for Yamin, Medan literature spoke to “our society, the 
Indonesian society” (masjarakat kita, masjarakat Indonesia).589  In its inaugural issue 
of October 1938, Doenia Pengalaman printed the following statement from its 
publisher Poestaka Islam, followed with an editorial remark. 
 
Taking A Stride 
                                                
588 Mr. Muhd. Yamin dalam “Pemandangan,” “Kemenangan bahasa Indonesia,” ABAD XX, Thn. 3, No. 
5 (February 3, 1934), pp. 46-47. 
589 Mr. Muhd. Yamin dalam “Pemandangan,” “Kemenangan bahasa Indonesia,” ABAD XX, Thn. 3, No. 
5 (February 3, 1934), pp. 46-47. 
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Our society, Indonesian society is getting restless.  It’s stirring with quests, 
hopes, and yearning for progress.  Change is desired; from the static, mute and 
tranquil to the dynamic, positive and active.  All alive, energetic. 
In the world of publications and literature, the same is taking place.  From 
among the young generation, disciples of the new literature have made their 
mark!  From pollen to stigma, the stigma bears fruit, and the fruit turns into 
healthy and scrumptious food for the restless soul wanting to move forward, 
that is the Indonesian people in general. 
Poestaka Islam is forging a new path for the publishing world in Indonesia.  
Even though the path had already been trodden before by several benefactors, 
whose contribution shall not go to waste, the underbrush was back again.  It is 
the path that young generation has long yearned for, supporters for the 
energetic, swift and lithe, that is romance and detective novels. 
On the lap of the Indonesian youth so full of aspirations and lively spirits, we 
lay down this modest endeavor, with sincere hope that it will be cheerily 
welcomed. 
To Mr. Pamoentjak and A. Diningrat, we entrust its life care, nurture, and 
fecundity.  As to the new literati of Indonesia, we invite them to open their 
books and sharpen their kalam pens, to render their feelings in the world of 
experience that is constantly restless in search of progress. 
Lastly, we hope that its unassuming name “Doenia Pengalaman” (World of 
Experience) will give it the resilience to extend its life. 
Publisher: POESTAKA ISLAM – MEDAN 
Medan, end of September ’38 
 
Wholehearted and Dedicated Reception. 
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Poestaka Islam’s offering us to lead this romance and detective journal was 
received wholeheartedly and passionately.  We understand that this task is 
heavy, too enormous for us to accept the entrustment for its care and training, 
even guidance to lead the new spirit of Indonesia. 
But we believe in and are aware of the unstoppable fighting spirit inside the 
helmsmen of Poestaka Islam.  The publication of the popular Islamic journal 
of knowledge that today is 5 years old and has become a best-selling weekly, 
Pandji Islam; the selling and publication of books appropriate for Indonesians 
reading in all subjects; the establishment of a library for book lending called 
Hidoep!  Now the time has come for the launching of Doenia Pengalaman, to 
take up a field that is still open, romance and detective stories.  To the two of 
us the task to lead it was delegated. 
Bismillah [In the name of God]!  We accept and have begun to sride ahead.  
Our hope is great that the new literati will join us and create this new path.  
And to the readers and Indonesian youth in general, we wish for a warm 
reception. 
The saying, “No ivory is without a crack,” gives us the hope to continue 
advancing. 
Sincerely 
A.M. PAMOENTJAK 
A. DININGRAT 
Medan, early October ’38590 
                                                
590 Doenia Pengalaman: Madjallah Boelanan Roman dan Detective-roman, No. 1, Th. 1, (Oct. 1938).  
Underline is original. 
 Moelai Melangkah 
Masjarakat Kita, masjarakat Indonesia moelai gelisah.  Dia bergerak mentjari-tjari, 
bertjita-tjita dan rindoe kemadjoean.  Segalanja ingin perobahan; dari statis, diam dan tenang 
mendjelma mendjadi dinamis, positif dan aktif.  Segalanja hidoep, giat-gesit. 
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Roman pitjisan activities were primarily in Sumatra and their influence in Java 
was rather limited, as Balai Poestaka and peranakan publications were dominant there.  
But the rise of roman pitjisan brought about some kind of ethnic contestation in 
publications in Malay/Indonesian language in the late 1930s.  As a matter of fact, even 
                                                                                                                                       
Dalam doenia pembatjaan dan kesoesasteraan, djoega tidak ketinggalan.  Dalam 
lingkoepan generasi moeda, ditanai pentjinta kesoesasteraan baroe!  Dari sari mendjadi poetik, 
poetik menhasilkan boeah dan boeah mendjadi hidangan-santapan jang lazat tjita rasanja 
oentoek rohani jang gelisah ingin madjoe, oemoemnja ra’jat kita Indonesia. 
Poestaka Islam merambah djalan baroe bagi doenia pembatjaan Indonesia.  Walaupun 
djalan itoe soedah pernah dilaloei oleh beberapa pengoesaha dan djasa itoe tidak akan hilang –, 
tetapi sekarang moelai semak kembali.  Djalan jang sangat dirindoei oleh barisan baroe 
angkatan moeda, penjemangat roh jang giat-gesit, tjepat dan tangkas, jaitoe tjerita roman dan 
detektif. 
Keharibaan poetra dan poeteri Indonesia jang penoeh bertjita-tjita dan berdjiwa 
hidoep, kami serahkan oesaha jang tidak sepertinja ini, dengan harapan jang soenggoeh moga-
moga mendapat samboetan jang penoeh gembira. 
Kepada toean-toean Pamoentjak dan A. Diningrat kami serahkan memimpinnja, 
mengasoeh dan menjoeboerkan hidoepnja.  Dan kepada para poedjangga baroe Indonesia, 
kami persilakan memboeka rehal dan meroentjing kalam, meloekiskan rasa hati dalam doenia 
pengalaman jang senantiasa gelisah mentjari madjoe ini. 
Penoetoep, moga-moga namanja jang sederhana “Doenia Pengalaman” memberi 
semangat jang tahan oentoek melandjoetkan oemoernja. 
     Penerbit: POESTAKA ISLAM – MEDAN  
     Medan, achir September ’38 
 
Samboetan sedia dan setia. 
Penjerahan Poestaka Islam kepada kami akan memimpin madjallah roman dan 
detektif ini, kami samboet dengan penoeh sedia dan setia.  Kami tahoe bahwa pekerdjaan ini 
amatlah berat, tidak lajaknja kami menerima serahkan boeat mengasoeh dan melatih bahkan 
mendjadi pandoe membimbing semangat baroe Indonesia. 
Tetapi penoeh jakin dan insaf akan semangat jang hidoep tidak tertahan-tahan dalam 
djiwa pengemoedi Poestaka Islam.  Diterbitkannja madjallah wetenschap Islam popoeler jang 
sekarang telah meningkat oesia 5 tahoen dan telah mendjadi minggoean dengan oplaag jang 
besar, bernama PANDJI ISLAM.  Didjoealnja dan diterbitkannja boekoe-boekoe jang penting 
oentoek pembatjaan Indonesia, dalam segala tjabang.  Dibangoenkannja poela satoe 
bibliotheek oentoek perséwaan boekoe dengan nama HIDOEP!  Maka sekarang datang poela 
temponja menerbitkan DOENIA PENGALAMAN, oentoek mengisi lapangan jang masih 
berboeka, roman dan detektif.  Kepada kami berdoea dipikoelkan kerdja memimpinnja. 
Bismillah!, kami terima dan kami moelai melangkah.  Sangatlah besar harapan kami 
kepada para poedjannga baroe akan toeroet serta mentjiptakan djalan baroe ini.  Dan kepada 
para pembatja dan oemoemnja poetera dan poeteri Indonesia, kami harapkan samboetan jang 
penoeh. 
Peribahasa “Ta’ ada gading jang tidak retak,” memberi harapah kami akan madjoe 
teroes meneroes. 
Wassalam 
     A. M. PAMOENTJAK 
     A. DININGRAT 
     Medan, awal October ’38 
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in its heyday in the 1920s the Balai Poestaka’s oligopolistic control and cultural 
hegemony were mainly confined to Java and Madoera, whereas in the Outer Islands, 
Balai Poestaka had to rely on local agents and publishers to sell and distribute its 
products.  Publishers such as Sjarikat Tapanoeli and Penjiaran Ilmoe, which were later 
to become the main publishers of roman pitjisan, were Balai Poestaka’s main agents 
in Sumatra.  In other words, the Outer Islands were pretty much left for indigenous 
writers and private publishers to carve out their own markets. 
Then in the late 1930s, roman pitjisan emerged.  These serialized novels 
became popular, because they dealt with such subjects as politics, religion, and love 
affairs, which Balai Poestaka avoided, and did not focus on the Chinese in Java.  Not 
only did these nationalistic roman pitjisan writers and publishers call for the creation 
of an “Indonesian library,” they also advocated for the creating a national language – 
Indonesian – that was modern.  Editors of these journals, such as Tamar Djaja and 
Pamoentjak, were quite emphatic that the kind of Indonesian language they wanted to 
use (or contributors to use) was not Chinese-Malay, which was used in the newspapers 
and literary works of the Chinese in Java.  
While encouraging indigenous writers to produce original novels from the 
1920s on, Balai Poestaka had failed to build a linguistic hegemony.  Those who were 
recruited by this government-subsidized publishing house came from West Sumatra 
and/or South Tapanoeli, because they all had Dutch education and could claim a 
mother tongue that was close enough to the Malay that Balai Poestaka believed to be 
authentic.  Their influence was noticeable in Balai Poestaka, especially in editing 
periodicals, which were considered their main products besides books.  The editorship 
provided by Sumatran writers had certain characteristics.  In 1930 Adi Negoro was 
appointed as the chief editor for its periodicals, Pandji Poestaka and Sri Poestaka.  
After he left Balai Poestaka, his position was succeeded by Sutan Takdir Alisjabhana 
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(1930-36), Armijn Pané (1936-41), and Sanoesi Pané (1941).  All of these figures 
came from South Tapanoeli, and were either of Minangkabau or Batak ethnic 
background.   
It is no wonder that many early novels by Balai Poestaka are set in Padang or 
the Minangkabau cultural domain.  The emancipation and aspiration for modernity 
that many of the novels highlight stemmed from the young writers’ challenge to their 
parents’ culture and tradition.  In the late 1930s, authors of Medan literature such as 
Hamka, Soeman, Selasih, and Damhoeri also contributed to Balai Poestaka.  
Especially, Hamka’s works Tuan Direktur (Mr. Director), Keadilan Ilahi (Divine 
Justice), and Didalam Lembah Kehidoepan (In the Valley of Life) were first published 
in roman pitjisan journals before being reproduced by Balai Poestaka in book form.  
In this way, both in terms of style and personnel (writers and editors), the Indonesian 
nationalists were quietly taking over the literature part of the colonial state publishing 
house from within.  
In the linguistic sphere, Indonesian cultural nationalists publicly declared their 
confidence in creating cultural identity through literature.  A group of young 
intellectuals stirred up a discussion about the cultural identity of Indonesia in the 
1930s.  In 1933, the New Literati (Poedjangga Baroe) emerged as an open forum for 
intellectuals who wished to contribute their ideas on the cultural identity of Indonesia.  
The most prominent writer in this group was Sutan Takdir Alisjabhana, with the 
collaboration of Armijn Pané, Amir Hamzah, and Sanoesi Pané.   
Those committed to the New Literati organized the first “Language Congress” 
(Kongres Bahasa) in Soerakarta from June 25 to 28, 1938.  The conference was about 
the Malay/Indonesian language.  “The new spirit,” as Takdir Alisjabhana remarked, 
demanded using the correct Indonesian national language as opposed to the 
unsystematic Chinese-Malay language.  Authors of Medan literature were also invited 
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to the Congress because of their ethnic and personal network with the New Literati 
group, but it appears that the Medan group had rather different visions.591  At the 
conference, Adi Negoro gave a speech on the Indonesian language, “Bahasa Indonesia 
dalam Persoerat Chabaran” (Indonesian Language in the Press), and Pamoentjak 
remarked on issues of establishing a spelling convention for the language, “Edjaan 
Bahasa Indonesia” (Spelling in the Indonesian Language).  Their resolution urged the 
discontinuation of “standardized” Malay or “high” Malay that was being taught at 
government schools and endorsed by Balai Poestaka.  In their opinion, the Indonesian 
language needed to be brought back to the people, thus their promotion of the 
colloquial form.  By so doing they challenged the Dutch cultural enterprise. 
But for the Medan group, the question of the Indonesian people had remained 
overly vague at the Language Congress.  In order to clarify the question, they 
organized their version of the conference, “Komperensi Roman” (Conference on 
Novels), on December 17, 1939.  Adi Negoro took leadership of the conference.  
Almost all of the approximately forty attendants were persons who were committed to 
Medan literature; they were journalists, writers, and publishers of “roman.”  The list of 
names of the popular writers included Matu Mona, Tamar Djaja, Joesoef Sou’yb, 
Hamka, Si Oema, Damhoeri, M. Yunan Nasution, Hasanoel Arifin, Loetan Gani, 
Joesoef Hoesin, A. W. Rata, Noerdin Soelan, M. Dien Jatim, and Mr. Indo.  They 
came not only from Medan, but also from Fort de Kock. Conference discussions were 
impassioned and lengthy, lasting well into the night.  Because many of the attendants 
were from West Sumatra and had a long road home, Adi Negoro finally cut the 
conference off at midnight, so that those attendees were able to leave for Fort de Kock 
in the following morning. 
                                                
591 Even to Poedjangga Baroe, popular roman pitjisan writers such as Joesoef Sou’yb contributed 
regularly.   
 381 
This one-day conference highlighted the nationalistic spirit of the literary 
community.  Its aim was to discuss whether the popularity of roman pitjisan 
contributed positively to the Indonesian society.  At issue was the creation of “Roman 
Indonesia” through popular novels, that is, how to make Indonesian literature alive 
(hidoepan roman Indonesia).  Attendants also discussed how to bring “Roman 
Indonesia” (the Indonesian novel) closer to the daily language of the readers.  
“Roman,” they believed, would benefit from use of simpler language that was familiar 
to the readers, because of its nature for “propaganda, suggestions, and criticism.”592  
The many kinds of roman that being published at the moment would help make the 
Indonesian people and society mature.  This would in return stimulate the “Roman 
Indonesia.”  With roman pitjisan, attendants at the conference believed that Roman 
Indonesia would make a more rapid progress.593 
This nationalistic attitude distinguished the roman pitjisan group from the New 
Literati group, which organized the Language Congress.  And they made the 
difference explicit. 
 
Is it enough if there is only the New Literati? 
Far from enough! 
Is it sufficient if a language is decided and conferred only by those with dr. 
and mr. titles? 
Doubtful! 
It is true that they have a huge interest in language, but it does not guarantee 
that what they have systematized and put together corresponds with the will of 
                                                
592 “ROMAN KOMPERENSI,” Roman Pergaoelan, Thn. 1, No. 11 (December 20, 1939), pp. 1-2. 
593 Roman Pergaoelan, 1-11 (December 20, 1939), pp. 1-2; Pandji Islam, 6-52 (December 25, 1939), p. 
7660.  “Roman Indonesia” was the concept of a novel-based literary form written by and from 
(Sumatran) Indonesian; it differed from the Balai Poestaka’s idea of proper Indonesian literature in that 
it used colloquial language. 
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the people.  A language does not belong to kings, or to intellectuals, but grow 
from the community, from millions of people.  From there it grows, from 
there it rises.  The intellectual group “above” only systematizes and puts 
together the grammar.  They systematized the grammar and structure only 
after the language had been “created” by the community.594 
 
For the Medan group, it appears that the disagreement with regard to national 
language (therefore also language of media) is one of class.  The discrepancy between 
the educated class and the ordinary people illustrates the problem that the Indonesian 
language was facing in the final moment of Dutch colonialism.  By the time this 
argument materialized, the Netherlands had been occupied by Nazi Germany and 
Indonesians were confronted with an unpredictable future.  Because of this, Balai 
Poestaka was no longer a significant challenge; instead, the New Literati became the 
new target that the Medan circle had to deal with.   
 
[Roman pitjisan’s] content and style of language had effects on the people, 
even though they did not receive high education.  Because often times their 
language is more accessible to laypeople compared to the language of those 
with advanced degrees.  Because writers live and mature amongst the 
                                                
594 “Timbangan Redaksi: Bahasa Indonesia,” Pedoman Masjarakat, Thn. 7, No. 46 (November 12, 
1941), p. 861. 
Apakah mentjoekoepi kalau sekiranja hanja “Poedjangga Baroe” itoe sadja? 
Djaoeh dari tjoekoep! 
Apakah mentjoekoep kalau sekiranja bahasa itoe hanja ditjamoeri dan diperkatakan oléh jang 
bertitel dr. dan mr.? 
Beloem tentoe! 
Betoel meréka menaroeh minat jang besar kepada bahasa, tetapi beloem tentoe apa jang 
meréka atoer dan soesoen itoe bersetoedjoe dengan kehendak masjarakat.  Bahasa itoe boekan 
kepoenjaan radja-radja, boekan kepoenjaan kaoem intelek, tetapi bahasa toemboeh dari 
masjarakat, dari orang banjak jang bermillioen.  Dari sana toemboehnja dan dari sana terbitnja.  
Kaoem terpeladjari jang “diatas” hanja menjoesoen dan mengatoer nahwoenja.  Meréka atoer 
nahwoe dan sarafnja ialah setelah hahan-bahan bahasa itoe di “perboeat” lebih dahoeloe oléh 
masjarakat tadi. 
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populace.  If writers do not connect with the “body” that generates the 
language, it will be difficult for them to provide the public with a language in 
an orderly manner.  Because in all eras, authors have become leaders of the 
public, much more so than writers of grammar and structure [syntax].595 
 
In the eyes of the Medan groups, both Balai Poestaka and the New Literati represented 
“high” cultural institutions, whose legitimacy came from their official and social 
positions.  Because of their high station within the Indies class structure, they had 
neglected the masses who constituted the majority of Indonesians, and therefore their 
legitimacy as representatives of Indonesian literature was questionable.  By contrast, 
the Medan group saw themselves as more authentic in that they had a large audience, 
which represented the majority of the market for popular literature in Sumatra.  And 
this audience was not expected to be simply passive consumers.  Rather, as Adi 
Negoro pointed out, readers of Medan literature were called into active and 
independent participation for “roman Indonesia” activity by reading them.  Although 
the concept of developing active and independent readers might sound idealistic, it 
was necessary in order to shape the literary/publishing power that the Medan group 
pursued. 
Developing this power, however, did not mean Medan writers were free from 
censorship.  A good example was the M. Saleh Oemar’s arrest due to the charge of 
persdelict (press offence) in 1940.  Saleh Oemar was a roman pitjisan writer and 
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jg isi dan gaja bahasanja mempengaroehi kepada masjarakat, walaupoen meréka tidak keloear 
sekolah tinggi.  Sebab kadang2 bahasa meréka lebih dikenal didalam kalangan oemoem 
daripada bahasa orang jang berdiploma tinggi.  Sebab pengarang itoe hidoep dan toemboeh 
dalam kalangan orang banjak.  Kalau sekiranja pengarang2 itoe tidak ada perhoeboengannja 
dengan “badan” pemikir bahasa itoe, maka soekarlah menjiarkan bahasa jang teratoer kepada 
orang banjak.  Sebab pengarang itoelah ditiap-tiap zaman jang mendjadi pemimpin orang 
banjak, lebih besar daripada pengaroeh pengarang gramatica dan nahoe saraf. 
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editor of journal Poernama, a sister journal of Doenia Pengalaman.  He was popular 
partly because his publications allegedly carried pornographic content.  He was 
imprisoned for more than three months, and with his arrest Poernama lost its sole 
manager and main writer, and so was forced to suspend publication.596  Despite such 
challenges, the Medan circle kept producing popular literature until Indonesia was 
taken over by the Japanese military. 
Although the number of its core members was small, the Medan group 
declared that they could help create the “national” language, as if it was a sphere over 
which they had sovereignty.  This declaration of influence was supposed to have 
legitimacy because their literary works had gained mass support.  Thus popular 
nationalism in the form of popular literature was created.   
Because of its form, Medan literature did not attract the attention of colonial 
government, and caused no overt threat to the authorities.  Yet this group had their 
rivals and enemies; they competed with Balai Poestaka and the Dutch-educated New 
Literati for cultural legitimacy, and fought for a market share against the popular 
Chinese-Malay literature.  Medan literature also fought for the creation of the 
Indonesian nation, in part by imagining the underground revolutionary struggle 
represented by Patjar Merah.  Its struggle developed with its audience, and its 
audience shared this dream with Medan literature, that their nation would materialize 
in the near future. 
 
Colonial Protection 
As a newly emerging city in the late colonial era, Medan symbolized 
modernity and provided the opportunity and energy for new cultural formations.  The 
multicultural character of the city was conducive to the emergence of a uniquely 
                                                
596 Doenia Pengalaman, III-9 (March 25, 1940).  
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“Indonesian” popular literature.  This literature became a phenomenon in Sumatra 
because it enjoyed overwhelming popularity among the indigenous Muslim audience.  
It also aspired to nationalistic ideals by turning Malay into the national language 
“Indonesian,” and by establishing Indonesian literature.   
Medan literature also introduced two kinds of new politics.  First, it enjoyed an 
exclusive network of writers and publishers from the Minangkabau ethnic group who 
were able to make use of the Minangkabau commercial network as well as the 
modernist Islam network.  The Minangkabau network helped publish popular 
literature, whereas the Islamic network and community both helped produce and the 
literary journals and provided its main consumers.  Since Minangkabau were 
“outsiders” in the local politics in the East Coast of Sumatra, which was divided along 
ethnic lines and dominated by long simmering rivalries between ethnic groups,597 the 
Medan group demonstrated the politics of class in the cultural sphere by separating 
themselves from the Poedjangga Baroe group.  They played the politics of language 
for popular consumption.  Considering the popularity of the Medan literature, their 
approach appeared to be welcomed by a wide range of people. 
A second kind of politics introduced by Medan literature involved a context of 
cultural politics as this literature shaped a culturally and economically contested 
sphere in the late colonial Indonesia.  On the cultural front, Medan writers were faced 
with two forces – Balai Poestaka and the New Literati.  Both cultural enterprises and 
literary circles were considered of high quality and representative of the “modern” 
form of Indonesian literature, which subsequently set the “national” standard after 
independence across the former Dutch colony.598  Yet in Sumatra, the cultural 
influence of Balai Poestaka was limited.  A handful of Medan writers worked for Balai 
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Poestaka at one time with the result that from the 1920s on Balai Poestaka 
occasionally reproduced popular novels from Medan.  In this sense, the Medan group 
took over Balai Poestaka from within.  A more exciting contest took place between the 
Medan circle and the New Literati group, although the latter did not consider the 
former as worthy rival.  The Medan group did not share the New Literati’s vision of 
the national language and literature, as the latter was mainly confined to the Dutch-
educated elite circle in Batavia.  Instead, the Medan group tried to establish their own 
version of “Indonesian literature” on the basis of colloquial Malay and popular 
literature.  In terms of the publishing market, they succeeded in gaining recognition.   
In this they succeeded in gaining some kind of cultural authority at the end of Dutch 
colonialism, while still being unable to make headway in the political front. 
Their story and contest does not end here.  While the Minangkabau network 
was key to the success of Medan literature the latter’s reliance on this network also 
proved limiting.  Medan literature commanded a specific but limited segment of the 
publishing market because the Chinese-Malay literature had been established far 
longer and was able to maintain its position of dominance.  Peranakan publications 
overwhelmed the marketplace since the 1910s and Medan literature could not compete 
with it.  Even in terms of Malay language, although peranakan publications were 
accused of using a corrupted form of Malay, their brand of Malay (the Chinese-Malay) 
was also dominant in urban settings.599  In this regard, any attempts to develop a larger 
market share outside Sumatra for Medan literature were generally fruitless. 
It is safe to say that peranakan, the Minangkabaus, and the Javanese (or Java-
oriented intellectuals), had their own slightly different versions of Malay.  Each had its 
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own sphere of influence, but none was able to dominate Indonesia.  The rise of Medan 
literature shows this contest over the establishment of the “national language” in 
colonial Indonesia, when it was still an empty signifier.  The contest, however, was 
halted due to the Japanese takeover in 1942, and never recovered after Indonesia 
gained independence.  After the independence, Java-oriented intellectuals continued 
the effort to create the national language and literature; but by then, the Minangkabaus 
and peranakan had become “minority” players and their influence in the literary 
sphere declined rapidly.  In retrospect, ironically, both peranakan and Minangkabaus 
had been able to emerge as real contestants in the publishing market under the 
“protection” of the colonial government’s repressive regulations. 
 
 CHAPTER 9 
 
(IN)VISIBLE CHINESE: 
PRINT POWER, SECURITY, POLITICAL POSITION 
 
In the 1930s newspapers that were on the persbreidel watch-list were put under 
surveillance for a year.600  The authorities constantly updated the list, but the degree of 
priority placed on this activity was subject to change depending on the socio-political 
condition.  The changing priorities evident in the colonial state reflect the fact that 
external circumstances became more significant to the Indies state, as is implied in 
three-ways communications among the Governor-General, the Prosecutor General and 
the Director of Justice described blow.601  
Concern about external security was new to the colonial authorities.  Indeed, 
most colonial states concentrated on only internal security matters, as external security 
was generally guaranteed by written agreements and/or treaties among Western 
colonial powers.  From the Dutch point of view, dire developments in international 
context took place in the 1930s.  These included the Great Depression, which reached 
the Indies in 1930; the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931; Hitler’s rise to power 
in Germany in 1933, his suppression of all opposition, and reoccupation of Rhineland 
in 1934-1935; the February failed coup in Japan and the subsequently intensified 
militarization; the breakout of the Spanish civil war; Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia in 
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1936; the Sino-Japanese war in China in 1937; war in Europe and the beginning of the 
formation of the Axis alliance in 1939; and, finally, the occupation of Holland in 1940.   
How the Indies state would confront these rapid changes in the international 
situation during the 1930s became a significant policy decision that opened up 
possibilities for various (re)actions in the colonial society.  An obvious problem for 
the Dutch authorities was Chinese reactions to Japan’s aggression towards China.   
 
Japan’s Presence 
In 1930, the census tallied 60.7 million persons living in the Indies.  Out of the 
total, there were 1,233,000 persons in the “Chinese” category, which constituted about 
2.3 percent of the population.  Recent Chinese immigrants retained close contacts with 
their ancestral home, as historian C. F. Remer estimates based on Chinese emigrants’ 
remittances to China in 1930.  Funds transfer from the Netherlands Indies came to 
about 25 million guilders or 5.8 percent of the Foreign Asiatic income in the colony.602  
Since the amount of remittances was small, it suggests that the Chinese had their own 
networks and maintained ties between the Indies and China.   
In an article published in 1930, Amry Vandenbosch, a political science 
professor at Kentucky University, wrote of strong material and sentimental bonds 
between the Indies Chinese with China: 
 
among the totoks (full-blooded) and also among large number of peranakans 
there is a very active Chinese national sentiment which expresses itself in 
forms that cause the government no little trouble and concern.  […]  The 
Chinese schools recruited large number of teachers from this region, and these 
have done much to awaken Chinese nationalist sentiment.  There is much 
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propaganda from out of China; the Kuomintang controls a considerable press 
in the Indies.  Events in China are closely followed and when China has a 
grievance the press reflects it.  […]  When Canton was still revolutionary 
Chinese conflict was transported to the Indies and disturbances took place.  
The boycott against Japan was observed with varying degrees of rigidity in 
different parts of the Indies, and in some places was maintained by 
terrorization. […] 
“(the) Chinese in the Indies really do not constitute the danger politically that 
some people would have us believe.  They are too practical to continue 
sending money to China for purely sentimental reasons without some tangible 
return.  […]  Complaints are expressed in the Chinese press that they are 
making little economic progress. […] 
The [Chinese] Nationalist government has not forgotten about the Chinese 
colonies abroad, and its attitude in most respect is similar to that of its 
predecessors.  It is demanding a new consular treaty with the Netherlands and 
also desires the assimilation of Chinese to Europeans in the East Indies.603   
 
But Vandenbosch also recognized that the majority of Chinese in the Indies were loyal 
Dutch subjects with only sentimental interest in China as the “long-continued turmoil 
in China has disillusioned many and caused a general decrease of interest in the 
homeland.”604  Even though American and English scholars such as Vandenbosch and 
John S. Furnivall605 claimed that by 1930 there was no longer such thing as the 
“Chinese question,” and that the Chinese were not politically dangerous, the above 
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citation already signaled that the Chinese might eventually bring anxiety to the Dutch 
government in the Indies.  
The timing of the publication of Vandenbosch’s article is worth noticing.  In 
1929, a year before the piece was published, the Chinese government passed a new 
Chinese citizenship act, which reaffirmed the principle of jus sanguinis and stipulated 
that a Chinese who wished to become a national of another country could only lose his 
Chinese citizenship with the permission of the Ministry of the Interior.606  In other 
words, this was the time when the question of citizenship reemerged as a diplomatic 
issue between China and the Netherlands, which is what appears to have prompted 
Vandenbosch to remark that the Chinese did not constitute a political threat to the 
Indies, while implying that their existence could cause a diplomatic headache for the 
Netherlands.   
Vandenbosch later incorporated his article into his book, The Dutch East 
Indies,607 which arguably became a standard introduction to the affairs of the Indies.  
Ten years after the article was published, Vandenbosch’s view on the Indies Chinese 
question was also reproduced in a book published in Japan.  Regardless of whether or 
not the author was a Chinese expert, the appearance of Vandenbosch’s article as a 
Japanese publication deserves closer notice. 
This article was published in a book entitled Ranryo Indo niokeru Kakyo 
(Overseas Chinese in the Dutch Indies), edited by Mantetsu Toua Keizai Chosa-kyoku 
(the Research Institute of East Asian Economy of the South Manchurian Railroad 
Company, hereafter Mantetsu).  Mantetsu was a Japanese enterprise that not only 
constructed and operated railways in Manchuria, but also undertook the construction 
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of towns, harbor improvements, coal and iron mining, social infrastructure, and 
agricultural experimentation.  It was also known for its intelligence activity; its 
research institute published a series of books on Asia including the Southeast Asian 
region.  During the period of 1938 and 1940, it published a series of six-book series on 
the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, one of which was the title mentioned above.608  
The series was printed in haste, because after the Sino-Japanese war broke out in July 
1937, the Japanese government was preparing to establish a new Asian order.  The 
general introduction for the series revealed two aims: first and foremost the task at 
hand was to understand to what extent overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia would 
collaborate with the Japanese in the near future, while the second aim was to examine 
the socio-economic influence of this population group.609  The text also maintained 
that in order for Japan to establish a new regional order, it had to build a direct 
relationship with seven million overseas Chinese in the region.610   
The book contains significant data on the Indies Chinese.  It provides general 
demographic, economic, political and social data, while also showing to whom Japan 
was paying attention among the pro-Japanese prominent Chinese.  The Matetsu team 
made use of Vandenbosch’s article to map the political position of the Chinese in the 
Indies.611  This does not mean that the team did not know or read Dutch sources.  They 
referred to Dutch colonial publications such as Vragen van den dag (Questions of the 
Day), Regeerings-almanak voor Nederlandsch-Indië (Governmental-Almanac for the 
Netherlands Indies), and Indische Verslag (Indies Reports) to develop data on the 
Chinese political position in official colonial institutions.  But since their intention in 
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making this report was to seek out pro-Japan Chinese, they disregarded other 
categorizations that could have been made of the Chinese in the Indies according to 
political orientation, which included groups such as pro-China, pro-Holland and pro-
Indonesia Chinese.612  The reason behind Japan’s attention to pro-Japan Chinese was 
obviously its intention to expand its activities in Southeast Asia. 
From the 1920s onward Japan’s economic expansion into Southeast Asia had 
increased rapidly, and by the 1930s its economic influence over the Indies could no 
longer be ignored.613  The Indies-Japan trade relations constituted a major 
international challenge for the Indies government.  In the 1930s Japan’s economic 
presence became a burning issue in the Indies as well as elsewhere in Southeast Asia.  
Even the vernacular press reported on Japan’s expansion in the Indies.614  The ratio 
between imports and exports became quite unbalanced.  While exports to Japan 
constituted only four percent of all exports, imports from Japan exceeded one-third of 
total imports.  Under this condition, the Indies state issued an emergency ordinance to 
restrict imports of cement and beer from Japan, because it was concerned with rising 
economic protectionism after the Great Depression and with Japan’s economic 
penetration.  In order to resolve the situation, a series of Japan-Dutch trade 
negotiations took place.  Informal talks began in late 1933, and formal talks resumed 
in June 1934.  But while the Indies government sought to restrict imports from Japan, 
it rejected Japan’s requests for the expansion of exports and investments, maritime 
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agreements between the two countries, and unrestricted immigration to the Indies.  
Because of this gap between the two governments, the negotiation broke down in late 
1934.  After this break in negotiations lasted more than one year, on June 8, 1936,615 
the two countries reached an agreement on cargo shipping.  The Netherlands 
government agreed to a compromise on various points for it, resulting in the Hart-
Ishizawa agreement on interim (intra-quarter) trades on April 9, 1937.616  As had 
become clear in the trade negotiations, the Indies had a weak position against Japan’s 
aggressive demands.  The trade talks made the Indies government realized the 
challenges it faced in dealing with Japan.  The negotiation process showed that a main 
motivation of the Indies state was the desire to appease the Japanese government. 
The challenge posed by Japan for the Indies government was the major factor 
defining persbreidel in the latter half of the 1930s, except for those cases involving 
Dutch newspapers.  Japan constituted the main security concern for the Indies 
government during this period.  Patterns in the number of the colonial files being 
issued at the time reflected this shift of policy priority.  The number of files on 
“movements,” meaning political activities by “communists” and “extremists,” which 
had constituted the major part of colonial mail report declined substantially as the 
1930s proceeded.  In the 1920s there were four or five hundreds files sent to The 
Hague every year on “communists,” especially from 1923 to 1928, and several 
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hundred on “communists” and “nationalists” from 1929 to 1933/34.  But between the 
late 1920s and 1934, an almost equal number of files were produced on “Chinese,” 
and from the middle of the 1930s, the files sent to The Hague on “Japanese” 
outnumbered all those on communists, nationalists, and the Chinese combined.  This 
pattern again suggests that by the middle of the 1920s and the late 1930s the top 
security concern of the Indies government had evidently shifted from “communists” to 
“Japanese.”  
The Japan question did not solely derive externally, but took a different shape 
within the Indies colony, where was related to anti-Japanese actions and discourses 
among the Indies Chinese residents.  Several waves of anti-Japanese actions had taken 
place up until the middle of the 1930s.  In the 1920s there had been conflicts between 
the Indies government and the Chinese consuls over the use of the Chinese national 
flag on the days of national mourning, one of which was the day for commemorating 
the Twenty-one Demands on May 25.  The demands in question in the 
commemoration were those made by Japan on the Chinese government.  During 
World War I, in January 1915 Japan had sent a set of demands to the nominal 
government of the Republic of China that resulted in two treaties signed in May 1915.  
Among other things, the treaties guaranteed special privileges for Japan in China much 
like those already enjoyed by major European powers, confirmed Japan’s railway and 
mining claims in Shandong province, and gave Japan special concessions in 
Manchuria.  In short the treaties symbolized a national humiliation for the Chinese.  
The Indies government understood this historical background well, and yet, as 
Vandenbosch observes in his article on Indies Chinese, it had “prohibited flying the 
flag at half mast on these days on the ground that it could not permit within its 
territory any act which would constitute an offence to Japan, a power with which it is 
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on friendly relations.”617  The Indies government had prioritized deferring to Japan’s 
sensibilities over those of its Chinese residents’, and warned that all kinds of Chinese 
actions that could affect Japan’s dignity should be avoided.   
In 1932 and 1933 large-scale anti-Japan demonstrations and boycotts of 
Japanese goods took place.  Similar anti-Japan movement occurred in other colonies in 
Southeast Asia.  The trigger was the establishment of the Manchuria puppet state by 
the Japanese government in September 1932.  The Indies Chinese press zealously 
reported on this development and even campaigned for anti-Japanese actions.  Their 
acts naturally displeased the Indies government, and thus the very first persbreidel to 
be issued in the Indies was applied to Warta Warna in Semarang.  The rationale was 
that its anti-Japanese articles had caused insecurity of public order.  But the last big 
blow came in late 1937 after the Sino-Japanese war broke out.  As the war escalated, 
the Indies Chinese press published even more aggressive anti-Japanese articles.  In 
response the Indies government issued persbreidel against those newspapers one after 
another. 
Japan’s aggressive moves in Asia also took a cultural turn.618  Starting in the 
early 1930s, Japan made a move to penetrate the print culture of the region by 
circulating its political propaganda.  To do this, Japan started building its own print 
houses and subsidizing Indonesian newspapers.  These activities pushed the Indies 
government to take steps to counter Japan’s cultural penetration. 
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Bureau for East Asian Affairs 
The growing presence of Japan in Asia and in the Indies in particular required 
the Indies government to reorganize its administrative institutions, and in 1932 a major 
administrative reorganization took place.  The two Bureaus for Chinese Affairs and for 
Japanese Affairs were merged into a new one, the Bureau for Chinese and East Asian 
Affairs (Dienst der Chineesche Zaken en Oost-Aziatische Aangelegenheden, hereafter 
Bureau for East Asian Affairs).  The head of this Bureau was H. Mouw, who had been 
the head of Bureau for Chinese Affairs since 1919.  He ran the new bureau until his 
retirement in 1935, and then A. H. J. Lovink took his position on July 25, 1935.  
Lovink served as its head until the Bureau was dissolved in 1942 following Japan’s 
occupation of the Indies.   
Combining the bureaus of Chinese and Japanese Affairs represented a change 
of policy.  Since 1916, the Bureau for Chinese Affairs had a section for Japanese 
affairs.  Back then, H. Mouw was the head of the bureau, which had two officers for 
Chinese Affairs, J. A. M. Bruneman and J. Snellen van Vollenhoven, while H. L. 
Bense was in charge of the Japanese Affairs.  In 1921 the independent bureau, Bureau 
for Japanese Affairs, was organized and a year later it became the Office for Japanese 
Affairs.  Its advisor was P. A. van de Stadt until the office was combined with the 
Bureau for East Asian Affairs in 1932.   
The newly established bureau had to watch over not only activities of the 
Indies Chinese, but also political and military developments taking place in China and 
Japan.  Nevertheless, as the name showed, it put more focus on Chinese affairs than 
those of Japanese.  The Chinese division had ten officials.  This included five officers 
of Chinese Affairs: J. Snellen van Vollenhoven, Dr. A. D. A. de Kat Angelino, J. B. de 
Wilde, A. H. J. Lovink, and L. Kamper.  Indonesians were appointed as excisemen 
with Tjitrotaroeno assuming the position of first exciseman, and Raden Soeria Adi 
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Negara and Soeratman as his subordinates.  A Chinese, S. Cho, also known as Tsang 
Tsui Shih, had been appointed as an officer since January 7, 1922.  In 1934 one more 
officer was added.  All officers for Chinese affairs were trained as Sinologists at 
Leiden University, and hence they all were able to read Chinese language. 
Between late 1936 and 1937 under the leadership of Lovink, further 
administrative restructuring of the Bureau for East Asian Affairs took place as new 
positions were added.  One editor, Dr. L. G. M. Jaquet and four aspirant-controllers, F. 
J. E. van Gelden, Mr. Th. H. Bot, S. Meijer Jr. and F. P. Thomassen, were appointed.  
Three aspirant officials were newly stationed in Peking (H. Hagenaar) and Tokyo (G. 
J. Dissevelt and G. J. Jogejans).  S. Cho was now a chief translator for Japanese 
language, while J. King and Tso Ping Nam took charge in Chinese language 
translations.  With these changes, the size of the staff at the Bureau for East Asian 
Affairs had doubled to twenty officials.619   
High officials working for the Bureau for Chinese Affairs tended have 
lengthier terms of service in the colonial administration, when compared with officials 
in other administrative positions.  For instance, J. Snellen van Vollenhoven served as 
adviser in the Indies for twenty-three years, his last post being that of Deputy Adviser 
on East Asian Affairs to the Government at Batavia before returning to Holland in 
1933.  H. Mouw also worked for twenty-three years from 1912, and was eventually in 
charge of the Bureau from 1916 until his retirement in 1935.  In the capacity of 
advisor for the Bureau Mouw travelled widely in China, Japan, Indo-China, Siam and 
the Straits Settlements, and built an international intelligence network between the 
imperial powers.620  
                                                
619 Regeerings-Almanak voor Nederlandsch-Indië (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij), 1895-1942. 
620 Mr. 321x/1922; 434x/1922; 430x/1931.  On February 1931 an international conference on Chinese 
affairs was held in Singapore where British, Dutch, and French colonial officials on the Chinese affairs 
as well as Siamese officials discussed on the Chinese matters in Asia.  Mr. 430x/1931. 
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 The Bureau for East Asian Affairs was responsible for gathering information 
on the political activities of Indies Chinese as well as China’s political development 
and Japan’s actions in Asia.  In the 1930s the bureau spent more time than ever on 
Japan’s affairs, because the latter directly affected China’s development and evoked 
strong reactions from Indies Chinese.  The bureau regularly sent confidential reports 
on those issues, but the additional information it also provided to help make sense of 
newspaper reports became worthwhile reading for colonial officials as well.   
 Among other issues, Japan’s aggressive approach to Indonesian nationalists, 
intellectuals, and journalists caught the bureau’s attention.  Development in the year 
1933 was particularly notable as Japan invited two prominent intellectuals – Mohamad 
Hatta and Parada Harahap – to visit Japan.  According to a Dutch confidential report, 
Hatta visited Japan for a month in April 1933.621  The report cited Japanese 
newspapers in Osaka and Kobe, which described him as “the young Gandhi of Java” 
(de jonge Gandhi van Java).  These newspapers detailed Hatta’s life, the connection 
between his visit and Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, and how his 
people’s self-consciousness would awaken.  They reported that Hatta’s visit would 
bring Japan and Indonesia, whose people shared the (Asian) blood, closer together.  
According to the newspapers, the intention of Hatta’s visit was to study Japan’s 
industrial development as a model for the Indies in the development of private 
industries for its economic independence, which was crucial for its political 
sovereignty.  The Dutch report also described the reaction of the Indies press to 
Hatta’s Japanese visit.  The semi-governmental Dutch newspaper, Java Bode, made an 
abridged translation of the English edition of Osaka Mainichi (Osaka Daily), and 
concluded Hatta to be a propagandist but harmless.   
                                                
621 “Bezoek van Mohamad Hatta aan Japan,” Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 6, 1933, in Mr. 
711x/1933.   
 400 
A more sobering warning signal for the Dutch came from Jawa Nippo, the 
Japanese language newspaper in Java, when it mentioned that Hatta met several 
influential persons in Japan, one of whom was Rash Behari Bose, the exiled British 
Indian agitator and leader of the anti-British movement.622  During World War I Bose 
became one of the leading figures of the Ghadar Conspiracy, which attempted to 
trigger a mutiny in India in February 1915.  The revolution failed and most 
revolutionaries were captured.  But Bose managed to escape British intelligence, 
obtained a passport for Japan by asking P. N. Tagore, a relative of the famous poet 
Tagore, and reached Japan in late 1915 by way of Singapore and Hong Kong.  In 
Japan he established a shelter for radical Pan-Asian groups and became a Japanese 
citizen in 1923, living as a journalist and writer.  In 1942 he formed the Indian 
Independence League in Tokyo and started organizing non-residential Indians in 
Southeast Asia.  Through his activity, he became close friends of Japanese right-wing 
nationalists and Pan-Asianism leaders, such as Toyama Mitsuru.623   
Hatta’s other significant meeting took place with Shimonaka Yasaburo, a 
member of an extremely reactionary nationalist association, Kodokai (Imperial Way 
Society).624  Shimonaka was a well-known leader of labor and peasant movements, the 
founder of a teachers’ union, and founder of a successful publishing company, 
Heibonsha.  But his ideological position changed from leftism to National Socialism 
in the early 1930s, which also embraced pan-Asianism.625  Pan-Asianism was an 
ideology formed in the 1930s, promoting a view that under the leadership of Japan, 
                                                
622 “Bezoek van Mohamad Hatta aan Japan,” Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 6, 1933, in Mr. 
711x/1933. 
623 For a biography of Rash Behari Bose, see Nakajima Takeshi, Nakamuraya no Bose: Indo Dokuritsu 
Undo to Kindai Nihon no Ajia Shugi (Tokyo: Hakusuisha, 2005). 
624 “Bezoek van Mohamad Hatta aan Japan,” Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 6, 1933, in Mr. 
711x/1933. 
625 For biographical description of Shimonaka Yasaburo, see Shimonaka Yasaburo Jiten (Tokyo: 
Heibonsha, 1965). 
 401 
Asian nations would solidify and create a continental identity that would defeat 
Western imperialism.  The Dutch secret report found Hatta’s access to Pan-Asianism 
organizations and leaders troubling because those networks would support nationalist 
movements in the Indies as well as British India.  The worrisome indicator was the 
anti-British movement being organized by Bose and other Indian exiles in Japan.  
Since the Japanese government did not suppress such activity, it posed a threat to 
Western powers.  At the same time, the report also found relief in the fact that no 
Indonesian political exiles had yet sought refugee status in Japan, and hence no 
evidence of active Japan-Indonesian associational activity appeared to exist.626   
While Hatta met Japanese and Indian political figures, Parada Harahap’s trip to 
Japan focused more on industrial and economic aspects of the country.  It appeared 
that Harahap went to Japan not in the capacity of journalist but as entrepreneur.  He 
was accompanied by seven friends and arrived at Kobe on December 1933.627  He met 
three members of the executive board of the Ishihara Sangyo Koshi (Ishihara 
Concern), which owned iron ore mines in British Malaya and the Indies and was 
growing as a trading company in the region.628  In Kobe and Osaka, the Chamber of 
Commerce, and Governor and Mayor offered dinners for the Harahap group.  The 
Dutch report on Harahap’s trip notes that the English edition of Osaka Mainichi 
referred to Harahap as “the king of newspaper in Java” (Java kranten koning) and 
praised the good relationship between Japan and Java.629  According to the colonial 
document, Harahap managed to avoid delivering any official speech during his stay in 
                                                
626 “Bezoek van Mohamad Hatta aan Japan,” Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 6, 1933, in Mr. 
711x/1933.  For Hatta’s understanding of Japan’s “return to Asia,” see Goto, ‘Returning to Asia,’ pp. 
307-322. 
627 “Reis Parada Harahap naar Japan,” Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 1, 1934, in Mr. 
107x/1934. 
628 Yasukichi Yasuba, “Hiroichiro Ishihara and the Stable Supply of Iron Ore,” in Saya Shiraishi and 
Takashi Shiraishi (eds.), The Japanese in Colonial Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, 
Cornell University, 1993), pp.  139-154. 
629 Osaka Mainichi, December 6, 1934, in “Reis Parada Harahap naar Japan,” Mededeelingen 
Chineesche Zaken, No. 1, 1934, in Mr. 107x/1934. 
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Japan, despite various requests.  The implication was that Japan was eager to develop 
a relationship with Harahap, who continued to contribute his travel essays to his daily 
Bintang Timoer.630   
Japan’s overtures to Hatta and Harahap were not entirely successful.  Hatta 
was arrested in February 1934 due to his political activity along with his connection 
with Japan’s right-wing activists, and then banished to Boven Digoel in January 1935.  
Harahap went bankrupt in 1935 and was charged with financial felony.631  But despite 
these setbacks, by the beginning of the 1930s Japan’s cultural activities had begun to 
take root in the Indies. 
 
Japan’s Propaganda, Printing Houses, Print Competition 
Since the 1920s, Japan’s economic presence in Southeast Asia rapidly grew.  
Japan’s economic interests in the region, especially in the Indies, lied in rich natural 
resources such as oil and rubber that were considered essential for Japan’s economic 
progress.  In the 1930s Japan’s southward expansion became justified by the ideology 
of Pan-Asianism, mostly led by various rightist organizations that developed close 
relationships with the Japanese government.632   
                                                
630 “Reis Parada Harahap naar Japan,” Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 1, 1934, in Mr. 
107x/1934. 
631 Harahap later was funded by Japan for his newspaper business. 
632 Along with Japanese economic penetration into Southeast Asia, many Japanese merchants, 
fishermen, and camera shop owners worked for the Japanese government by collecting socio-economic 
information.  For Japanese southward advancement and spy activities, see Eric Robertson, The 
Japanese File: Pre-War Japanese Penetration in Southeast Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore, Kuala 
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Japan’s aggressive propaganda involved various methods.  In the 1930s, the 
intensification of Japanese “cultural” activities in the Indies, both formal and informal, 
became a problem with regard to the colonial order and tranquility.  Formal cultural 
activities were carried out by the Japanese consulates in the Indies.  The Japanese 
consulate in Soerabaja, for instance, produced and circulated propaganda documents 
on Pan-Asianism by the Japanese government, held anti-Chinese lectures, and wrote 
letters of protest to Dutch authorities against anti-Japanese newspaper articles.633 
Informal cultural activities included publishing newspapers in the Malay 
language, and building and making use of collaborative relationship with Indonesian 
intellectuals and journalists.  The Japanese started to publish Malay newspapers in the 
late 1930s.  Two Japanese-owned newspapers deserve our attention here.  In 1937 the 
daily Sinar Selatan (Southern Gleam) began circulation in Semarang with a well-
known figure, Tsuda Tsukasa, as a chief editor who was the president as well as 
editor-in-chief of daily Astra.  Sinar Selatan was considered a semi-official Japanese 
newspaper and had Taira Isamu as its editor-in-chief, Mohamad Soedradjat as the vice 
editor-in-chief, and Sjamsoedin also in the editorial board.  In late 1938, Sinar Selatan 
discontinued its publication because its core associate Kaneko Keizo had arranged to 
purchase daily the Warta Harian (Daily News) in Batavia.634  The other newspaper, 
under the guidance of the Japanese consulate, Tohindo Nippo (Indies Daily), was 
launched in Batavia in 1937.  Kubo Tatsuji, who owned Nichiran Shogyo Shimbun 
(Japan-Netherlands Commercial Newspaper) since 1934, was committed to the 
establishment of Tohindo Nippo and made it a joint venture.635  Saito Masao, who 
used to be the editor-in-chief of a Japanese daily Jawa Nippo, became the president, 
while Taniguchi Goro served as the editor-in-chief.  Siauw Tjin Hoen or Shio Sei Oen 
                                                
633 Vb. 24-10-39-M 44; Mr. 146x/1940 in Vb. 14-3-40-A 17. 
634 Mr. 673x/1939. 
635 Nichiran Shogyo Shimbun changed its name to Tohindo Nippo in 1937. 
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took charge of publishing and the Ogawa Corporation took responsibility of the 
printing.636 
Building up collaborative relationships with Indonesian nationalists and 
leading journalists was also important for the Japanese in the publishing business.  
Three approaches were possible in this regard.  The first was to build a network 
among indigenous journalists through a leading indigenous journalist, in this case 
Saëroen, who as editor-in-chief of Pemandangan had a long history of involvement 
with Indies newspapers and enjoyed a good relationship with leading Indonesian 
“national” figures such as Dr. Soetomo, Thamrin, Soekardjo, H. A. Salim, and Parada 
Harahap.637  Kubo and a missionary Kurinoki Tatsuo had access to Saëroen.  Through 
Saëroen’s network, Kubo and Kurinoki became acquainted with leading Indonesian 
figures and built a sort of collaborative relations to spread Japan’s ideas of pan-
Asianism.  
The second method for effective propagandizing was to increase the number of 
pro-Japanese Indonesian periodicals.638  Soerabaja in particular had many pro-
Japanese periodicals.  Among others, Soeara Oemoem (Public Voice), Djawa Timoer 
(East Java), Sipatahoenan, Nan Sen (Soerabaja-based weekly magazine) each had a 
large circulations and therefore relatively strong influence.  Soeara Oemoem was led 
by Dr. Soetomo, while Parada Harahap was deeply involved in the publication of 
Djawa Timoer.  After October 1937, Kurinoki who was competent in Malay 
                                                
636 It is not surprising for the fact that “Indonesian” journalists worked for the Japanese press 
considering relatively “racially” collaborative circumstances in print media industry in the Indies.  The 
Indies society was considered as “racially” distinguished society as Furnivall describes, and yet for 
journalists it was not unusual to work in print media industry regardless of “racial” lines.  On 
Furnivall’s discussion of plural society, see Furnivall, Netherlands India.  Working relations among 
journalists in print media industry, see for instance Sin Po 25 Tahun 1910-1935 (Batavia: Sin Po, 1935). 
637 Mr. 11x/1939 in Vb. 20-1-39-F2, 673x/1939 in Vb. 10-7-39-S26. 
638 Mr. 988x/38, 11x/39 in Vb. 20-1-39-F2. 
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frequently contributed articles on Japanese propaganda to four newspapers including 
Soeara Oemoem. 
The third propaganda measure was to extend Japan’s influence over local 
newspapers by providing loans, financing, and purchasing advertisements.639  By 
financing local newspapers, Japanese agents were able to persuade them to carry pro-
Japanese articles.  In late 1938 the Japanese tried to purchase Warta Harian, a 
Batavia-based daily.640  Warta Harian was considered a neutral newspaper and 
therefore Japanese agents thought that it would not be difficult for Warta Harian to 
carry pro-Japanese articles from time to time without drawing attentions from the 
colonial authorities.  The agents pursued this plan for more than a year, had conducted 
a background research on Warta Harian, and obtained information on the number of 
publication, readers, subscribers and its business situation. 
Japanese agents evidently made every effort to propagate Japan’s political 
ideas in the Indies through its cultural policy and were in some sense successful in 
their mission to penetrate the indigenous journalistic network.  The colonial authorities 
had already recognized these Japanese activities and subsequently begun to collect 
information on them.  As the Japanese cultural activities, which consisted of 
conducting anti-Chinese and anti-Western campaigns as well as finding and 
encouraging collaborators among Indonesian journalists and nationalists, intensified in 
1938, the Indies government started to exercise persbreidel against such Japanese 
newspapers as Sinar Selatan and Tohindo Nippo.  From the secret colonial documents 
one is able to see how, when and where Japanese agents operated clandestinely, but it 
is difficult to identify how colonial authorities obtained this information about them.  
One possible explanation suggests the presence of Dutch informants among the 
                                                
639 Mr. 988x/38 in Vb. 20-1-39-F2. 
640 Mr. 673x/39; 859x/39 in Vb. 19-9-39-Z37. 
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Indonesian journalists who worked closely with the Japanese.  What is clear in any 
case is that the Dutch eventually tried to counter Japan’s moves by imposing business 
regulations. 
Japan’s cultural activities were closely intertwined with its economic activities.  
Among other developments, Japan’s penetration of the print business posed a threat to 
the colonial authorities.  In 1934 the Department of Economic Affairs sent a draft of 
“Business Regulation Ordinance 1934” to the Council of the Netherlands Indies.641  It 
became an official ordinance in April 1935 (Official Gazette No. 595) and known as 
the Printing Regulation (Reglementeering Drukkerij).642  The regulation required all 
printing houses to obtain government license and permits, which implied that there 
would be cases in which the application would be rejected.  The ordinance, as Article 
2 read, was applicable to printers across the Indies.643  In effect, the colonial 
authorities sought to get better control over the social and economic order by imposing 
stronger regulations on business in the colony, particularly in the printing industry. 
As a confidential letter of 1935 from the Director of Department of Economic 
Affairs, G. H. C. Hart, demonstrated, the new regulation on print business regulations 
represented an attempt to confine the expansion of Japan’s influence in the field.644  
He even used the word “fear” (vrees) regarding the establishment of Japanese printing 
houses in the Indies.  Those Japanese printing houses, Hart continued, potentially 
could destroy major companies.  As he saw it, this danger derived from the fact that no 
effective regulation controlling the establishment of new publishing companies had 
existed up until now.  For Hart, the new regulations were meant to protect existing 
                                                
641 Mr. 204x/1935. 
642 Sin Tit Po provided the Malay translation of the ordinance on its April 11, 1935 issue.  
“Reglementeering Drukkerij,” Sin Tit Po, April 11, 1935. 
643 Mr. 204x/1935. 
644 De Directeur van Economische Zaken (G.H.C. Hart), “Toepassing van bedrijfsreglementeering op 
drukkerijen,” No. 69/A.Z.I. Geheim, January 30, 1935, in Mr. 204x/1935. 
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printing and publishing companies and by so doing to prevent Japan’s influence from 
penetrating in this field.   
In fact as reported by the newspaper Sin Tit Po, in 1933 Japan was 
aggressively trying to establish its printing houses in Semarang.645  In the same year, 
the printing house, “Astra,” had already started its business at Gang Pinggir and was 
now waiting for the permission from the government.  Although its request for 
permission had been once rejected, this time it tried by using the name of the Chinese 
from Formosa (Taiwan).  There was also report of yet another Japanese printer 
looking for a place to start his business.  Semarang was an ideal city for the Japanese, 
according to Sin Tit Po, because the kretek cigarettes factories were located nearby.646 
 The confidential reports from Bureau for East Asian Affairs give more detailed 
information on the development described in the Sin Tit Po news coverage.  The 
Bureau’s ninth report issued in 1933 identified the name of a big printing company in 
Semarang.647  The company was a joint venture of the Printer Morikawa in Osaka, the 
Hamada Printing Press Factory in Tokyo, and Kato & Co. from Kobe.  Its capital was 
ƒ 50,000 and it employed Japanese.  The report also indicated that its capital was 
equivalent to a Dutch newspaper, Algemeen Handelsblad, in Semarang.  Indies 
Chinese newspapers such as Sin Tit Po and Sin Po fiercely protested the new 
“intruder” (indringer), and Sin Tit Po threatened to boycott the new Japanese printing 
company. 
In addition to the matter of Japanese printing houses, the Bureau’s report also 
described a rumor, saying that Japanese government was secretly subsidizing 
Indonesian newspapers.  The police apparently had begun its investigation on this 
                                                
645 “Drukkerij Djepang: Sebagi djamoer di moesin oedjan,” Sin Tit Po, August 24, 1933. 
646 “Drukkerij Djepang: Sebagi djamoer di moesin oedjan,” Sin Tit Po, August 24, 1933. 
647 “Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken,” No. 9, 1933, in Mr. 1110x/1933. 
 408 
allegation.  This news became the cover story of Pewarta Deli in August 22, 1934,648 
in which the editor explicitly said that Japan tried to subsidize Indonesian papers in 
order to disseminate Japan’s propaganda.  Because of this allegation, the confidential 
report continued, PID had started its investigation to “open the secret of Indonesian 
press companies” (ingin boeka rahsia peroesahaan2 pers Indonesia) to determine if 
any companies had received secret money (fonds rahsia) from the Japanese 
government.  The article even argued that it was the obligation of PID to investigate 
Japan’s political slogan – Asia for the Asian nation – because of the threat the slogan 
would pose to the Indies government if it succeeded in gaining the people’s sympathy.  
The editor was certain that Japan subsidized some Indonesian newspapers, so PID 
needed to find out which newspapers were under Japan’s influence. 
In order to understand the economic circumstances surrounding printing 
houses, the Department of Economic Affairs launched an investigation.  In March 
1935, for the first time ever the Dutch made a list of printing houses (not publishers) 
operating in the Indies.649  The list was compiled as the supplement document no. 3 in 
verbal no. 35 dated 26 March 1935, which is equivalent to the secret mail report no. 
204 in the year of 1935.  It records 305 printing houses from 74 cities.  Among others, 
44 printing houses are located in Batavia, followed by 24 in Soerabaja, 21 in 
Bandoeng, 16 in Soerakarta, 14 in Medan, 10 in Padang and Semarang. 
Other than this government-made list several other sources of data on 
publishers, printing-houses, and bookshops in the Indies also exist.  Handboek voor 
cultuur- en handels-ondernemingen in Nederlandsch-Indies, published yearly by J. H. 
                                                
648 “Kapitaal Yapan masoek kedalam peroesahaan soerat kabar Indoneia?: Politieke Inlichtingendienst 
asjik mentjari keterangan berhoeboeng dengan kekoeatiran itoe,” Pewarta Deli, August 22, 1934. 
649 “Overzicht der mutaties in het drukkersbedrijf gedurende de jaren 1933 en 1934” in 204x/35 in Vb. 
26-3-35-31 Bijlage: 4. 
 409 
de Bussy in Amsterdam is a useful source.650  As the title clearly shows, this is a list-
book on cultural and commercial firms and shops.  According to the 1910’s edition, 
there were 72 publishers, printing-houses, and bookshops existed in 24 cities in the 
Indies.  Most of these were located in major cities in Java and owned by Dutch and 
Eurasians judging from the Dutch-sounding names of their listed owners.  Twenty-
four years later, the Handboek’s 1934 edition shows that the number of publishing 
related shops jumped from 72 to one 178; the number of cities in which publishing-
related business were operating had jumped from 24 to 37, due largely to the 
economic development that had taken place in Sumatra.651 
An even more important piece of information offered in the same mail report is 
a list titled “General Mutations of Printing Business in the Years of 1933 and 
1934.”652  This is a listing of private printing houses that either began their business or 
closed down in the years 1933 and 1934.  As the listing shows, in the course of two 
years, some 35 new printing houses started business in the Indies, while 30 printing 
houses were forced to close down.  Once-major printing houses that produced many 
books and periodicals in the Indies – including the likes of Drukkerij “Minerva” in 
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26-3-35-31 Bijlage: 4. 
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Bandoeng, Drukkerij “Hoa Saing In Kiok,” “Albrecht” and “Bintang Hindia” in 
Batavia, Drukkerij “Han Po” in Palembang, Drukkerij “Minerva” and “Warna Warta” 
in Semarang, Drukkerij “Excelsior” in Soekaboemi and Soerabaja – ceased operation 
in the years 1933 and 1934.  In some cases, such as that of Drukkerij 
“Brotoamiprodjo” in Pamekasan and Drukkerij “Apollo,” newer publishing and 
printer houses were in business for less than two years.  Clearly, the print market of 
the early 1930s was a very competitive scene. 
The timing of the Dutch colonial government’s survey of Indies printing 
houses is suggestive.  By 1934 the Indonesian nationalist movement had been well 
confined by the secret police, and almost at the same time many private publishers and 
printing houses went bankrupt due to the economic depression that had badly hit the 
Indies from 1932 onwards.  Oddly enough, the middle of the 1930s also saw a period 
when a new trend in the launching of many new printing houses emerged.  Obviously, 
the print media market was perceived to be a good profit-generating prospect for 
private enterprises, and in fact the number and variety of periodicals and publications 
flourished in that period. 
 
Table 9-1: General Mutations of Printing Business  
in the Years of 1933 and 1934 
  Opening business   Closing business   
City Name Year Name Year 
Bandoeng Sin Ah 1934 Minerva 1933 
  Galoenggoeng 1934 Maks v/d Klits 1934 
  Soekarja 1934     
Batavia Paseban 1933 Hoa Siang In Kiok 1933 
  Milly 1933 Said Abdullah 1933 
  Kwee Tjeng Yan 1933 Artisto 1933 
  Gouw Thio Goan 1933 Dunlop 1933 
  Lie Ie Tjoeng 1933 Milly 1934 
  Elsevier 1934 Albrecht 1934 
  Djawa Barat 1934 Plantjin 1934 
  Tan Hin Hoo 1934 Bintang Hindia 1934 
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Table 9-1 (Continued) 
  
Maisin Chemical 
Factory 1934     
Blitar     Liem Liang Djwan 1934 
Cheribon Affif 1934 Tiong Hoa 1934 
Djocjakarta Fabriek Negresco 1933 Tan Gwat Bing 1934 
  Fadjar 1933 Bob 1934 
  Kita 1933     
  Het Boekendepot 1934     
Kediri Quick 1934     
Makassar Lie A Liat 1933     
Malang Mars 1934     
Palembang Ebeling 1933 Han Po 1933 
  Ban Seng Hoat 1933 Ind. Mij. Palembang 1933 
Pamekasan Brotoamiprodjo 1933 Brotoamiprodjo 1933 
Parakan Ong Tiauw Hok 1934     
Pekalongan Fortuna 1933     
Poerwokerto Apollo 1933 Apollo 1934 
  Logawa 1934     
  Trio 1934     
Salatiga 
Three-onderneming 
Ampel 1933     
Semarang Astra 1933 Minerva 1933 
  Kongsie Djit Po 1933 Warna Warta 1933 
  Smeroe 1933 Van Sohijndel 1933 
      Pang Khoen Liem 1934 
Samarinda Paramount Press 1934 Kramat 1933 
Soekaboemi Van Moosdijk 1934 Persaudaraan 1933 
      Excelsior 1933 
Soerabaja Litera 1934 Helios 1933 
      Excelsior 1933 
      Reproductie Co. 1933 
      Illustra 1933 
      Java Nippo Sha 1934 
 
The date in the above survey clearly indicate that the printing business still 
attracted many newcomers even as some established printing houses were forced to 
shut down because of the intense competition.  It also suggests that the print market 
was growing and offered some opportunities to make money.   
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From this data it is possible to begin to understand why the government was 
moved to undertake its survey of the publishing industry in 1935 – which is to say at a 
time when the Indonesian nationalist movement had already been virtually contained, 
rather than years earlier, in the 1920s, when the movement and the printing industry 
that helped carry it first began to flourish.  It is reasonable to assume that the timing of 
the government’s survey was shaped by factors related to the print market, more 
specifically by the important expansion in the print market that took place in the 
1930s.  To recall some of the data cited earlier in this chapter, the number of weeklies 
was 108, increasing by more than 30 publications from the previous year, whereas the 
number of monthlies was 382, representing the addition of 130 new monthlies to the 
Indies publishing market.  Many private publishers published various kinds of new 
periodicals and books; many private printing houses tried to slip into the publishing 
industry to look for profit.  And more importantly, by 1935, the Dutch government no 
longer had a major influence on the print market and thereby could exert almost no 
control on the market itself. 
The next question would then be: Who was competing in the printing market in 
the latter half of the 1930s?  From the table above it appears that indigenous 
enterprises were entering the competitive printing market during this period.  But I 
have some doubts about this observation.  From my experience in examining IPO 
(The Survey of Indigenous and Malay Chinese Press),653 when the Dutch counted the 
numbers of Malay periodicals, they were looking exclusively at the periodicals’ 
publishers.  In other words, they disregarded those businesses involved in printing the 
publications.  I would argue then, that not until the Japanese began to enter printing 
business in the 1930s did the Dutch government became motivated to document the 
printing houses of the Indies, which it finally did in its survey of 1935. 
                                                
653 See Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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If one focuses on the printing houses of the newly published periodicals, it is 
possible to find some cases in which Chinese printers assisted in printing the 
periodicals of indigenous publishers.  Soerabaja, the second largest publishing center 
in the Indies, provides some of the most interesting cases, because in the arena of the 
publishing industry, the Indonesian nationalists and Indies Chinese intellectuals of 
Soerabaja had worked very closely together since the 1920s.  For instance, Sendjata 
Indonesia (Indonesian Weapon), whose editor-in-chief was Marsoedi, a leading 
nationalistic figure in Soerabaja in the late 1920s, was printed by Sin Jit Po, and 
Perasa’an Kita (Our Opinion), published by Persatoean Ra’jat Indonesia Sedjati, was 
printed by Nam Yong.  Both Sin Jit Po and Nam Yong printing houses were owned by 
Chinese, as is obvious from their names.  As these examples show, in order to 
understand the dynamic relationship between various ethnic groups in the print 
market, it is better to pay more attention on the printing houses.  And in the case of 
Java, there was not much competition among private indigenous, Chinese, and Dutch 
publishers.  Rather a primary factor shaping the publishing scene in Soerabaja was a 
common interest in working together against Balai Poestaka’s state-backed project in 
the market. 
By contrast, Sumatra gives us somehow a different story, as indigenous 
printers in those cities, led by Medan in the 1930s, indigenous printers played 
dominant roles in the publishing industry.  Medan and Padang, led by Adi Negoro 
with some 40 of the most popular writers, produced many series of roman pitjisan, 
which were considered and categorized as periodicals.  Printing houses such as N. V. 
Handel Mij. & Electrische Drukkerij “Sjarikat Tapanoeli” and Mij. Sumatrasche 
Drukkerij contributed to the development of periodicals in the Sumatran scene.  It was 
almost impossible for indigenous people in publishing industry in Sumatra to co-
operate with ethnic Chinese publishers and printers, because roman pitjisan-related 
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articles sometimes sound anti-Chinese in terms of “proper” Malay language.  Writers 
as well as publishers and printers of roman pitjisan were generally Indonesian 
nationalists, relying on Minangkabau’s local, commercial and school networks.654 
However, what is interesting in this quick comparison is that private publishers 
and printers in Java did not literally compete with those in Sumatra as there was 
limited overlap in terms of their actual print market and reading public.  In Java the 
main competitive target of private publishers was Balai Poestaka, while the so-called 
Chinese-Malay literature was widely read there; in Sumatra since neither Balai 
Poestaka or Chinese-Malay literature was overwhelmingly dominant, indigenous 
publishers and writers ruled the market.  The latter were quite nationalistic in 
orientation, while their readers were deeply influenced by modern Islamic views.  That 
is why leading roman pitjisan writers included figures like Hamka, Joesoef Sou’yb, 
Tamar Djaja, and the like. 
Furthermore, some similarities can be pointed out.  On both Java and Sumatra, 
private publishers imagined their market to be limited to the growing print market in 
the Indies.  In this sense, they appeared to have an incipient consciousness about the 
territoriality of the state.  More importantly, one of their main concerns had to do with 
making money through the print market.  Also, the content of the published 
periodicals was carefully selected.  The main focus was on international as well as 
local news and affairs and the frequent inclusion of detective stories.  As a rule, the 
periodicals tried to avoid commentary on “national” politics, except on the affairs of 
the People’s Council, which was the only terrain on which the Indies press was 
allowed to freely report.    
In short, under a regime of political repression and apparent social stability, 
and yet with little institutional censorship, the print market grew drastically in the last 
                                                
654 See Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
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fifteen years of Dutch colonial era.  At the same time, the capitalistic oriented 
publishers, writers, printers, and distributors contributed to the development of some 
kind of “national” territorial mapping.  Although the Indies state failed to install 
successful institutional censorship in service of its political and security-related 
priorities during this period, the development and spread of capitalistic ventures 
contributed to the creation of a feeling of nationalism with particular local flavors as 
well as, ironically, self-censored publications in the last years of the Dutch period. 
 
Polemics on Indies Chinese – 1934  
The middle of the 1930s saw sweeping changes regarding the political position 
among the Indies Chinese.  Understanding this drastic change requires examining a 
polemic that occurred in 1934 on the Chinese status in the colony.  The polemic 
revealed how the Indies Chinese identified themselves and how Indonesian 
intellectuals thought of them. 
The polemic evolved over a controversial issue on how the Chinese should 
position themselves in the Indies society.  The discussion took place in the middle of 
1934 and was reported in detail in a colonial confidential report.655  At this time, the 
Indonesian nationalist movement had been crushed and prominent leaders such as 
Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, and Sutan Sjharir were exiled to prison camps.  In other 
words, nationalist political activism had been contained and no more mobilizational 
politics was evident.  Indonesian nationalists were faced with the need to change the 
form of their activism in order to avoid government oppression.  Under such political 
calmness, the polemic on Indies Chinese challenged how Indonesian nationalists 
imagined the future Indonesia. 
                                                
655 “Uitgefte nieuw Maleisch-Chineesche dagblad Matahari,” Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 8, 
1934, in Mr. 1075x/1934. 
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It started in August 1934 when Kwee Hing Tjiat published his article “Baba 
Dewasa” (“Mature Indies Chinese”) in the daily Mata Hari.  Mata Hari was a 
Chinese-Malay newspaper based in Semarang, and Kwee Hing Tjiat was its chief 
editor.  Born in 1891 in Soerabaja, Kwee was educated at Dutch schools, and then 
worked at the administrative division of Firma Kian Gwan, a large Chinese-owned 
company.656  In September 1911 he managed to publish the weekly, Asia, in 
Soerabaja.  In October 1913 after abandoning Asia, he founded a new weekly, Bok 
Tok, which became Tjhoen Tjhioe in 1914.  In 1915 he left Tjhoen Tjhioe and moved 
to Jogjakarta where he published the weekly Palita (Lantern).  Later that year he was 
invited by Hauw Tek Kong to Batavia-based Sin Po to become its deputy editor-in-
chief, and later became its chief editor.  Sin Po by 1915 had been a well-established 
Malay-Chinese newspaper that took a Chinese nationalist line and was sympathetic to 
the Republic Government of China.  By working for Sin Po, Kwee developed his 
nationalistic ideals and expressed his opinion that the Chinese in the Indies were truly 
nationals of China, not imperial subjects of the Netherlands.  In 1918 he left Sin Po 
and took charge of a Chinese firm in Bali.   
As a businessman, Kwee often travelled to China and Japan, and then was 
stationed in Europe for three years from 1920.  While staying in Europe, he continued 
contributing articles to Sin Po, and often criticized Dutch policy toward the Indies 
Chinese.  In 1921 he published a book Doea Kepala Batoe (Two Obstinate) in 
Berlin.657  The book gave a history of Chinese movement in the Indies, and implied 
                                                
656 The career of Kwee Hing Tjiat relies on Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan’s Search for National Identity: 
Biographical Studies of Seven Indonesian Chinese (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1993), pp. 17-
24. 
657 The book describes the history of Chinese nationalism in the Indies, and in particular depicts two 
political streams among the Indies Chinese in the 1920s Indies. “Two obstinate” were represented by 
two leading Chinese; Dr. Yap Hong Tjoen, the president of the CHH, who pursued the status of Dutch 
subject, whereas Tjoe Bou San, the editor-in-chief of Sin Po, promoted Chinese nationalism in the 
Indies.  Yap had a close relationship with the Dutch Sinologist, P. H. Fromberg, who was the advisor 
for the Chinese Affairs as well as an advocate for the Indies Chinese.  “Fromberg and the Chinese 
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that Chinese nationalism was the right way and could not be suppressed.  His 
aggressive discourse was not welcomed by the Dutch authorities, and hence he was 
not allowed to come back to the Indies.  The official excuse was that Kwee did not 
possess a proper visa to reenter the Indies, because he had travelled to Europe with a 
Chinese passport.  Upon his arrival in Java, he was deported to Canton and then 
moved to Shanghai where he spent the next ten years.  But raised and educated in 
Java, he did not understand Chinese and soon felt alienated in his ancestral land.  So 
he kept his attention on Java.   
In the early 1930s, Kwee met Oei Tjong Hauw in Shanghai.  Oei Tjong Hauw 
was a wealthy Indies Chinese, son of the late tycoon Oei Tiong Ham, and successor to 
the Oei Tiong Ham Concern, also known as Firma Kian Gwan.  In March 1934, with 
Oei Tjong Hauw’s guarantee, Kwee Hing Tjiat was able to return to Java and obtained 
the position of editor-in-chief at a new daily Mata Hari in Semarang, funded by Oei 
Tiong Ham Concern.  Upon his arrival in Soerabaja, Kwee travelled throughout Java 
to learn about local conditions and made acquaintance with prominent journalists such 
as Parada Harahap, Saëroen, and Bakri Suraatmadja, who later became regular 
contributors to Mata Hari.  The Boen Liang was the head agency of the newspaper in 
Soerabaja, while Liem Koen Hian, the leader of the new Indonesian Chinese Party 
(Partai Tionghoa Indonesia, PTI) served as the representative in Batavia.658 
                                                                                                                                       
Movement,” in Leo Suryadinata (ed.), Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese, 1900-1977: A 
Sourcebook (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1979), pp. 17-24. 
658 “Uitgefte nieuw Maleisch-Chineesche dagblad Matahari,” Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 8, 
1934, in Mr. 1075x/1934.  Liem Koen Hian recalled the fact that many Chinese were eager to fight 
together with Indonesians for Indonesia’s independence.  But those who joined the party were often 
called up by the local PID.  This intimidation happened all cities where the PTI had its branches, and 
resulted in discouraging people to keep their membership with the party.  See Liem Kone Hian’s speech 
of July 11, 1945, at the Investigative Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia’s Independence in 
1945 in A. B. Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945: Memuat Salinan Dokumen Otentik 
Badan Oentoek Menyelidiki Oesaha2 Persiapan Kemerdekaan (Depok: Fakultas Hukum Unviersitas 
Indonesia, 2004), pp. 268-269. 
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Kwee’s long exile in China had changed his attitude about Indies Chinese.  He 
realized that he actually had more affinities with the Indies than with China.  He was 
not a promoter of Chinese nationalism any longer, but turned himself into a pro-
Indonesian spokesperson among the Indies Chinese community.  He was famous for 
his anti-Dutch action and discourses.659  Changing political identity was not unusual 
among Indies Chinese in the colonial era,660 and Kwee Hing Tjiat provided a 
representative case.  In the inaugural issue of Mata Hari, he wrote the aforementioned 
essay “Baba Dewasa.”  It expressed his longings, claiming that baba (indigenized 
Chinese) were prepared to assimilate into the Indonesian society. 
 
The clock has struck, and the Baba must take their place as sons of Indonesia 
by preparing to carry out all the duties, together with everyone who worships 
Indonesia as his Mother and the Dutch Government acting as trustee.  The 
Baba did not choose their place.  They were fated to stand up there, based on 
spiritual rights and as medicine for all the complications and dualisms, but 
also based on their vital economic interests. […] 
Any kind of Baba movement will not progress until the political 
position of the Baba in Indonesia is expressed, established, and made 
the basis of their livelihood.  Without this foundation, the Baba 
economy will fall apart, and with it, all affairs.661 
 
                                                
659 “Uitgefte nieuw Maleisch-Chineesche dagblad Matahari,” Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 8, 
1934, in Mr. 1075x/1934. 
660 Another representative person was Liem Koen Hian, who was the chief editor of Sin Tit Po and the 
founder of PTI. 
661 Kwee Hing Tjiat, “Baba Dewasa,” Mata Hari, August 1, 1934, in Suryadinata, Peranakan’s Search 
for National Identity, pp. 24-25.  I cite the article from Suryadinata’s newer but somehow different 
translation from his former translation.  The previous translation appeared in Suryadinata, Political 
Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese 1900-1977, pp. 62-63. 
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According to Kwee Hing Tjiat, the Indies Chinese were ready to assimilate into the 
Indonesian society, including carrying out the duties it entailed, and therefore it was 
the Indonesians’ turn to show whether or not they accepted the Chinese.  If that was 
the only message, then the article would not have been a problem.  But it was the one 
phrase “sons of Indonesia” that stirred a controversy among Indonesian intellectuals.  
The phrase originally referred exclusively to indigenous Indonesians (Indonesiër), 
which were assumed to not include the Chinese. 
There emerged two groups of Indonesian intellectuals in response to Kwee’s 
article.  Those who supported his argument included prominent Indonesian 
intellectuals such as Dr. Soetomo, Mr. Singgih, and Dr. Satiman.  They shared his 
opinion that if the Chinese sincerely expressed their wish to assimilate totally, 
Indonesians would be prepared to accept them as sons of Indonesia.662  Dr. Satiman 
added that the open acceptance from the indigenous community had to be followed 
with a promise from the Chinese, that is, the latter must feel and act as Indonesians, 
and work for the Indonesian homeland.663  A Jogjkarta-based Sedio Tomo expressed 
the same argument as Dr. Satiman’s, basically by supporting Kwee Hing Tjiat’s claim, 
and made the following comment: 
 
If such a stream [of thought] really comes out of a pure heart, is proven with 
the willingness to fulfill all duties towards Indonesia, and the attitude towards 
sons of the soil [indigenous Indonesians] is similar to that towards the Baba, 
                                                
662 Suryadinata, Peranakan’s Search for National Identity, pp. 24-30. 
663 Djawa Tengah Review, August 1934, p. 622, in Suryadinata, Peranakan’s Search for National 
Identity, pp. 25, 33. 
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we believe that we Indonesians will open our doors as widely as possible to 
accept them.664 
  
The article maintained that the Indies Chinese were not yet Indonesian at the moment, 
but left open the possibility for them to assimilate into the Indonesian society.  In 
order to do so, they were encouraged to establish a close relationship with 
Indonesians.  Sedio Tomo’s view however endorsed Kwee Hing Tjiat’s argument that 
the Chinese assimilation might happen in one generation.  Kwee had written: 
 
We also feel that within one generation or 30 years Baba will have assimilated 
into the people of Indonesia, as in the Philippines, Siam and other such 
countries, except for a few sour-grapes who must be kicked out. 
 
But his opponents did not buy this vision.  Criticism against Kwee derived from the 
common perception of the current Chinese position.  The opposition consisted of 
Sjamsoeddin’s Bahagia (Semarang), Jogjakarta’s daily Oetoesan Indonesia, 
Soerabaja’s Soeara Oemoem, for which Sanoesi Pané was the chief editor, and 
Saëroen’s Pemandangan from Batavia.  All of these were major newspapers from four 
main cities in Java.  Bahagia responded to Kwee by expressing doubts regarding 
Chinese people’s intentions: 
 
The advantage is, for example, if Indies Chinese are willing to carry out their 
duties wholeheartedly, to fight together with indigenous sons of Indonesian 
towards the independence of Indonesia.  Thus, here we acquire comrades in 
                                                
664 The essay was originally published in Sedio Tomo, and later reprinted in Djawa Tengah Review, 
August 1934, p. 611.  Surayadinata’s translation is based on Djawa Tengah Review version.  
Suryadinata, Peranakan’s Search for National Identity, p. 25. 
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our struggle.  However, they will not carry out their duties free of charge, will 
they?  Once they become sons of Indonesia, then they are entitled to demand 
the same rights as indigenous Indonesians, aren’t they?  […]  Should they be 
given the right to land ownership when they are very strong economically?  It 
is here that a conflict of interest arises.  We cannot prevent them from 
demanding the right, since they are regarded as having become sons of 
Indonesia. […]  As for us, since we do not agree that the right to land 
ownership and other rights of the people should be given to other parties 
(because our people have very few rights and they are also poor), therefore we 
say: let the Chinese remain sons of China.  We are Indonesians, you are 
Chinese!  We really have different nationalities, but we are both … Asians!665 
 
The foundation of Bahagia’s opposition to Chinese assimilation consisted of suspicion 
mixed with an economic inferiority complex towards the Chinese.  For Bahagia it was 
obvious that if Indonesians accepted the Chinese, the latter would simply take over the 
economy.  In order to protect Indonesians’ interest, it contended that the Chinese were 
fundamentally different from Indonesians.  The newspaper needed to find an excuse 
not to accept the Chinese, thus it cited the “fact” that Indonesians and Chinese were 
inherently different in terms of nationality. 
Indies Chinese were not known for ironclad solidarity either.  There were those 
who endorsed this line of ethno-nationalistic argument and resisted Kwee Hing Tjiat’s 
claim.  They did not want to assimilate into the Indonesian society, because they had 
pursued either Dutch or Chinese patrons or felt more affinities with these groups.  
From their writings in such newspapers as Siang Po and Sin Po, they denied any 
                                                
665 Bahagia reprinted in Djawa Tengah Review, August 1934, p. 613, in Suryadinata, Peranakan’s 
Search for National Identity, p. 26. 
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obligation to fight for Indonesia’s independence.  They rather ridiculed Kwee Hing 
Tjiat’s position as if it was a naïve dream.  Siang Po commented “When the time 
comes for the promise to be fulfilled, will Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat have the capability to 
mobilize his baba Chinese to struggle for the independence of the Indonesian 
homeland????,”666 while Sin Po said “Chickens and ducks resemble each other in 
many respects: they have two eyes, two feet, a pair of wings, and both of their eggs 
can be boiled, but to make chickens become ducks or the other way around is 
impossible.”667 
Interestingly, the debate took place based on different foundations.  Kwee Hing 
Tjiat and his supporters looked at the future possibility for the Chinese to be 
assimilated into the Indonesian society, and took into account possible social change 
in the future.  By contrast, his opponents rejected future assimilation and argued that 
fundamental differences between the two nations could never be fused.  The legal 
definition of “foreign” nationals demonstrated such inherent differences.  On the one 
hand, it reminded everyone of the fact that Indonesian political parties refused to 
accept Chinese membership after facing a severe crack down by the Indies state since 
the late 1920s.  The banning of PKI that had included many Chinese associates in its 
membership prompted wider hesitation on part of Indonesian political parties’ to 
accept Chinese member into their own organizations.  On the other hand, it 
demonstrated the fact that many Indies Chinese were not willing to take part in the 
struggle for the independence of Indonesia.  Rather they appeared to enjoy their social 
status afforded to them as Chinese in the colonial setting.   
                                                
666 Siang Po reprinted in Djawa Tengah Review, p. 622, in Surayadinata, Peranakan’s Search for 
National Identities, p. 28.  
667 Sin Po reprinted in Djawa Tengah Review, p. 615, in Surayadinata, Peranakan’s Search for National 
Identities, p. 29. 
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The polemic however revealed that there was a shared foundation even for 
different intellectual circles.  First, the dispute developed through Malay language 
newspapers.  This was a polemic not only between Indonesians and Chinese, but also 
among both the Indonesians themselves and the Chinese themselves.  For Indonesians 
the issue was whether they were willing to accept the Chinese in their society, while 
for the Chinese the main point of the discussion was the question of whether or not to 
assimilate into the Indonesian society.  The newspapers involved in the polemic were 
Mata-Hari (Semarang), Bahagia (Semarang), Sedio Tomo (Jogjakarta), Oetoesan 
Indonesia (Jogjakarta), Soeara Oemoem (Soerabaja), Siang Po (Batavia), and Sin Po 
(Batavia).  Whether a newspaper endorsed Kwee Hing Tjiat’s argument did not really 
matter.  What was important was the fact that such polemic took place in the circle of 
Malay newspapers in Java.  It showed that, as far as the Malay press was concerned, 
there was no barrier between Indonesians and Chinese.  Rather it was common 
practice among journalists to communicate with each other by reading, supporting, 
and criticizing each other’s newspapers.   
This was not new.  A Malay-language journalistic community demonstrated 
characteristics of the marketplace, because it depended on the size of its readership for 
its existence rather than on the ethnic make-up of its contributing writers.  The case of 
a journalistic association established in October 1925 illustrates the point.  On October 
16, 1925, Sin Jit Po carried an article on the establishment of the Association of 
Journalists of Asia (Journalistenbond Azia).668  Tabrani from Hindia Baroe (New 
Indies) and Kwee Kek Beng from Sin Po served as the executive board; W. R. 
Soepratman from press bureau “Alpena”669 as the chairperson; Boen Joe On from 
                                                
668 Sin Jit Po, October 16, 1925 (Th. 3, No. 82), L2-2. 
669 “Alpena” or Algemene Pers Nieuws Agency (General Press News Agency) was established by 
Parada Harahap.  Soepratman worked there as an assistant for Harahap.  Bambang Sularto, Wage 
Rudolf Supratman (Jakarta: Proyek Biografi Pahlawan Nasional, Departemen Pendidikan dan 
Kebudayaan, 1997), p. 76.  Kwee Kek Beng recalled the fact that Harahap often made fun of 
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Perniagaän as the secretary; and R. S. Parindih from press bureau “Berita” as the 
treasurer.  The committee was organized by Parada Harahap from Bintang Hindia, 
Ling Ying Ching from Sin Po, Khoe Boen Sioe from Keng Po, Bee Giauw Tjoen from 
Sin Po and Achmad Wongsosewojo from “Volkslectuur” (Balai Poestaka).  A week 
later, the structure was altered slightly.670  Tabrani D. I. was chosen as the chairperson, 
Kwee Kek Beng was the vice-chairperson, W. R. Soepratman became the secretary, 
Bong Jong On the first treasurer and R. S. Palindih the second treasurer.  The 
committee members were Ling Yin Chen, Parada Harahap, Khoe Woen Sioe, Achmad 
Wongsosewojo, and Bee Giauw Tjoen.  The above-mentioned ten names were leading 
journalists of the time.  Both indigenous and Chinese journalists were included.  It is 
to be noted that different Asian “races” were represented in the Association.  Although 
the association itself had purely journalistic intentions, its choice of the name “Azia” 
was political as it implied non-Western journalists.  Whether one worked for 
government organizations or private ones was immaterial; rather, what mattered was 
being on the side of Asia.  In fact, since the beginning of Sin Jit Po, R. M. Bintarti, 
who was a Eurasian, served as one of the two editors.  A journalistic community in the 
1920s, therefore, symbolized the marketplace where interaction among different races 
existed as John Furnivall’s influential thesis of plural society maintained.671  
Second, as the debate demonstrated, the word “Asia” (Azia) was shared by 
both Indonesians and Chinese as a way to identify themselves.  There was a sense of 
solidarity between Indonesians and Chinese who searched for their nationalisms.672  
                                                                                                                                       
Soepratman, while the latter disclosed the former’s secrets.  Kwee Kek Beng, Doea Poeloe Lima Tahon 
sebagi Wartawan 1922-1947 (Batavia: Kuo, 1948), p. 36. 
670 Sin Jit Po, 24 October 1925 (Th 3, No. 89), L3-1. 
671 Furnivall, The Netherlands India. 
672 For the Chinese, being Chinese nationalists meant also to be anti-imperialist, a position that could be 
shared with Indonesian nationalists.  A symbolic collaboration between Indonesian and Chinese 
intellectuals was evident in the way the Indonesian national anthem was conceived.  The song 
“Indonesia,” whose writer and composer was W. R. Soepratman, was performed for the first time at the 
Second Indonesian Youth Congress in Batavia on October 28, 1928.  On November 7, 1928, the 
Indonesian Study Club’s Soerabaja newspaper Soeloeh Ra’jat Indonesia (The Torch of Indonesian 
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They might have different nationalities, but they were similar to each other when 
compared to Westerners.  This idea was expressed not only by those on the pro-
assimilation side but also by those taking an anti-assimilation position.  The analogy 
of chicken and duck by Sin Po and the proclamation “we are both Asians” by Bahagia 
supported this fact.  As noted earlier, the above-mentioned Association of Journalists 
of Asia used “Asia” with political connotations in mind.  The concept excluded 
Westerners and simultaneously united Asian people.  This symbolism was well 
captured by the Japanese slogan, “Asia for Asians.”  Considering the fact that Pan-
Asianism had been established in part as an anti-Western ideology in the 1930s, the 
word “Asia” now became politically sensitive.  
 
Persbreidel and the Chinese Press – 1935 and 1936 
While Japanese cultural penetration became a serious political matter, the 
question of policing the Chinese press emerged in the middle of the 1930s.  At the 
time, governors and residents were required to pay close attention to the Chinese 
language newspapers, which was a new task for them.  In this period persbreidel was 
invoked as a matter of ensuring effective security and policing, and from 1934 the role 
and power of the Prosecutor General concerning persbreidel in the colonial 
administration expanded significantly.673 
                                                                                                                                       
People) published the text of the song, while on November 10 the Chinese-Malay newspaper Sin Po 
printed the note and the text of the song.  In 1929 Supratman changed the song title to “Indonesia Raya” 
(Great Indonesia) and turned it into a Gramophone record on the advice of Yo Kim Tjan.  Panitia 
Penysusun Naskah Brosur Lagu Kebangsaan Indonesia Raya, Brosur Lagu Kebangsaan Indonesia Raya 
(Jakarta: Proyek Naskah Brosur Lagu Kebangsaan Indonesia Raya, 1972), pp. 37-38; Kwee Kek Beng, 
Doea Poeloe Lima Tahon sebagi Wartawan, p. 35.  
673 In 1934 the Governor-General, the Prosecutor General and Director of Justice reached agreement in 
which the Prosecutor General would have the decisive position in determining persbreidel.  “Uittreksel 
uit de Nota der Algemeene Secretarie: Schema politieke maatregelen. Persbreidel,” in Mr. 604x/1934. 
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On June 22, 1936, the Prosecutor General circulated a confidential letter to 
governors and residents across the Indies.674  The letter’s contents were unusual.  First, 
it urged governors and residents to as much as possible avoid applying persbreidel to 
Dutch newspapers.  Second, the letter stated that if the need arose, translation services 
for non-Malay languages, especially in the case of Chinese newspapers, were available 
upon request.  The letter ordered governors and residents to pay more attention to the 
Chinese press, in particular the Chinese language one, and the order was effective 
immediately.  On June 24, the Prosecutor General also mailed out a confidential letter 
under the title of “persbreidel” to the Governor-General.  Co-signed with the head of 
Political Information Service this letter informed the Governor-General of the order he 
had circulated two days before.675    
The June 22 letter marked a turning point in the decade of persbreidel.  It also 
highlights the degree to which, contrary to the conventional understanding, the 
Prosecutor General rather than the Governor-General was in charge of persbreidel.  
Finally, it also shows that Chinese language newspapers were the major targets of 
persbreidel.  In April and May 1936, before the Prosecutor General’s letter had ever 
circulated, two Chinese-Malay newspapers, the Padang-based Radio and the Batavia-
based Sin Po, were slapped with the first phase of persbreidel.  Two months after the 
letter, in August 1936, Sumatra Bin Poh, a Chinese language newspaper in Medan, 
received a warning of the first phase of persbreidel.  Less than a year later, in June 
1937, five Chinese newspapers received similar warning: Three Chinese language 
newspapers, Sin Po and Thien Sung Yit Po both in Batavia, and Tay Kong Siang Po in 
                                                
674 Parket van de Procureur-General, no. 22/4243 A.P., De dd. Procureur-Generaal bij het 
Hoogrechtshof van Ned. Indië. Aan de Gouverneurs en Residenten in Nederlandsch-Indië en de 
Afdeelingshoofden in de Vorstenlanden in 618x/1936. 
675 De dd. Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof van Ned. Indië op Last; Het Hoofd van Dienst 
der Algemeene Recherche, (w.g.) v.d. Most aan Zijne Excellentie den Gouverneur-Generaal van 
Nederlandsch-Indië, in 618x/1936. 
 427 
Soerabaja; and two Chinese-Malay newspapers, Sin Po in Batavia and Soeara 
Mataram in Jogjakarta.  In addition to New China, four Chinese-language newspapers, 
that is, Sin Po, Sumatra Bin Poh, Thieng Sung Yit Po, and Tay Kong Siang Po, were 
forced to cease publication due to the second phase of persbreidel.  Evidently, the 
colonial authorities in Medan, Batavia, Soerabaja, and Jogjakarta did not waste their 
time to curb the local Chinese newspapers.    
The timing of these persbreidel cases deserves our attention.  The Chinese 
press had engaged in sporadic anti-Japanese discourse after Japan established its 
puppet Manchurian government in 1932.  Such anti-Japanese campaigns intensified 
after July 1937 when the Sino-Japanese war broke out.  Nine Chinese newspapers fell 
victim to persbreidel between April 1936 and June 1937.  This development begs the 
question: Why, in early 1936, did the Dutch authorities “all of a sudden” begin to pay 
close attention to Chinese newspapers?   
The shifting focus of persbreidel to the Chinese press did not run smoothly, 
because dealing with an external threat was novel to the Indies government.  In 1936 a 
series of discussions among high Dutch colonial officials – the Governor-General, the 
Prosecutor General, the head of Justice, the head of PID, and the head of East Asian 
Affairs – revealed the rationale of persbreidel.  The discussion addressed to what 
extent and on what basis certain Chinese newspapers should and could be punished 
with persbreidel.676  This discussion represented an intriguing turn of events.  The 
Indies government’s shift towards applying persbreidel to Chinese newspapers turned 
out to have both international and domestic causes.   
In 1936 the Bureau for East Asian Affairs made two contradictory but 
ultimately connected decisions about applying persbreidel against Chinese-owned 
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newspapers.  One decision dealt with Sin Po from Batavia, the most circulated 
Chinese-Malay newspaper in the Indies, while the other had to do with the Medan-
based Chinese-language paper, Sumatra Bin Poh.  It was the Bureau for East Asian 
Affairs that was consulted for persbreidel against the Chinese press as a whole.  Both 
cases demonstrated two different logics in the way the authorities dealt with cases of 
Chinese owned newspapers. 
In July 1936, the Bureau for East Asian Affairs investigated articles that 
Sumatra Bin Poh had published.677  Since its reestablishment in 1929, the paper had 
been known as a news organ of Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang and for its strong anti-
Japanese stance.678  Because of its position, its chief editors got into frequent trouble 
with the Dutch authorities.  Its history of uncompromising editorship led to 
persbreidel charges against the paper in July 1936.  As early as 1930, its chief editor, 
Tan Meng Yuen contributed several articles that had communist inclination and 
elicited warnings by the authorities.  Because the warnings appeared to have little 
impact in curbing Tan Meng Yuen’s writing, he was refused extension of his visa.679  
His successor, Thio Mie Kie, arrived in November 1931.  Upon taking over the 
position, Thio wrote a series of anti-Japanese articles and he too received severe 
warnings from the police.  The timing was important, because two months before he 
assumed the position, Japan had invaded Manchuria and established its puppet 
government.  Given the context, it was no surprise that Thio Mie Kie produced 
aggressive anti-Japanese articles in his newspaper.  But his articles appearing in 
Sumatra Bin Poh’s issues of October 19, 23 and November 11 drew special police 
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attention.  Due to those writings he was sentenced for persdelict in February 1932 by 
the Lower Court in Medan, and imprisoned for 14 days.   
In the same year, Thiao Hsiung Fang replaced Thio Mie Kie for the 
newspaper’s editorship.  Thiao Hsiung Fang followed the footsteps of his predecessors 
with his own anti-Japanese writings.  He also received repeated warnings from 
authorities, that his article might have undesirable effect on the community.  For 
unknown reasons, those warnings appeared to have no effect on Thiao Hsiung Fang 
either.  Yet, again for unknown reasons, in 1935 he was allowed to extend his stay for 
the next six years by the Governor of the East Coast of Sumatra.  In October of that 
year, however, the Prosecutor General advised the Governor to revoke Thiao Hsiung 
Fang’s application, and on January 28, 1936, the Governor ordered to his removal 
from Medan to China.   
In January 31 Shun Ie Tung temporarily took the position of chief editor of 
Sumatra Bin Poh.  He continued the newspaper’s tradition of what the Dutch 
considered to be strong anti-Japanese and/or extreme leftist (links-extreme) content.680  
In particular, his articles on the Association for National Salvation in Beijing and the 
Association of Chinese Students for Salvation of the Fatherland drew the authorities’ 
attentions.  These associations were considered to have extreme leftist ideas with 
vigorous anti-Japanese attitudes, and Sumatra Bin Poh’s coverage of their activities 
appeared to take the form of a persistent anti-Japan(ese) campaigns.  The newspaper 
had also neglected repeated warnings from the authorities, despite the removal and 
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prosecution of its editors.681  This attitude irritated the authorities, which temporarily 
suspended the newspaper in August 1936.682 
The case of the Malay edition of Sin Po shows that confusion existed in how 
decisions about applying persbreidel were made and how the Chinese press was 
viewed in the middle of the 1930s.  As with Sumatra Bin Poh, the authorities justified 
the application of persbreidel by compiling writings that reflected Sin Po’s stance over 
a period of time.  In his confidential letter to the Governor-General dated on April 8, 
1936, Prosecutor General Vonk said that Sin Po has gone too far with hostile writings 
against Japan and the Japanese.683  In order to make the case, the letter cited a series of 
anti-Japanese articles that dated back to October 1931 when Sin Po’s editors, Kwee 
Kek Beng and Go Tiauw Goan, launched a series of anti-Japanese articles.  This was 
the period just after Japan had invaded Manchuria and was about to establish 
Manchukuo.  Furthermore, the letter continued, in August 1932, Sin Po produced 
“hatred sowing” articles against a Chinese Association, Chung Hwa Hui (CHH).  
CHH consisted of Dutch-educated and wealthy Chinese who were in favor of Dutch 
rule and Dutch nationality, and thus were willing to participate in colonial political 
institutions such as the Volksraad.  Since Sin Po was the champion of Chinese 
nationalism (including a claim on Chinese nationality for overseas Chinese), its 
political orientation put it in opposition to CHH.  If the “crime” in question had to do 
with hate-sowing articles, the action invoked by the colonial government should have 
been a matter of persdelict.  But the authorities found more controversial articles in 
Sin Po issues of 1934 onward, in particular the anti-Japanese cartoons and editorial 
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comments published in its February 3, 1934 and January 21, 1935 issues.  These 
article caught the attention of the Prosecutor General.  He had asked the Resident of 
Batavia to give warnings to the editorial board of Sin Po, while duly issued the 
warnings went unheeded.  Although the Resident summoned Kwee Kek Beng in 
February and March of 1936, Sin Po still carried articles with anti-Japanese as well as 
anti-Western undertones.684 
Because of this attitude, the Prosecutor General Vonk proposed the application 
of persbreidel to Sin Po, instead of prosecuting individual editors such as Kwee Kek 
Beng.685  At the same time, Vonk made it clear that the application of persbreidel 
should be confined to the Malay edition of Sin Po, because the Chinese edition had its 
own editors and thus far had not carried controversial articles.  He explained his 
rationale, saying that the two editions should be considered separately, because the 
Chinese edition was for the Chinese immigrant traders (Singkeh-Chineezen), while the 
Malay edition targeted the Chinese-Dutch nationals (de Chineezen-Nederlandsche 
onderdanen).  Although Vonk did not specify, this did not mean that the Chinese 
edition of Sin Po did not carry any anti-Japanese articles.  Vonk was concerned far 
less about that than about the fact that the Malay edition had tried to stir up a Chinese 
nationalistic spirit among the Chinese-Dutch nationals.   
The day after the above-mentioned confidential letter, on April 9, 1936, the 
Adviser and Head of the Bureau for East Asian Affairs, A. H. J. Lovink, circulated a 
confidential letter to support the Prosecutor General’s proposal.  In it Lovink 
introduced a brief summary of an article written by Kwee Kek Beng to show the 
stance being taken by the Malay Sin Po.  This was the article that Kwee Kek Beng 
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contributed to Koloniale Studiën686 entitled “De Chineesche pers in Ned.-Indië” (The 
Chinese Press in the Netherlands Indies).687  According to Lovink’s summary, Sin Po 
(New Journal) was launched in October 1910, on the eve of the Chinese revolution.  It 
contained progressive news along with a serialized popular novel titled San Kuo Chi 
(Romance of the Three Kingdoms).  Sin Po, as the summary goes, focused on Dr. Sun 
Yat Sen and the revolutionary movement in China, and because of its political outlook 
became involved in a controversy with another Chinese-Malay newspaper, 
Perniagaän, which promoted Dutch nationality for Indies Chinese and participated in 
various representative bodies in the colony.  Lovink reminded his colleagues in the 
colonial administration that in 1918 and 1919 Sin Po launched a campaign for the 
Indies Chinese to refuse the Dutch nationality based on the 1911 treaty signed between 
the Netherlands and China.  Lovink contended that in propagating Chinese 
nationalism in the Indies and encouraging the Chinese to reject Dutch nationality, Sin 
Po did not hesitate to express anti-Dutch and anti-Western sentiments.  Therefore, he 
concluded that the Malay Sin Po was worth being penalized with the first phase of 
persbreidel.  
The Bureau for East Asian Affairs also explained how it perceived (and 
distinguished) Chinese language and Chinese-Malay language newspapers.  On the 
one hand, it categorized Sumatra Bin Poh as a China-oriented radical newspaper.  The 
Bureau was concerned about the newspaper because its radicality was rooted in strong 
nationalistic sentiments that drove vigorous anti-Japanese discourse.  In this case the 
main readers were the immigrant Chinese traders who stayed in the Indies with 
foreigners.   
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On the other hand, however, the Bureau was far less worried about the Chinese 
edition of Sin Po, even though the latter was the most influential Chinese-language 
newspaper in the Indies and also promoted anti-Japan discourse and patriotic activities 
among the Indies Chinese.688  The Bureau was more concerned about the Malay 
edition of Sin Po, because it had been discouraging Indies Chinese to hold and/or 
apply for Dutch nationality.  In this case the Chinese meant the so-called “peranakan” 
residents of the colony, who were born and raised in the Indies with Malay as their 
mother tongue.  With the Netherlands Citizenship Act of 1910 these Chinese were 
accorded “Dutch subjecthood” and so were placed under the jurisdiction of the Indies 
state instead of China.  This, then, was the heart of Lovink’s concerns about the 
impact of the writings in Malay-language Sin Po, that is, that the Indies Chinese might 
be persuaded to give up their Dutch subjecthood.  His summary suggested that he 
perceived this attitude as anti-Dutch.   
At a glance, Lovink’s argument did not appear to correspond with the 
reasoning that Prosecutor General Vonk developed for his case against Sin Po.  Vonk 
instead was concerned about two points.  One was the “hate-sowing” language that Sin 
Po had used against CHH; presumably it could induce hatred among Chinese people, 
in particular among Indies Chinese.  The other point was the anti-Japanese articles in 
Sin Po.  This latter point corresponded with the case against Sumatra Bin Poh, but the 
logic applied to the case of Sin Po was slightly different.  Vonk argued that Sin Po’s 
articles might stir anti-Dutch and anti-Western attitude among the Indies Chinese.  
Thus it was this anti-Dutch and anti-Western sentiment that Lovink tried to highlight 
in his summary about Sin Po. 
In short, in the case of Sumatra Bin Poh, the newspaper’s anti-Japanese 
discourse lay at the heart of the matter for colonial authorities in their decision to 
                                                
688 Mantetsu Toa Chosa-Kyoku, Ranryo Indo ni-okeru Kakyo, p. 332. 
 434 
invoke persbreidel, while for Sin Po its potential anti-Dutch undertones were 
considered the newspaper’s dangerous elements.  The former newspaper was 
penalized with the first phase of persbreidel on August 15, 1936,689 and Sin Po’s 
penalty was announced by the Council of Netherlands Indies on April 20, 1936.690 
When between September and October of 1936, or about a half year after Sin 
Po received the first phase of persbreidel, the colonial authorities discussed the 
potential application of second phase of persbreidel to the Malay Sin Po, the argument 
had changed slightly.  This time, the Prosecutor General, H. Marcella, initiated the 
discussion.  As I have described earlier in this thesis, according to the colonial policy, 
the second phase of persbreidel was to be applied if after the first phase was issued, 
the attitude shown by the newspaper in question did not change.  In a confidential 
letter to the Governor-General on October 3, 1936, Marcella explained that the 
application of persbreidel to the Malay Sin Po involved twofold issues.691  Marcella 
cited a letter from the Consul General of China regarding the Sin Po case, which had 
expressed regret about the newspaper’s problematic commentary along with a promise 
that the Consul General would see to it that an improvement in the quality of the 
newspaper’s editors occurred.  While referring to the letter, Marcella also made the 
point while under normal circumstances such promise would be acceptable, in the 
current period (het huidige tijdsbestek) it could not be justified.  The term “current 
period” here may be taken to mean the unstable relations that prevailed between China 
and Japan.  Marcella went on to say that Sin Po was known as a fierce defender of 
China’s national interest, which in his opinion could disturb the bilateral relation 
between Japan and China, i.e., disturbance in the relations between China and Japan 
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had negative implications for the stability of Asia as a whole, including Southeast 
Asia.  For instance, Marcella pointed out the fact that in its September 18 edition, Sin 
Po published articles and pictures commemorating the Mukden incident, which 
marked the beginning of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1932.  As this action 
demonstrated, the editors at Sin Po had not change their attitude against Japan, and 
therefore, argued Marcella, it was the time to apply the second phase of persbreidel to 
the newspaper. 
The Advisor and Head of East Asian Affairs, J. B. de Wilde, responded 
immediately to the Prosecutor General.  On October 5, 1936, De Wilde sent a 
confidential letter to the Governor-General.692  As an expert, De Wilde argued that the 
contents of Chinese newspapers largely depended on the nature and seriousness of 
events in China, and the development of Chinese movement in Southeast Asia 
reflected the conditions in the mainland.  He went on to say that the Sino-Japanese 
relation was heading in an alarming direction, which was in step with flourishing anti-
Japanese propaganda in Chinese newspapers.  This, according to De Wilde, could 
destabilize the society and therefore required the government to take actions to prevent 
undesirable consequences.  On this basis, he strongly recommended that the Governor-
General apply the second phase of persbreidel to Sin Po, as the government had done 
to Sumatra Bin Poh in August. 
At this point the question of persbreidel against Sin Po turned into a 
diplomatic matter.  On October 21, 1936, the First Secretary of Government J. M. 
Kiveron sent a personal and confidential letter regarding the possible application of 
persbreidel to Sin Po, addressed to the Chinese Consul General, Fartsan T. Sung.693  
In his letter, Kiveron informed Sung that the Governor-General could find no reason 
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to retract the decision regarding Sin Po.  In his own letter to Kiveron, Sung noted that 
he shared the Indies government’s view about Sin Po and the Chinese press in general.  
Sung was sensitive to the Indies government’s growing concern about the potentially 
destabilizing effects of Sin Po’s anti-Japanese rhetoric, and had attempted to warn the 
newspaper to tone down its commentary.694  The Chinese Consul General had himself 
repeatedly warned the chief editor of the Malay Sin Po, as well as its Chinese edition, 
following personal talks with the Advisor and Head of East Asian Affairs, De Wilde.  
But Sin Po neglected Sung’s warnings and continued publishing anti-Japanese articles.  
Sung expressed his regrets that the Chinese community in the Netherlands Indies was 
unable to understand why the Indies government had to be so cautious with all the 
Chinese newspapers, particularly in Medan and in Batavia.695   
As Sung continued, editors of some Chinese newspapers in the Indies had their 
own opinions that challenged the Dutch view about their role and social impact.  
These editors pointed out that after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, none of the 
Chinese immigrants in the Indies had clashed with any of the Japanese nationals there.  
There was no intention to cause troubles or difficulties for the Indies government 
either by boycotting Japanese goods or any other methods.  Rather, these leaders of 
the Chinese press appreciated the effort by the government to undertake strict 
measures for the maintenance of peace and order in the colony.  At the same time, 
however, being the intellectual class of “Chinese nationals” residing in the Indies, they 
also felt the obligation to open “the eyes of some of the leaders of the native 
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population, for example, Dr. Soetomo, President of the Great Indonesia Party (Partai 
Indonesia Raja), who is reportedly a pro-Japanese native leader in Java.”   
After introducing the editors’ view, Sung concluded that he would exert his 
utmost to cooperate with the Indies government to maintain peace and order among 
his nationals.  At the same time, he did not forget to shift the blame to the Japanese 
aggressive policy towards the militarily weak Chinese nation, which had affected the 
editors’ view, and thus begged the Indies government for a more lenient attitude 
towards them. 
This letter from the Chinese Consul General appeared to have some influence 
on the Prosecutor General Marcella when making decisions concerning persbreidel 
against Chinese newspapers.  On October 26, 1936, Marcella wrote an urgent 
confidential letter to the Governor-General.696  In it he discussed two Chinese 
language newspapers, Sin Po in Batavia and Tay Siang Kong Po in Soerabaja.  In the 
case of Sin Po he argued that none of the prejudice towards other people that 
characterized the writings of Sumatra Bin Poh was evident, while in the case of Tay 
Siang Kong Po he contended that an administrative warning much like that issued 
against the Chinese Sin Po would be enough because no hateful article was detected.   
In both cases, Marcella basically rejected the recommendation made by De 
Wilde and the request from the Resident of Soerabaja.  Given that the usual pattern 
was for the Prosecutor General to readily consent to the recommendation and request 
made by the Bureau for East Asian Affairs, the Governors and the Residents regarding 
persbreidel, it appeared that something had changed his mind.  One factor may have 
been Marcella’s understanding that the state of Sino-Japanese relations was actually 
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less alarming than had been the case in the recent past.  At the same time, however, it 
should be noted that he continued to be apprehensive about the Malay Sin Po.697   
The Prosecutor General did not waste his time.  The very next day, October 27, 
1936, Marcella sent another urgent confidential letter to the Governor-General.698  It 
contained a strong recommendation for the application of the second phase of 
persbreidel to the Malay Sin Po.  Recurring anti-Japanese articles that the newspaper 
carried were the motive.  An article in the September 30, 1936 edition called for a 
boycott of the Olympic Games in Tokyo scheduled for 1940.  Another article on 
October 1 argued that using military power was the only way to end Japan’s 
infringement of China’s sovereignty.  An article on October 3 even contended that a 
war between China and Japan could no longer be prevented.  While printing these 
articles, Sin Po continued to receive warnings from the authorities, and yet it did not 
stop publishing similar kind of anti-Japan(ese) writings.699  By then the authorities had 
realized that not only the Chinese language newspapers, but also the Malay language 
ones could provoke anti-Japanese campaigns.  On top of it, the prediction that the 
Sino-Japanese war was inevitable made the colonial authorities worried about possible 
reactions from Japan.   
The communication among the Governor-General, the Prosecutor General, and 
the Advisor and Head of Bureau for East Asian Affairs that I described above reveal 
some facts about persbreidel.  First, there is no question that the rationale for the 
application of persbreidel on Chinese newspapers had to do with the content of 
newspaper articles.  It is important to note that anti-Japanese articles began to appear 
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in Chinese newspapers from 1935 onward.  Yet, as all persbreidel cases involving 
Chinese newspapers between 1936 and July 1937 showed, the evidence cited by the 
Bureau for East Asian Affairs would trace anti-Japanese articles and stance of a 
particular newspaper since the early 1930s.700   
Second, anti-Japanese content was not the only factor to invoke persbreidel for 
Chinese newspapers; the authorities were also worried about the anti-Dutch and anti-
Western implications of the commentary published in these newspapers, in particular 
among those Chinese papers published in the Malay language.  The Chinese-Malay 
press circulated widely among Chinese and Indonesian readers, whereas those who 
could read Chinese characters were limited.  In other words, the authorities needed to 
pay attention to the unpredictable influence of the Chinese-Malay press not only on 
Indies Chinese, but also on indigenous Indonesian readership.  For this reason, anti-
Dutch and anti-Western discourses were especially unacceptable.   
Finally, the state of Sino-Japanese relations prevailing in the international 
context proved the determining factor of persbreidel against Chinese newspapers, as 
the Prosecutor General’s letter on October 26, 1936, indicated.  That is why the First 
Secretary of Government informed the Chinese Consul General about their decision 
on persbreidel against the Chinese press.  In this context, the application of 
persbreidel became in part a diplomatic matter. 
Also notable in the way that the story of persbreidel against Chinese 
newspapers unfolded is the fact that the Chinese Consul General was enjoined to take 
responsibility for not only the Chinese nationals residing in the colony, but also for the 
Indies Chinese in general.  This situation seems odd because many Chinese residents 
had applied for the status of Dutch citizens, with many keeping “dual nationalities” of 
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both Dutch subjecthood and Chinese nationality.  But as a matter of fact, China’s 
Republican Government never conceded its jurisdiction over Indies Chinese, nor 
allowed them to lose their Chinese citizenship.  The government appointed consuls to 
the Indies, and their duties were to protect the Chinese interests in commerce and 
schools there.  In 1929 it passed a new Chinese citizenship act, which reaffirmed the 
principle of jus sanguinis that the Ch’ing government instituted in 1909.  In 1930 it 
refused to agree to Article 4 of the Hague Convention on Citizenship, which 
prohibited any state from extending its diplomatic protection to one of its subjects 
living in any other jurisdiction with the status of its subject.701  Therefore, technically, 
from China’s point of view both the full-blooded (totok) and mix-blooded (peranakan) 
Chinese were subjects of its protection.  This diplomatic argument supported the right 
of China’s consuls to intervene in the Chinese press in the Indies.  And it was this fact 
that put the Indies Chinese in a complicated position socially, politically, and legally, 
which was reflected in the case of the Chinese-Malay newspapers. 
  
Sino-Japanese War 
On July 7, 1937 the Marco Polo Bridge Incident marked the beginning of full-
scale war between China and Japan, which is often referred to as the second Sino-
Japanese War.702  The front page of Sin Tit Po, a Surabaya-based Chinese-Malay 
newspaper, on July 29, 1937, carried the news of the war’s development.  The 
headline reads “Pertempoeran-pertempoeran heibat: Kamenangan-kamenangan 
tentara Tionghoa di Langfiang, Fengial dan Tungchow” (Intense Battles: Chinese 
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Troops Victorious in Langfiang, Fengial and Tungchow).703  It provided a picture of 
Japan’s aggressiveness in China and gave indication of its ambitious advance 
southward.  Within two years, the shadow of Japan loomed large in the Netherlands 
Indies.  The April 17, 1939 issue of Sin Tit Po blared this headline, “Netherlands 
Indies threatened by Japan!: American Marines on Watch in the Pacific. Berlin-Rome-
Tokyo Ready to Strike?”704  Around this time, most residents in the Indies could feel 
the eventuality of war; that it was not confined to China, but was fast approaching.  In 
fact, if the press was any indication, Japan had been a major security issue for the 
Indies government in the later half of the 1930s.  The prevailing feeling was that even 
a little provocation could attract Japan’s aggression to the Indies.  
By the same token, the Sino-Japanese war also intensified the patriotic 
sentiments of the Chinese in the Indies.  In its coverage of the war on July 29, 1937, 
Sin Tit Po used the phrase “tentara Tionghoa” (Chinese soldiers).705  In normal times, 
the more likely choice of phrasing would have been “tentara Tiongkok,” which means 
the soldiers of China.  There were two reasons for this peculiar word choice.  The first 
had to do with a desire to appeal to the Chinese community in the Indies.  Sin Tit Po 
opted for “Tionghoa,” which encompasses all Chinese people, including those residing 
overseas.  Obviously, the phrase choice was a move to appeal to the “national” 
sentiment of the Chinese in the Indies, with the implication being made that not only 
China but also Chinese people everywhere were at war with Japan.  As a matter of 
fact, ever since Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, Chinese newspapers in the Indies 
had diligently carried reports on Japan-related “incidents” in China706 and, not 
                                                
703 “Perang Tiongkok-Japan: Pertempoeran-pertempoeran heibat: Kamenangan-kamenangan tentara 
Tionghoa di Langfiang, Fengial dan Tungchow,” Sin Tit Po, 29 Juli 1937. 
704 “Hindia Blanda teramtjem Djepang!: Marine Amerikaan mendjagah2 di Pacific. Berlin-Rome-Tokyo 
bersediah menghantem?” Sin Tit Po, April 17, 1939. 
705 The term “Tionghoa” was Hokkien dialect, meaning the people of the center. 
706 Between 1931 and 1937, China and Japan fought in small, localized engagements in so-called 
“incidents.” 
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infrequently, anti-Japan(ese) opinions.  As Amry Vandenbosch pointed out in the 
journal Pacific Affairs in 1930, the Chinese people in the Indies did have an active 
Chinese national sentiment.707   
The second possible explanation for the use of the phrase “tentara Tionghoa” – 
that is “Chinese soldiers” rather than “soldiers of China” in Sin Po’s news coverage – 
derives from the fact that there was no unified Chinese military in China in the 1930s.  
Internal power struggle between the Nationalist and Communist parties had continued 
since the late 1920s and local warlords had enjoyed extraordinary power.  Japan took 
advantage of this situation and made alliance with local powers in the course of its 
invasion. 
As the crisis in China grew, the widespread sentiment of anti-Japan among the 
Chinese population in the Indies predictably alarmed and displeased the Indies 
government, which did not want its Chinese subjects to provoke Japan’s aggression.  
Chinese newspapers had played an important role in the political landscape of the 
Indies for a long time, and were increasingly becoming a medium for anti-Japan 
campaigns.  In particular, after 1937 when the Japanese army invaded mainland China 
and the subsequent Sino-Japanese war broke out, scores of Chinese-owned 
newspapers explicitly promulgated anti-Japan sentiments.  Unlike the British colonial 
government in Malay and Singapore, which supported Chinese-led anti-Japan 
campaigns, the Indies government suppressed them because it feared negative 
reactions from Japan.  For this reason, as the Table 9-2 “Persbreidel Application and 
Warning of Chinese and Chinese-Malay periodicals from July 1, 1937” shows, in two 
years of time between 1938 and 1939, eleven Chinese and thirteen Chinese-Malay 
periodicals received either a warning or temporary persbreidel suspension. 
                                                
707 Vandenbosch, “A Problem in Java,” p.1016. 
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With regard to the Table 9-2, the order of the place of publication is 
suggestive.  Soerabaja was listed at the top, because it was the city where Japan’s 
cultural propaganda was concentrated.  Hence it is no surprise that the local Chinese 
press vigorously carried out anti-Japanese campaigns to counter Japan’s propaganda.  
Other than Soerabaja, Batavia, Pontianak, Medan, and Makassar had Chinese 
consulates, and Chinese language newspapers in those cities also caught the attention 
of authorities.    
   
Table 9-2: Persbreidel Application and Warning of Chinese and  
Chinese-Malay Periodicals from July 1, 1937708 
 
Chinese Press 
Place Newspaper Warning 1st Phase 2nd Phase 
2nd Phase 
Reapplied 
Soerabaja  Tay Kong Siang Po 38/4/1 38/7/9 38/9/17 38/5/9 
 Shang Pao 38/4/2 38/5/9 April 39  
 Ching Pao Weekly 37/7/27    
 Sie Nam Fung 38/12/6    
Batavia Thien Sung Yit Po 38/4/7 38/7/9   
 Sin Po 38/5/21 38/7/9 39/4/26  
 
Ta Chung Shih Chieh 
Weekly 38/5/14 38/8/6 38/10/13 39/2/24 
Pontianak Chiao Sheng Weekly 38/5/9 38/7/9   
Medan Sumatra Bin Poh April 39    
 New China 38/5/7 37/7/15   
Makassar Hoa Chiao Yit Pao 38/5/30 38/10/5 39/3/3  
 
Chinese-Malay Press 
Soerabaja Sin Tit Po 37/12/13 38/4/5 38/7/9  
 Sin Tit Po (monthly) April 38    
 Pewarta Soerabaia  38/5/7    
Batavia Sin Po 38/10/27 39/3/25   
 Keng Po  38/7/28   
 Tsa Hsioh Tsa Chih (Dutch) 38/11/26    
 Sin Po (weekly) 38/9/5 38/11/28   
 Panorama July 38    
 Kung Yen 38/11/28    
Bandoeng New Life Journal 38/12/8    
                                                
708 Transcript. Letter. Buitenzorg, May 2, 1939, letter, HH. Extremely Urgent. The General Secretary (J. 
M. Kiveron). 
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Table 9-2 (Continued) 
Semarang Soeara Semarang Jan/Feb/38    
 Matahari Aug 38    
Makassar Pemberita Makassar 38/10/6    
Djogjakarta Soeara Mataram 38/3/31    
 
Select Chinese newspapers were most important to the colonial authorities in 
their application of persbreidel.  Twenty-four Chinese periodicals were among this 
group, and with a staff of twenty to focus on Chinese affairs at the Bureau for East 
Asian Affair, keeping close watch on a group of this size was not overly demanding 
task.  Particular Chinese journalists were under constant surveillance, too.  During this 
period, both Chinese as well as indigenous journalists were sent to prison due to 
violations of persdelict.  Suffice to say that the Indies government was quite 
concerned about the influence of Chinese newspapers and the activities of (Chinese) 
journalists in relation to Japan’s advancement in Asia. 
It appears, however, that the Indies government was less concerned about the 
Chinese newspapers or their nationalistic sentiment against Japanese than about the 
response that these provocations might elicit from the Japanese government.  In fact, 
the Japanese consulates in Batavia and Surabaya repeatedly filed complaints with the 
Governor-General, calling attention to anti-Japanese articles that were published in 
Chinese newspapers.  The Indies government generally responded by penalizing the 
reported Chinese newspapers.  The majority of Chinese newspapers carrying out 
major anti-Japanese campaigns were in Batavia, Soerabaja and Medan, the cities 
where, coincidentally or not, Chinese consulates were stationed.  Accordingly, most of 
the Chinese newspapers that were slapped with temporary suspension were located in 
these three cities.  The Indies authorities also closely watched over the activities of the 
Chinese consulates, which they suspected to be hubs for Kuomintang’s underground 
activities.  
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Due to the intensification of anti-Japanese campaigns by Chinese newspapers, 
the Indies authorities decided to invoke the second phase of persbreidel more often 
than in the past.  In his letter to the Governor-General dated on October 20, 1938, the 
Prosecutor General recommended an urgent implementation of the second phase of 
persbreidel, and this recommendation was especially directed to newspapers in 
Chinese, Japanese, Chinese-Malay, and Malay languages,709 though it should be noted 
that Indonesian (Malay language) newspapers were not among the colonial 
government’s primary security concerns at that point in time. 
In November 1938 three important classified letters were circulated.  First was 
a secret letter by the First Government Secretary, E. A. Zeilinga, addressed to the 
Prosecutor General as well as the directors of Bureau for East Asian Affairs and of 
Bureau for Native Affairs, which supported the Prosecutor General’s view to pursue 
the application of the second phase of persbreidel more aggressively than ever 
before.710  Second was a confidential letter from the Prosecutor General himself 
regarding the system for the circulation of secret documents.  The letter suggested that 
the system had been simplified, making it possible for Assistant Regents to give policy 
recommendations directly to the Governor-General, so that the government could 
make decision on persbreidel in a more efficient way.711  As a result, in the period of 
seventeen months from December 1938 to April 1940,712 the second phase of 
                                                
709 Parket van de Procureur-Generaal, 20 October 1938, no. 3122/A.P. Geheim. Mr. 1030x/38. 
710 De wd 1e Gouvernments Secretaris (E. A. Zeilinga) aan den Procureur-Generaal, November 3, 1938, 
no. 283/A Geheim, in Mr. 1030x/1938. 
711 Parket van de Procureur-Generaal, 22 November 1938, no. 3515/A.P. Geheim. Mr. 1112x/38. 
712 This time frame seems to overlap with the development of war in Europe.  In March 1938, Germany 
annexed Austria, while Hitler began pressing his claims on the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia.  In the 
same month, Germany invaded the remainder of Czechoslovakia and put it into the German 
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the pro-German client state, the Slovak Republic.  In August 
1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression treaty, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.  In 
September 1939, Germany attacked Poland, and the so-called World War II began.  In April 1940, 
Germany invaded Denmark and Norway, and in May advanced to France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg.  On May 13, 1940, the day before the Luftwaffe bombings in Rotterdam, Queen 
Wilhelmina, with Crown Princess Juliana and key government officials, boarded the British destroyer 
Hereward and sailed for England.  Margaret E. Wagner, David M. Kennedy, Linda Barrett Osborne, 
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persbreidel was issued fourteen times, twelve out of which were against Chinese-
owned newspapers.   
A third letter was delivered by the Director of Economic Affairs, H. J. van 
Mook, dated on November 22.  This recommendation was about the Pan-Asian media 
propaganda being conducted by the Japanese.  According to Van Mook, Japan 
developed its propaganda in various Indonesian newspapers.  In order to counter its 
activities, he recommended the applications of the Business Regulation Ordinance of 
1934 and the Printing Houses Regulation Ordinance of 1935.713  These urgent 
confidential letters suggest how desperate the Dutch authorities were in the middle of 
massive Japanese expansionist activities and domestic Chinese reactions.   
The practice of persbreidel thus reflected the security concerns of the Indies 
state, which were formulated according to what the government considered the 
dominant threats against the state at the given time.  In the late 1930s the Indies 
government shifted its security concern from internal to external issues; from the 
threat of the Indonesian nationalist movement to the imagined Japan’s presence in the 
Indies and the likelihood of its aggression.  One can say that persbreidel took shape 
because of the atmosphere of insecurity in the Indies.  We shall look at how the Indies 
government conceived threats and how local journalists, especially Chinese, 
responded to the government’s measures. 
 
Liem Koen Hian and the Chinese Political Position 
Towards the end of the 1930s conflicting evaluations existed about the 
Soerabaja-base Chinese-Malay daily, Sin Tit Po.  A semi-official Japanese 
                                                                                                                                       
Susan Reybur (eds.), The Library of Congress World War II Companion (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2007), p. 77-78. 
713 De Directeur van Economische Zaken (H. J. van Mook), No. M 120/N.P. Zeer Geheim, November 
22, 1938 aan den Gouverneur Generaal, in Mr. 1120x/1938. 
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government intelligence publication on the Indies Chinese categorized this newspaper 
as moderate and hence did not provide the same level of detailed information about 
the latter that it did for other anti-Japanese or pro-Japanese Chinese-Malay 
newspapers.714  This suggests that the Japanese did not take the newspaper seriously.  
However, the Dutch authorities held a completely different view on the daily.  As the 
chart “Persbreidel Application and Warning of Chinese and Chinese-Malay 
periodicals from July 1, 1937” demonstrates, Sin Tit Po not only received a warning 
on December 13, 1937, but was also temporarily shut down for the first phase of 
persbreidel on April 5, 1938, and three months later on July 9 was penalized with the 
second phase.  Sin Tit Po’s persbreidel record stands out because no other Chinese-
Malay newspapers were given the second phase of persbreidel, suggesting that the 
newspaper was targeted for particularly aggressive scrutiny by the authorities. 
The peculiar circumstances of Sin Tit Po’s case are notable.  A revealing 
contrast is provided by the case of other Chinese-Malay newspapers such as Sin Po 
and Keng Po (Batavia), and Pewarta Soerabaja (Soerabaja), which were stamped as 
“anti-Japanese” by the Japanese intelligence.  These newspapers were also on the 
watch list for potential persbreidel action after July 1937.  That is, both Japan and 
Dutch authorities shared the same view of all three dailies.  As the one newspaper that 
was subject to some of the colonial government’s harshest actions, however, Sin Tit 
Po, was clearly perceived differently and this had to do with the newspaper’s character 
and history.  In the Indies, it was customary that chief-editors shaped the direction and 
opinions of the newspapers.  From the outset the pro-(independent) Indonesia Liem 
Koen Hian took charge of Sin Tit Po.  At the time the Prosecutor General considered 
applying persbreidel against the newspaper, Liem Koen Hian was, however no longer 
                                                
714 Mantetsu Toua Keizai Chosakyoku, Ranryo Indo Niokeru Kakyo, pp. 332-339. 
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the chief editor, but only a regular contributor from Batavia.  Still, the Prosecutor 
General remained obsessed with Liem Koen Hian and his connection to Sin Tit Po. 
The timing of the Prosecutor General’s consideration of persbreidel against Sin 
Tit Po was peculiar as well, too.  In March 1938, more than a half-year before the 
Dutch authorities expedited the procedure for persbreidel, Sin Tit Po drew particular 
attention from the Prosecutor General and the Head of Bureau for East Asian Affairs.  
In his letter dated on March 7, 1938, the Head of Bureau for East Asian Affairs, 
Lovink, requested Prosecutor General Marcella to take immediate action – meaning 
the first phase of persbreidel – against Sin Tit Po.715  In citing his reasons for the 
request, Lovink explicitly referred to anti-Japanese articles written by Liem Koen 
Hian.   
Marcella’s accusation against Liem Koen Hian deserves examination, partly 
because Liem was by that time only a regular contributor and no longer the chief 
editor of Sin Tit Po and partly because Liem’s articles revealed how he assailed and 
ridiculed Japan in his capacity as a journalist.  As with other cases of persbreidel 
against the Chinese press, what irritated Lovink was not only Liem’s articles, but also 
Japan’s reaction to them.  In January 27, 1938, Lovink had expressed concerns over 
Liem Koen Hian’s criticism of Japan.  Likely playing a factor in Lovink’s growing 
irritation were the critical views on Liem’s piece expressed in a Batavia-based 
Japanese newspaper, Tohindo Nippo on December 23 and 24, 1937.  As early as on 
November 30, 1937, the Prosecutor General had assigned the Resident of Soerabaja 
the task of warning the editorial board of Sin Tit Po that because of its articles the 
paper was running serious risk of prosecution and persbreidel action.  This decision 
was based on the Prosecutor General’s observation of Liem’s articles, which in 
                                                
715 De Adviseur, Hoofd van den Dienst der Oost-Aziatische Zaken (Lovink) aan den Procureur-
Generaal, March 7, 1938, no. 1322/38 Geheim, in V 24-5-38-F17. 
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Marcella’s view expressed contempt for Japan and aimed at stirring the feeling of 
hostility against Japanese.   
According to Marcella, in a series of articles that appeared on October 25, 26, 
27 and 28, 1937 under the title “Kebangoesaan [Kebangsaan] di Djepang,”716 Liem 
Koen Hian had revealed a list of corruption scandals in the Japanese government, 
among local officials at regional governments, and in the Japanese trade and banking 
industries.  In those articles Marcella saw a systematic pattern of expressing enmity 
and hatred against Japan.  He also maintained that Liem’s articles were shaped by an 
inferiority complex that Liem Koen Hian felt in connection with Japan and the 
Japanese.  Marcella understood that such expressions in the press were officially 
subjected to Article 156 of the Penal Code, which concerned persdelict.  Two weeks 
later, on December 13, 1937, Marcella ordered the Resident to give a severe warning 
to the newspaper as it had continued to publish offensive articles written by Liem 
Koen Hian.  After this warning, it appeared that Sin Tit Po toned down its rhetoric.  
The chief editor of the newspaper, Liem Sam Thiang, told the Resident of Soerabaja 
that he had no intention to create problem between the Chinese and Japanese people in 
the Indies.  He defended Liem Koen Hiam by saying that the latter had written articles 
based on numerous quotes from other people’s writings.  Liem Sam Thiang reportedly 
concluded that since he had received a severe warning from the Resident, he would no 
longer publish such controversial articles.  The Prosecutor General observed that this 
was a positive change, and hence would not pursue further administrative measure 
against Sin Tit Po, as Marcella mentioned in his confidential letter of January 27, 
1938.717    
                                                
716 There is no such word as “kebangoesaan.”  It should be “kebangsaan” (nation). 
717 De Adviseur, Hoofd van den Dienst der Oost-Aziatische Zaken (Lovink) aan den Procureur-
Generaal, March 7, 1938, no. 1322/38 Geheim, in V 24-5-38-F17. 
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Despite the warnings Liem Koen Hian did not stop contributing anti-Japanese 
articles to Sin Tit Po in the course of February and March of 1938, and editor Liem 
Sam Thiang continued to publish these, which led the Prosecutor General to rethink 
his decision about Liem and the newspaper.  Marcella sent an urgent confidential letter 
to the Governor-General dated on March 23, 1938, under the title “Proposal to apply 
the first phase of persbreidel to the Surabaya-based Chinese-Malay newspaper Sin Tit 
Po.”718  In it, Marcella made it clear that Liem Koen Hian, a former chief editor of Sin 
Tit Po, had been writing anti-Japanese articles for the newspaper for many years now.  
The letter determined that for some time now the major part of the newspaper was 
dedicated to fierce anti-Japanese articles and the responsibility for most of these lay 
with Liem Koen Hian.  The list of anti-Japanese articles cited by Marcella included the 
following: “Djepang Minta Minta-ampoen” (“Japan Begging for Mercy”) in the 
December 17, 1937 issue; “Keadaan moelai terbalik boeat Djepang” (“The tide has 
turned against Japan”) on January 22, 1938; “Djepang obral abab Minister” (“Japan’s 
inept ministers on sale”) on January 26; “Djepang tentoe tamat tjeriteranja” (“Japan’s 
story will surely end”) on January 28; “Kebiadaban binatang Djepang” (“Japan’s 
bestiality”) on February 14; “Tjoema ada doea bangsa” (“Only two kinds of people 
exist”) on February 15; “Treurig” (‘Sad”) on February 22; “Ke Tokio” (“To Tokyo”) 
on February 24; and “Perlawanan Tiongkok boeat perdamian doenia, pri-pri-keadilan 
than kesopanan” (“China fighting for world peace, justice and civilization”) on March 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9.  Some of the cited articles did not directly attack, but rather 
poked fun at Japan or Japanese.  For instance, in the article “Djepang obral abab 
Minister,” Liem referred to the Japanese Prime Minister Suetsugu as a senile old man 
who was half cooked.  Still, noting the anti-Japanese rhetoric in this writing, the 
                                                
718 Den Procureur-Generaal (Marcella) aan den Gouverneur-Generaal , no. 832/A.P. Spoed Geheim, 
March 23, 1938 in V 24-5-38-F17. 
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Prosecutor General decided to apply the second phase of persbreidel to Sin Tit Po in 
March 1938. 
It is obvious that the Dutch authorities paid special attention to articles by 
Liem Koen Hian and an important factor in this high level of scrutiny applied to 
Liem’s writings appears to have been the debate that Liem had with Soetomo back in 
1936.719  Soetomo had just concluded a study tour to Japan in June 1936 and 
contributed his travel accounts to Soeara Oemoem.  This was his second trip to Japan 
and he advocated a closer relationship between Indonesia and Japan for the benefit of 
Indonesians.  Because of this, Liem chided Soetomo as a “propagandist of Japanese 
imperialism,” noting that the latter had failed to identify Japan as an imperialistic 
nation.   
Soetomo dismissed Liem’s criticism, according to scholar Leo Suryadinata, 
arguing that Liem did not like Japan simply because Japan was penetrating into China, 
Liem’s ancestral land.  But this claim did not really correspond with Liem Koen 
Hian’s character.  By the middle of 1930s, Liem had been established as an advocate 
of Indonesian nationalism.  Soetomo knew this quite well because he had written 
several articles in support of the PTI, which Liem established in 1932.  In fact, they 
were friends, and there appeared to be no hard feelings between them despite of the 
debate.  When Soetomo passed away in May 1938, Liem Koen Hian and other PTI 
leaders attended his funeral service to pay their last respect. 
Looking back at the footsteps taken in life by Liem Koen Hian helps to 
understand his politics.  Liem was known as an outspoken journalist from early on in 
his career.  He was born in 1896 in Bandjarmasin, East Borneo.  His father, Liem Ke 
                                                
719 The following account is based on Suryadinata’s analysis of the debate, Leo Suryadinata, “Pre-War 
Indonesian Nationalism and the Peranakan Chinese,” Indonesia, No. 11 (1971), pp. 83-94. 
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An, was a well-to-do Chinese businessman.720  He attended a Dutch primary school in 
Bandjarmasin and later studied law in Batavia.  When he was in Bandjarmasin, he 
started working as a staff writer for the weekly Penimbangan (Deliberation) and after 
1914 for a magazine in Soerabaja, Tjhoen Tjhioe.  The latter journal was run by Kwee 
Hing Tjiat and changed its name from Bok Tok in 1914.  Liem was also a 
correspondent for De Locomotief (Semarang), and contributed some articles in 
Soerabaiashce Handelsblad (Soerabaja); both were Dutch language newspapers.  In 
1917 at the age of 21, he published a short-lived weekly of his own, Soo Lim Poo in 
Soerabaja.   
After more than a year doing business in Aceh, from December 1918 to 1921 
Liem moved to Padang to take up a position as the editor-in-chief at Sinar Sumatra.  
This newspaper was an advocate of Chinese nationalism in Sumatra, the way Sin Po 
was in Java.  When it came to the issue of nationality, Liem was always opposed to the 
Dutch nationality law, which encouraged Indies Chinese to obtain Dutch nationality or 
remain Dutch subjects.  That was one of the ways by which the Dutch government 
tamed the Chinese grievances regarding their social status in the Indies.  To provide 
counterargument, in his article “Oendang-Oendang Kerakjatan Olanda” (“Dutch 
Nationality Law”) published on February 5, 1919, in Sinar Sumatra, Liem explicitly 
remarked: 
 
I am a Chinese, I have a fatherland across the sea which is trying to improve 
itself.  In this endeavor it urges its faithful sons, either those in the country or 
overseas, to help and make contribution.  Among these sons overseas are my 
people in the Indies who, in turn, look to their fatherland to enhance their 
                                                
720 Liem Koen Hian’s career mainly relies on Tjamboek Berdoeri, Indonesia dalem Api dan Bara 
(Malang, ELKASA, 2004); Leo Suryadinata, “Liem Koen Hian: A Peranakan Who Searched for 
Political Identity” in his Peranakan’s Search for National Identity, pp. 56-84. 
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status.  It is the duty of the Indies Chinese that, before we help other countries, 
we should help China because we place all our hope in China.  It is 
understandable that the improvement of our status overseas will come rather 
slowly, but we will not lose our patience.721 
 
Liem’s article made two points.  One was about the creation of the modern China 
state.  He acknowledged that he resided in the Indies and as an overseas Chinese he 
felt the obligation to support China.  This argument led to Liem’s second point, which 
was the status of Indies Chinese.  Liem understood that the inferior social and political 
status of Indies Chinese derived from the fact that China was not as developed as 
Japan.  Because Japan was recognized as a modern state like Western countries, its 
citizens were granted equal legal status as the Westerners in the Indies.  Therefore, a 
strong modern China would, in Liem’s view, uplift the Chinese status in the Indies.  
This was a common understanding among Chinese nationalists, and had persuaded 
many overseas Chinese to support Chinese nationalism since the turn of the century.  
It appears that Liem also subscribed to the theory.  
Liem however never believed in the idea that Indies Chinese should or would 
ultimately go back to China.  In fact, he sounded certain that Indies Chinese would 
continue to live in the Indies.  Thus, for Liem, supporting China did not mean 
abandoning the Indies.  Rather, it implied providing financial and moral support for 
China while building one’s life and future in the Indies.  Accordingly, Liem had 
argued for an improved status for the Chinese in the colony.  The main point of his 
writing, then, dealt not with the question of whether or not Indies Chinese should keep 
                                                
721 Liem Koen Hian, “Oendang-Oendang Kerakjatan Olanda,” Sinar Sumatra, February 5, 1919, cited 
and translated by Suryadinata, in his Peranakan’s Search for National Identity, p. 60.  
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their Chinese nationality, but with their demands for a better political, social, and 
economic position under the current situation.722   
This last point brings up the question of Liem’s readership.  Liem’s articles 
addressed not only the readers of Sinar Sumatra, but also the colonial authorities, 
because he was aware that the newspaper was under surveillance by the Bureau for 
Chinese Affairs.  When he used the word “we,” Liem addressed his Indies Chinese 
readers.  But while doing this, he also talked to the authorities, that “we” the Chinese 
people in the Indies demanded equal status and better treatment in the Dutch colony.  
He understood the fact that in order for the Chinese to uplift their status, they had to 
negotiate with the colonial government.  He was conscious of how political 
circumstances determined the destiny of “his” people.   
Liem held this realistic view of the Chinese’s position in the Indies 
consistently throughout his life.  Up until the middle of the 1920s, no one could 
imagine that the Indies state would come to an end in one’s lifetime.  But in the 
middle of the 1920s the political discourse of Indonesian nationalism shifted from the 
creation of a new society based on ideology such as Islamism and Communism, to 
attaining political sovereignty from the Dutch.  In this changing political context, 
Liem understood early on that the Chinese needed to resolve their status in the Indies, 
or the potentially sovereign Indonesia.  That is, in anticipation of the fact that 
Indonesian would gain their political sovereignty, the Chinese needed to speak to 
Indonesian political leaders, not to the Dutch authorities, to secure the betterment of 
their position and their future.   
A turning point for Liem came in 1921 when he moved to Soerabaja and 
became an editor for Pewarta Soerabaia, a weekly owned by The Kian Seng.  The 
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Kian Seng was another prominent Chinese nationalist and journalist, who had been 
critical of the Dutch citizenship policy.  In March 1925 Liem resigned from Pewarta 
Soerabaia, and two months later, in May 1925, he obtained the position of chief editor 
of Soeara Poeblik in Soerabaja, which he kept until 1929.  In 1929 before Sin Jit Po 
went bankrupt, he became its editor-in-chief, and subsequently for Sin Jit Po’s 
reincarnation, Sin Tit Po.  In Soerabaja he collaborated with moderate Indonesian 
nationalists, such as leaders of the Association of Indonesian Nation (PBI) headed by 
Soetomo.   
His view of the political and social position as Indies Chinese was clear.  He 
wrote an article “Soeal peranakan” (“About the Indies Chinese”) in the June 17, 1930 
issue of Sin Tit Po, saying that: 
 
As we have often said, this export of Indies Chinese to China is an impossible 
thing, because they have been destined by nature to live and make their 
livelihood here, not in China.  […] 
Most people cannot work with the same aptitude in different types of climate 
and soil.  Except for the Chinese, because thus far Chinese people seem to be 
able to work hard, no matter if their present country has a colder or hotter 
climate compared to in their land of origin.  This habit of hardwork in all 
types of climate, combined with frugality, has made Chinese people an 
invincible labor force everywhere.  […] 
Because the issue concerning Indies Chinese is first and foremost the matter 
of provisions in order to survive and pursue life’s goals, and because Indies 
Chinese cannot live in other countries, especially not in China, the Chinese 
people here should not neglect their position in this country but must attempt 
every effort to make this position the best they can, by first getting rid of the 
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mindset that is indifferent to affairs of this country.  Because in the end these 
things are also the Chinese problems.723 
 
Liem’s realistic understanding of the Chinese position in the Indies led him to 
establish the PTI in 1932.  He was elected as chairperson and Sin Tit Po became its 
official news organ.  PTI had among its supporting bases the Chinese labors in 
Soerabaja, in contrast to the Sin Po group whose circle consisted mainly of Batavian 
Chinese, or to the pro-Dutch Chinese association CHH, which was based in Semarang 
among Dutch-educated, rich Chinese entrepreneurs.724 
                                                
723 “Persoalan peranakan,” Sin Tit Po, June 17, 1930. 
Kita soedah sering oedjoenken, ini export baba ke Tiongkoka ada satoe perkara jang tida aken 
bisa kedjadian, sebab baba soeda ditakdirken oleh alam aken hidoep dan tjari makannja di sini, 
boekan di Tiongkok. […] 
Kebanjakan bangsa tida bisa bekerja sama koeatnja dalem segala matjem hawa oedara dan 
boemi.  Tjoema bangsa Tionghoa roepanja ada terketjoeali, sebab sampe sabegini djaoeh 
bangsa Tionghoa kliatannja sanggoep bekerdja berat, tida perdoeli di negeri jang hawanja lebih 
dingin atawa lebih panas dari negeri asalnja.  Ini kebiasa’an bekerdja keras dalem segala 
matjem hawa oedara, ditambah sama kebisa’an hidoep saderhana sekali, bikin bangsa 
Tionghoa sebagi kaoem boeroeh djadi sanget ditakoeti di segala negeri. […] 
Sebab soeal peranakan pertama ada soeal peroet aken bisa hidoep boeat beroe toedjoean-
toedjoeannja manoesia hidoep, dan sebab peranakan tida bisa hidoep di negeri laen, teroetama 
tida di Tiongkok, maka peranakan tida boleh loepaken kedoedoekannja dalem ini negeri dan 
moesti berdaja sebisanja boeat bikin itoe kedoedoekan djadi sebrapa bisa baek, dengen lempar 
lebih doeloe sikepnja jang tida perdjoelian pada oeroesan-oeroesan dari ini negeri.  Jang toch 
mendjadi sebagian djoega dari marika poenja oeroesan sendiri. 
724 Liem Koen Hian, “Three Political Streams in the Peranakan Chinese Community,” Sin Tit Po, 
August 25-26, 1932, translated and complied by Leo Suryadinata in Suryadinata, Political Thinking of 
the Indonesian Chinese 1900-1995, pp. 51-55.  
Three political streams can be divided in two different ways; the criteria are educational 
background of the members and class differences between their supporters.   
The main supporting organization of daily Sin Po was the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (the Chinese 
Association, THHK), whereas PTI members, like those of CHH, usually had Dutch education.  Thus 
roughly speaking, due to their language (education) differences, the way in which Indies Chinese 
perceived their political situations also varied.  The Sin Po group was closer to totok Chinese, whereas 
the PTI and CHH Chinese were Western-minded.  Yet this cultural difference did not cause major 
conflicts or hostile rivalry among them.   
The second factor is perhaps more crucial, that is class/ideological difference.  CHH was based 
in Semarang where an old peranakan community was long established and served as center for 
peranakan big business, such as the Oei Tiong Ham Concern, one of the biggest conglomerates in 
colonial Southeast Asia.  It was in a sense a rightwing peranakan party.  CHH’s leaders like Kan Hok 
Hoei (H. H. Kan) and Tan Tjiang Ling were usually criticized as being pro-Dutch.  The association 
itself was often condemned in the peranakan newspapers as neglecting the Chinese poor.  To the 
contrary, PTI was “known as the party of the less wealthy strata of peranakan society” (Mona Lohanda, 
The Kapitan Cina of Batavia 1837-1942. Jakarta: Djambatan, 1996, p. 164).  In fact, PTI constituted of 
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In early 1933 Liem quit Sin Tit Po due to a quarrel with the director.  Staying 
in Soerabaja, he then joined Kwee Hing Tjiat at the daily Mata Hari of Semarang, 
which was subsidized by Oei Tiong Ham Concern and was known to maintain a close 
link with the CHH.  Liem subsequently moved to Batavia to study at the law school 
(Recht Hogeschool).  There he directed Timboel magazine with Sanoesi Pane, a 
prominent indigenous Indonesian literati.  He also assisted Siang Po, a newspaper 
owned by Phoa Liong Gie, a lawyer who left CHH in 1934.  In Batavia he became 
associated with radical and active indigenous nationalists such as Mohamad Yamin, 
Sanoesi Pane, and Amir Sjariffoedin.  These nationalists published a newspaper, 
Kebangoenan (Awakening), which was printed by the Siang Po Printing Press and 
shared news items and articles with Siang Po.  In 1936 Liem became the chief editor 
of Panorama magazine, whose editorial board included A. Subardjo, Amir 
Sjarifoeddin, Mohamad Yamin, Phoa Liong Gie, and Sanoesi Pane.  However 
circumstantial, Liem’s journalistic experience in Padang helped him get closer to Amir 
Sjariffoedin, Mohamad Yamin and Sanoesi Pane, who spent their younger days in the 
city.  While he stayed in Batavia, he regularly contributed articles to Sin Tit Po. 
In April 1937 Liem left Siang Po and became the editor-in-chief of Kong Hoa 
Po, which was also published by the Siang Po Printing Press.  In November 1938 he 
left Kong Hoa Po at the invitation of Dr. Tjoa Sik Ien, the new president of the PTI 
Soerabaja branch and the proprietor of Sin Tit Po.  In January 1939 he returned to 
                                                                                                                                       
a small minority of peranakan (despite its electoral success in Soerabaja), relatively leftwing 
professionals and journalists.  It sought for a political assimilation of the Chinese with the indigenous 
society.  The members’ political orientation was generally anti-colonial and supported the Indonesian 
nationalist movement.  Even the party’s pro-China stand was essentially based on anti-Japanese 
imperialism.  In this sense, PTI’s political stand differed from Sin Po’s pro-China stand which 
emphasized rather on affinity for the motherland.  Therefore, while Sin Po often invited its readers to 
assist China in times of trouble, Sin Tit Po paid more attention to changing political situations in China 
and to anti-Japanese movements in and outside of China.   
This analysis is drawn from my article, “The Chinese Connection.”  The rivalry between PTI 
and CHH, see also Arief W. Djati dan Ben Anderson (eds.), Menjadi Tjamboek Berdoeri: Memoar 
Kwee Thiam Tjing (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2010), pp. 103-122.  Kwee Thiam Tjing described CHH 
as the enemy of PTI (musuh politiek).  Djati and Anderson, Menjadi Tjamboek Berdoeri, p. 112. 
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serve as editor-in-chief for Sin Tit Po, but soon relinquished that position to Tan Ling 
Djie in order to continue his study of law in Batavia. 
Liem Koen Hien’s personal networks present several intriguing points.  First, 
he worked with journalists of various political orientations.  Such Chinese journalists 
as The Kian Seng, Hauw Tek Kong, and Phoa Liong Gie did not share Liem’s political 
beliefs and were affiliated with different organizations.  Yet, within their network 
Chinese journalists appeared to both compete with each other over and share their 
positions as editors.725  For example, Oei Kie Hok retired from his editorial position at 
Sin Jit Po, and Tan Kien Lian (former editor of Sin Bin, Bandoeng) and Lie Sin Thian 
(former chief editor of Tjhoen Tjhioe and Palita, Soerabaja) replaced him.726  In 
another instance, Liem Djit Seng and Oei Kie Hok (who left Sin Jit Po) took up the 
position of editor at Warna Warta (Semarang).  In this manner, prominent journalists 
traveled through major newspapers and cities in the Indies, as Liem journalistic career 
clearly shows.  Such mutation of editors worked because journalist network operated 
on a regular basis, and the operation of the press depended on such networking. 
Second, Liem also made connections with indigenous journalists and 
nationalist leaders, such as Soetomo, Sanoesi Pane, Amir Sjarifoeddin, Mohamad 
Yamin, and A. Subardjo.  It was not unusual for Chinese journalists to network with 
indigenous journalists.  Indeed, the Association of Journalists of Asia facilitated such 
connections.  For instance, Kwee Hing Tjiat had connections with Parada Harahap, 
Saëroen, and Bakri Suraatmadja, while Kwee Kek Beng as director of Sin Po 
employed W. R. Soepratman and D. Koesoemaningrat.  These personal networks 
intertwined and provided the basis for a journalist community in the Indies.  In the 
                                                
725 I find it a kind of mutation among Chinese journalists, although they often had controversies and 
quarrels.  Yamamoto, “The Chinese Connection”; Djati and Anderson, Menjadi Tjamboek Berdoeri, pp. 
61-69. 
726 Sin Jit Po, May 28, 1926, (Th. 3, No. 114), L1-2. 
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case of Liem Koen Hian, he did not confine himself to a purely journalistic circle, but 
through his network with Indonesian intellectuals joined Gerindo (Indonesian People’s 
Movement), which was established in May 1937 by his friends, A. K. Gani, Sartono, 
Amir Sjarifoeddin, Sanoesi Pané, and Mohamad Yamin.  Those founding members of 
Gerindo were known as leftwing nationalists who aspired to socialist ideals for the 
future of Indonesia.  In fact, Gerindo was the first Indonesian political party that 
opened the door to peranakan Chinese in the 1930s.  Gerindo had two missions for its 
movement.  The first was to raise the public’s consciousness of nationalist ideas by 
organizing people.  The second was to seek a cooperative approach with the Dutch 
authorities.  This stance stemmed from the developing international affairs when 
fighting against fascism in Europe as well as in Asia became a major issue. 
The fact that Liem joined Gerindo confirmed his lifelong anti-imperialist 
political position.727  It was this aspect of Liem’s life and work that was the main 
reason why the Dutch authorities were especially intent on suppressing his writing 
through their actions against Sin Tit Po, singling out his articles from among other 
anti-Japanese publications for a particularly strict level of scrutiny and punishment.  
Other Chinese newspapers were essentially nationalistic and carried anti-Japanese 
articles because China was under attack.  By contrast, Liem Koen Hian assailed Japan 
                                                
727 His other political orientation was anti-authority.  He had been critical against Dutch-appointed 
Chinese officials, and often criticized or made fun of them.  “Persdelict Liem Koen Hian: Satoe 
peladjaran dalem journalistiek,” Sin Tit Po, March 17, 1936.  Liem was arrested when Japanese 
occupation began in 1942, but was soon released.  Then he was appointed assistant to Toyoshima, head 
of the Chinese Section at the Japanese Consulate in Batavia.  Suryadinata, Peranakan’s Search for 
National Identity, p. 73.  On April 29, 1945 when the Investigative Committee for the Preparation of 
Indonesia’s Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 
BPUPKI) was established, he was appointed to be a member of it.  Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-undang 
Dasar 1945, pp. 8, 534.  In 1950 Liem reestablished a multiracial political party, the Union of 
Indonesian Forces (Persatuan Tenaga Indonesia).  In the middle of August 1951 Liem was detained for 
his leftist activities by the Sukiman cabinet that arrested approximately 15,000 left-wing activists until 
the end of October.  Liem was released on October 29, 1951, but was quite ill.  On November 5, 1952, 
he passed away in Medan as a Chinese citizen.  Suryadinata, Peranakan’s Search for National Identity, 
pp. 78-79.  For anti-Communist raid of August 1951, see Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional 
Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 187-192. 
 460 
because he regarded Japan as imperialistic.  Tohindo Nippo perceived this difference, 
and in the Japanese eyes Liem Koen Hian’s anti-imperialistic argument after he left 
Sin Tit Po became far more dangerous than the nationalistic ones by other Chinese 
press.  Moreover, Sin Tit Po circulated mainly in Soerabaja where Japanese cultural 
propaganda was active and they must have been aware of the influence of his articles 
in local Chinese circles as well as in the Indonesian community.  Therefore the 
Japanese news organ took exception to Sin Tit Po’s articles, and the Prosecutor 
General of the Indies was forced to take care of the problem by shutting down the 
newspaper. 
The Dutch authorities employed different strategies for containing Liem Koen 
Hian.  In April 1939 he was accused of persdelict with a fellow Chinese journalist, 
Liem Sam Tjiang.  Unlike persbreidel, in which a court trial that includes exchanges 
between journalists and the authorities is circumvented, high profile persdelict cases 
were often reported in the press.  The persdelict charge against these two journalists 
was apparently some kind of public punishment.  In its issues of April 4 and 8, 1939, 
Keng Po, a Batavia-based Chinese-Malay newspaper, published the transcript of the 
persdelict trial of the two Chinese journalists from Sin Tit Po by the Landraad.  The 
Court tried Liem Koen Hian and Liem Sam Tjiang on charges of expressing enmity, 
hatred and insult against Japanese people (bangsa Djepang) in the Indies.  It listed as 
evidence seven articles published in the period of two months, namely from January 
26, 1938 to March 1, 1938.728  Five out of seven articles were the exact same articles, 
which the Prosecutor General had cited in his confidential report in April 1938.  As a 
                                                
728 Seven articles are as follows: “Djepang obral abab Minister” (January 26, 1938), “Djepang tentoe 
tamat tjeritanja” (January 28, 1938), “Tjoema ada doea bangsa” (February 15, 1938), “Terlaloe ketjiwa 
en treurig” (February 22, 1938), “Gebiedende eisch” (Imperious demand) (February 23, 1938), “Ka 
Tokio” (February 24, 1938), and “Gelijke methoden” (Similar methods) (March 1, 1938). 
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matter of fact, Liem Koen Hian wrote all the articles, but Liem Sam Tjiang was also 
tried for publishing them. 
The exchanges that took place between the Court chairman and the two 
defendants are quite intriguing.  To begin, the chairman, Mr. Beukerman, asked what 
the defendants thought of the accusation, and both naturally denied the charges.  Liem 
Sam Tjiang argued that the writings were about Japanese soldiers who were currently 
occupying China and had nothing to do with the Japanese people in the Indies.  The 
chairman however insisted that the Japanese in the Indies could not be separated from 
those in China, as they surely would stand behind their government.  In his response, 
instead of backing down, Liem Sam Tjiang proclaimed that God would not forgive the 
Japanese for their cruel acts in China.   
When it was his turn to be questioned, Liem Koen Hian argued that he had an 
obligation as a journalist to counter the influence of Japanese propaganda, which was 
good for only Japan and bad for the Indies.  In the article “Tjoema ada doea bangsa” 
(“Only two kinds of people exist”), he argued that there were two types of nations, 
“civilized” and “barbaric” (bangsa-bangsa biadab dan bangsa-bangsa jang sopan), 
and went on to call Japanese soldiers barbaric for their brutality in China (soldadoe-
soldadoe Djepang jang berlakoe begitoe boeas di Tiongkok).  The chairman pointed 
out that, reading Liem’s article, readers would make assumption that all Japanese 
people were barbaric and as such the article was offensive to Japanese.  Liem simply 
denied that it was his intention.  The chairman also pointed out another article in 
which Liem had remarked that Japan tried to fool other Asian nations (Djepang tjoba 
menipoe bangsa-bangsa Asia jang lain).  Liem defended his writing by saying that 
Japan was not at all honest with its motto “Asia for Asians” (Asia boeat orang Asia), 
because its real intention was to dominate all Asian nations.729 
                                                
729 “Persdelict ‘Sin Tit Po’,” Sin Tit Po, April 4 & 8, 1939. 
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As with Semaoen, the trial allowed Liem Koen Hian and Liem Sam Tjiang to 
further criticize the Japanese military action in China.  In the 1910s and 1920s, 
Indonesian nationalists and journalists sometimes took advantage of persdelict trials to 
make their case against the authorities, as they were given the opportunity to present 
their defense in front of an audience in the court.  Liem Koen Hian and Liem Sam 
Tjiang also took advantage of their trial to express critical views on Japanese and 
Dutch authorities.  But this particular persdelict case was exceptional, because it came 
one year after persbreidel was applied to Sin Tit Po.  Usually with the persbreidel, 
journalists were deprived of the chance to speak or argue against the authority.  In this 
case, however, since the persdelict charge came a year after the persbreidel, the 
authorities inadvertently gave an opportunity for the two Chinese journalists to speak 
up not only for their defense, but also for that of Sin Tit Po’s. 
It appears that the Dutch authorities came under increasing pressure from the 
Japanese to punish the two journalists.  Under Japan’s shadow, the colonial state was 
paralyzed by political discourses in Chinese-Malay newspapers.  It had to penalize 
Liem Koen Hian, a prominent Chinese journalist, who joined Gerindo, which under 
the leadership of leftist Indonesian nationalists had pursued collaboration with the 
Indies state to fight against Japan’s fascism.  The vulnerable colonial government 
apparently began to lose its way in the time of war. 
 
Conclusion 
For the first three decades of the twentieth century, as Amry Vandenbosch and 
John Furnivall correctly described, the Chinese were not a threat to the Indies 
government at all.  The politics of the Chinese community were not considered 
threatening, as they generally concerned their own group and were unrelated to other 
groups in the Indies.  This was how the Indies government framed “de Chineesche 
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kwestie” (“the Chinese question”), that is as essentially a question concerning their 
legal and social status in the Indies, not their politics.  In this view, the Chinese 
residents of the Indies were busy either seeking greater concessions from the 
government or quarreling among themselves.  In this sense, in the eyes of the colonial 
authority, the Chinese were politically “invisible.” 
But in late 1930s, the Chinese became “visible” in the context of international 
affairs when their activities became politically threatening to the colonial state, albeit 
indirectly.  Cases of persbreidel illustrated how national security was perceived by the 
Indies government.  In this regard, the Chinese press shaped the national security issue 
in the late 1930s.  In many respects, both the colonial government and the Chinese in 
the Indies were spectators.  They were the audience and consumers of news coverage 
of affairs that took place in distant China, in particular the conflict with Japan.  The 
difference is that for the Chinese, the war became a moment that encouraged 
expressions of patriotism and anti-imperialism, whereas for the Indies government, 
such expressions of Chinese solidarity became a matter of state security.  Ironically, it 
is this position of spectatorship that finally made the Chinese “visible” to the colonial 
state. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
CONCLUSION   
 
“SINGAPORE DJATOH” (SINGAPORE HAS FALLEN), was the headline of 
Sin Tit Po on February 16, 1942.  “It is officially announced: Singapore has 
surrendered” (Dengen officieel dikabarken: Singapore telah menjerah), the subtitle 
elaborated.730  From this news, taken from Reuters, residents in the Indies learned that 
the Japan had successfully taken over Singapore, a major hub of British imperialism, 
just northwest of Indonesia.  The news shook the Indies, as the Netherlands had long 
relied on the British support for the defense of its colonial empire.  The last shred of 
hope that war in Asia could be averted appeared to have vanished. 
The Indies government found itself completely unprepared for the Japanese 
military invasion.731  Just two months earlier, on December 19, 1941 or less than two 
weeks after the assault on Pearl Harbor,732 the city of Pontianak in West Borneo had 
been seized by the Japanese military,733 and hence the Netherlands Indies was 
practically at war with Japan.  In early January 1942, Minahasa in North Celebes and 
Tarakan in East Borneo, too, were under attack.  Some Indonesians still held out hope 
                                                
730 “SINGAPORE DJATOEH,” Sin Tit Po, February 16, 1942. 
731 Among Indonesian literati the coming war was a given fact.  Adi Negoro even published a book 
entitled Boekoe Perang Doenia Kedoea (World War II Book) in August 1940.  According to the 
advertisement, the book covered the development of war in Europe between September 1939 and June 
1940.  Advertisement of the book is listed in Pewarta Deli, August 24, 1940.   
732 In his memoir, Oey Tiang Tjoei, a journalist, recalled the day (December 8, 1941) he was arrested by 
the Dutch for his pro-Japanese activities as follows. 
I remember very vividly, that since very early morning and on Monday 8 December 2601 
[1941], it was raining all over Batavia.  The air at that time was dark, as if bringing terrible 
signs for the Dutch people.  It was as if nature had given notice to the Dutch government, that 
the end of the Dutch rule in Indonesia was only a matter of time.  
Oey Tiang Tjoei, Pengalaman kita dalam pengasingan Garoet-Soekaboemi dan Noesakambangan 
(Tjilatjap) (Djakarta: Hong-Po, 1942), p. 1. 
733 “Pontianak Diserang Moesoeh,” Sin Tit Po, December 20, 1941. 
 465 
that American warplanes would come to their rescue,734 even after the raid on 
Soerabaja on February 2.735  But the Dutch colonial army was not trained for modern 
warfare, thus the Japanese military easily advanced from the Philippines to North 
Celebes, to Borneo, to South Celebes, and finally Java.  From the initial attack, it took 
no more than two months to reach the heart of the Dutch colony.   
In fact, since the Netherlands was occupied by the Nazi Germany in May 1940, 
the Indies had been trying to get ready for the upcoming war.  The war situation 
pushed the Indies government to exercise an extreme form of censorship, including a 
control over any kind of information related to war.736  Channels of communication 
like the postal service, telegraph, and telephone were put under tight surveillance.  
Travelling in and out of the Indies was also closely controlled.737   
The legal foundation for this government action was the censorship ordinance 
(censuurordonnantie) of 1932, stipulating official “supervision on the use of transport, 
postal, telegraph and telephone services to protect the external and internal security of 
Netherlands Indies” (overheidstoezicht op het gebruik van vervoer-, post-, telegraaf- 
en telefoondiensten ter bescherming van de uit- en inwendige veiligheid van 
Nederlandsch-Indië).  It granted the government authority to exercise such censorship 
in instances when there was confirmed “risk of war or insurrection” (gevaar voor 
oorlog of opstand).738  The Netherlands and the Indies governments, and their policy 
makers had been discussing such an ordinance to supervise various means of 
communications since 1911, before the 1911 Chinese revolution and the World War I 
                                                
734 “Pesawat2-pemboeroe U.S.A. sampe di Java?” Sin Tit Po, February 9, 1942. 
735 “Soerabaja diserang pertama,” Sin Tit Po, February 3, 1942. 
736 “Indonesia dalem geloembang perang: Censuur dan Publiciteit,” Sin Tit Po, July 22, 1940.  The title 
is suggestive, because it reads, “Indonesia in the waves of war.”  The article describes the government 
is tight censorship concerning war.   
737 Mr. 128x/1933.   
738 Mr. 371x/1924.  In the proposal for the ordinance in 1932, the phrase “to protect the external and 
internal security of the Netherlands Indies” was added.  Mr. 128x/1933.  
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took place.  In fact, the Netherlands, which played only a minor role in international 
affairs, employed a neutralist policy towards the Boxer Rebellion in China at the turn 
of the twentieth century as well as in the World War I.739  Originally the ordinance 
was intended to monitor internal postal, telegraph, and telephone communication, so 
whenever a “warning” (waarschuwing) sign was detected, the authorities could 
exercise a tighter control.  During the World War I when the Netherlands kept its 
neutrality, the word “warning” was replaced with “the risk of war or insurrection” 
(gevaar voor oorlog of opstand). 
This censorship ordinance underscored the Netherlands’ vulnerable position in 
world politics.  Geopolitically it was a small power in Europe, while its commercial 
activities with its colonies were made possible under the protective arm of Britain.  
But since the late nineteenth century, rapid changing international circumstances 
pushed the Netherlands to change its policies towards its colony in Asia.  In the 1870s, 
under international pressure, it was forced to open up the Indies to international trade, 
essentially integrating its market with the world capitalist economy.  In the mean time, 
in Asia, Japan was emerging as a considerable power – being recognized by Sino-
Japanese war in 1894-95, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902 and defeating Russia in 
1905; in Europe, the growing hostility between Britain and Germany had made the 
Netherlands uneasy, especially with Germany’s naval development, which naturally 
posed a threat to the Netherlands.  As these changes necessitated more independent 
security policy and actions in order to maintain the law and order in the Indies, the 
censorship ordinance was discussed.  It had been “in the making” for all those 
years,740 long before its formal installation in 1932. 
                                                
739 Amry Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands During the World War (Grand Rapids: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans, 1927). 
740 In the early 1920s, the issue of censorship ordinance was discussed even in the quasi-parliament, 
Volksraad (People’s Council).  Mr. 371x/1924.  But the 1932 version had been examined within a 
limited circle of Dutch policy makers in the Netherlands and high-ranking colonial bureaucrats, such as 
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But as this dissertation has shown, in practice since the early twentieth century 
other forms of censorship had been tried and applied on many occasions, in particular 
where the Indies government confronted the nationalist movement as well as radical 
and transnational political activism by its residents since the 1910s.  Before the Dutch 
policy makers discussed the censorship ordinance, they had started deliberating on 
other ways to regulate the press – whether or not to introduce administrative measure, 
or whether the existing Penal Code was adequate.  As it turned out, political 
circumstances were the primary determinant in both the policy process and outcome of 
censorship.   
The two major types of press censorship, persdelict and persbreidel, were the 
outcome of changing political environments.  As a component of the Penal Code, 
persdelict was a product of the liberal democratic idea, which put emphasis on legal 
governance.  Democracy and liberalism had penetrated into the Dutch society since 
the 1880s, when the Netherlands started to democratize its own political system and 
introduced civic governance.  It was also the time when the Indies was compelled to 
open itself to the world capitalist economy, and experienced the shift toward liberal 
politics.  Under these politico-economic circumstances, the Indies government 
inevitably resorted to legal tools to maintain its authority and control over its territory.  
Under such a liberal atmosphere, administrative measures were thought to be 
undemocratic by the Dutch policy makers, thus the Penal Code was carefully 
formulated in legal terms and additions were made when necessary.  
Being a colonial state, however, Dutch colonialism often asked in conservative 
way, oscillating between the promotion of free press and control over its subjects.  
Thus for the first three decades of the twentieth century, during what is known as the 
                                                                                                                                       
the Governor-General, the Prosecutor General, and the Director of the Department of Justice.  Mr. 
128x/1933. 
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Ethical era, the colonial government employed conflicting policies in order to 
maintain peace and order.  It was the time when the Indies state expanded its influence 
in the Outer Islands and carved out its new territory, coming closer to completing its 
imperial ambitions.  The fact that all Governor-Generals between 1899 and 1916 were 
professional soldiers at some stage in their career is indicative of the Dutch 
expansionist agenda.  At the same time, this was also the period when the indigenous 
people of the Indies were encouraged to express themselves through print and speech, 
an extension of the privilege that Dutch citizens in the liberal metropole had enjoyed.  
Such liberal policies however were problematic; the colonial authorities were very 
aware that free speech and press in the colonial setting were by nature precarious.   
The international political circumstances brought about major changes in the 
Indies in the late 1910s.  After Lenin gained control over Russia in 1917, the German 
emperor Wilhelm II abdicated in 1918, and the economic depression reached the 
Indies in the early 1920s, the Dutch society turned defensive and more conservative.  
Accordingly, the Netherlands government reorganized its intelligence activities both 
in its country and its colonies.  In 1919 when the Netherlands formed the Central 
Intelligence Agency (Centrale Inlichtingendienst, CI), the Indies state also established 
PID.741  Under PID, the Bureaus for Native and Arab, and for Chinese Affairs 
provided first-hand information on political activism to the Service.  PID diligently 
gathered materials on leftwing (communist) and rightwing (Indonesian and Chinese 
nationalist) individuals and groups, and monitored their activities.  Monitoring the 
vernacular press was one of the significant ways to survey those who were potentially 
dangerous.  The colonial authorities used parts of the Penal Code – in particular the 
persdelict and haatzaai-artikelen – to restrict journalists, especially those who were 
                                                
741 For a general history of the Dutch police, see Cyrille Fijnaut, A History of the Dutch Police 
(Amsterdam: Boom 2008). 
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affiliated with radical political parties.  This type of pressure successfully extinguished 
some radical newspapers.  Many radical activists such as Semaoen and Tan Malaka 
were exiled to Europe, while Chinese activists who had connections with Kuomintang 
were deported to China.  PID’s activities were visible to the public, and were often 
reported in the vernacular press.  In this way PID and the press formed a symbiotic 
relation where one became object of the other’s trade (information gathering and 
reporting).  
In the middle of the 1920s the Dutch parliament experienced power shift to the 
right.742  In 1925, when the colonial authorities faced growing Indonesian radical 
movement, the Indies government added articles 153 bis and ter to the Penal Code to 
restrict any movement and discourse that might cause public insecurity.  The political 
appointment of Governor-Generals also became increasingly right-leaning.  Colonial 
pressures on political activists were more repressive in the 1920s than in the 1930s.  
The establishment of Boven Digoel as a political internment camp was in a sense a 
natural reaction when the colonial authorities were faced with unexpected communist 
uprisings.  These changes culminated in the installation of administrative measure to 
control the press, that is, persbreidel.  In the early 1930s, due to the effects of the 
Great Depression, financial insecurity, trade deficits, rapid influxes of Chinese and 
                                                
742 Generally, the interwar years in Europe experienced growing numbers of affinities and coalitions 
between conservatives and the radical right.  The so-called “stable democracies” such as Great Britain, 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands also increasingly became conservative, widely supported by the 
lower middle classes and some higher echelons of society.  In the case of the Netherlands, the younger 
generation of aristocrats turned to follow radical right movement because their political privilege had 
eventually gone after the 1917 parliamentary election.  It had to do with a change in the electoral law in 
1917, in which the constituency system was replaced by proportional representation.  Since then, party 
allegiance counted for more than status or networks of local and regional notables.  Hans de Valk, 
“Distance and Attraction: Dutch Aristocracy and the Political Right Wing,” in Karina Urbach (ed.), 
European Aristocracies and the Radical Right 1918-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 
74-77.  The proportional representation also created a new political scene where many small political 
parties emerged and competed, causing frequent changing alliances.  Koen Vossen, Vrij vissen in het 
Vondelpark: Kleine politieke partijen in Nederland 1918-1940 (Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 2003).  
For a general tendency in Europe, see Martin Blinkhorn (ed.), Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical 
Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe (London, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990); 
Philip Morgan, Fascism in Europe 1919-1945 (London: Routledge, 2003). 
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Japanese immigrants into the Indies, and the rise of the Axis powers, the Dutch 
politics turned hardline.  Such domestic and international circumstances inevitably 
affected press censorship in the Indies. 
The two types of press censorship deployed by the Indies government – 
persdelict and persbreidel – had three major differences.  First of all, the policy 
intentions were different, even though both measures were aimed to control political 
vernacular press.  Persdelict targeted individual journalists, whereas persbreidel was 
to warn and shut down troubling publishers.  As an administrative measure, 
persbreidel aimed to control the society, whereas persdelict as a component of the 
Penal Code governed what constituted as an offence in order to punish its commission.  
The execution of persdelict through criminal trials is indicative of both the 
socialization of a supposed press offence and its punishment.  Being part of the Penal 
Code, private individuals could invoke persdelict (klachtdelict); to defend themselves 
while local strongmen and influential families occasionally sued journalists for 
defamation.  On the other hand, as an administrative measure, persbreidel was a 
prerogative of the government, unilaterally executed, without the possibility for 
appeal. 
Second, the bureaucratic arrangements were different.  Persbreidel was 
practiced at the national level, whereas persdelict was exercised at the local level.  
This difference is clear in terms of who made the final decision.  The local criminal 
courts gave the ultimate verdict on persdelict cases.  No higher courts or high-ranking 
colonial bureaucrats were involved.  Persdelict was therefore limited to a local affair, 
and hence no state-wide administrative coordination existed.  In the case of 
persbreidel, until 1934 the final decision was delivered by the Governor-General, 
although in the book the Council of the Netherlands Indies was to give the final push.  
After 1935 it was the Prosecutor General who decided which newspaper should be 
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suspended temporarily by persbreidel.  Since persbreidel had to do with the matter of 
“national” security, it could not avoid being influenced by political changes at 
domestic and international levels. 
Third, the consequences varied.  As an administrative measure, the 
consequence of persbreidel was pre-determined, whereas the outcome of charges of 
persdelict was unpredictable.  After the criminal trial, a persdelict charge could lead to 
a fine and/or imprisonment of the prosecuted journalist.  But intriguingly, journalists 
learnt how to deal with persdelict and avoid especially the prison penalty.  There were 
cases where blame was designed to fall onto junior colleagues (usually office boys) 
and stooges who were paid to spend time in jail.743  At the same time, the court trial 
also gave opportunity to journalists to defend themselves, to appeal, and occasionally 
to expose abuses of power and mistrial, leading to reduced sentences.  On the other 
hand, persbreidel simply functioned as it was intended – the temporary suspension of 
troubling publishers.  In eight years it was applied for 85 cases, which was a relatively 
small number to the numbers of periodicals circulated at the time.  To avoid being 
suspended, which would bring economic damage, publishers of commercial 
newspapers became more cautious about their contents.  In this way a kind of self-
censorship worked among publishers, while those who did not cooperate were quickly 
shut down.  Thus to a great extent, persbreidel was able to control its consequences.   
Press censorship, whether restrictive or otherwise, brought intriguing 
consequences to the Malay print culture.  It helped cultivated Malay print culture in 
different ways.  In reality, since the 1900s, private popular reading materials had 
dominated the Malay print market, despite the state cultural project led by Balai 
Poestaka.  Even persdelict promoted political journalism in the 1910s and 1920s.  
                                                
743 A chief typesetter was blamed to have “misplaced” the incrimating article. Sin Jit Po, August 12, 
1928. 
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Court trials became an object of press coverage, as well as entertaining reading/book 
materials.  Unlike party organs, which tended to have strong ideological orientations, a 
neutral press also carried reports of persdelict cases as newsworthy.  Persbreidel on 
the other hand, by short-circuiting the execution process, paved the way for alternative 
ways to write about and consume politics in the 1930s.  The literary field became 
infused with political news, while new kinds of journals and publications emerged in 
place of political ones.  Under the strict post-publication censorship, the Malay print 
culture actually flourished.  Another factor in this flourishing of the print market in the 
Indies was that it was open to everyone regardless of race and politics.  Among others, 
the Indies Chinese remained major producers and distributors of the Malay popular 
publications in the last four decades of Dutch colonialism.  Because the print market 
was open, a large variety of publications became available.  Obviously, a total 
suppression of the undesirable market was impossible for the colonial authorities.  The 
Malay print power appeared to gain its strength and was unstoppable especially 
towards the end of the Dutch colonial era.   
The World War II however fundamentally changed the situation of Malay print 
culture.  In September 1939 the war in Europe broke out and had an impact on the way 
the Indies government conducted print censorship.  In July 1940, less than a month 
after the Netherlands was occupied by the Nazi Germany, the Indies government 
decided to implement the censorship ordinance, signaling that internally the colony 
was “at war” before Japan even set foot in the territory.  Its (re)action was 
understandable, considering signs of Japan’s southward expansion.  In April 1940, the 
Japanese government expressed its concern over the possible effects of the war in 
Europe on the Netherlands Indies.744  As the Japanese Foreign Minister has said, 
                                                
744 “Press Release Issued by the Japanese Embassy on April 15, 1940,” in United States Department of 
State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United State: Japan: 1931-1941 (Volume 2) 
(Washington: United States Department of State, 1943), p. 281. 
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cooperation from the Indies was indispensable for the stability and prosperity of 
Asia.745  At the same time, the Japanese press was under the impression “that the 
Netherlands East Indies [government] had shown an unfriendly attitude towards 
[Japan],” and thus “made thinly veiled admonitions to the effect that the Netherlands 
East Indies should consider the danger to it of opposing its incorporation into the new 
‘Co-prosperity Sphere’.”746 
The shift to wartime censorship in July 1940 drastically changed the situation 
of print censorship.  The Indies government ceased applying persbreidel altogether.  
The last persbreidel case took place in April 1940 against Het Nationale Weekblad.  A 
Dutch language newspaper had made inflammatory remarks on ethnic relations in the 
Netherlands.  But after May 1940 such a matter seemed trivial.747  Under the new 
circumstances, the Indies authorities would simply shut down troubling newspapers 
without even invoking persbreidel, as was the case with the Chinese-edition of 
Tohindo Nippo in May 1941.748  Only major news agencies like Reuters and Aneta 
were allowed to provide information on war-related affairs;749 nevertheless, news 
about the war was everywhere through printed media and radio. 
Ironically, the war that fed it with news also killed the press industry in the 
Indies.  The cause was primarily economic, due to paper shortage.  In December 1941, 
the impotent Indies government announced that paper, including newsprint, must be 
                                                
745 “Press Release Issued by the Japanese Embassy on April 15, 1940,” in United States Department of 
State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United State, p. 281. 
746 “The Ambassador in Japan ([Joseph C.] Grew) to the Secretary of State,” in United States 
Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United State: Japan: 1931-1941 
(Volume 2), p. 305.  It is to be noted that by 1937 Japanese press also under military censorship.  David 
C. Earhard, Certain Victory: Images of World War II in the Japanese Media (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 
2008), pp. 89, 99, 108, 143. 
747 At the end of Dutch colonialism, under the obvious war pressure, the Dutch tried to promote inter-
racial cooperation in the Indies.  Benedict Anderson, “Twilight Dogs-Jangled Nerves,” Indonesia, No. 
73 (2002), pp. 129-144. 
748 The Tripartite Pact among Germany, Italy, and Japan signed on September 27, 1940, demonstrated 
that Japan became an ally with Germany that currently occupied the Netherlands, and the most 
dangerous enemy for the Netherlands in Asia. 
749 “Indonesia dalem geloembang perang: Censuur dan Publiciteit,” Sin Tit Po, July 22, 1940. 
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used frugally, and started regulating the distribution of paper to printing houses.750  
The price of paper quickly rose.  Many vernacular presses could not afford to buy 
newsprint, and simply ceased publication.  The publishing business in the Indies 
underwent serious damage.  But soon, the material shortage would not matter 
anymore, because the Indies print and press culture would be gone along with the 
colonial state that had given rise to it. 
Soon after Japan began its military advance into the Netherlands Indies 
territory, the colonial government was shown out to be a paper tiger.  On February 3, 
1942, the Governor-General sent a message to regions that had fallen under Japan’s 
siege, expressing his feeling of “great sadness” (kesedihan besar).  His messages 
betrayed a loss of hope that the Indies might be saved.751  The end of Dutch rule was 
only a matter time.  By April 1942, two months after Singapore fell, Japan had 
concluded its takeover of the Dutch colony. 
The Japanese military regime ushered in a new era of censorship in 
Indonesia.752  All censorship was pre-publication, and the publishing business was 
fully controlled.  Prominent writers and journalists, along with leading nationalists and 
Islam activists, were mobilized for the new government’s programs.  Many Chinese 
journalists and writers who had been vocal critics of Japan’s aggression in China 
                                                
750 “Moesti Himat Kertas Koran” Sin Tit Po, December 16, 1941.  At the same time, since December 8, 
1941, interrogation by the colonial authorities to newspapers got worse.  In his memoir, Oey Tiang 
Tjoei wrote that the newspaper under his directorship, Hongpo, had to endure extraordinary oppression.  
Almost every day the chief editor was summoned by the PID, while the Prosecutor General (in Oey’s 
memoir was referred to as PG or Paling Goblok [Most Idiotic]) continued to “issue ‘advice’ (prentah) 
along with threats” that the newspaper would be closed down if the “advice” was not heeded.  Oey 
Tiang Tjoei, Pengalaman kita dalam pengasingan Garoet-Soekaboemi dan Noesakambangan, p. 4. 
751 “G. G. bitjara: Pada Pendoedoek di Daerah Indonesia Jang Didoedoeki Moesoeh,” Sin Tit Po, 
February 4, 1942. 
752 Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 
1942-1945 (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958); Aiko Kurasawa, “Mobilization and Control: A Study of 
Social Change in Rural Java, 1942-1945,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1988); Ken’ichi 
Goto, Nihon Senryoki Indonesia Kenkyu (Tokyo: Ryukei Shosha, 1989); Shigeru Sato, War, 
Nationalism, and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945 (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 
1994). 
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found themselves arrested or intimidated.  Others had little choice but to cooperate 
with the authority.753  Popular print market was replaced with state-controlled 
publishing.  The print power that journalists and writers had enjoyed during the 
colonial days was gone.  Instead, the Japanese occupation was now laying the basis for 
the future print culture in Indonesia, where neither ethnic nor local popular literature 
would find room to survive. 
                                                
753 Tjamboek Berdoeri, Indonesia dalem Api dan Bara (Malang: ELKASA, 2004); Kwee Kek Beng, 
Doea Poeloe Lima Tahon sebagi Wartawan, pp. 73-96. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Expansion of Railways in the Nineteenth Century Indies 
opening 
year route(s) distance (km) 
1868 Semarang Goedang-Tanggoeng 9 
1868 Tanggoeng-Kedoengdjati 2 
1870 Semarang Goedang-Oostzijda Havenkanaal 74 
1872 Kedoengdjati-Soerakarta 58 
1872 Gambir-Mester Cornelis 6 
1873 Soerakarta-Jogjakarta 37 
1873 Mester Cornelis-Buitenzorg 44 
1881 Buitenzorg-Tjitjoeroeng 27 
1882 Tjitjoeroeng-Soekaboemi 31 
1883 Soekaboemi-Tjiandjoer 39 
1883 Semarang-Genoek 6 
1883 Genoek-Demak 18 
1883 Batavia-Harmonie 4 
1883 Harmonie-Kramat 4 
1884 Kramat-Mester Cornelis 4 
1884 Demak-Koedoes 26 
1884 Koedoes-Pati 23 
1884 Pati-Joana 14 
1884 Poerwodadi-Goendih 17 
1884 Tjiandjoer-Bandoeng 60 
1884 Bandoeng-Tjitjalengka 27 
1885 Batavia-Priok 9 
1885 Tegal-Slawi 14 
1886 Slawi-Balapoelang 10 
1887 Jogjakarta-Tjilatjap 176 
1887 Koetardjoe-Poerworedjo 12 
1887 Batavia-Bekas 27 
1887 Koedoes-Majong 13 
1888 Demak-Godong 21 
1889 Godong-Poerwadadi 17 
1889 Poerwadadi-Wirosari 22 
1889 Ujung-Benteng 3 
1889 Modjokerto Kali-Modjoagoeng 17 
1890 Benteng-Benteng 2 
1890 Modjoagoeng-Ngoro 17 
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1890 Wonokromo-Sepandjang 7 
Appendix 1 (Continued) 
1890 Bekasi-Tjikarang 17 
1891 Tjikarang-Kedoeng Gede 13 
1891 Mester Cornelis-Kampoeng Melajoe 1 
1891 Poeloeajer-Padangpandjang 71 
1891 Padangpandjang-Bukittinggi 19 
1892 Padangpandjang-Solok 53 
1892 Solok-Moearakalaban 23 
1892 Solok-Moearakalaban 7 
1892 Gemekan-Dinojo 8 
1893 Tjibatoe-Tasikmalaja 56 
1893 Wirosari-Koendoeran 18 
1894 Koendoeran-Ngawen 10 
1894 Ngawen-Blora 15 
1894 Tasikmalaja-Kasoegihan 118 
1894 Padang-Emmahavn 4 
1895 Kedoengdjati-Ambarawa 23 
1895 Majong-Patjangaan 10 
1896 Moearakalaban-Sawahlunto 33 
1896 Maos-Poerwokerto 29 
1896 Poerwokerto-Soekaradja 9 
1896 Pasoeroean-Waroengdowo 6 
1896 Pasoeroean-Boom 2 
1897 Waroengdowo-Bekasi 10 
1897 Wonoredjo-Bakalan 4 
1897 Soekaradja-Poerwokerto 16 
1897 Semarang Barat-Kaliwoengoe 19 
1897 Kalibodri-Weleri 9 
1897 Tegal-Brebes 12 
1897 Mundu-Tjirebon 6 
1897 Losari-Tjiledoeg 12 
1897 Tjiledoeg-Sidanglaut 18 
1897 Sidanglaut-Mundu 10 
1897 Pelaboehan-Semarang 5 
1897 Djombang-Kediri 50 
1897 Pesantren-Waters 14 
1897 Pelem-Papar 14 
1897 Malang-Boeloelawang 11 
1897 Djati-Gending 10 
1897 Gending-Djaboeng 19 
1897 Probolinggo-Djati 1 
1898 Djaboeng-Phoeton 5 
1898 Boeloelawang-Gondanglegi 12 
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1898 Gondanglegi-Talok 7 
Appendix 1 (Continued) 
1898 Paree-Kentjong 4.4 
1898 Paree-Kepoeng 12.4 
1898 Weleri-Pekaongan 49 
1898 Pemalang-Tegal 29 
1898 Brebes-Losari 28 
1898 Jombangpasar-Jombang lin Raja 3 
1898 Kedoeng Gede-Krawang 6 
1898 Jogjakarta-Magelang 27 
1898 Wirosari-Kradenan 8 
1898 Poerworedjo-Bandjarnegara 30 
1898 Sepandjang-Krian 7 
1898 Poeloradjo-Ngoro 6 
1898 Porong-Modjokerto 38 
1898 Djapanan-Pandaan 11 
1898 Kamal-Bangkalan 18 
1899 Bankalan-Tandjoeng 5 
1899 Tambangan-Kalianget 20 
1899 Waroengdowo-Wonoredjo 11 
1899 Patjing-Pohdjedjer 15 
1899 Talok-Dampit 8 
1899 Ngoro-Kandangan 7 
1899 Kentjong-Kadangan 5.8 
1899 Goerah-Kawarasan 9 
1899 Joana-Trangkil 8.2 
1899 Trangkil-Boeloemanis 7.5 
1899 Pekalongan-Pemalang 34 
1899 Babat-Plosso 10 
1899 Batavia-Doeri-Tanggerang 23 
1899 Doeri-Rangkasbetoeng 76 
1899 Harmonie-Kabonbinatang 5 
1899 Kabonbinatang-Lipauersweg 2 
1900 Lipauersweg-Batavia 5 
1900 Gondanglegi-Kepandjen 17 
1900 Toempang-Singosari 23 
1900 Rangkasbetoeng-Serang 34 
1900 Serang-Anjer Kidoel 42 
1900 Gundih-Kradenan 37 
1900 Babat-Lamongan 28 
1900 Lamongan-Soerabaja 41 
1900 Boeloemanis-Tajoe 8.8 
1900 Joana-Lasem 34 
1900 Majong-Welahan 6 
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1900 Bandjarnegera-Poerbolinggo 7 
Appendix 1 (Continued) 
1900 Bakalan-Pasar Alkmaar 4 
1900 Tandjoeng-Kwanjar 22 
1900 Tandjoeng-Kapedi 45 
1900 Kapedi-Tambangan 24 
  TOTAL DISTANCE (KM) 2607.1 
[Source: Tim Telaga Bakti Nusantara, Sejarah Perkeretaapian Indonesia, 
Jilid 1 (Bandung: Angkasa, 1997), pp. 164-178.] 
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Appendix 2: The Number of Publications in Malay (1871-1942) 
  Indies Chinese 
Balai 
Poestaka 
Indigenous 
Publishers 
1871 1     
1872 ---     
1873 ---     
1874 ---     
1875 ---     
1876 1     
1877 1     
1878 1     
1879 ---     
1880 ---     
1881 1     
1882 2     
1883 6     
1884 41     
1885 18     
1886 26     
1887 16     
1888 8     
1889 3     
1890 18     
1891 39     
1892 4     
1893 3     
1894 40     
1895 ---     
1896 19     
1897 28     
1898 19     
1899 20     
1900 7     
1901 26     
1902 53   1 
1903 54     
1904 36     
1905 7   1 
1906 5     
1907 6     
1908 36     
1909 22   1 
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1910 125     
Appendix 2 (Continued) 
1911 34 3   
1912 135 5   
1913 80 6   
1914 44 4   
1915 49 4   
1916 51 5   
1917 87     
1918 104   1 
1919 142   2 
1920 128   1 
1921 166   5 
1922 81     
1923 168     
1924 137     
1925 114 25   
1926 47 23 3 
1927 48 29 1 
1928 44 42 2 
1929 53 35 9 
1930 119 30 11 
1931 142 47 2 
1932 101 51 1 
1933 117 24 6 
1934 91 20 2 
1935 148 24 10 
1936 89 17 15 
1937 135 31 39 
1938 143 50 65 
1939 144 34 117 
1940 122 64 131 
1941 96 55 103 
1942 17 5 12 
[My computation is based on the following sources: Salmon, Literature in Malay by the Chinese in 
Indonesia; Balai Pustaka, Balai Pustaka; G. Ockeloen, Catalogus dari Buku-Buku jang Diterbitkan di 
Indonesia, 1937-1941, Djilid 2: Buku dalam Bahasa Melaju, Djawa, d.l.l (Bandung: G. Kolff & Co., 
1950)] 
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Appendix 3: Chinese Newspapers in the Indies (1939) 
City Name Language Orientation Ownership Manager Chief Editor 
Circula
tion Information 
Sin Po C (Evening) 
Three 
Principles of 
the People 
Sin Po     
Before 
1937 
5,000-
6,000; 
After 
1937 
9,000 
Established in 1921. 
The most influential 
Chinese paper, its 
subscribers all over the 
Indies. Anti-Japanese 
agitation, promotion of 
patriotism and 
donation. Many 
Henanese as editors. 
Subscription fee ƒ7.50 
for three months. 
Sin Po M (Evening) 
Three 
Principles of 
the People 
Sin Po     6,000 
Pioneer of Chinese-
Malay paper. Anti-
Japanese stance. Kwee 
Kek Beng initiated Sin 
Po, a Java-born 
Hokkianese with 
Dutch education. 
Thien 
Sung Yit 
Po 
C 
Three Principles 
of the People 
(Kuomintang's 
organ) 
N.V. 
Handel Mij 
Drukkerij 
en Dagblad 
  
Before 
1937 
3,000; 
After 
1937 
4,000-
5,000 
Established in 1921. 
Kuomintang's organ, 
ƒ300/month subsidy 
from the Consulate 
General of China. 
Anti-Japanese stance. 
Editors often arrested 
and deported. 
Frequently temporary 
shut down. Due to its 
anti-Japanese article 
shut down for 8 days 
in June 1937. 
Subscription fee ƒ7.50 
for three months. 
Sian Po M (Evening) M (Evening) 
Hoa Kiao 
In Kiok    2,000 
Established in 1902. 
Former Perniagaan. 
Less nationalistic than 
Sin Po. Since 1937 
increasingly anti-
Japanese stance. 
Keng Po M         3,000 
Its opinion similar to 
Sian Po, but anti-Sian 
Po. Strong anti-
Japanese stance. 
Recently warned by 
authorities. 
Kong 
Siang Djit 
Po 
C           Established 1922 
Chuan 
Min Yit 
Po 
C           Established 1926 
Kei Hoa 
Po (?) C/M C/M   
Khoe 
Woen 
Sioe 
 2,000   
Kong Hoa 
Po 
C/M C/M   Phoe Liang Gie  1,500   
Batavia 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Ho Suk 
Min Kok 
Yit Po 
C             
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Appendix 3 (Continued) 
Mata Hari M Pro-Japan   Kwee Hing Jjiat 
Kwee 
Hing Jjiat 4,000 
Oei Tiong Ham 
Concern (capital 
ƒ200,000). Kwee Hing 
Jjiat is Hokkienese 
Soeara 
Semarang 
M Neutral   Jja Kiang Si 
K.C. 
Chan, Tan 
Boen 
Twan 
2,000 
Tja Kiang Si has 
ownership. Its capital 
is ƒ100,000. In 1936 it 
bought Djawa Tengah 
and changed to Soeara 
Semarang. 
Commercial oriented. 
Warna 
Warta M             
Tiong 
Nam Yit 
Po 
C 
Three 
Principles of 
the People 
Kuomintang 
branch      Established in 1926. 
Semaran
g 
  
  
  
  
Tai Kong 
Siang Po C 
Three 
Principles of 
the People 
 Yap See Lie Kong Hie 4,000 
Established 1930. 
Most influential 
Chinese language 
newspaper. Since 1937 
aggressively anti-
Japanese. Due to 
public security, got 
several warnings and 
in May 1939 being 
shut down for two 
weeks. 
Siang Po C 
Three 
Principles of 
the People 
    1,500 Yap See and Lie Kong Hie are Hokkienese. 
Pewarta 
Soerabaja M 
Three 
Principles of 
the People 
 
The 
Kiang 
Sing 
The Ping 
Oen 8,000 
Established in 1921. 
Upper class 
subscribers. After 1937 
anti-Japanese stance. 
The Ping Oen is 
Dutch-educated 
Fukkienese. The Kiang 
Siang is his uncle. 
Sin Tippo M 
Three 
Principles of 
the People 
  
Liem 
Sang 
Tjiang 
4,000 
Established in 1924. 
Liem Sang Tjiang is 
Fukkienese. Moderate 
paper. 
Soeara 
Publiek 
N 
Three 
Principles of 
the People 
        
Soerabaj
a 
  
  
  
  
Se Kang 
Yit Po C 
Three 
Principles of 
the People 
      Established in 1925. 
Min Sei 
Po (?) C 
organ of 
Kuomintang 
branch 
      Established in 1927. 
Kai Jo 
Shu Po 
C 
Three 
Principles of 
the People 
      Ceased to exist. 
Makassa
r 
  
  
Fikiran M/C        1,000   
Menado Sumatra Bin Po 
C 
(Evening) 
Three 
Principles of 
the People 
 Yap Ee Chong 
Chu 
Chien 
Cheoon 
2,000 
Established in 1913. 
Anti-Japanese stance. 
Yap Ee Chong is the 
most influential 
Kuomintang member 
in Sumatra and strong 
anti-Japanese 
orientation. 
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Appendix 3 (Continued) 
New 
China 
M 
(Evening) 
Three 
Principles of 
the People 
New China Lim Few Bie 
Khoo Soo 
Sie, Yong 
Kuo Hui 
1,800 
Established in 1929. 
Its reports and 
influences are less than 
those of Sumatra Bin 
Po. 
Andalas M         1,500   
Medan 
  
  
Sinar 
Sumatra M Neutral 
Sinar 
Sumatra 
Kho 
Tiauw 
Tian, A. 
Gaban 
Oei Goan 
Po, 
Boerhano
eddin, 
Marah 
Alief, Lim 
Phie Kiat 
1,500 
Used to be strong 
sympathiser of 
Indonesian 
nationalism. Due to 
financial difficulty, 
received Chinese 
capital. Accurate 
reports on 
development in China. 
Subscription fee is 
ƒ6.75 for three months. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
adat   tradition, customs 
Balai Poestaka  Bureau for Popular Literature or Volkslectuur 
Bodie Oetomo  Noble Endeavor 
boepati  indigenous regent 
Dinijjah schools private systems of modern elementary and secondary school 
originated and developed in West Sumatra  
haatzaai-artikelen hate-sowing articles 
Indische Partij  Indies Party 
Indische Vereeniging  Indies (Students) Association 
Indo   Eurasian 
Kapitan (Cina) a civil official appointed by the colonial authorities to oversee 
local Chinese community 
Kuomintang Chinese Nationalist Party in China 
Kweekschool Teacher’s Training School 
Landraad District Court 
peranakan local-born mix-blood Chinese, who were generally Malay or 
Javanese-speaking; indigenized Chinese 
persdelict  press offence 
Poedjangga Baroe The New Literati, a small group of Dutch-educated young 
Indonesian writers, who created the journal Poedjangga Baroe 
in the Indonesian language  
Raad van Nederlandsch-Indië  Council of the Netherlands Indies 
Raad van Justitie Court of Appeal 
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Rechtshogeschool Law College 
roman pitjisan  dime novels 
Sarikat Prijaji  Aristocrats Association 
spreekdelict  speech offence 
Sumatra Thawalib schools private systems of modern elementary and secondary 
school originated and developed in West Sumatra 
totok Chinese more recent immigrants to the Indies without local “blood,” and 
whose mother tongues were various Chinese dialects 
Volksraad People’s Council in the Indies established in 1918 
Wedono   middle-ranking official of the native territorial bureaucract
